Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
VENKATESH NARAHAR KATTl
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HAJI SAHEB KHADIR SAHEB MULLA AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
13/10/1965
BENCH:
BACHAWAT, R.S.
BENCH:
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SUBBARAO, K.
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 1085 1966 SCR (2) 215
ACT:
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (57 of 1948), s.
29(2) Application unde--Starting point of limitation.
HEADNOTE:
On 8th December 1956, the appellant served on the respondent
three months’ notice in writing under s. 14(1) (b) of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, terminating
the tenancy on the ground of default in payment of rent. On
24th June 1957 the appellant filed an application under s.
29(2) for possession. The Tahsildar allowed he application
and the order was confirmed on appeal. But in revision, the
Revenue Tribunal set aside the order on the ground, that the
application was barred by limitation, because, it was filed
more than two years, after 20th May 1955, which was the date
of default. A petition ay the appellant under Art. 227, was
rejected by the High Court.
In the appeal to the Supreme Court, on the question whether
the application was filed within the two yea& period of
limitation prescribed by s. 29 (2).
HELD : Limitation for the application began to run from the
date of the termination of the tenancy and not from the
antecedent date of default in payment of rent and so, the
application, filed within two years of the termination of
the tenancy was not barred by limitation. 220 G]
The legislature could not have intended that limitation
would commence to run before the right to apply under s.
29(2) accrues. The right to apply accrues to the landlord
when the tenancy is terminated by notice under s. 14(1)(b).
But in spite of the termination of the tenancy the landlord
has no right to obtain possession without an order under s.
29(2). On the termination of the tenancy, the right to
obtain possession, though in reality not accrued to the
landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued to
him. Consequently, the date of termination of the tenancy
is also the date when the right to obtain possession is
deemed to have accrued to the landlord. Since the
limitation for, the application under s. 29(2) commences to
run from the date when the right to obtain possession is
deemed to have accrued to the landlord, it would follow that
limitation begins to run from the date when the tenancy is
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terminated by the notice under s. 14(1) (b). [218 A-B, C-D,
F-G]
The history of the legislation also shows that both before
and after the Amendment Act, 1951-which provided the two
years’ period of limitation-the date of the termination of
the tenancy is the starting point of limitation. [218 H]
Ramachandra Anant v. Janardan, 64 Bom. L.R. 637 (F.B.)
approved.
Chimanbai Rama v. Ganpat Jagannath, I.L.R. [1958] Dom. 917
(F.B.) overruled.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 558 of 1963.
216
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
January 19, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Petition
No. 654 of 1960.
S. G. Patwardhan and K. R. Chaudhury, for the appellant.
A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bachawat, J. The appellant is the landlord and respondent
No. 1 is the tenant of S. Nos. 180 and 182 of village
Dhanyal, taluk Bijapur. Respondent No. 1 defaulted in
payment of rent for the years 1951-52, 1953-54 and 1954-55.
On December 8, 1956, the appellant served on respondent No.
I three months’ notice in writing under s. 14(1)(b) of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act
No. 57 of 1948) hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act,
terminating the tenancy on the ground of default in payment
of rent. On June 24, 1957, the appellant filed an
application under s. 29(2) read with s. 14(1) of the Tenancy
Act for possession of the land. The Tahsildar, Bijapur
allowed the application, and directed possession of the land
to be delivered to the appellant. This order was affirmed
on appeal by the Assistant Commissioner, Bijapur. On
revision, the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal set aside
the order of the first two tribunals and dismissed the
application. A petition by the appellant under Art. 227 of
the Constitution was summarily rejected by the Mysore High
Court. The appellant now appeals to this Court by special
leave.
The Tribunals below concurrently found that respondent No. I
defaulted in payment of the rent for the years 1951-52,
1953-54 and 1954-55, the last default took place on May 20,
1955 and the tenancy was properly terminated by the
appellant. The first two Tribunals also held that the
application was filed within the time, allowed by law. The
Revenue Appellate Tribunal, however, held that the
application being filed more than two years after May 20,
1955 is barred by limitation. The sole question before us
is whether the application was filed within the two years’
period of limitation prescribed by s. 29(2) of the Tenancy
Act. The appellant contends that the application was filed
within the prescribed period of limitation because (1) the
right of the appellant to obtain possession of the land is
deemed to have accrued to him on the termination of the
tenancy by the notice given on December 8, 1956, (2) in any
event, in computing the two years’ period of limitation, the
period of the three months’ notice should be excluded in
view of s. 15(2) read with s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation
Act, 1908. We are of the opinion that the first contention
of the appellant
217
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should be accepted. In view of this conclusion, we do not
think it necessary to express any opinion on the second
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant.
Sections 14(1) and 29(2) of the Tenancy Act, as they stood-
at. the relevant time, are as follows :
"14. (1) Notwithstanding any law, agreement or
usage, or the decree or order of a court, the
tenancy of any land shall not be terminated-
(a) unless the tenant-
(i) has failed to pay the rent for any
revenue years. before the 31st day of March
thereof;
(ii) has done any act which is destructive or
permanently injurious to the land;
(iii) has sub-divided, sub-let or assigned the
land in-, contravention of section 27;
(iv) has failed to cultivate it personally;
or
(v) has used such land for a purpose other
than agriculture or allied pursuits; and
(b) unless the landlord has given three months’ notice in
writing informing the tenant of his decision to terminate
the tenancy and the ground for such termination, and, within
that period the tenant has failed to remedy the breach for
which the tenancy is liable to be terminated."
29(2) No landlord shall obtain possession of any land, or
dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the
Mamlatdar. For obtaining such order he shall make an
application in the prescribed form and within a period of
two years from the date on which the right to obtain
possession of the land or dwelling house, as the case may
be, is deemed to. have accrued to him."
At first sight, it may appear that the Act gives no
indication of the time when the right to obtain possession
of the land or dwelling house is deemed to have accrued to
the landlord as contemplated by s. 29(2). But on a close
scrutiny of the Act we are satisfied’ that this right must
be deemed to have accrued to him on the date of the
termination of the tenancy.
It is to be noticed that limitation for the application
under s. 29 (2) commences to run from the date when the
right to obtain
218
possession of the land or dwelling house is deemed to have
accrued to the landlord. ’Now, the legislature could not
have intended that,, limitation would commence to run before
the right to apply accrues. It is reasonable to think that
the right to apply also accrues to the ,landlord on the date
when limitation for the application begins to run. But the
right to apply under S. 29(2) read with S. 14(1) accrues to
the landlord when the tenancy is terminated by the notice
under S. 14 (1 ) (b). In Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype v. Aba
Maruti Mali(1), this Court observed :
"The statute having provided for the
termination of the tenancy would by necessary
implication create a right in the landlord to
recover possession. The statute recognises
this right by providing by S. 29(2) for its
enforcement by an application to the
Mamlatdar."
It would follow that limitation for the application under s.
29(2) read with S. 14(1) begins to run from the date when
the tenancy is terminated, by the notice under S. 14(1)(b).
Consequently, the date of the termination of the tenancy is
also the date when the right to obtain possession is deemed
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to have accrued to the landlord. But it is argued that on
the date of the termination of the tenancy, the right to
obtain possession of the land actually accrues ’to the
landlord, and, therefore, the legislature could not have
intended that on that date this right is deemed to accrue to
him. This ,argument must be rejected.
In spite of the termination of the tenancy, the landlord has
no right to obtain possession of the land without an order
of the Mamlatdar under s. 29(2). Between the date of the
termination of the tenancy and the date of the order for
possession under S. 29(2), the tenant continues to be in
lawful possession of the land and is liable to pay rent and
not mesne profits, see Ramchandra Avant v. Janardan(2).
Thus, on the termination of the tenancy, the right to obtain
possession of the land, though in reality not accrued to the
landlord, is, by a legal fiction, deemed to have accrued to
him so that he may immediately apply under S. 29(2) for an
order for possession.
This conclusion is reinforced if we look at the history of
the legislation. The Tenancy Act, as originally passed in
1948, did not provide for a special period of limitation for
the application to the Mamlatdar under s. 29. But it was
thought that s. 72 of the Tenancy Act attracted the period
of limitation prescribed
(1) [1961] 1 Supp. S.C.R.730,747.
(2) 64 Bom. L.R. 635 (F.D.) 637, 641.
219
by sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 5 of the Mamlatdars’ Courts
Act, 1906 (Bombay Act No. 2 of 1906), which are as follows :
"5(3). No suit shall be entertained by a
Mamlatdar’s Court unless it is ’brought within
six months from the date on which the cause of
action arose.
5 (4). The cause of action shall be deemed to
have arisen on the date on which the
impediment to the natural flow of surface
water or the dispossession, deprivation or
determination, of tenancy or other right
occurred, or on which the impediment,
disturbance or obstruction, or the attempted
impediment or disturbance or obstruction,
first commenced."
The Bombay Revenue Tribunal, therefore, ruled that an
application under s. 29(2) must be made within six months
from the date when the cause of action accrues, see A. S.
Desai’s Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, Second
Edn., pp. 137-38, 287-88; and in view of s. 5(4) of the
Mamlatdars’ Courts Act, 1906, this cause of action was
deemed to accrue on the determination of the tenancy. The
six months’ period of limitation led to hardship, and the
legislature decided to extend the period of limitation and
enacted the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Third
Amendment) Act, 1951 (Bombay Act No. 45 of 1951), which
amended s. 29 by providing for two years’ period of
limitation and also s. 72 by inserting the words "save as
provided in section 29". Thus, the Amending Act extended
the period of limitation from six months to two years, but
both before and after the Amending Act, the date of the
termination of the tenancy is the starting point of limita-
tion; formerly because the right to apply was then deemed to
accrue to the landlord and now because the right to obtain
possession is then deemed to have accrued to him.
The Tenancy Act was amended from time to time. The
requirement of a notice for terminating the tenancy under s.
14(1) was introduced by Bombay Act No. 33 of 1952, and is
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repeated in the new s. 14 substituted for the original
section by Bombay Act No. 13 of 1956. Before the tenancy
can be terminated under the new s. 14(1), two conditions
must be fulfilled. Firstly, the tenant must be guilty of
one of the breaches mentioned in s. 14(1)(a). Secondly,’
the landlord must give three months’ notice in writing under
s. 14(1)(b) and within that period the tenant must have
failed to remedy the breach. The tenancy is not terminated
unless both these conditions are fulfilled. Neither failure
to pay rent nor sub-letting nor any
C.I./66-15
220
other breach is sufficient. The breach must be followed by
the requisite notice terminating the tenancy. It is on the
termination of the tenancy and not earlier that the right to
obtain possession of the land is deemed to accrue to the
landlord and limitation for the application under s. 29(2)
read with s. 14(1) begins to run.
In Chimanbai Rama v. Ganpat Jagannath(1), a Full Bench of
the Bombay High Court held that the period of limitation
under s. 29(2) for applying to the Mamlatdar for possession
of the land on the ground that the tenant had sub-let it,
began from the date of sub-letting, and that though the
right to obtain possession actually accrues to the landlord
on the date when he terminates the tenancy, under S. 29(2)
it is fictionally deemed to accrue as from an antecedent
point of time, viz., the date of the sub-letting. With
respect, we are unable to agree with this judgment. On the
termination of the tenancy by the notice under S. 14 (1) (b)
and before the order for possession under s. 29(2), the
landlord has no right to obtain possession of the land;
nevertheless, this right is then deemed to accrue to him, so
that he may apply immediately for an order for possession
under s. 29(2). The sub-letting alone does not give him’
this right to apply under s. 29(2). He may, if he likes,
ignore the breach. But where the breach is followed by a
notice terminating the tenancy he acquires the right to
apply under s. 29(2). It is difficult to impute to the
legislature the intention that limitation would begin to run
against the landlord immediately on the sub-letting, though
he is not aware of the breach and takes no steps for
terminating the tenancy in consequence of the breach. In
our opinion, limitation, for the application under s. 29(2)
begins to run from the date of the termination of the
tenancy and not from the date of the sub-letting or the
date of default in payment of rent.
In the instant case, three months’ notice in writing under
s. 14(1)(b) terminating the tenancy was given on December
8, 1956. The application under s. 29(2) read with s. 14(1)
being filed on June 24, 1957 within two years of the
termination of the tenancy is not barred by limitation.
In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, the order
of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Belgaum Branch
dated July 27, 1960 is set aside and the orders passed by
the Tahsildar, Bijapur and the Assistant Commissioner,
Bijapur are restored.
Appeal allowed.
(1) I.L.R. 1958 Bom. 917.
221