Full Judgment Text
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2024 INSC 115
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s)._______ OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11975/2019)
CHATRAPAL …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ANR. ... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, by special leave, is directed against
the judgment and order dated 08.01.2019 passed by the High
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition (C) No. 297 of
NITIN TALREJA
Date: 2024.02.15
17:23:27 IST
Reason:
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2008, whereby the High Court has dismissed the petition of the
appellant being devoid of merit.
3. The facts, briefly stated, are that the appellant was
appointed on permanent basis on the post of Ardly (a class IV
Post) in the Bareilly Judgeship. The appellant was transferred
and posted as Process Server in the Nazarat of outlying court
of Baheri, District Bareilly on 24.08.2001. In compliance of the
transfer order, the appellant joined the Nazarat Branch in
Baheri, District Bareilly as Process Server on 31.08.2001 but he
was being paid the remuneration of Ardly.
3.1 Being aggrieved, the appellant made a
representation on 20.01.2003 to the District Judge to pay the
salary due to the post of Process Server. The said
representation was duly considered by the competent authority
and a report from the Munsarim in the office of Civil Judge,
Baheri, Bareilly was called for. As per the report of Munsarim
dated 27.02.2003, the appellant joined the post of Process
Server in the Court of Civil Judge, Baheri, Bareilly on
31.08.2001 and since then is working on the said post.
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Allegedly, after submission of the said report, the Central Nazir
started harassing the appellant and demanded illegal amount
of gratification for settling his dues.
3.2 Since the grievance of the appellant was not being
redressed, he made a representation dated 05.06.2003 to the
Janapad Nyaayaadeesh inter alia stating that he is deprived of
the allowance that is admissible to the incumbents who are
posted at an outlying court as Process Server. It is further
stated that when the appellant went to meet the Central Nazir
on 04.06.2003, he demanded bribe to get his work done. The
District Judge, Bareilly sought an explanation from the Central
Nazir, Bareilly Judgeship who in turn admitted that by mistake
the salary of the appellant has been shown as against the post
of Ardly, however, he denied having demanded illegal
gratification from the appellant.
3.3 The District Judge placed the appellant under
suspension vide order dated 21.06.2003 and initiated a
departmental inquiry. The Inquiry Officer vide memorandum
dated 22.08.2003 served the charge sheet on the appellant on
the charges firstly, the appellant vide communication dated
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05.06.2003 had used inappropriate, derogatory and
objectionable language and made false allegations against the
officers including the District Judge as well as against the
Presiding Officer of Aonla Court and secondly, the appellant
communicated letters and representations to the Registrar
General of High Court and other officials of the State
Government including the then Chief Minister without routing
the same through proper channel. The Inquiry Officer, upon
completion of enquiry, recorded in his report dated 21.04.2006
that the charges levelled against the appellant are duly
established. The District Judge, Bareilly accepted the inquiry
report dated 21.04.2006 and vide order dated 30.04.2007
dismissed the appellant which was challenged in appeal before
the High Court and the same was dismissed vide order dated
19.09.2007 being devoid of any substance while affirming the
order dated 30.04.2007 passed by the Disciplinary Authority
imposing punishment of dismissal.
3.4 Being aggrieved by the order dated 19.09.2007
passed by the Administrative Judge of the High Court of
Allahabad, the appellant filed the Writ Petition (C) No. 297 of
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2008 before the High Court which attained the same fate as
that of the appeal. Hence, the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the
first charge, in particular, is vague as no finding has been
recorded by the Inquiry Officer with regard to the allegations
made in the letter dated 05.06.2003 against the officials.
Learned counsel would further submit that if it is presumed
that the language used in the complaint constitutes flagrant
breach of Rule 3 of the U.P. Government Servant Conduct
Rules, the quantum of punishment imposed on the appellant is
not commensurate to the guilt. Learned counsel for the
appellant next submits that the appellant was not supplied
copy of various documents including proposed evidence and
thus he was prejudiced. It is lastly argued that the findings of
guilt recorded by the enquiry officer is perverse.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
appellant has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court
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rendered in ‘Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan’ and
2
‘ Santosh Bakshi vs. State of Punjab ’
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the High Court
would submit that the appellant is habitual of making false
allegations against the senior officers including the District
Judge and the charges framed against him are specific and
definite and not vague.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and perused the case papers.
7. The appellant was subjected to the departmental inquiry
on two charges of misconduct and insubordination. For the first
charge, it was alleged that he used inappropriate, derogatory
and objectional language and made false allegations against
the Central Nazir and higher officials and earlier also he had
lodged a false report against the Presiding Officer of
Aonla Court. For the second charge, he allegedly sent a
representation dated 05.06.2003 to the Registrar General of
the High Court and Harijan Society Welfare Minister as also to
1
AIR 1986 SC 995
2
AIR 2014 SC 2966
7
the Chief Minister without using the proper channel and without
permission of the Head of the Department.
8. The Inquiry Officer has found both the charges to be
proved. In the discussion with respect to the first charge, it is
mentioned in the inquiry report that the appellant’s statement
in his letter dated 05.06.2003 that he met the Central Nazir,
Bareilly number of times between 24.08.2001 to 15.01.2003 is
false because from the order dated 21.06.2003 of the District
Judge, Bareilly it is clear that the Central Nazir took charge at
Bareilly on 23.07.2002, therefore, he could not have met the
Central Nazir, Bareilly before 23.07.2002.
9. However, the finding of the Inquiry Officer that the
appellant’s statement in his application dated 05.06.2003 that
he met the Central Nazir number of times between 24.08.2001
to 15.01.2003 is not reflected in appellant’s representation. In
fact, the application dated 05.06.2003 was addressed to the
Janapad Nyaayaadeesh and the relevant statement is that the
applicant met the addressee i.e. Janapad Nyaayaadeesh
number of times between 24.08.2001 to 15.01.2003. There is
no statement that he met the Central Nazir during this period.
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In respect of meeting the Central Nazir, his statement is that
he met him on 04.06.2003. Thus, the finding of making false
statement and allegation in his representation dated
05.06.2003 is not borne out from the record. Since, this finding
is the fulcrum of the reasoning to hold that charge no. 1 is
proved, in our considered view, this finding in the inquiry
report is perverse.
10. Insofar as the allegation that the appellant made false
allegations of discrimination on caste basis, it is significant to
notice that the appellant himself has not made any such
allegation in his letter dated 05.06.2003. In the said letter, he
has stated that it was the Central Nazir who told him that the
District Judge is saying that the appellant is a Harijan
employee, and he hates the people of such community. Thus, it
is clear that the appellant himself has not made any such
allegation against the District Judge but it was the Central
Nazir who made that statement. The Inquiry Officer had
referred to the report of the Central Nazir dated 20.06.2003
which is available on record. Regarding the above statement,
the Central Nazir has not denied specifically. He has only stated
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that the charges levelled by the appellant are false and
baseless. The Central Nazir has neither made any specific
denial that he has not demanded illegal gratification of Rs.
3,000/- from the appellant. Even though, in his letter dated
05.06.2003, the appellant has made specific allegation to this
effect against the Central Nazir.
11. The charge no. 2 against the appellant concerns directly
sending the representations to the High Court and Hon’ble
Chief Minister/Minister without routing the same through
proper channel. In this regard, it is suffice to observe that
Class-IV employee, when in financial hardship, may represent
directly to the superior but that by itself cannot amount to
major misconduct for which punishment of termination from
service should be imposed. Even otherwise, the appellant has
cited examples of other employees of the District Court,
Bareilly who have sent representations directly to the
superiors, but no action has been taken against them.
12. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the
Inquiry Officer should not be interfered by the appellate
authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of
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| guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| finding the same can always be interfered as held in Union of | |||
| India vs. P. Gunasekaran3, State of Haryana vs. Rattan | |||
| Singh4 and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and | |||
| Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu5. In P. Gunasekaran | |||
| (supra), the following has been held by this Court in para nos. | |||
| 12, 13, 16 & 17: | |||
| 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully<br>“<br>disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as<br>an appellate authority in the disciplinary<br>proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence<br>before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I<br>was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was<br>also endorsed by the Central Administrative<br>Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court<br>is not and cannot act as a second court of first<br>appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers<br>under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,<br>shall not venture into reappreciation of the<br>evidence. The High Court can only see whether:<br>(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;<br>(b) the enquiry is held according to the<br>procedure prescribed in that behalf;<br>(c) there is violation of the principles of natural<br>justice in conducting the proceedings;<br>(d) the authorities have disabled themselves<br>from reaching a fair conclusion by some<br>considerations extraneous to the evidence and<br>merits of the case; | 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully<br>“ | ||
| disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as | |||
| an appellate authority in the disciplinary | |||
| proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence | |||
| before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I | |||
| was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was | |||
| also endorsed by the Central Administrative | |||
| Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court | |||
| is not and cannot act as a second court of first | |||
| appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers | |||
| under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, | |||
| shall not venture into reappreciation of the | |||
| evidence. The High Court can only see whether: | |||
| (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; | |||
| (b) the enquiry is held according to the | |||
| procedure prescribed in that behalf; | |||
| (c) there is violation of the principles of natural | |||
| justice in conducting the proceedings; | |||
| (d) the authorities have disabled themselves | |||
| from reaching a fair conclusion by some | |||
| considerations extraneous to the evidence and | |||
| merits of the case; |
3
(2015) 2 SCC 610
4
(1977) 2 SCC 491
5
(2014) 4 SCC 108
11
| (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to | |
|---|---|
| be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous | |
| considerations; | |
| (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so | |
| wholly arbitrary and capricious that no | |
| reasonable person could ever have arrived at | |
| such conclusion; | |
| (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously | |
| failed to admit the admissible and material | |
| evidence; | |
| (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously | |
| admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced | |
| the finding; | |
| (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. | |
| 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of | |
| India, the High Court shall not: | |
| (i) reappreciate the evidence; | |
| (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, | |
| in case the same has been conducted in | |
| accordance with law; | |
| (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; | |
| (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; | |
| (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on | |
| which findings can be based. | |
| (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it | |
| may appear to be; | |
| (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment | |
| unless it shocks its conscience. | |
| 16. These principles have been succinctly summed | |
| up by the living legend and centenarian V.R. | |
| Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Haryana v. Rattan | |
| Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298] . | |
| To quote the unparalleled and inimitable | |
| expressions: (SCC p. 493, para 4) | |
| “4. … in a domestic enquiry the strict and | |
| sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian |
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| Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which<br>are logically probative for a prudent mind are<br>permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay<br>evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and<br>credibility. It is true that departmental<br>authorities and administrative tribunals must be<br>careful in evaluating such material and should<br>not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not<br>relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this<br>proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions<br>nor textbooks, although we have been taken<br>through case law and other authorities by<br>counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial<br>approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous<br>materials or considerations and observance of<br>rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the<br>basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or<br>surrender of independence of judgment vitiate<br>the conclusions reached, such finding, even<br>though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held<br>good.” (emphasis supplied)<br>17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up<br>to the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply<br>and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4<br>SCC 108: (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38, these principles<br>have been consistently followed adding practically<br>nothing more or altering anything.” | Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| are logically probative for a prudent mind are | |||
| permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay | |||
| evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and | |||
| credibility. It is true that departmental | |||
| authorities and administrative tribunals must be | |||
| careful in evaluating such material and should | |||
| not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not | |||
| relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this | |||
| proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions | |||
| nor textbooks, although we have been taken | |||
| through case law and other authorities by | |||
| counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial | |||
| approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous | |||
| materials or considerations and observance of | |||
| rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the | |||
| basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or | |||
| surrender of independence of judgment vitiate | |||
| the conclusions reached, such finding, even | |||
| though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held | |||
| good.” (emphasis supplied) | |||
| 17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up | |||
| to the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply | |||
| and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 | |||
| SCC 108: (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38, these principles | |||
| have been consistently followed adding practically | |||
| nothing more or altering anything.” | |||
| 13. Having considered the entire material available on record | |||
| and keeping in view that the appellant is a Class-IV employee | |||
| against whom charge no. 1 was found proved on the basis of | |||
| perverse finding and charge no. 2 is only about sending the | |||
| representation to the High Court directly without availing the |
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proper channel, we deem it appropriate to set-aside the
impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the order
dated 30.04.2007 whereby the appellant was terminated from
service. Consequently, the appellant is reinstated in service
with all consequential benefits. The appeal is allowed.
………………………………………J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
FEBRUARY 15, 2024
NEW DELHI.