Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6304 of 2001
PETITIONER:
S.R. BABU
RESPONDENT:
T.K. VASUDEVAN AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/09/2001
BENCH:
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI & S.N. PHUKAN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2001 Supp(2) SCR 553
The following Order of the Court was delivered: Leave is granted.
The appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam in O.P.No. 2249 of 1994 dated May 20, 1998.
The appellant is the tenant of respondent No. 1 in respect of premises,
Ward No. 28, Changanacherry (hereinafter referred to as ’the suit
premises’). The first respondent filed eviction petition (R.C.P. No. 11 of
1983) against the appellant in the court of the Rent Controller, Kottayam,
on three grounds: (i) bona-fide requirement for personal occupation-under
Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control), 1965 (Act 2
of 1965) (for short ’the Act’); (ii) bona-fide requirement for personal
occupation after reconstruction-under Section 11(8) of the Act; and (iii)
under Section 1 l(4)(iv) of the Act stating that he intends to demolish and
reconstruct the portion for his more beneficial use. The appellant denied
bona fide requirement of the first respondent and contested the eviction
petition on all the three counts.
The learned Rent Controller rejected the claim of the respondent under sub-
section (8) of Section 11 as also under clause (iv) of sub-section (4) of
Section 11 of the Act. However, he ordered eviction under sub-section (3)
of Section 11 holding that bona fide requirement of the first respondent
was proved. The findings of the learned Rent Controller were upheld by the
Appellate Authority in the appeal, filed by the appellant herein, and the
appeal was dismissed on June 23, 1987. The appellant carried the matter in
revision before the Additional District Court, Kottayam. The learned
Additional District Judge on re-appreciating the evidence held that the
bona fide requirement of the first respondent was not proved and reversed
the order of the Appellate Authority, on that ground, by allowing the
revision on October 18, 1993. The first respondent challenged the said
order of the learned Additional District Judge by an application under
Article 227 of the Constitution, O.P. No. 2249 of 1994, before the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The High Court set aside the order of the
learned Additional District Judge in RCRP No. 16/87 and restored the order
of the Appellate Authority in RCA Nos. 16 and 17 of 1985 confirming the
order of the Rent Controller in RCP 11/83 dated January 30, 1985. The O.P.
was thus allowed on May 20, 1998. It is the correctness of that order which
is assailed in this appeal.
Mr. M.P. Vinod, the learned counsel for the appellant, contends that as the
first respondent intends to occupy the suit premises not in its present
form but after reconstruction, so it cannot be said that he bona fide
requires the suit premises.
Mr. S. Prasad, the learned counsel for the first respondent, contends that
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as all the courts below except the Additional District Court found the need
of the respondent for the suit premises for his personal occupation is
bonafide it is immaterial whether he utilises it as it is or repairs or
reconstructs the same to suit his requirements.
On the above contentions the questions that arises for our consideration
is: whether the requirement of the suit premises by the appellant for
personal use implies its use not only in the existing condition but also on
making necessary repairs to or reconstruction of the same.
Before proceeding further it will be useful to notice the distinction
between sub-sections (3) and (8) of Section 11 of the Act. It is necessary
to refer to them here:
"(3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing
the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona
fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any
member of his family dependent on him:
Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if
the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same
city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that
for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to
do so.
Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction
to a tenant to put the landlord in possession if such tenant is depending
for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business
carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building
available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or
business.
Provided further that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises
under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to
be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the
instrument.
Provided further that if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in
possession transfers his rights in respect of the building to another
person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless
he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or
for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him."
A plain reading of the provision, quoted above, shows that it enables a
landlord to seek eviction of a tenant from the demised building if he bona
fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any
dependent member of his family. The option available to a landlord under
sub-section (3) is hedged around with conditions contained in the four
provisos that follow it to prevent its misuse. The first proviso prohibits
the court from passing an order of eviction in a case where the landlord is
occupying another building of his own except when for special reasons the
Rent Controller is satisfied that it will be just and proper to order
eviction. The second proviso contains a prohibition addressed to the Rent
Controller that he shall not pass an order of eviction from the building
against a tenant who is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income
derived from any trade or business carried on in that building and there is
no other suitable buildings available in the locality for the tenant to
carry on such trade or business. The third and the fourth provisos place
embargo on a transferee landlord. A landlord who acquires title to the
building under an instrument of transfer inter vivos cannot, in view of the
third proviso, invoke sub-section (3). until the expiry of one year from
the date of the instrument. The fourth proviso precludes a transferee
landlord from taking advantage of the order of eviction secured by his
transferor under sub-section (3) against the tenant of the building unless
the transferee proves his bona fide need of the building for his own
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occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on
him.
Sub-section (8) of Section 11 reads thus:
"A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the
Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or
any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in
possession thereof, if he required additional accommodation for his
personal use." A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke
this sub-section the landlord must show that : (i) he is occupying only a
part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion
of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional
accommodation for his personal use.
The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section
(8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the
building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs
the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of
his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his
own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter
provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of
the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is
occupying, for his personal occupation.
In the instant case admittedly the first respondent is in occupation of a
part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the
building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation
for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of
Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.
In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional
accommodation for his personal use he is entitled to utilise it to best
suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation
is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first
respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary
repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant
has no say in such matters.
The finding recorded by the Original Authority which is confirmed by the
Appellate Authority, as also by the High Court, is that the first
respondent bona fide needs the suit premises for his personal use, a
fortiori he requires additional accommodation for his personal use.
In connection with an order under sub-section (8), sub section (10) of
Section 11 of the Act needs to be noticed :
"(10). The Rent Control Court Shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of
the landlord under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) or sub-section (8) is bona
fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landloard in possession
of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent Control Court,
and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the
application :
Provided that, in the case of an application made under subsection (8), the
Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the
hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the
advantage to the landlord.
Provided further that the Rent Control Court may give the tenant a
reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and
may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.
It provides that if the Rent Controller is satisfied that the claim of the
landlord under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) or (8) is bona fide, he has to
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make an order directing the tenant to put the landloard in possession of
the building. However, the first proviso says that the Rent Controller
shall reject the application, if he is satisfied that the hardship which
may be caused to the tenant by granting the application, will outweigh the
advantage to the landlord. Inasmuch as the authorities below, having
proceeded on the footing that sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act is
attracted, have not recorded a finding under the first proviso to sub-
section (10) of Section 11 of the Act, it is necessary that the case should
be sent back to the Rent Controller to consider whether requirement of the
said proviso is satisfied and if so, to record a finding thereunder, after
hearing the parties.
We, therefore, allow the appeal, remand the case to the Rent Controller for
considering whether the requirement of the first proviso to sub-section
(10) of Section 11 of the act is satisfied and for passing appropriate
orders on the eviction petition (R.C.P.No. 11 of 1983), on the basis of the
finding arrived at, thereunder, in accordance with law.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.