Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5295 of 2006
PETITIONER:
M/s. Siemens Ltd. ... Appellant
RESPONDENT:
State of Maharashtra & Ors. ... Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/2006
BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15691 of 2005)
S.B. Sinha, J.
Leave granted.
Whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India would interfere with a demand directing
payment of cess is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment
and order dated 8.07.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 4338 of 2005.
The appellant is a multi location company. It has a factory and
godown at Kalwe. It pays cess for the goods supplied from the said factory
in terms of the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation
Act, 1949. It also owns a factory at Aurangabad. Its office is at Kharghar.
The said factory at Aurangabad and the office at Kharghar are outside the
jurisdiction of the city limits of Navi Mumbai and, thus, outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Supplies are
made to dealers directly from the appellant’s factory situated at Aurangabad
and office at Kharghar. However, the establishment of the appellant at
Kalwe was directed to pay taxes, although according to it, no jurisdictional
fact exists therefor.
The demand was made terming the same as a show cause notice. It
appears that in course of routine investigation, some vendors had made
certain complaints as regards the transactions of goods from the appellant’s
factory at Kalwa. The appellant made its representation on receipt of the
said purported demand. Oral and written submissions were also made on
2.05.2005 and 10.06.2005 stating that the appellant had neither been
receiving any goods within the local limits of Respondent No. 2 nor was it
an importer in respect of the goods directly sold from its Aurangabad factory
or from its sub-vendors’ manufacturing premises and, therefore, they were
not liable to pay any cess thereupon.
By reason of a purported show cause notice, the appellant was
directed to make payment of cess with interest immediately in respect of the
purported supplies made to Navi Mumbai parties right from 1.06.1996. It
was, however, stated:
"You are also requested to attend at above
address at 11.00 a.m. on 4.7.05 hearing. I am
enclosing herewith the photocopies of the bills
raised by Aurangabad Daman divisions to the Navi
Mumbai Vendees."
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A writ petition was filed by the appellant herein questioning the said
purported notice. By reason of the impugned order, the High Court refused
to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
stating:
"Challenge is to a show cause notice issued by the
Corporation demanding certain payment of cess on
the value of goods imported from Aurangabad and
Daman. Petitioners may file their reply to the
show cause notice and produce the relevant
documents within two weeks. In case the order is
adverse to the petitioner no recovery shall be made
for a period of four weeks from the date of service
of the order on the petitioner."
Before this Court a counter affidavit has been filed wherein although
inter alia it was contended that the said show cause notice cannot be termed
as an order determining the rights and obligations of the parties, it has
clearly been stated:
"I say that the show cause notice dated
22.6.2005 at Annexure P-2 to the Special Leave
Petition indicates that the Respondent No. 2
Corporation has been deprived of lawful recovery
of Cess on the said goods imported within the
jurisdiction of the Respondent Corporation. I say
that such evasion of Cess is in huge amounts and it
is perfectly within the rights of the respondent
Corporation to call upon all the parties involved in
the transactions to arrive at the exact finding of
fact. I say that for arriving at the finding of fact
with regard to the said imports there are many
facts which need to be taken into account. I say
that such factual aspects include : which is the
party which has imported the goods within the
jurisdictional limits of the respondent Corporation
what is the nature of contract between the seller
and the said importer of goods, is there any
mechanism used by the parties to avoid payment
of Cess on the said import of goods, what is the
extent of Cess that is evaded as a result of such
mechanism and who ultimately can be held
responsible both for the purposes of recovery as
also for the purpose of penalty\005"
It was further asserted:
"\005I say that it is well known that under the
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation (Cess
on Entry of Goods) Rules 1996 goods purchased
from registered dealers are not subject to Cess. I
say that in this view of the fact the entire nature of
the transactions, to which the petitioner also was
party, need to be examined and scrutinized from
the perspective of recovery of cess and
identification of liability. I say that if the
petitioner has directly or indirectly supplied the
goods the petitioner itself must come forward to
cooperate with the respondent Corporation to
enable it to discharge its duties prescribed under
the B.P.M.C. (Cess on Entry of Goods) Rules,
1996 read with B.P.M.C. Act 1949\005"
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The question as to whether jurisdictional fact existed for issuance of
the said notice order passed by the respondent was in question in the said
writ petition.
Although ordinarily a writ court may not exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition questioning a notice to show cause
unless the same inter alia appears to have been without jurisdiction as has
been held by this Court in some decisions including State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Brahm Datt Sharma and Anr. AIR 1987 SC 943, Special Director and
Another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Another, (2004) 3 SCC 440 and
Union of India and Another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, 2006 (12) SCALE
262], but the question herein has to be considered from a different angle, viz,
when a notice is issued with pre-meditation, a writ petition would be
maintainable. In such an event, even if the courts directs the statutory
authority to hear the matter afresh, ordinarily such hearing would not yield
any fruitful purpose [See K.I. Shephard and Others v. Union of India and
Others (1987) 4 SCC 431 : AIR 1988 SC 686]. It is evident in the instant
case that the respondent has clearly made up its mind. It explicitly said so
both in the counter affidavit as also in its purported show cause.
The said principle has been followed by this Court in V.C. Banaras
Hindu University and Ors. v. Shrikant [2006 (6) SCALE 66], stating:
"The Vice Chancellor appears to have made
up his mind to impose the punishment of dismissal
on the Respondent herein. A post decisional
hearing given by the High Court was illusory in
this case.
In K.I. Shephard & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union
of India & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 686], this Court
held :
"\005It is common experience that once a
decision has been taken, there is tendency to
uphold it and a representation may not really yield
any fruitful purpose."
[See also Shri Shekhar Ghosh v. Union of India & Anr. 2006 (11)
SCALE 363 and Rajesh Kumar & Ors. v. D.C.I.T. & Ors. 2006 (11) SCALE
409]
A bare perusal of the order impugned before the High Court as also
the statements made before us in the counter affidavit filed by the
respondents, we are satisfied that the statutory authority has already applied
its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the liability or otherwise of
the appellant. If in passing the order the respondent has already determined
the liability of the appellant and the only question which remains for its
consideration is quantification thereof, the same does not remain in the
realm of a show cause notice. The writ petition, in our opinion, was
maintainable.
For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed and the
matter is remitted to the High Court for its consideration afresh on its own
merits. No costs.