Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RONALD WOOD MATHAMS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF WEST BENGAL(With connected Appeals)
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
22/04/1954
BENCH:
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
BENCH:
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
JAGANNADHADAS, B.
CITATION:
1954 AIR 455 1955 SCR 238
CITATOR INFO :
R 1955 SC 309 (7)
R 1960 SC 266 (37)
R 1966 SC 220 (16)
RF 1967 SC 776 (6)
R 1969 SC 686 (5)
ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure, (Act V of 1898), s. 257-Absence
of opportunity to produce defence evidence-Effect of-Court’s
duty in this respect.
HEADNOTE:
If for no fault of the accused reasonable opportunity has
not been given to him to adduce his evidence under the
imperative provisions of a. 257 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898, there is no fair trial and the accused
cannot be convicted, even though the prosecution evidence by
itself may tend to establish a strong case against him.
Rules of procedure designed to ensure justice must be scru-
pulously observed and Courts should be jealous in seeing
that there is no breach of them.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal, Appeals Nos. 9,
13, 14 and 15 of 1952.
Appeal on transfer after grant of Special Leave by Privy
Council on the 13th November, 1947, from the Judgment and
Order dated the 14th July, 1947, of the High Court of
Judicature at Calcutta in Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 1946
and Appeals under article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution of
India from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th September,
1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in
Criminal Appeals Nos. 340, 341 and 351 of 1946 and
Government Appeal No. 19 of 1946.
N.C. Chakravarty, A. K. Mukherjea and Sukumar Ghose for the
appellant in Cr. A. No. 9.
A. K. Basu, (Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant in
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Cr. A. No. 13.
A. K. Dutt and Ganpat Rai for the appellant in Cr. A. No.
14.
Sukumar Ghose for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 15.
B.Sen, A. M. Chatterji and P. K. Bose, for the respondents
in all the appeals,
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1954. April 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are appeals against the judgments
of the High Court of Calcutta convicting the appellants on
charges of conspiracy to cheat the Government and of
bribery. The facts, so far as they are material, may be
briefly stated. The appellant, S. K. Dutt, carried on
business as a building contractor under the name and style
of British India Construction Company. This firm had a
branch at Asansol which was, at the material dates, in
charge of the appellant J. K. Bose. In May, 1942, the
military took up construction of dumps and roads in this
area, and the appellant, R. W. Mathams, who was the Garrison
Engineer at Asansol, was put in charge of it, and the
appellant, P. C. Ghose, was functioning as overseer under
him. On or about 10th May, 1942, an order was placed with
S. K. Dutt for the construction of dumps at a place called
Burnpur near Asansol. The works were executed in June and
July 1942, and sums amounting to Rs. 1,74,000 were paid to
S. K. Dutt on account there for. The case for the
prosecution is that this amount was in excess of what was
due to him for works actually done, by about Rs. 56,000, and
that with a view to avoid the refund of this excess, the
appellants entered into a conspiracy, under which S. K. Dutt
was to prefer a claim for construction of roads purported to
have been carried out in execution of an order which R. W.
Mathams was to issue; P. C. Ghose was to measure the road so
claimed to have been constructed, and the bill was to be
passed for an amount exceeding what had actually been paid.
In accordance with this scheme, S. K. Dutt wrote Exhibit 19
on 28th January, 1943, claiming payment for " additional
work within the store dump area "; R. W. Mathams passed an
order bearing date 7th July, 1942, Exhibit 10, placing an
order with S. K. Dutt for the construction of roads; P. C.
Ghose prepared the final bill,, Exhibit 6, for Rs. 1,89,458-
14-0 on 15th March, 1943, and the same was passed by R. W.
Mathams. It is stated for the prosecution that the roads
alleged to have been constructed by the appellant, S. K.
Dutt, were, in fact,
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constructed by the military, and that the order of R. W.
Mathams bearing date 7th July, 1942, was, in fact, brought
into existence sometime in March, 1943. It is further
stated for the prosecution that as consideration for passing
the above bill, a bribe of Rs. 30,000 was agreed to be paid
to R. W. Mathams and to P. C. Ghose, that S. K. Dutt sent
that amount by cheque to J. K. Bose on 16th March, 1943, and
that on 17th March, 1943, R. W. Mathams was paid Rs. 18,000
and P. C. Ghose Rs. 12,000 as illegal gratification. The
appellants were accordingly charged with conspiracy to cheat
the Government and bribery.
The appellants denied the conspiracy. They stated that the
roads had, in fact, been constructed by S. K. Dutt. With
reference to the cheque for Rs. 30,000, the case of S. K.
Dutt and P. C. Ghose was that the amount was required for
payment to sub-contractors, who had constructed the roads
under S. K. Dutt, and that it was, in fact, utilised for
that purpose. They produced Exhibit 27 series, which are
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receipts purporting to have been signed by the several sub
contractors.
The Special Tribunal which tried the case, delivered its
judgment on 9th May, 1946, acquitting the appellants on the
charge of conspiracy but convicting them for the offence of
bribery. Appeals against this judgment were taken to the
High Court of Calcutta by the appellants against their
conviction on the charge of bribery and by the Government
against the acquittal on the charge of conspiracy. By their
judgment dated 14th July, 1947, the learned Judges (Clough
and Ellis JJ.) dismissed the appeals of the appellants, and
allowed that of the Government. ’In the result, the
appellants stood convicted on the charges both of conspiracy
and bribery.
R. W. Mathams applied to the Privy Council for special
leave to appeal, and by an order dated 13th November, 1947,
the appeal was admitted only on the question whether the
prosecution was bad for want of sanction under section 197
of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellants, S. K. Dutt,
J. K. Bose and P. C. Ghose, appealed to the Federal Court
under a certificate Under section 205 of the Government of
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India Act, and as the order passed in their appeal forms the
foundation of the argument in the present appeals, it
becomes necessary to refer to it in some detail.
One of the grounds argued by the appellants in the Federal
Court was that the requirements of section 257 of the
Criminal Procedure Code had not been complied with, and that
there was accordingly no fair trial. The facts on which
this objection was based are these: The complaint was
instituted on 7th June, 1945. The examination of witnesses
on the side of the prosecution commenced on 6th September,
1945, and it was concluded after undergoing several
adjournments on 29th March, 1946. On 27th March, 1946, the
appellant, J. K. Bose, filed a list of 15 witnesses to be
examined for the defence. Most of them were persons who are
alleged to have given the receipts, Exhibit 27 series,
acknowledging payment of money for construction of works
done by them. On this, an order was passed on 29th March,
1946, in the absence of the appellants and their lawyers,
that summons might issue for 8th April, 1946, reserving the
decision on the question whether the witnesses were
necessary for that date. Summons was not sent in the manner
prescribed by sections 68 and 69 of the Code but by ordinary
post. When the case was taken up on 8th April, 1946, it was
found that two of the envelopes had returned from the Dead
Letter Office, and as to the rest, there was nothing to show
what had happened to them. In this situation, the Tribunal
passed an order that no further process would issue, and the
case was then decided on the evidence on record, and the
appellants convicted on the charge of bribery.
On these facts, it was contended before the Federal Court
that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal was in
contravention of section 257 of the Code, and amounted to a
serious irregularity. In upholding this objection, the
Court observed that section 257 was imperative in its terms,
that process could, not be refused except for the reasons
mentioned therein, that no such reasons existed, and that
the order of the Tribunal, dated 8th April, 1946, refusing
to issue process was accordingly illegal. It was further
observed that
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the witnesses cited would be material because their
evidence, if accepted, would establish that Exhibit 27
series were genuine, and that this would militate against
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the case of the prosecution in respect of both the charges
of conspiracy and bribery. The Court accordingly set aside
the convictions, and directed that the appeal should be re-
heard "after giving a reasonable opportunity to the
appellant No. 2 (J. K. Bose) to take such steps as he may
be entitled to take in law for enforcing the attendance of
the witnesses mentioned in the list of the 27th March, and
after considering the evidence of such of these witnesses as
may appear before the Court."
This judgment was passed on 23rd April, 1948. When the
matter went back to the High Court of Calcutta in pursuance
of this judgment, an order was passed by that Court on 2nd
August, 1948, adjourning the hearing of the appeals till the
disposal of the appeal of R. W. Mathams by the Privy
Council. Then came the Independence of India, and the
appeal of R. W. Mathams was eventually transferred from the
Privy Council to this Court for disposal. As information
concerning the exact position of the appeal of R. W. Mathams
was for sometime lacking, and as the prospect of that appeal
being heard appeared distant, the High Court passed an order
on 9th April, 1951, that the remanded appeals would be taken
up for hearing on 11th June, 1951, that the appellants
should take the necessary steps for examination of the
witnesses mentioned in the list, dated 27th March, 1946, and
that the office should take steps to secure the attendance
of those witnesses, except one who was in East Pakistan.
The list was accordingly filed on 8th May, 1951. Therein,
it was stated that out of the 15 persons whose names were
mentioned in the list, dated 27th March, 1946, it was
possible to get the address of only six persons, and that as
for the rest, it was not possible to trace their
whereabouts, as they had mostly migrated to Asansol at the
time when the works were being executed and had since left
that place. Out of the six persons whose addresses were
given, B. C. Mukherjee and R. K. Paul, were served and
examined in Court.
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A third witness was given up, as he was a handwriting
expert. The fourth witness Liakat Hossain, had migrated to
East Pakistan, and no process could be issued against him.
Another witness, Sanichar Mistry, had died in the hospital.
As regards the sixth witness, Sashinath De, the endorsement
on the summons was that he had left the place, and that it
was not known to which place he had gone. The learned
Judges who heard the appeal on remand held by their
judgment, dated 6th September, 1951, that on the evidence
both the charges of conspiracy and bribery had been estab-
lished, and convicted the appellants, S. K. Dutt, J. K. Bose
and P. C. Ghose, under the appropriate sections. The matter
comes before us on special leave under a certificate of the
High Court under article 134(c) of the Constitution.
The argument in support of these appeals is that the trial
of the appellants had been vitiated by reason of the fact
that they had no reasonable opportunity to examine their
witnesses, and that their convictions were accordingly bad.
We think that this complaint is well-founded. By its
judgment, dated 23rd April, 1948, the Federal Court decided
that the order of the Tribunal, dated 8th April, 1946,
declining to issue process for the witnesses mentioned in
the list, dated 27th March, 1946, was in contravention of
section 257 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that the
evidence of those witnesses would be material for refutation
of the charges of both conspiracy and bribery, and that
accordingly the appellants should be granted an oppor-
tunity to examine those witnesses. On this order, the only
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question that has to be decided is whether the appellants
got such an opportunity when the appeal was re-heard in
pursuance of the order of remand. The important point to be
noted is that by reason of the order of the High Court,
dated 2nd August, 1948, the appeal was not taken up for
hearing immediately as it ought to have been, and that it
was only on 8th May, 1951, that it was possible for the
appellants to take steps in the matter. But by that time,
the situation had undergone a radical change. In their
application, the appellants stated that the whereabouts of
most of
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the witnesses could not be traced, and this is not to be
wondered at Burnpur, where the works had to be executed,
is a petty township situated in a corner of the State, and
it sprang into prominence only owing to military activities.
Contractors and sub-contractors flocked to that place from
all sides for executing the military works, and there is
nothing improbable in their having left the place when the
situation changed, as it did on the conclusion of the war by
the end of 1945. And there arose a further complication.
In 1947, two Dominions came into being as a result of the
Indian Independence Act, and there was a partition of
Bengal. It is not unlikely that some of these contractors
belonged to East Pakistan or bad settled there.
That the list of witnesses given on 27th March, 1946, was
not all fictitious is borne out by the fact that two of them
actually gave evidence at the re-hearing and a third had
died in the hospital. When some of the witnesses mentioned
in the list are proved to be real persons, there are no
materials on which it can be affirmed that the others are
fictitious persons. Indeed, the evidence of the two
witnesses,. Mukherjee and Paul, is that they bad seen some
of those sub-contractors whose names appear in Exhibit 27
series, actually at work there. The learned Judges have
rejected their evidence on the ground that they are not men
of status; but on the question whether the appellants had
made payments to the sub-contractors under Exhibit 27
series, the best evidence can only be of those persons. It
may be that the two witnesses are not speaking the truth
when they say that they saw the other persons mentioned in
the list working on the roads, and it is possible that those
persons are fictitious. But it is equally possible that
they are real persons, whose whereabouts could not be traced
in the exceptional circumstances which had intervened. As
admittedly three of them are real, it would be unsafe to act
on the view that the others must be fictitious, and if they
are real persons who could not be examined for no fault of
the appellants, grave injustice would result in the accused
being condemned without the evidence of these witnesses
having been taken. For this situation; the
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appellants are not to blame. That was the result of the
erroneous order passed by the Tribunal on 8th April, 1946,
refusing to issue process and the order of the High Court,
dated 2nd August, 1948, adjourning the appeal, till the
disposal of the appeal of R. W. Mathams.
In coming to the conclusion that the guilt of the appellants
had been established, the learned Judges were greatly
influenced by the correspondence relating to the passing of
the bill, in Particular the letter of S. K. Dutt, dated 23rd
January, 1943, Exhibit 18, by the long interval between the
completion of the work which was in July, 1942, and the
alleged payments under Exhibit 27 series which were after
17th March, 1943, and by various other circumstances, which
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probabilised the case for the prosecution. It must be
conceded that the evidence on record tends to establish a
strong case against the appellants. But then, that is a
case which they are entitled to rebut, and if, as was held
by the Federal Court, Exhibit 27 series would furnish good
material for rebutting that case, the Court, by declining to
issue process for the examination of the witnesses connected
with those documents, has deprived the appellants of an
opportunity of rebutting it. Whatever one may think of the
merits of the appellants’ contention, they cannot be
convicted without an opportunity being given to them to
present their evidence, and that having been denied to them,
there has been no fair trial, and the conviction of the
appellants, S. K. Dutt, J. K. Bose and P. C. Ghose, cannot
stand. The result may be unfortunate. Bat it is essential
that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice, should
be scrupulously followed, and Courts should be jealous’ in
seeing that there is no breach of them. The, appeals will
be allowed, and the appellants acquitted.
Then there ’remains the appeal of R. W. Mathams. It has
been already stated that by an order dated 13th November,
1947, the Privy Council gave him special leave to appear,
limited to the question whether the proceedings were bad for
want of sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure
Code. By a further
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order dated 5th August, 1948, the Privy Council enlarged the
scope of the appeal by permitting the appellant to raise the
contention that there had been a contravention of section
257 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These are the two
points that arise for determination in his appeal. The
question whether sanction under section 197 was necessary
for instituting proceedings against the appellant on charges
of conspiracy and of bribery, is now concluded by the
decisions of the Judicial Committee in H. H. B. Gill ’V.
The King (1) and Phanindra Chandra Neogy v. The King (1),
and must be answered in the negative. The question whether
there was contravention of section 257 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and a denial or fair trial must, for the
reasons already given, be answered in the affirmative, and
the conviction of the appellant set aside on that ground.
His appeal will also be allowed, and there will be an order
of acquittal in his favour.
Appeal allowed.