Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE WORKMEN AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT04/08/1975
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
BENCH:
UNTWALIA, N.L.
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 1737 1976 SCR (1) 231
1975 SCC (4) 679
CITATOR INFO :
D 1988 SC1369 (13)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947) s. 2(a)(u)-
’Appropriate Government, Scope of-Direction by Tribunal to
make certain employees permanent- Propriety. ’
HEADNOTE:
The Government of West Bengal referred under s. 10(1)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, five issued for
adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. The dispute was
between the respondents-workmen working at the Barkeeper
branch of the appellant company’s workshop. All the shares
of the appellant are owned by the Central (Government. and
its Memorandum and Articles of Association point out the
vital role and control of the Central Government in the
matter et carrying on of the industry.
The Tribunal granted relief with respect to three
issues.
In appeal to this Court, the competency of the
Government to make the reference was challenged on the
ground that the appropriate Government to make the reference
was either the Central Government, because the industry was
under the authority of the Central Government, or the State
of Karnataka, since the works of the Barkeeper branch is
under the Banglore Divisional office of the Company.
Rejecting the contention, but allowing the appeal to
this Court on merits,
^
HELD: l (a) the submission regarding the competency of
the Central Government is identical to the one made before
this Court and repelled by this Court in the case of Heavy
Engineering Mazdoor Union v. The Sate of Bihar [1969] 3
S.C.R. 995. [233C]
(b) The fact that the Government company in the Heavy
Engineering Mazdoor Union ease was carrying on an industry
where Private Sector Undertakings were also operating,
whereas, in the instant case, the Government alone was
entitled to carry on to the exclusion of private operators.
would not make any difference. [234B]
(c) The definition of "appropriate Government" in s.
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2(a)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act his been amended from
time to time and certain statutory corporations were
incorporated in the definition to make the Central
Government the appropriate Government’ in relation to the
industry carried on by them. But no public company, even if
the shares were exclusively owned by the Government, was
brought within the definition. [234C]
(2) Assuming that the Barkeeper branch was under the
control of the Bangalore Division of the Company, it was a
separate branch working as a separate unit. The workers were
receiving their pay at Barkeeper, were under the control of
the officers of the Company stationed there, their
grievances were their own and the cause of action in
relation to the industrial dispute arose there. If there was
any disturbance of industrial peace at Barrackpore, the
appropriate Government concerned in its maintenance was the
West Bengal Government, [234D-F]
M/s. Lipton Limited and another v. Their employees
[1959] 2 Suppl. S.C.R. 150 distinguished.
(3) On the first issue relating to allowance for the
education l employees’ children the Tribunal directed the
appellant to pay Rs. 12/- per month to each employees to
meet the educational expenses of his children. This
direction is in elect a revision of the pay structure of the
Barrackpore employees and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to change the ware structure in the garb of allowing
educational expenses, [235A-C]
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(4) On the issue regarding revision of lunch allowance,
the award of the Tribunal was unnecessary because all
members of the staff were getting such lunch allowance.
[235E-F]
(5) As regards the directions of the Tribunal that
certain canteen employees should be made permanent. it was
not justified because those workman were casual workmen
appointed temporarily. The workmen could be made permanent
only against permanent vacancies and not otherwise, and
there was no direction by the Tribunal for the creation of
any new post. [235-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1330 of
1969
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated the 5th
March, 1969 of that Fifth Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal,
in Case No. 26 of 1967.
V S. Desai and R. B. Dater, for the appellant.
A. K. San and Sukumar Ghose, for respondent no. 1. C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J.-This is an appeal by special leave filed
by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. from the award dated 8-3-1969
made by the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. The
Governor of West Bengal made the reference under section
10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-hereinafter
called the Act, for adjudication on the following 5 issues:
"(1) Allowance for the education of employees’
children,
(2) House Building loan;
(3) Free conveyance or conveyance allowance;
(4) Revision of Lunch allowance;
(5) Whether the following canteen employees
should be made permanent"-the names of 10
employees given.
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The Tribunal granted no relief to the workmen on issues
2 and 3, allowed their claim in part in respect of issues 1,
4 and S. Feeling aggrieved by the said award the appellant
which is a Government company constituted under section 617
of the Companies Act, the shares of which are entirely owned
by the Central Government, has filed this appeal. The
dispute relates to about 1,000 workmen working at the
Barrackpore (West Bengal) branch of the Company’s repairing
workshop represented by the Hindustan Aeronautics Workers’
Union, Barrackpore.
The competency of the Government of West Bengal to make
the reference was challenged before the Tribunal as also
here. Mr. V. S. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant,
submitted that the appropriate government within the meaning
of section 2(a) of the Act competent to make the reference
was the Central Government, or, if a State Government, it
was the Government of Karnataka where the Bangalore
Divisional office of the Company is situated and under which
works the Barrackpore branch. Counsel stressed the point
that the Central
233
Government owned the entire bundle of shares in the company.
It appoints and removes the Board of Directors as well as
the Chairman and the Managing Director. All matters of
importance are reserved for the decision of the President of
India and ultimately executed ill accordance with his
directions. The memorandum and articles of association of
the company unmistakably point out the vital role and
control of the Central Government in the matter of carrying
on of the industry owned by the appellant. Hence, counsel
submitted that the industrial dispute in question concerned
an industry which was carried on "under the authority of the
Central Government" within the meaning of section 2(a) (i)
of the Act and the Central Government was the only
appropriate Government to make the reference under section
10. The submission so made was identical to the one made
before and repelled by this Court in the case of Heavy
Engineering Mazdoor Union v. The State of Bihar & ors.(1)
wherein it has been said at page 1,000)
"It is true that besides the Central Government having
contributed the entire share capital, extensive powers
are conferred on it, including the power to give
directions as to how the company should function, the
power to appoint directors‘and even the power to
determine the wages and salaries payable by the company
to its employees. But these powers are derived from the
company’s memorandum of association and the articles of
association and not by reason of the company being the
agent of the Central Government. The question whether a
corporation is an agent of the State must depend on the
facts of each case. Where a statute setting up a
corporation so provides, such a corporation can easily
be identified as the agent of the State as in Graham v
Public Works commissioners-(1901) 2 K.B. 781 where -
Phillimore, J. said that the Crown does in certain
cases establish with the consent of Parliament certain
officials or hodies who are to be treated as agents of
the Crown even though they have the power of
contracting as principals. In the absence of a
statutory provision, however. a commercial corporation
acting on its own balefully even though it is
controlled wholly or partially by a Government
department. will be ordinarily presumed not to be a
servant or agent of the State. The fact that a minister
appoints the members or directors of a corporation and
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he is entitled to call for information, to give
directions which are binding on the directors and to
supervise over the conduct of the business of the
corporation does not render the corporation an agent of
the Government. (see the State Trading Corporation of
India Ltd v. The Commercial Tax officer.
Visakhapatnam)-(1964) 4 S.C.R. 99 at 188 per Shah J.
and Tamlin v. Hannaford-(1950)1 K.B. 18 at 25, 26. Such
an inference that the corporation is the agent of the
Government may be drawn where it is performing in
substance govern mental and not commercial functions.
(cf. London Country
234
Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association v.
Michale)- (1948) 2 All. E.R. 432."
Mr. Desai made a futile and unsubstantial attempt to
distinguish the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union on
the ground that was the case of a Government company
carrying on an industry where Private Sector. Undertakings
were also operating It was not an industry, as in the
instant case, which the Government alone was entitled to
carry on to the exception of the private operators. The
distinction so made is of no consequence and does not affect
the ratio of the case in the least We may also add that by
amendments in the definition of appropriate Government" in
section 2(a)(i) from time to time certain statutory
corporations were incorporated in the definition to make the
Central Government an appropriate Government in relation to
the industry carried on by them. But no public company even
if the shares were exclusively owned by the Government was
attempted to be roped in the said definition.
The other leg of the argument to challenge the
competency of the West Bengal Government to make the
reference is also fruitless. It may be assumed that the
Barrackpore branch was under the control of the Bangalore
division of the company. Yet it was a separate branch
engaged in an industry of repairs of air crafts or the like
at Barrackpore. For the purpose of the Act and on the facts
of this case the Barrackpore branch was an industry carried
on by the company as a separate unit. The workers were
receiving their pay packages at Barrackpore and were under
the control of the officers of the company stationed there.
If there was any disturbance of industrial peace at
Barrackpore where a considerable number of workmen were
working the appropriate government concerned in the
maintenance of the industrial peace was the West Bengal
Government. The grievances of the workmen of Barrackpore
were their own and the cause of action in relation to the
industrial dispute in question arose there. The reference.
therefore, for adjudication of such a dispute by the
Governor of West Bengal was good and valid. The facts of the
case of M/s Lipton Limited and another v. Their employees(1)
cited on behalf of the appellant are clearly
distinguishable. The ratio of that case was pressed into
service in vain on behalf of the appellant.
The first demand on behalf of the workmen as respects
the education allowance of the children was chiefly based
upon the educational facilities said to be available to the
workmen of Bangalore. On behalf of the management it was
pointed out that certain educational facilities were given
to the employees living in the township of Bangalore out not
in the city of Bangalore. The workmen working at
Barrackpore had also been provided with certain educational
facilities. We, however, do not propose to go into the
merits of the rival contentions. In our opinion the award
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directing the company
235
to pay Rs. 12/- per month to each employee to meet
educational expenses of their children irrespective of the
number of children a particular workman may have is beyond
the scope of the issue referred for adjudication. The
Tribunal while discussing this issue felt constrained to
think that strictly speaking claim for allowance for the
education of employees’ children could not form a subject
matter of industry. dispute. Really it was a matter to be
taken into consideration at the time of fixing their wages.
In substance and in effect the directions given by the
Tribunal is by way of revision of the pay structure of the
Barrackpore employees. No such reference was either asked
for or made. The Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to
change the wage structure in the garb of allowing
educational expenses for the employees’ children. We may add
that on behalf of the appellant it was stated before us that
the latest revised wage structure has taken the matter of
education of the employees’ children into consideration,
while, Mr. A. K. San, appearing for the workmen, did not
accept it to be so. If necessary and advisable a proper
industrial 1) dispute may be raised in that regard in future
but the award as it stands cannot be upheld.
Apropos issue no. 4 it was stated on behalf of the
appellant that all staff and not only the supervisory staff
were getting Rs. 1.50 as lunch allowance under circumstances
similar to the ones under which the employees belonging to
the supervisory staff were getting Rs. 1.50 as lunch
allowance. The award of the tribunal, therefore, was
unnecessary and superfluous in that regard. If that be so,
the award may be a surplusage as it is conceded on behalf of
the appellant that under the existing service conditions
every employee eligible to get a lunch allowance was getting
at the rate of Rs. 1.50 .
The 10 workmen sought to be made permanent under issue
no. 5 were casual workmen before 4-1-1967 within the meaning
of clause (b) (d) of Standing order I headed "Classification
of workmen". They were appointed as temporary workmen within
the meaning of clause (b)(b) of Standing order I on and from
4-1-1967. The ’Tribunal’s direction to make them permanent
on and from 4.1.1968 treating them as probationers appointed
in permanent vacancies was not justified. The Tribunal did
not go into the question as to whether more permanent
workmen were necessary to be appointed in the canteen over
and above the existing permanent strength to justify the
making of the of workmen as permanent in the canteen where
they II were working. No direction of creation of new posts
was given. O,. the evidence as adduced before tic Tribunal
and on the basis of the
236
findings recorded by it, it is plain that the 10 workmen or
ally of them could be made permanent only against the
permanent vacancies and not otherwise. On behalf of the
appellant it was stated before us that all of them have been
made permanent against such vacancies, while, on behalf of
the workmen the assertion was that none of them has been
made permanent so far. The management has no objection 13 in
absorbing, the 10 workmen concerned in permanent vacancies
as and when they occur if any of the has not been already
absorbed. The workmen want nothing more than this.
In the result the appeal is allowed and substantially
the award of the Tribunal is set aside but subject to the
clarifications and observations made above. In the
circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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V.P.S. Appeal allowed.
237