Milind S/O Ashruba Dhanve vs. The State Of Maharashtra

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 355

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6843 OF 2024)
MILIND S/O ASHRUBA DHANVE AND ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ... RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Present appeal is against the final judgment and order dated
26.02.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at
Aurangabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’ ) , in Criminal Appeal No. 506
of 2023. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence for the
charge of Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2026.04.13
16:34:16 IST
Reason:
Penal Code ‘IPC’ , as determined by the Special Judge
(hereinafter, )
(POCSO), Beed. The Trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court,
1


imposed sentences, whereby Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter,
‘A-1, A-2 and A-3’ respectively) were each directed to pay a fine of
Rs. 500/- under Section 323, with default stipulation of 15 days’
simple imprisonment; and a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 324,
with default stipulation of one-month simple imprisonment, both
read with Section 34 of IPC. Appellant No. 4 (hereinafter, ‘A-4’ ) was
directed to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- under Section 323 read with
Section 34 of IPC, with a default stipulation of 15 days’ simple
imprisonment. The present appeal has been preferred assailing the
aforesaid findings.
FACTS IN BRIEF
3. It is the case of prosecution that the victim, a 17-year-old girl,
was at her home during Diwali vacation. On 02.11.2019, at around
8.30 A.M. while she was standing outside her house, the accused
persons approached her. A-1 grabbed her hand, pressurized her for
relationship and gave proposal of marriage since her father wasn’t
agreeing. Upon which she screamed and her grandmother as well as
sister came out and confronted the Appellants. At that moment, A-2
assaulted the sister, and A-3 pushed the grandmother. Thereafter,
2


the victim informed about the incident to her father at his nearby
garage. At about 9:30 A.M, all five accused (including one accused
who was acquitted by the Trial Court) arrived in a white Sumo vehicle
and attacked the father of the victim. A-2 struck on the head by iron
tambi , A-1 hit on leg with an iron rod, A-3 beat with a wooden stick,
A-4 assaulted with fists and kicks, while co-accused Dayabai
instigated them. During the incident, ₹ 2,000 fell from the father's
pocket. Bystanders rescued him and took the family to the police
station. The injured father was referred to a Government Hospital.
An FIR of the incident was registered on 02.11.2019 as Crime No.
190/2019 under sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 354-A, 504,
506 of IPC and sections 8 and 12 of POCSO, 2012. Learned Trial
Court acquitted accused Dayabai for all the charges while other
accused persons, who are Appellants before us, were acquitted for all
the charges except as specified in paragraph (2) above. Upon filing
appeal, the High Court vide the impugned order dismissed the same,
hence, the present appeal.

4. In this Criminal Appeal, notice was issued vide order dated
17.05.2024, however, when it was listed on 11.12.2024, learned
counsel for the Appellants submitted that they do not wish to press
3


the appeal on merits and urged to consider benefit of Sections 3 and
4 read with Sections 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
(hereinafter, ‘1958 Act’ ).
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
5. Mr. Amol B. Karande, learned counsel for the Appellants, has
contended that present is a fit case to grant benefit of Sections 3 and
4 read with Section 12 of 1958 Act. In support, reliance was placed
1
on Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab , submitting that 1958 Act
recognizes the reformative theory of punishment and object of the
penal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish. It
has also been said that it is the duty of the sentencing court to be
activist enough to collect such facts bearing in mind the rehabilitative
approach, as has been observed in Ved Prakash v. State of
2
Haryana .
6. In reference to the fact and looking at the nature of offences,
i.e., voluntarily causing hurt and voluntarily causing hurt by
dangerous weapons, it is contended that the Appellants may be

1
1964 SCC OnLine SC 40
2
(1981) 1 SCC 447
4


released after admonition or on probation of good conduct. Placing
reliance upon the decision of this Court in Mohd. Hasim v. State of
3
Uttar Pradesh , it has been argued that Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958
Act vests discretionary power on Court to release a convict on
probation of good conduct on bond with or without sureties, even at
the appellate or revisional stage. It is further argued that the word
‘expedient’ used in Sections 3 and 4 ought to be construed in its
widest amplitude to mean what is apt, suitable, and appropriate to
the end in view. In the facts and circumstances of the present case,
releasing the Appellants on a bond of good conduct would be entirely
consistent with the letter and the spirit of the enactment. As such
Appellants may be released after admonition or on probation on bond
with or without sureties as may be deemed fit.
7. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the State submitted
that the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court, as
confirmed up to the High Court vide impugned judgment does not
warrant interference. The benefit of the 1958 Act is being sought
mainly on the ground that it may cause prejudice in employment to

3
(2017) 2 SCC 198
5


A-1 and A-4 who are in government service, rather than on any
genuine merits warranting probation.
8. It has further been contended with respect to applicability of
Section 3 that the A-4, who has been sentenced under Section 323
IPC only may be benefitted. A-1, A-2 and A-3, who stand convicted
under Section 324 IPC fall outside the scope of benefit under Section
3, as claimed. It has been vehemently argued that the true import
and object of Section 4 is to spare an offender from incarceration and
shield them from the deleterious effects of jail life, postponing the
receiving of sentence for a period not exceeding three years; unlike
Section 3, which expunges the imprisonment itself. Since A-1, A-2
and A-3 have been sentenced only for payment of fine and not to any
term of imprisonment, the very premise underlying Section 4 is
absent in this case. Therefore, it has been urged, the prayer for
probation qua A-1, A-2 and A-3 is wholly unjustified and liable to be
rejected at threshold.
ANALYSIS

9. In light of the arguments advanced and, in the facts of the
present case, issues that fall for our consideration are - (i) Whether
6


the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the
1958 Act, and if so, to what extent? ; (ii) Whether the benefit of Section
4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced
only with payment of fine, and not to any term of imprisonment?
10. Since the Appellants have pressed this appeal limited to the
grant of benefit under the 1958 Act, therefore, to understand the
intent of the provisions of the said Act and the extent to which it may
be allowed to an offender who requires to be punished, including by
way of fine only, both the issues are dealt with simultaneously and
in reference to the provisions of the 1958 Act, the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’ ) , the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNSS’ ) , the IPC and the Bhartiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNS’ ) .
11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that 1958 Act is a
beneficial legislation, therefore, keeping the legislative intent in mind,
its provisions ought to be interpreted in a purposive manner. It is
trite law that if two or more views are possible vis-a-vis interpretation
of a beneficial legislation, it must be interpreted in favour of
7


4
beneficiaries. The objects clause of the 1958 Act declares the act to
provide for the release of offenders on probation or after due
admonition and the matters connected therewith. While introducing
the Probation of Offenders Bill, 1957 to the Lok Sabha on
14.11.1957, the then Minister of State for Home Affairs remarked as
follows –
“ On a number of occasions, the Inspector-General of Prisons
in the various States have met. From 1925 onwards there
were a number of meetings and the Inspectors-General who
are in close touch with the life of the convict behind the
prison bars found that oftentimes the particular rigour to
which the convict has been subjected or the life that he
leads there produces certain results other than those
expected. The expected result would be that the man
must reform himself, and that after he comes out of
the jail, he ought to lead a reformed life, he ought to
return to the proper or social life to which every
citizen has to confine himself. But oftentimes on
account of the long period behind the prison bars, the
man does not improve; on the other hand, he shows
certain sign of deterioration or worse results. That
was the reason why it was considered necessary that the
question of prison reform or the question of the reform of the
convict or the prisoner ought to be considered not only from
the point of view of the administration as such, not only from
the point of view of its having a deterrent effect upon him,
but also from the point of view of improving this particular
man, namely the convict.

4
See, Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre , (1986) 2 SCC 614; Kerala Fishermen's
Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food , (1995) 4 SCC 341; Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya
Kumar , (2008) 9 SCC 527; Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn. , (2009) 9 SCC 61

8


The principle that is followed in this connection is
that a man becomes a criminal on account of certain
circumstances or on account of certain tendencies,
which are anti-social and which are criminal, so far
as he is concerned. So the way to reform him and to
bring him back to human standards is to find out
certain items of reform by means of which he would
become a good man, and after some time, he would
become a better man.
These are two standards that we have taken into
”
account.
12. After introduction in the Lok Sabha, it was referred to the Joint
Committee on 18.11.1957. Similarly, Rajya Sabha also agreed to said
reference to the Joint Committee on 26.11.1957. The Joint
Committee prepared its report on 19.2.1958 and the bill was again
discussed in the Lok Sabha on 26.04.1958. In the opening statement,
the then Dy. Minister of Home Affairs reflected upon the objectives of
the act in following words –
“ …..Therefore we feel that if we have such good human
material inside the prison, we should give this human
material every opportunity to rehabilitate itself in
society without the stigma of conviction and prison
term ……..
……To avoid this stigma, we want to try out this most
progressive measure in the country and see that the men
and women who become offenders for the first time or even
offenders for the second or the third time, as we call them
hopeless, are given an opportunity……..
…… The meaning of probation is suspended sentence.
Suspended sentence means that he will be left in
9


society under the guidance and care of a probation
officer or of a surety or of such other agent who would
be able to look after him and assist him and see that
he behaves well and is able once again to become
what we call a good citizen ……..
…..We are only trying to rehabilitate those many hundreds
and hundreds of offenders who because of, may be, socio-
economic considerations or other stringencies, or may be,
their mental make-up, commit certain offences. Therefore,
we have certain sections of the Indian Penal Code only in
which probation would be permitted to be granted by
courts….. ”
13. From the above, it can safely be gathered that the object and
purpose of the 1958 Act is to rehabilitate offenders and make an
attempt to reintegrate them into the mainstream of the society as
reformed citizens, rather than to punish for their delinquent actions.
What weighed in the mind of the law makers was that crime is, more
often than not, a product of numerous socio-economic circumstances
and that punishment may in fact lead to further deterioration of his
character. In other words, the 1958 Act seeks to harmonize
deterrence and reformation while empowering the courts to release
the offenders after admonition or on probation of good conduct under
supervision of the probation officer. It saves the offenders from the
stigma of conviction as well as imprisonment and affords them an
opportunity to return to the social life with dignity. In light of the
10


above discussion, the 1958 Act requires purposive interpretation
keeping in mind its objectives.
14. Since the main argument of the Appellants is canvassed for the
benefit of 1958 Act, in particular Sections 3 and 4, we will deal with
the provisions empowering the Courts either to release the offender
after admonition or on probation of good conduct. To understand the
situations in which the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act
can be made available to an offender, it is necessary to refer to those
provisions hereunder:
“3. Power of court to release certain offenders after
admonition. — When any person is found guilty of having
committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or
Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or any offence
punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years,
or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code or
any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against
him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of
opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case
including the nature of the offence and the character of the
offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any
punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct
under Section 4, release him after due admonition.
Explanation – For the purposes of this section, previous
conviction against a person shall include any previous order
made against him under this section or section 4. ”
11


Upon reading of Section 3, it is apparent that benefit thereof
can be granted only when offender is found guilty of committing the
offence as specified therein or any offence punishable with not more
than two years or fine or both under IPC or any other law and such
offender does not have any antecedents of previous conviction. In
the said contingencies, if the Court is of the opinion that looking to
the nature of offence, circumstances and the character of offender, it
is expedient to do so, it may pass an order of release after admonition,
instead of sentencing or passing an order under Section 4.
15. Similarly, Section 4 deals with the cases of those offenders, who
can be released on probation of good conduct. For ready reference, it
is reproduced as thus:
“4. Power of court to release certain offenders on
probation of good conduct. —
(1) When any person is found guilty of having
committed an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is
found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the
circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence
and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release
him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to
any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering
into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive
sentence when called upon during such period, not
12


exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the
meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an
offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety,
if any, has a fixed place of abode or a regular occupation in
the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in
which the offender is likely to reside during the period of the
bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the
court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the
probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order is made under this section, the
court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the
offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in
addition, pass a supervision order directing that the
offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation
officer named in the order during such period, not being less
than one year, as may be specified therein, and may require
the offender to comply with such conditions as may be
specified in the supervision order.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-
section (3) shall require the offender, before releasing him,
to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the
conditions of the supervision order and such additional
conditions with respect to residence, abstention from
intoxicants or any other matter as the court having regard
to the particular circumstances of the case may think fit to
impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a
commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-
section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and
conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy
of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the
sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned. ”
16. A perusal of the above makes it clear that if a person is found
guilty of an offence which is not punishable with either death or
13


imprisonment for life and the Court, having regard to the
circumstances of the case which includes nature of the offence and
the character of the offender, is of the opinion that it is expedient to
do so, notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force,
instead of sentencing at once of any punishment for such offence, the
accused may be released on furnishing the bond, with or without
sureties. It is also prescribed that the Court may direct him to appear
and receive the sentence during such period when called upon, which
may not exceed three years. In the meantime, such person has to
keep peace and be of good behaviour. It is clarified that such an order
ought to be passed by the Court only after recording satisfaction
regarding place of stay of the offender or his surety or about the
regular occupation in the place where the court exercises jurisdiction
or at a place where the offender may likely reside during period of
bond. The Court should also take into consideration the report of the
probation officer while passing such order, if such report is available.
An order of supervision can also be passed by the Court, if it is of the
opinion that such an order will be in the interest of the offender and
of the public, directing the offender to remain under the supervision
of a probation officer named in the order during period, which shall
14


not be less than one year. The condition, if any, imposed by the
Court, is required to be complied with by the offender, as prescribed
in the supervision order. The offender is required to enter into a bond,
with or without sureties, and to observe the conditions as contained
hereinabove and such additional conditions with respect to
residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter which the
Court may think fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same
offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. The
conditions, as imposed for supervision and circumstances as
indicated in the order has to be explained to the offender and a copy
of such order has to be furnished to each offender, sureties and the
probation officer.
17. At this stage, it is necessary to make it clear that under Section
3, a convict can be released by the Court after admonition only with
respect to offences as specified therein. On the other hand, while
exercising the power under Section 4, the Court may release the
offender on probation of good conduct with respect to the offences as
prescribed.
15


18. It is not out of place to specify that in context of the object and
reasons for which the 1958 Act was brought, powers have been
conferred upon the Court primarily under Sections 3 and 4. As
contemplated under Section 11, the Courts are competent to make
such orders even during appeal and revision. Further, once the
benefit either under Section 3 or Section 4 has been granted to such
offender, it would entail the benefit of removal of disqualification, if
any, attaching to the conviction. Therefore, Section 12, in this regard,
is relevant, which is reproduced as thus:
“12. Removal of disqualification attaching to
conviction. — Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law, a person who has been released on probation of
good conduct under Section 4 or after admonition under
Section 3 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching
to a conviction of an offence under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person
who, after his release, is sentenced to imprisonment for the
commission of the original offence or of any other offence. ”
19. On perusal, it is quite clear that in case a person has been
released after admonition under Section 3 or on probation of good
conduct under Section 4, they shall not face a disqualification
attaching to such conviction.
16


20. Learned counsel for the Respondents vociferously objected to
extending the benefit of 1958 Act to A-1, A-2 and A-3 who have been
convicted for the charge of Section 324 IPC, in addition to the charge
of Section 323 IPC. It is contended that in Section 4 of the 1958 Act,
the expression used ‘release of the offender’ has some significance
and in the case at hand, the Appellants have not been sentenced of
imprisonment but were fined, therefore, passing an order of release
in this case is not possible.
21. The said argument was countered by the Appellants, referring
to Section 53 of IPC and Section 4 of BNS, wherein fine has been
included within the connotation ‘punishment’ along with other
categories of punishment including imprisonment. The applicability
of Section 4 of 1958 Act is with respect to the offences not punishable
with death or life imprisonment, therefore barring the sentence of
death and life imprisonment, in case the punishment, if any,
including the fine has been awarded, the release order can be passed
by the Court under Section 4 of 1958 Act even in case of fine.

22. Having considered the contentions as advanced and to
appreciate them, it would be necessary to refer to Section 53 of IPC
17


and corresponding provisions of Section 4 of BNS. Both the Sections
are reproduced hereunder in tabular form for comparison –

23. In view of the above, it is clear that Section 53 of IPC has been
adopted as it is in Section 4 of BNS while also adding another
punishment in nature of community service. This is also indicative
of the paradigm shift in the legislative intent from deterrence to
reformation which has been reaffirmed while prescribing the mode of
punishment in BNS.
18


24. In view of the above, it is a clear that for an offender, the
punishments may include the death, imprisonment for life,
imprisonment (rigorous with hard labour or simple), forfeiture of
property, fine and community service in terms of the recent addition
in BNS. Since Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act govern acts committed
by an offender in relation to the specific punishments prescribed
under the IPC, BNS and any other law, these provisions must
naturally extend to sentences including fine. Consequently, the
argument advanced by the learned counsel for the State that Section
4 is inapplicable in case sentence consist solely of a fine, is entirely
devoid of merit.
25. Therefore, any reference to ‘punishment’ in 1958 Act has to be
construed as per enumeration contained in Section 53 of IPC and
Section 4 of BNS and should undoubtedly include ‘fine’ as well. From
the above discussion, it is luculent that, the benefit of Section 4 of
the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced only
to payment of fine.

26. During course of arguments, much emphasis was laid by the
Counsel for the State that Section 4 uses the expression ‘release’ in
19


context of ‘instead of sentencing’ and thus, when the person is
sentenced only for fine and not for imprisonment, there is no
occasion for the Court to ‘release’ him, thereby making application
of Section 4 of 1958 Act impossible. In light of the discussion in the
preceding paragraphs, the expression ‘release’ has to be read
accordingly. In this context, we are of the opinion that ‘release’
cannot mean release only from custody. It has to be read as releasing
from the obligation to serve sentence of payment of fine. This view is
further strengthened by the meaning of the word ‘release’ as
5
contained in Advanced Law Lexicon . It is defined, inter-alia, as ‘to
set at liberty’. Therefore, ‘release’ as contained in Section 4 of 1958
Act should be read as to set the offender at liberty from receiving
sentence, even of fine only.
27. In addition to the provisions as contained under the 1958 Act,
the CrPC also confers powers upon the Court to make an order of
release on probation of good conduct or after admonition as per
6
Section 360 . The said provision is reproduced as thus –

5 rd
P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, Pg. 4037 (3 Edition, 2005, Wadhwa Nagpur)
6
Section 401 of BNSS is corresponding provision.
20


“360. Order to release on probation of good conduct
or after admonition. —
(1) When any person not under twenty-one years of age is
convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with
imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any
person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is
convicted of an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved
against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which
he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or
antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in
which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that
the offender should be released on probation of good
conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once
to any punishment, direct that he be released on his
entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and
receive sentence when called upon during such period (not
exceeding three years) as the Court may direct, and in the
meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that where any first offender is convicted by a
Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered by
the High Court, and the Magistrate is of opinion that the
powers conferred by this section should be exercised, he
shall record his opinion to that effect, and submit the
proceedings to a Magistrate of the first class, forwarding the
accused to, or taking bail for his appearance before, such
Magistrate, who shall dispose of the case in the manner
provided by sub-section (2).
(2) Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the
first class as provided by sub-section (1), such Magistrate
may thereupon pass such sentence or make such order as
he might have passed or made if the case had originally
been heard by him, and, if he thinks further inquiry or
additional evidence on any point to be necessary, he may
make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct
such inquiry or evidence to be made or taken.
(3) In any case in which a person is convicted of theft,
theft in a building, dishonest misappropriation, cheating or
any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),
21


punishable with not more than two years, imprisonment or
any offence punishable with fine only and no previous
conviction is proved against him, the Court before which he
is so convicted may, if it thinks fit, having regard to the age,
character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the
offender and to the trivial nature of the offence or any
extenuating circumstances under which the offence was
committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment,
release him after due admonition.
(4) An order under this section may be made by any
Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session
when exercising its powers of revision.
(5) When an order has been made under this section
in respect of any offender, the High Court or Court of Session
may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such
Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside
such order, and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such
offender according to law: Provided that the High Court or
Court of Session shall not under this sub-section inflict a
greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the
Court by which the offender was convicted.
(6) The provisions of sections 121, 124 and 373 shall,
so far as may be, apply in the case of sureties offered in
pursuance of the provisions of this section.
(7) The Court, before directing the release of an
offender under sub-section (1), shall be satisfied that an
offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or
regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or
in which the offender is likely to live during the period
named for the observance of the conditions.
(8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a
Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of
his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed
to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance, it may
issue a warrant for his apprehension.
(9) An offender, when apprehended on any such
warrant, shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing
the warrant, and such Court may either remand him in
custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a
22


sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence
and such Court may, after hearing the case, pass sentence.
(10) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of
the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), or the
Children Act, 1960 (60 of 1960) or any other law for the time
being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of
youthful offenders. ”
28. From reading of the above, it is apparent that Section 360 of the
CrPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act share a common thread
i.e., reformation but at the same time their framework differs in their
scope and structure. Section 360 of CrPC creates eligibility
distinctions based on age and gender. In case of persons under 21
years of age and women, benefit is extended to all offences not
punishable with death or life imprisonment, while restricting person
not below 21 years of age to offences carrying a maximum of seven
years or less or fine only. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of the
1958 Act, extend the benefit universally without any age or gender
classification, focusing on the nature of the offence and the character
of the offender. At this stage, it is also pertinent to take note of
Section 6 of the 1958 Act, which casts a positive obligation upon the
Court to record reasons for not dealing the offender under Sections
3 and 4 of 1958 Act, in case such offender is below twenty-one years
23


of age having committed offence not punishable with imprisonment
for life. Therefore, the distinction sought to be created by Section 6
based on age of the offender is in different context.
29.
Benefit under Section 360(1) and (3) of CrPC can enure only in
absence of a prior conviction, whereas Section 4 of the 1958 Act
leaves antecedents of the offender to the Court's discretion, and
Section 3 of the 1958 Act while requiring absence of prior conviction
also expands the concept of previous conviction to include prior orders
under the Section 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act itself. Importantly, Section
360 CrPC is bereft of any supervisory mechanism whatsoever, while
Section 4 of the 1958 Act establishes an elaborate mechanism
involving probation officers, supervision orders, and conditions as
prescribed in sub-section (3) and (4). Moreover, 1958 Act
contemplates report of the probation officer which is absent from the
framework of Section 360 CrPC.
30. The relationship between the Section 360 of CrPC and the 1958
Act has been subject matter of judicial pronouncements by this
Court. The Division Bench of this Court in Sanjay Dutt (A-117) v.
24


7
State of Maharashtra , while relying upon the inherent differences
between these two frameworks, held that they could not be intended
to co-exist. It was observed as thus –
“ 81. Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
provide for any role for probation officers in assisting the
courts in relation to supervision and other matters while the
Probation of Offenders Act does make such a provision.
While Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act states
that a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with
under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, shall
not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction
of an offence under any law. The Code of Criminal
Procedure does not contain parallel provision. Two
statutes with such significant differences could not
be intended to co-exist at the same time in the same
area. Such co-existence would lead to anomalous
results. The intention to retain the provisions of
Section 360 of the Code and the Probation of
Offenders Act as applicable at the same time in a
given area cannot be gathered from the provisions of
Section 360 or any other provisions of the Code.”
31. Nonetheless, this issue fell for consideration before another
8
Division Bench in Lakhanlal v. State of M.P. , where this Court
held both the frameworks to be mutually co-existent in following
words –
“ 14. At this stage, it may be noticed that a two-Judge Bench
of this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State of Maharashtra [Sanjay
Dutt v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1, at p. 964 :

7
2013 SCC OnLine SC 252
8
(2021) 6 SCC 100
25


(2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1, at p. 964] considering the provisions of
Section 360 of the Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958
Act held that the co-existence of such provisions would lead
to anomalous results. It was further held that the intention
to retain the provisions of Section 360 of the Code and the
1958 Act at the same time in a given area cannot be
gathered from the provisions of Section 360 or any provision
of the Code, when the Court held as under : (SCC p. 1012,
para 2935)
“2935. Section 360 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not provide for any role for
probation officers in assisting the courts in
relation to supervision and other matters while
the Probation of Offenders Act does make such a
provision. While Section 12 of the Probation of
Offenders Act states that a person found guilty of
an offence and dealt with under Section 3 or 4 of
the Probation of Offenders Act, shall not suffer
disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction
of an offence under any law. The Code of Criminal
Procedure does not contain parallel provision.
Two statutes with such significant differences
could not be intended to co-exist at the same time
in the same area. Such co-existence would lead to
anomalous results. The intention to retain the
provisions of Section 360 of the Code and the
Probation of Offenders Act as applicable at the
same time in a given area cannot be gathered
from the provisions of Section 360 or any other
provisions of the Code.”
15. We find that the attention of the Court was not
drawn to sub-section (10) of Section 360 which
provides that Section 360 will not affect the
provisions of the 1958 Act or other similar laws for
the time being in force for the treatment, training or
rehabilitation of youthful offenders. Still further,
Section 4 of the 1958 Act has a non obstante clause,
giving overriding effect over any other provisions of
law.
26


16. The conjoint reading of the provisions of both the
statutes, we find that the provisions of Section 360 of
the Code are in addition to the provisions of the 1958
Act or the Children Act, 1960, or any other law for the time
being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of
”
youthful offenders.
32. Therefore, it can be concluded that there have been divergent
opinions of this Court with respect to relationship between Section
360 CrPC and 1958 Act. Be that as it may, we are only concerned
with the issue whether offenders sentenced with ‘fine only’ can be
granted benefit of Section 4 of 1958 Act and for that purpose alone
we may take assistance from the language of Section 360 of CrPC
which may be different in its scope, but forms part of the reformative
approach shared by both the frameworks.
33. Even under the provision of CrPC, the legislative intent is
reflective of the fact that in cases of minor offences that falls within
the scope of Section 360 of CrPC, deterrent approach of punishment
ought to be avoided while applying the reformative approach so that
the offender need not face the deleterious effect of jail life as well as
the stigma of conviction and such person can lead his life upon
reintegration in society with dignity.
27


34. At this stage, it is important to ascertain as to under what
circumstances an offender, who was found guilty for offences as
prescribed, can avail the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act.
It is also necessary to enumerate what may be relevant factors for the
Court that can be taken into consideration while passing orders
under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act. In this regard, we can
profitably refer to various precedents explaining the circumstances
in which such benefit can be extended.
35. In Rattan Lal (Supra), this Court was having an occasion to
consider the object of Sections 3 and 4, in general, and Section 6, in
particular, of the 1958 Act. It was observed that –
“ 4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the
modern liberal trend of reform in the field of
penology. It is the result of the recognition of the
doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to
reform the individual offender than to punish him.
Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21
years of age and those above that age, and offenders who
are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a
lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above
the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court
to release them after admonition or on probation of good
conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the
appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders
below the age of 21 years an injunction is issue to the court
not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied
that having regard to the circumstances of the case;
28


including the nature of the offence and the character of the
offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. ”
36. This Court, while considering the factors relevant for the
purpose of extending the benefit of Section 360 CrPC or of 1958 Act,
in Ved Prakash (Supra) opined that the Court must ascertain
relevant material regarding social background and the personal
information of the crime-doer. While releasing the accused on
probation of good conduct, this Court, through Krishna Iyer, J.
observed as thus –
“ …..The materials before us are imperfect because the trial
court has been perfunctory in discharging its sentencing
functions. We must emphasise that sentencing an
accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion
and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting
on hunch. The trial court should have collected
materials necessary to help award a just punishment
in the circumstances. The social background and the
personal factors of the crime-doer are very relevant
although in practice criminal courts have hardly paid
attention to the social milieu or the personal
circumstances of the offender. Even if Section 360 CrPC
is not attracted, it is the duty of the sentencing court to be
activist enough to collect such facts as have a bearing on
punishment with a rehabilitation slant…..
…..In the present case, the offender is a young person and
his antecedents have no blemish. His life is not unsettled
or restless and the report indicates that he is an
agriculturist, pursuing a peaceful vocation. His
parents are alive and he has a wife and children to
29


maintain. These are stabilising factors in life. A long
period of litigation and the little period of
imprisonment suffered, will surely serve as a
deterrent. We are mindful of the fact that a firearm
has been used by the appellant and we cannot sleep
over the gravity of the offence. Nevertheless, the
report of the Probation Officer states that the
appellant is not given to any bad habits or stresses of
poverty. A land dispute led to the crime and that does
not survive any longer. The Probation Officer
recommends that an opportunity be given to the
appellant to improve himself and bring up his family
by honest labour as an agriculturist so that the
interests of social defence may be secured. We are
inclined to agree that in this case the appellant may be given
the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. We are
satisfied that the offender has a fixed place of abode and
regular occupation. We are inclined also to rely on the
Probation Officer's report which supports the direction for
release on probation. We, therefore, direct that the appellant
be released under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958, and instead of sentencing him, direct that he be
released on his entering into a bond before the trial court
with two sureties, one of whom shall be his father, to appear
and receive sentence when called upon during the period of
three years from the date of release and in the meantime to
keep the peace and be of good behaviour. In addition, we
pass an order that the Probation Officer shall have
supervision over the offender for a period of one year and
shall make reports once every three months to the Sessions
Court about the conduct of the offender. We direct further,
that the appellant shall be specially supervised from the
point of consumption of intoxicants and the matter brought
to the notice of the court in case the appellant violates. The
undertaking to be incorporated in his bond shall contain a
term that he shall not consume alcohol during the period
covered by the bond. We allow the appeals in the manner
above indicated. ”
30


As indicated, other factors that were considered are age,
antecedents, character, habits, economic conditions, occupation,
fixed place of abode, familial responsibilities, gravity of offence, origin
of dispute etc., so that an opportunity can be given to the accused to
improve himself and to bring up his family or may live with sense of
social security.
37. Similarly, when grant of relief under Section 4 of the 1958 Act
came up for consideration in State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan
9
Singh Kuldip Singh Anand for offences under Sections 324,
452/34 IPC, this Court in the circumstances extended benefit of
probation subject to execution of a bond for good behavior. Factors
that were considered by this Court may have some significance;
therefore, the relevant paragraph is reproduced as under –
“ 27. The learned counsel appearing for the accused
submitted that the incident is of the year 1990. The parties
are educated and neighbours. The learned counsel,
therefore, prayed that benefit of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958 may be granted to the accused.
The prayer made on behalf of the accused seems to be
reasonable. The incident is more than 10 years old.
The dispute was between the neighbours over a trivial
issue of cleaning of drainage. The incident took place
in a fit of anger. All the parties are educated and also
distantly related. The incident is not such as to direct

9
(2004) 7 SCC 659
31


the accused to undergo sentence of imprisonment. In
our opinion, it is a fit case in which the accused should be
released on probation by directing them to execute a bond
of one year for good behaviour. ”

10

38. In another case of Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana , this
Court was having an occasion to consider the circumstances of the
case and the nature of offences in which the court may exercise power
under Section 4 of the 1958 Act. Although the plea of the accused in
that case vis-à-vis grant of such benefit was rejected, nonetheless, it
was observed as thus –
“ 8. Parliament made it clear that only if the court forms the
opinion that it is expedient to release him on probation for
his good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of
the case. One of the circumstances which cannot be
sidelined in forming the said opinion is “the nature of the
offence”.
9. Thus Parliament has left it to the court to decide when
and how the court should form such opinion. It provided
sufficient indication that releasing the convicted
person on probation of good conduct must appear to
the court to be expedient. The word “expedient” had been
thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to
mean it as “apt and suitable to the end in view”. In Black's
Law Dictionary the word expedient is defined as “suitable
and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object”
besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of
Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri [(1975) 1 SCC 138 : AIR 1974
SC 2233] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has considered

10
(2000) 5 SCC 82
32

39. Therefore, release on probation of good conduct under Section
4 of the 1958 Act depends on the Court forming an opinion that such
release is expedient. In doing so, the Court must consider relevant
factors, particularly the nature of the offence. Naturally, probation
should be granted only where the Court records the satisfaction as
per the factors indicated above, and grant of benefit would serve the
33


purpose with intent to reform the offenders. The said judgment has
11
been followed in the case of Mohd. Hashim v. State of U.P. ,
whereby benefit under Section 4 of the 1958 Act in a case involving
offences under Section 323 and 498-A of IPC along with Section 3
and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was granted by this Court.
40. In light of the above analysis, now we may embark upon to
consider the case of Appellants for purpose of benefit under 1958 Act.
In the instant case, the Appellants were convicted under Section 323
and 324 of IPC and the allegations as proved relates to assault upon
the persons belonging to same locality. The Appellants were
sentenced to pay a fine of only Rs. 500/- under Section 323 and Rs.
2000/- under Section 324 of IPC. As such, it is apparent that, the
trial Court as well as the High Court did not award any imprisonment
to the Appellants and directed only payment of fine.
41. Moreover, this Court vide order dated 10.02.2025 sought report
from the State regarding the conduct and of any subsequent or prior
involvement in commission of any offence. In the affidavit filed on
22.02.2025, it is said that only present criminal case has been

11
(2017) 2 SCC 198
34


registered against the Appellants. Further, as borne from the records,
it is seen that A-1 and A-4 are employed with State Government in
Public Work Department and as Assistant Teacher in Education
Department respectively. It is also pertinent to note that the
Appellants have not committed an offence involving moral turpitude.
Given the said circumstances and considering the purport of Section
3 and Section 4 of 1958 Act, we find it expedient to extend the benefit
of said provisions to the Appellants.
CONCLUSION
42. In view of the above discussion, A-1, A-2 and A-3 who have been
sentenced with fine under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section
34 of IPC, therefore, they do not satisfy the pre-requisite contained
in Section 3. Thus, while confirming the conviction, we direct that
they be granted benefit under Section 4(1) of the 1958 Act and
instead of sentencing them, we direct that they be released on
entering into a bond for one year before the jurisdictional Trial Court
with sureties. Moreover, they are further directed to appear and
receive sentence as and when called upon during the said period from
the date of release. They shall further maintain peace and good
35


behavior, and the Probation Officer shall keep supervision and
submit report once in every three months to the Court concerned.
Any other conditions may also be imposed by the Court, if deemed
necessary.
43. Insofar as A-4 is concerned, he has been sentenced for the
charge under Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC, which satisfies
the pre-requisites of Section 3 of 1958 Act. Therefore, we extend the
benefit of the said Section in his favour and instead of sentencing
him, we direct that he be released after due admonition by the
jurisdictional Court.

44. We make it clear that the amount of fine as directed by the Trial
Court and confirmed by High Court, to be paid by all the Appellants,
if not already deposited, shall be deposited before the jurisdictional
Court, and be treated as compensation towards the victim(s). The
amount shall be paid within a period of 4 weeks from the date of this
judgment, failing which, the jurisdictional Court shall take
appropriate steps for recovery and send a report to the Registry of
this Court.
36


45. Moreover, since all the Appellants have been extended the
benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur
any disqualification affecting their service career, if any, arising out
of the conviction, in terms of Section 12 of the 1958 Act.
46. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed-of in above terms.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed-of.



……….…………….…………J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)





……….…………….…………J.
(ATUL S. CHANDURKAR)
New Delhi;
April 10, 2026.
37