Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY(P) LTD. & ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/05/1996
BENCH:
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
BENCH:
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 2005 1996 SCC (4) 622
JT 1996 (4) 679 1996 SCALE (4)202
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY,J.
A plot of land was put to auction by the Delhi
Development Authority [D.D.A.] in October 1980. Skipper
Construction Company [Skipper] offered the highest bid in A
sum of Rs. 9.82 crores. It was supposed to be a record bid
at that time. According to the conditions of auction, twenty
five percent of the amount was payable immediately and the
rest within ninety days. Skipper deposited the twenty five
percent but did not deposit the balance. It asked for
extension repeatedly and it was granted repeatedly. As many
as seven extensions were granted spread over the period
January, 1981 to April, 1982. Since Skipper failed to
deposit the balance consideration even within the last
extended period, proceedings were taken for cancelling the
bid. Skipper went to Court and on May 29, 1992 obtained stay
of cancellation*. D.D.A. applied for vacating the stay.
Nothing happened but usual adjournments. Skipper was
simultaneously making representations to D.D.A. to give him
further time. In January 1983, D.D.A. constituted a
committee to consider the request of Skipper and other
similar requests and to devise a formula for ensuring timely
payments by such purchasers. The committee reported that
cancellation of bids in such matters usually land D.D.A. in
protracted litigation and
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*We are unable to see what jurisdiction or justification the
court could have for passing such an order in an ordinary
case of sale and purchase of property, more so when Skipper
had failed to pay the balance consideration not only within
the time stipulated but despite several extensions.
suggested that to enable them to pay the monies due to
D.D.A., the purchasers be given permission to commence
development/construction on the plot [though possession as
such be not delivered] subject to the condition that the
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property in the land would remain with the D.D.A. until the
entire consideration is paid; if the entire consideration
is not paid according to the revised schedule, the D.D.A.
should be entitled to re-enter the plot and take it over
along with the construction, if any, made thereon. [The
idea was to enable the purchasers to undertake development
and go on with the construction which would make it easy
for them to sell the space in the building being
constructed and thus raise funds for paying to D.D.A.] The
committee recommended further that a revised agreement be
obtained from such purchasers incorporating the above
terms. When called upon to execute the revised agreement,
in 1984, Skipper raised all sorts of objections and
executed it only in the year 1987. Even before permission
to enter upon the plot and to make construction thereon was
granted under the revised agreement, Skipper appears to have
been selling the place in the proposed building to various
persons and receiving monies. Once it got the permission to
enter upon the plot and to make construction thereon, it
became all the more easy for it to sell the space in the
proposed building. It did not pay the first instalment under
the revised agreement in time but only after some delay. It
did not pay the second instalment. Bank guarantees furnished
by it in terms of revised agreement were also found to be
defective. Every time the D.D.A. thought of cancelling the
agreement on account of the said defaults, an argument was
put forward that it would cause great hardship to hundreds
of persons who have purchased space in the proposed building
and that they would be deprived of their hard-earned monies.
Skipper has been making some small token payments from time
to time meanwhile. While the endless correspondence and
discussions were going on between Skipper and D.D.A.,
Skipper went to Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition,
C.W.No.2371 of 1989, asking for a writ of mandamus to the
D.D.A. to sanction the building plans or in the alternative
to grant permission to him to start construction at his
risk. On March 19, 1990, the High Court passed an order
permitting Skipper to commence construction in accordance
with the sanctioned plans subject to deposit of a sum of
Rupees twenty lakhs in two instalments and Rs.1,94,40,000/-
within one month. Against the said order, D.D.A. came to
this Court by way of Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 6338
and 6339 of 1990. Meanwhile, Writ Petition (C) No.2871 of
1989 came up for final hearing on December 21,1990. The
Delhi High Court made an order on that day directing Skipper
to pay to D.D.A. a sum of Rs. 8,12,88,798/- within thirty
days and to stop all further construction with effect from
January 9, 1991 till the said payment was made. It was
provided that in default of such payment, the licence
[revised agreement dated August 11, 1987] would stand
determined and D.D.A. would be entitled to re-enter the
plot. Reasons for the order were given on January 14, 1991.
Skipper failed to deposit the amount as per the direction of
the High Court. It approached this Court by way of Special
Leave Petition (C) No.196 of 1991. On January 29, 1991, this
Court grantee an interim order subject to Skipper depositing
Rs.2.5 crores within one month and another sum of Rs.2.5
crores before April 8, 1991. Skipper was expressly
prohibited from inducting any person in the building and
from creating any rights in favour of third parties. Inspite
of the said prohibitory orders from this Courts Skipper-
issued an advertisement on February 4, 1991 in the leading
newspapers of Delhi insisting persons to purchase the space
in the proposed building. It published such, advertisements
repeatedly. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 196 of 1991 was
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ultimately dismissed on January 25, 1993, whereafter, D.D.A.
re-entered the plot and took physical possession of property
on February 10, 1993 along with the building thereon free
from all encumbrances in terms of the revised
agreement/licence and as provided in the orders of the Delhi
High Court dated December 21, 1990/January 14, 1991. It also
forfeited the amounts paid till then by Skipper in terms of
the revised agreement and the said Judgment.
January 29, 1991 marks the watershed in these
proceedings. Before the said date, Skipper had collected
about Rupees fourteen crores from various parties agreeing
to sell the space in the proposed building. Even after
January 29, 1991, Skipper issued several advertisements and
collected substantial amounts - Rupees eleven crores,
according to its own version from various parties agreeing
to sell the space in the said building. It appears that same
space was sold to more than one person and monies collected.
Not only did Skipper brazenly violate the orders of this
Court dated January 29, 1991 by issuing advertisements, it
also filed a suit in the Delhi High Court being Suit No.770
of 1993 seeking an injunction restraining the D.D.A. from
interfering with its alleged title and possession over the
plot and for a declaration that the re-entry by D.D.A. was
illegal and void ! It also sought for a declaration that it
has discharged all the amounts due to D.D.A. and that
nothing was due from it. It obtained interim orders staying
re-auction of the plot.
Against the interim order of the High Court staying the
re-auction of the plot, D.D.A. approached this Court by way
of Special Leave Petition (C) No.21000 of 1993. Noticing the
conduct of Skipper, this Court initiated suo motu contempt
proceedings against Tejwant Singh and his wife, Surinder
Kaur, directors of Skipper. They were asked to explain (1)
why did they institute Suit No.770 of 1993 in respect of the
very same subject matter which was already adjudicated by
this Court on January 23, 1993, i.e., by affirming the
orders of the High Court dated December 21, 1990 and January
14, 1991 and (2) why did they enter into agreements for sale
and create interest in the third parties in defiance of the
orders of this Court dated January 29, 1991. After hearing
the contemnors, this Court found them guilty of contempt of
this Court in the following words:
"We, therefore, invoke our power
under Article 129 read with Article
142 of the Constitution and order
as follows: We sentence contemner-
Respondent is Tejwant Singh to
undergo simple imprisonment for six
months and to pay a fine of
Rs.50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand
only). We further sentence
contemner respondent 2, Surinder
Kaur to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of one month and to
pay a fine of Rs.50,000 (Rupees
fifty thousand only). In default of
payment of fine, the contemners
shall further undergo simple
imprisonment for one month. The
payment of fine shall be made
within one month from today.
All the properties and the
bank accounts standing in the names
of the contemners and the Directors
of M/S. Skipper Construction
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Co.(Pvt.) Ltd. and their wives,
sons and unmarried daughters will
stand attached."
At that stag Sri C.Ramaswamys learned council appearing
for the contemnors, requested for deferment of the sentence
of imprisonment subject to conditions indicated by him. On
the basis of the said offer, this Court deferred the
sentence of imprisonment subject to the following
conditions:
"(1). The contemners shall furnish
bank guarantee in favour of the
Registrar General of this Court in
the amount of Rs.11 crores (Rupees
eleven crores only) on or before
31-3-1995. The guarantee will be of
a nationalized bank or any foreign
bank operating in India The bank
guarantee will be given for a
period of one year from the date of
furnishing the bank guarantee.
(2) The contemners shall deposit
the entire account of Rs.11 crores
by a bank draft in the Registry of
this court on or before 30-11-1995.
If they fail to do so the bank
guarantee will become encashable
and will be encashed forthwith
after 30-11-1995.
(3) If the contemners fail to give
the bank guarantee by 31-3-1995 as
aforesaid, the sentence of
imprisonment will become
enforceable at once.
(4) No application for extension of
time either to furnish the bank
guarantee or to make the payment as
aforesaid, will be entertained by
this Court.
(5) The contemners shall not leave
the country without the express
permission of this Court.
(6) List of properties given by the
contemners is taken on record. The
contemners will also file a list of
properties held by their sons and
unmarried daughters within one week
from today.
(7) If and when any property that
is attached under this order is
sought to be alienated or
encumbered to raise money to pay
the liability of Rs.11 crores
stated aboves the contemners will
be at liberty to approach the Court
for permission to do so.
(8) The attachment of the
properties and the bank accounts
shall stand raised on the
contemners furnishing the bank
guarantee as aforesaid.
(9) The order with regard to the
disbursal of the amount deposited
will be passed after the amounts
are deposited as aforesaid."
The contemnors deposited a sum of Rupees two crores but
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failed to deposit the balance. They also failed to furnish
the Bank guarantee. As a result of the said failure, they
were committed to prison. Both the contemnors have served
out their sentence.
Meanwhile, D.D.A. invited tenders for the sale of the
said plot of land along with the construction raised
thereupon. The highest offer received was in the sum of
Rupees seventy crores from M/s. Banganga Investments. It was
accepted with the permission of this Court. The
consideration has been deposited with the D.D.A. and the
property transferred in favour of the said purchaser. At
this stage, the question arose as to what should be done
with the hundreds of persons who have been duped and
defrauded by Skipper and who had parted with substantial
amounts on the basis of the fraudulent and false
representations made by Skipper. This Court made a
distinction between persons who purchased the space before
January 29, 1991 and the persons who purchased the space
thereafter. The first concern of this Court was to reimburse
the persons who purchased space in the said building prior
to January 29, 1991. Their claims were said to be in the
region of Rupees fourteen crores. Accordingly, this Court
directed D.D.A. to set apart a sum of Rupees sixteen crores
[out of the said amount of Rupees seventy crores] and to
make it available to such purchasers in accordance with the
orders of this Court. This Court also requested Justice
R.S.Lahoti of the Delhi High Court to act as a one-man
Commission to prepare a list of persons who had paid the
amounts prior to January 29, 1991 and to determine the
amount paid by each of them. After an elaborate enquiry,
Justice Lahoti Commission submitted a Report dated February
2, 1996 according to which a sum of Rupees 13,27,37,561.59
crores was paid by more than seven hundred persons. The
Commission asked for directions of this Court whether the
said persons should also be paid the interest in addition to
the principal, as claimed by them. When the report of the
Commission came up for orders before this Court, Be directed
that for the time being only principal amount shall be paid
to the said purchasers and that the balance amount along
with interest accruing thereon shall be kept apart. This was
done keeping in view the interests of post-January 29, 1991
purchasers. It is true that these persons did purchase
notwithstanding the warning notice of D.D.A. but it is
equally possible that many of them may have seen only the
subsequent advertisements of Skipper and not the warning
notice of D.D.A. published on February 13, 1991.
We may clarify that our order dated February 12, 1996
does not mean that the pre-January 29, 1991 are not entitled
to interest on the amounts paid by them for which they have
a legitimate claim. We have only kept that claim under
consideration pending further developments in the matter.
We may also mention that this Court had appointed
another Commission headed by Justice O.Chinndppa Reddy, a
former Judge of this Courts to enquire into the role played
by the officials of the D . in the matter and to recommend
appropriate action against them. Justice Chinnappa Reddy
Commission submitted a Report promptly on July 7, 1995,
after conducting a pain-staking and elaborate enquiry, on
the basis of which this Court had directed disciplinary
action to be taken against certain officers of the D.D.A.
At this stages several applications have been filed by
the post-January 29 purchasers to sell the properties of
Tejwant Singh, his wife and children, which were attached by
this Court under its Order dated February 8, 1995 [in suo
motu contempt proceedings] and utilise the proceeds so
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realised to reimburse them along with interest and damages.
Notice of the said applications was given to Tejwant Singh
and Surinder Kaur and to the sons of the said persons whose
properties were attached under the aforesaid orders. We
have heard the parties at length on April 18, 1994.
S/Sri V.A.Bobde and Dushyant Dave, appearing for the
claimants [post-January 29, 1991 purchasers] and Sri Arun
Jaitley for the D.D.A. submitted that undergoing the
sentence of imprisonment by Tejwant Singh and his wife
Surinder Kaur does not erase their obligation to pay back
the amounts to the said claimants whom they had deliberately
and fraudulently induced into parting with substantial
amounts in clear and direct violation of the orders of this
Court. They submitted that the order of attachment of the
properties of Tejwant Singh and his wife and children was an
order independent from the order of punishment imposing
sentence of imprisonment and that the attachment was meant
for realizing amounts necessary for reimbursing the persons
defrauded. The attached properties should now be sold and
the proceedings therefrom utilised for paying the post-
January 29, 1991 claimants, it is submitted. Sri Arun
Jaitley further submitted that the claim of the pre-January
29, 1991 purchasers for interest on the amounts paid by them
is still there and has to be kept in mind while passing
orders in these applications. It is submitted that the
contemnors should not be allowed to keep or enjoy the fruits
of their contempt and that until all the persons defrauded
by Skipper are fully re-compensated, the contemnor’s
liability does not cease.
S/Sri Harish Salve and Rajeev Dhavan, appearing for
Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kaur respectively, took the stand
that while all the purchasers, whether pre- or post-January
29, 1991 should undoubtedly be duly reimbursed, the monies
for that purpose should come out of the monies collected by
the D.D.A. on account of the said plot. Interests of justice
and considerations of equity, which are the guiding factors
for this Court while acting under Article 142 of the
Constitution call for such a direction. They submitted that
as against Rs.9.82 crores payable to D.D.A., Skipper has
paid more than Rupees fifteen crores in all to D.D.A. The
amounts received from the purchasers has actually been
utilised for raising the construction which has now vested
in the D.D.A. in terms of the orders of the Delhi High Court
dated December 21, 1990/January 14, 1991. D.D.A. thus not
only got back the plot of the land but also the construction
made by Skipper free of any encumbrances. They have realised
a sum of Rupees seventy crores by selling the same. In other
words, D.D.A. has realised a total of Rupees eighty five
crores on account of the said plot. It is true that they
have set apart Rupees sixteen crores out of that but yet
they are in possession of about Rupees sixty nine crores of
the said money. The claim of post-January 29, 1991
purchasers is in a sum of about Rupees eleven crores. An
amount of Rupees five crores is lying with the Court.
Whatever balance amount is required to pay interest to pre-
January 29, 1991 purchasers and to pay off the post-January
29, 1991 purchasers should come out of the said amount of
Rupees sixty nine crores now with D.D.A. Learned counsel
submitted that on account of various proceedings taken
against Skipper and their directors and the attachment of
their properties and the adverse publicity in, that behalf,
it has become impossible for them to generate any monies for
depositing in this Court. They requested that a Commission
be appointed to determine the value of the structure raised
by Skipper on the said plot and also to determine the amount
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received by Skipper from post-January 29, 1991 purchasers
and to direct that the amount required to pay them should
come out of the funds with the D.D.A.
Sri K.Madhav Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the
two sons of Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kour [Prabhjot Singh
and Prabhjit Singh], submitted that the businesses of the
sons are independent and distinct from their parents and
that none of the monies received by their parents from the
aforesaid purchasers has been diverted to them or to the
companies of which they are directors. In facts the case of
the third respondents Prabhjot Singh, is that he has
separated from his father and that the company Technological
Park (P) Limited, at NOIDA [of which he and his wife are
directors] has nothing to do with the funds or activities of
their parent.. The fourth respondent. Prabhjit Singh, also
submitted that he and his wife are the directors of TeJ
Properties Private Limited, of which his parents were
directors earlier but that the affairs of Tej Properties are
in no way connected with the affairs and funds of his
parents. He is a director of Tej Properties as well as
Skipper Properties Private Limited.
D.D.A. has filed a list of properties held by Tejwant
Singh, his wife, Surinder Kaur and their sons and daughters
which according to them really belong to and are the
properties of Tejwant Singh and his wife. They submitted
that the various companies created by Tejwant Singh, his
wife and his children are merely fronts and devices to
defraud and defeat the claims of the purchasers and that for
doing complete Justice between the parties the corporate
veil should be lifted and all the said properties which have
already been attached, should be proceeded with to realise
the amounts necessary for paying the pre-January 29, 1991
purchasers in full [i e., interest] and also the post-
January 29, 1991 purchasers. In particular! Sri Jaitley has
pointed out the transaction of lease relating to he property
at No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi. The facts brought to our
notice are the following on October 1,1993 Tej Properties
(P) Limited through its Chairman and Managing Directors
Tejwant Singh, executed a lease agreement in favour of
"Maple Leaf Trading Company Limited, a company having its
office at 111, Charemont Roads Dublin, Ireland" for a period
of five years [with an option to the lease to have it
extended for another four years] at a rent of Rupees one
lakh per month. The lease agreement was to take effect from
October 8, 1993. On October 8, 1993, Maple Leaf executed a
lease deed in respect of the said property in favour of the
Embassy of Israel in India, New Delhi for a period of nine
years at the rate of Rs.8,78,360/- per month. It is pointed
out that Tejwant Singh and his wife, Surinder Kaur, were the
only two directors of Tej Properties and that in 1988 and 19
one H.S.Sarna and Prabhjit Singh [one of the sons of Tejwant
Singh] were brought in as its directors. It is submitted
that this property really belongs to the contemnors and that
this property alone is sufficient to realise all the monies
due to the persons defrauded by the said contemnors.
The issues arising from the contentions of the parties
are considered hereinafter topic-wise.
The nature and ambit of this
court’s power under Article the 142
of the constitution.
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India reads:
"142 Enforcement of decrees and
orders of Supreme Court and orders
as to descovery, etc.---(1) The
Supreme Court in the exercise of
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its jurisdiction may pass such
decree or make such order as is
necessary for doing complete
justice in any cause or matter
pending before it, and any decree
so passed or order so made shall be
enforceable throughout the
territory of India in such manner
as may be prescribed by or under
any law made by Parliament and,
until provision in that behalf is
so made, in such manner as the
President may by order prescribe."
In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [1995 (2) S.C.C.584], this
Court dealt with the scope and width of the power of this
Court under Article 142. After referring to the earlier
decisions of the Court in extenso, it is held that
"statutory provisions cannot override the constitutional
provisions and Article 142(1) being a constitutional power
it cannot be limited or conditioned by any statutary
provision. [Para 48]". lt is also held that "the
jurisdiction and powers of this Court under Article 142 are
supplementary in nature and are provided to do complete
justice in any matter....". In other words, the power under
Article 142 is meant to supplement the existing legal
framework - to do complete justice between the parties - and
not to supplant it. It is conceived to meet situations which
cannot be effectively and appropriately tackled by the
existing provisions of law. As a matter of fact, we think it
advisable to leave this power undefined and uncatalogued so
that it remains elastic enough to be moulded to suit the
given situation. The very fact that this power is conferred
only upon this Court, and on no one else, is itself an
assurance that it will be used with due restraint and
circumspection, keeping in view the ultimate object of doing
complete justice between the parties. Now, coming to the
facts of the case before us, the question is not what can be
done, but what should be done? We are of the opinion that
even while acting under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India, we ought not to re-open the orders and decisions Sf
the Courts which have become final. We do not think that for
doing complete justice between the parties before us, it is
necessary to resort to this extra-ordinary step. We are
saying this in view of the contention urged by S/Sri Salve
and Dhavan that since the D.D.A. has taken over not only the
plot but also the construction raised by Skipper thereon
[free from all encumbrances] in addition to the sum of
Rs.15.89 crores [said to have been paid by Skipper towards
the sale consideration of the said plot], the monies
required for paying the persons defrauded should come out of
the kitty of D.D.A. It must be remembered that the plot, the
construction raised thereon and the monies already paid
towards the sale consideration of the said plot have all
vested absolutely in the D.D.A. free from all encumbrances
under and by virtue of the decision of the Delhi High Court
dated December 21, 1990/January 14, 1991, which decision has
indeed been affirmed by this Court by dismissing the Special
Leave Petition preferred against it. It may not be open to
us to ignore the said decisions and orders, including the
orders of this Court, and/or to go behind those
decisions/orders and say that the amount received by D.D.A.
toward, sale consideration from Skipper or the value of the
construction raised by Skipper on the said plot should be
made available for paying out the persons defrauded by
Skipper. We must treat those decisions and orders as final
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and yet devise ways and means of doing complete justice
between the parties before us.
"The contemnor should not be
allowed to enjoy or retain the
fruits of his contempt":
The principle that a contemnor ought not to be
permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is
well-settled. In Mohd.Idris v. R.J. Babuji
[1985 (1) S.C.R.598], this Court held clearly that
undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that
the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for
remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its
Orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to
the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned
Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a
sentence of one month’s imprisonment. In addition thereto,
the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to
remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before
this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in
giving the aforesaid directions to in additing to punishing
the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was
rejected holding that "the Single Judge was quite right in
giving appropriate directions to close the breach [of
undertaking]".
The above principle has been applied even in the case
of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil Courts.
In Clarke v. Chadburn [1985 (1) All.E.R. 211], Sir Robert
Megarry V-C observed:
"I need not cite authority for the
proposition that it is of high
importance that orders of the court
should be obeyed. Willful
disobedience to an order of the
court is punishable as a contempt
of court, and I feel no doubt that
such disobedience may properly be
described as being illegal. If by
such disobedience the persons
enjoined claim that they have
validly effected some charge in the
rights and liabilities of others, I
cannot see why it should be said
that although they ere liable to
penalties for contempt of court for
doing what they did, nevertheless
those acts were validly done. Of
course, if an act is done, it is
not undone merely by pointing out
that it was done in breach in law.
If a meeting is held in breach of
an injunction, it cannot be said
that the meeting has not been held.
But the legal consequences of what
has been done in breach of the law
may plainly be very much affected
by the illegality. It seems to me
on principle that those who defy a
prohibition ought nat to be able to
claim that the fruits of their
defiance are good, and not tainted
by the illegality that produced
them."
To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and
Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Limited v. S.
Suppiah & Ors. [A.I.R.1975 Madras 270] and Sujit Pal v.
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Prabir Kumar Sun [A.I.R.1986 Calcutta 220]. In Century Flour
Mill Limited, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High
Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of
stay or injunction, it is the duty of the Court, as a
policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the
perpetuation of the wrong-doing. The inherent power of the
Court, it was held, is not only available in such a case,
but it is bound to be exercise it to undo the wrong in the
interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was
held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused
to recognize that the holding of the meeting is a legal one.
It put back the parties in the same position as they stood
immediately prior to the service of the interim order.
In Suraj Pal, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly
dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of
injunction and took possession of the property. The Court
directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with
the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality
can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its
inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of
Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory
direction is given for restoration of possession to the
aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent
the abuse of process of law.
There is no doubt that this salutory rule has to be
applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by
over-ruling any procedural or other- technical objections.
Article 129- is a constitutional power and when exercised
in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give
away. The Court must ensure full justice between the parties
before it.
Claims of Prabhjot Singh and
Prabhjit Singh [Sons of Tejwant
Singh]:
Prabhjot Singh Sabharwal, third respondent, stated in
his counter-affidavit filed in Interlocutory Application
No.29 of 1996 that he is in no way concerned with the
several companies pointed out by the D.D.A. [as belonging to
Tejwant Singh and members of his family] and that he is
interested only in one company, Technological Park Private
Limited, NOIDA. He stated that he and his wife are the
directors of thif company and that it does not deal in any
manner with Delhi Development Authority. He stated that his
parents are in no way concerned with Technological Park
Private Limited. He stated "I have separated from my father
and I have no dealings with the Delhi Development
Authority". It is significant to notice that this respondent
does not say when was he separated from his father, whether
the said ’separation’ is evidenced by writing, nor has he
stated that the said separation - or partition, as it may be
called - was reported to the Income Tax Authorities and was
accepted and recorded by them. The affidavit is quite vague
in this respect.
Prabhjit Singh, fourth respondent, [another son of
Tejwant Singh] has filed a separate counter-affidavit
stating that he and his wife are the directors in two
companies, Tej Properties Private Limited and Skipper
Properties Private Limited. Tej Properties is said to be an
investment company which is not carrying on any activity at
present. Skipper properties is said to be running in a loss.
He stated that he has no connection with the other companies
pointed out by the D.D.A. He admitted the transaction
relating to the property at No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi
but submitted that he is in no way connected with the
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affairs of his father or with Skipper Construction Private
Limited. It is significant to notice that this respondent
does mot say that he is separated or divided from his father
nor does he explain how he and his wife became directors of
Tej Properties of which his parents were the sole directors
at the time of grant of afore-mentiomed lease.
Lifting the corporate veil:
In Aron Salomon v. Salomon & Company Limited (1897
Appeal Cases 22), the House of Lords had observed, "the
company is at law a different person altogether from the
subscriber...; and though it may be that after incorporation
the business is precisely the same as it was before and the
same persons are managers and the same hands received the
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the
subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as
members liable, on any shape or form, except to the extent
and in the manner provided by that Act". Since then,
however, the Courts have come to recognize several
exceptions to the said rule. While it is not necessary to
refer to all of them, the one relevant to us is "when the
corporate personality is being blatantly used as a cloak for
fraud or improper conduct". [Gower: Modern Company Law - 4th
Edn. (1979) at P.137]. Pennington [Company Law - 5th Edn.
1985 at P.53] also states that "here the protection of
public interests is of paramount importance or where the
company has been formed to evade obligations imposed by the
law", the court will disregard the corporate veil. A
Professor of Law, S.Ottolenghi in his article "From Peeping
Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring it Completely" says
"the concept of ’piercing the veil’ in the United States is
much More developed than in the UK. The motto, which was
laid down by Sanborn,J. and cited since then as the law, is
that ’when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association
of persons. The same can be seen in various European
jurisdictions". [(1990) 53 Modern Law Review 338]. Indeed,
as far back 1912, another American Professor L.Maurice
Wormser examined the American decisions on the subject in a
brilliantly written article "Piercing the veil of corporate
entity" [published in (1912) XII Columbia Las Review 496]
and summarized their central holding in the following words:
"The various classes of cases where
the concept of corporate entity
should We ignored and the veil
drawn aside have vow been briefly
reviewed. What general rule, if
any, can be laid down? The nearest
approximation to generalization
which the present state of the
authorities would warrant is this:
When the conception of corporate
entity is employed to defraud
creditors, to evade an existing
obligation, to circumvent a
statute, to achieve or perpetuate
monopoly, or to protect knavery or
crime, the courts will draw aside
the web of entity, will regard the
corporate company as an association
of live, up-and-doing, men and
women shareholders, and will do
justice between real persons."
In Palmer’s Company law, this topic discussed in Part-
II of Vol-I. Several situations where the court will
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disregard the corporate veil are set out. It would be
sufficient for our purposes to quote the eighth exception.
It runs: "The courts have further shown themselves willing
to ’lifting the veil’ where the device of incorporation is
used for some illegal or improper purpose....Where a vendor
of land sought to avoid the action for specific performance
by transferring the land in breach of contract to a company
he had formed for the purpose, the court treated the company
as a mere ’sham’ and made an order for specific performance
against both the vendor and the company". Similar views have
been expressed by all the commentators on the Company Law
which we do not think it necessary to refer.
The law as stated by Palmer and Gower has been approved
by this Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company
Limited v. State of Bihar [1964 (6) S.C.R. 885 ]. The
following passage form the decision is apposite:
"Gower has classified seven
categories of cases where the veil
of a corporate body has been
lifted. But, it would not be
possible to evolve a rational
consistent and inflexible principle
which can be invoked in determining
the question as to whether the veil
of the corporation should be lifted
or not. Broadly, where fraud is
intended to be prevented, or
trading with enemy is sought to be
defeated, the veil of corporation
is lifted by judicial decisions and
the shareholders are held to be
’persons who actually work for the
corporation ."
In DHN Food Distributors Ltd. & Ors. v. London Borough
of Tower Hamlets [ 1976 (3) All.E.R. 462 ], the Court of
Appeal dealt with a group of companies. Lord Denning quoted
with approval the statement in Gower’s Company Law that
"there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the
separate legal entities of various companies within a group,
and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole
group". The learned Master of Rolls observed that "this
group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all
the three companies are partners". He called it a case of
"three-in-one" - and, alternatively, as "one-in-three".
The concept of corporate entity was evolved to
encourage and promote trade and commerce : but not to commit
illegalities or to defraud people. Where, therefore, the
corporate character is employed for the purpose of
committing illegality or for defrauding others, the court
would ignore the corporate character and will look at the
reality behind the corporate veil so as to enable it to pass
appropriate orders to do justice between the parties
concerned. The fact that Tejwant Singh and members of his
family have created several corporate bodies does not
prevent this Court from treating all of them as one entity
belonging to and controlled by Tejwant Singh and family if
it is found that these corporate bodies are merely cloaks
behind which lurks Tejwant Singh and/or members of his
family and that the device of incorporation was really a
Ploy adopted for committing illegalities and/or to defraud
people.
The concept of resulting trust and equity:
In Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas
[1994 (5) S.C.C.54], a Constitution Bench of this Court
comprising nine-Judges including one of us (B.P.Jeevan
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Reddy,J.) dealt with the challenge to the validity of the
definition of "illegally acquired properties" in clause (c)
of Section 3(1) of Smugglers and Foreign Exchange
Manipulators [Forfeiture of Property] Act, 1976 [SAFEMA].
The said Act provided that where a person earned properties
by smuggling or other illegal activities, all such
properties, whether standing in his name or in the name of
his relations or associates will be forfeited to the State.
while dealing with the justification for such a radical
provision, this Court held:
"So far as justification of such a
provision is concerned. there is
enough and more. After all, all
these illegally acquired properties
are earned and acquired in ways
illegal and corrupt - at the cost
of the people and the State. The
State is deprived of its legitimate
revenue to that extent. These
properties must justly go back
where they belong to the State.
What we are saying is nothing new
or heretical. Witness the facts and
ratio of a recent decision of the
Privy Council in Attorney General
for Hang Kong v. Reid [1993 (3) WLR
1143]. The respondent, Reid, was a
Crown-prosecutor in Hong Kong. He
took bribes as an inducement to
suppress certain criminal
prosecutions and with those monies,
acquired properties in New Zealand,
two of which were held in the name
of himself and his wife and the
third in the name of his solicitor.
He was found guilty of the offence
of bribe-taking and sentenced by a
criminal court. The Administration
of Hong Kong claimed that the said
properties in New Zealand sere held
by the owners thereof as
constructive trustees for the Crown
and must be made over to the Crown.
The Privy Council upheld this claim
overruling the New Zealand Court of
Appeals. Lord Templeman, delivering
the opinion of the Judicial
Committee, based his conclusion on
the simple ground that any benefit
obtained by a fiduciary through a
breach of duty belongs in equity to
the beneficiary. It is held that a
gift accepted by a person in a
fiduciary position as an incentive
for his breach of duty constituted
a bribe and, although in law it
belonged to the fiduciary, in
equity he not only became a debtor
for the amount of the bribe to the
person to whom the duty was owed
but he also held the bribe and any
property acquired therewith on
constructive trust for that person.
It is held further that if the
value of the property representing
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the bribe depreciated the fiduciary
had to pay to the injured person
the difference between that value
and the initial amount of the
bribe, and if the property
increased in value the fiduciary
was not entitled to retain the
excess since equity would not allow
him to make any profit from his
breach of duty. Accordingly, it is
held that tn the extent that they
represented bribes received by the
first respondent, the New Zealand
properties were held in trust for
the Crown, and the Crown had an
equitable interest therein. The
learned Law Lord observed further
that if the theory of constructive
trust is not applied and properties
interdicted when available, the
properties ’can be sold and the
proceeds whisked away to some
Shangri La which hides bribes and
other corrupt moneys in numbered
bank accounts; - to which we are
tempted to add - one can understand
the immorality of the Bankers who
maintained numbered accounts but it
is difficult to understand the
amorality of the Governments and
their laws which sanction such
practices - in effect encouraging
them. The ratio of this decision
applies equally where a person
acquires properties by violating
the law and at the expense of and
to the detriment of the State and
its revenues where an enactment
provides for such a course, even if
the fiduciary relationship referred
to in Reid is not present. It may
be seen that the concept employed
in Reid was a common law concept,
whereas here is a case of an
express statutory provision
providing for such forfeiture. May
we say in conclusion that ’the
interests of society are paramount
to individual interests and the two
must be brought into just and
harmonious relation. A mere
property career is not the final
destiny of mankind, if progress is
to be the law of the future as it
has been of the past’. (Lewis Henry
Morgan : Ancient Society)"
In Reid, the Privy Council made the following
observations which we find of crucial relevance to our
present-day society:
"A bribe is a gift accepted by a
fiduciary as an inducement to him
to betray his trust. A secret
benefit, which may or may not
constitute a bribe is a benefit
which the fiduciary derives from
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trust property or obtains from
knowledge which he acquires in the
course, of acting as a fiduciary
....Bribery is an evil practice
which threatens the foundations of
any civilised society..... Where
bribes are accepted by a trustee,
servant, agent or other fiduciary,
loss and damage are caused to the
beneficiaries, master or principal
whose interests have been
betrayed.......When a bribe is
offered and accepted in money or in
kind, the money or property
constituting the bribe belongs in
law to the recipient. Money paid to
the false fiduciary belongs to him.
The legal estate in freehold
property conveyed to the false
fiduciary by way of bribe vests in
him. Equity however which acts in
personam insists that it is
unconscionable for a fiduciary to
obtain and retain a benefit in
breach of duty. The provider of a
bribe cannot recover it because he
committed a criminal offence when
he paid the bribe. The false
fiduciary who received the bribe in
breach of duty must pay and account
for the bribe to the person to whom
that duty was owed. In the present
case as soon as Mr.Reid received a
bribe in breach of the duties he
owed to the Government of Hong
Kong, he became a debtor in equity
to the Crown for the amount of that
bribe........... As soon as the
bribe was received, whether in cash
or in kind, the false fiduciary
held the bribe on a constructive
trust for the person
injured........ If the property
representing the bribe exceeds the
original bridge value, the
fiduciary cannot retain the benefit
of the increase in value which he
obtained solely as a result of his
branch of duty..... When a bribe
is accepted by a fiduciary in
breach of his duty then he holds
that bribe in trust for the person
to whom the duty was owed. If the
property representing the bribe
decreases in value the fiduciary
must pay the difference between
that value and the initial amount
of the bribe because he should not
have accepted the bribe or incurred
the risk of loss. If the property
increases in vales, the fiduciary
is not entitled to any surplus in
excess of the initial value of the
bribe because he is not allowed by
any means to make a profit out of a
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breach of duty."
We respectfully agree with each and every statement
contained in the above extract. MAY WE SAY IN PARENTHESES
that a law providing for forfeiture of properties acquired
by holders of ’public officer" [ including the offices/posts
in the public sector corporations] by indulging in corrupt
and illegal acts and deals, is a crying necessity in the
present state of our society. The law must extend not only
to - as does SAFEMA - properties acquired in the name of the
holder of such office but also to properties held in the
names of his spouse, children or other relatives and
associates. Once it is proved that the holder of such office
has indulged in corrupt acts all such properties should be
attached forthwith. The law should place the burden of
proving that the attached properties were not acquired with
the aid of monies/properties received in the course of
corrupt deals upon the holder of that property as does
SAFEMA whose validity has already been upheld by this court
in the aforesaid decision of the larger Constitution Bench.
Such a law has become an absolute necessity, if the canker
of corruption is not to prove the death-khell of this
nation. According to several perceptive observers, indeed,
it has already reached near-fatal dimensions. It is for the
parliament to act in this matter, if they really mean
business. It may be recalled that in this very case, Justice
Chinnappa Reddy Commission [appointed to investigate into
the conduct of the officials of the D.D.A. in handing over
the possession of the plot to skipper without receiving the
full consideration and also in conniving at the construction
thereon] has reported that several top officials of the
D.D.A. have indeed connived at and acted hand in glove with
Skipper to confer illegitimate gain upon the latter. On the
basis of the said report. disciplinary enquiries have been
ordered against certain officials which are now pending. for
the reason that the enquiries are pending. For the reason
that the enquiries are pending. we desist form referring to
the findings of the commission except to broadly mention its
conclusion.
We are of the opinion that the holding in Amratlal
Prajivendas and in Reid should guide us while exercising the
extra-ordinary powers of this Court while acting under the
said Article form making appropriate orders for doing
complete justice between the parties*. The fiduciary
relationship may not exist in the present case nor is it as
case of a holder of public office, yet if it is found that
someone has acquired properties by defrauding the people and
if it is found that the persons defrauded should be restored
to the position in which they would have been but for the
said fraud, the court can make all necessary orders. This is
what equity means and in India the Courts are not only
courts of law but also courts of equity.
D.D.A.s responsibility to reimuburse the purchasers:
S/Shri Bobde and Dave, learned counsel for the
purchasers, countended that inasmuch as several top
officials of the D.D.A had colluded with Skipper and
connived at their wrong doing, the D.D.A. must be held
equally liable to reimburse the purchasers. Indeed, their
submission is that D.D.A. stood by and took no action
whatsoever while Skipper was issuing repeated
------------------------------------------------------------
*In other words, while action under Article 142 of the
Constitution, this Court will respect a statue, the absence
of a statue or statutory provision will not inhibit her to
make orders necessary for doing complete justice between the
parties.
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advertisements [even after January 29, 1991, in open and
brazen defiance of this Court’s Orders] and, therefore, it
must be made equally liable to reimburse the said purchasers
in full. We find it difficult to agree. Firstly, the said
contention is not factually correct. As has been pointed out
hereinabove, son after the publication of an advertisement
by Skipper in the newspapers inviting the citizens at large
to come and purchase the space in the proposed building on
February 4, 1991, the D.D.A. came forward with a warning
notice published in all leading national dailies advising
citizens not to purchase space in the building in view of
the orders of this Court. It is true that even thereafter
Skipper has been issuing similar advertisements but it
cannot be said with any reasonableness that D.D.A. should
have responded to each such advertisement by publishing a
warning. It would have done that but it cannot be faulted
for not doing it. It is, therefore, factually incorrect to
say that D.D.A. stood by and allowed Skipper to defroud the
people by issuing advertisements. Secondly, even if there is
any collusion between the officials of the D.D.A. and
Skipper as alleged by the learned counsel, the question
still arises whether D.D.A. be held bound by such actions of
its officials acting beyond their authority, indeed, acting
adverse to the interests of D.D.A. intentionally. We are not
suggesting nor are we laying down the proposition that the
D.D.A. is not bound by the acts and deeds of its officials
but are only saying that where the acts and deeds of the
officials are not only beyond their authority but are done
with a malafide intent, it may not be just end fair to bind
D.D.A. with such malafide acts and deeds. Be that as it may,
it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to pursue
this line of enquiry further or to express any definite
opinion thereon.
What are the directions called for in this matter?
In the light of the factual and legal position
adumbrated hereinabove, the question arises what are the
appropriate directions to be made in the matter? In other
words, the question is what directions and orders are called
for by this Court acting under its contempt jurisdiction
under Article 129 and its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties
before us? On one hand, the position is that the pre-January
29, 1991 purchasers have to be reimbursed in full which
means that they should also be paid interest at the
appropriate rate on the amounts advanced by them to Skipper.
[They have only been paid the principal amount in the sum of
Rs.13,27,37,561.59p pursuant to the Report of Justice Lahoti
Commission.] Secondly, the post-January 29, 1991 purchasers
have also to be reimbursed in full. According to Skipper,
the amounts collected from post January 29, 1991 purchasers
is in the region of Rupees eleven crores. The counsel for
the petitioners, however, say that some of them are bogus
purchasers set up by Skipper itself to defeat genuine
claims. As against these claims, only an amount of about
Rupees six crores is now available which is kept in fixed
depositing in nationalized banks. The balance has to be
realized. In our opinion, as at present advised, it would be
enough for the above purpose if we proceed against one
property, viz., No.30, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, which
appears to us, on the facts and material placed before us,
to belong wholly and exclusively to Tejwant Singh and his
wife. We ignore the corporate veil and we ignore the fact
that as present their son, Prabhjit Singh, and his wife are
the directors. [We have already held that Prabhjit Singh has
not explained in his affidavit how did he and his wife
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became directors in the place of his parents.] Tej
Properties private Limited, which is said to own the said
property, was intially having only two directors, viz.,
Tejwant Singh and his wife, Surinder Kaur. It is Tejwant
Singh who executed the lease deed in respect of the said
property in favour of ’Maple Leaf’ on October 1, 1993,
effective from October 8, 1993. On October 8, ]993 itself,
Maple Leaf executed a lease deed in respect of the said
property in favour of an Embassy of Israel in India, New
Delhi for a period of nine years at a rent of Rs.8,38,360/-
per month. It is crystal clear that the property belongs to
Tejwant Singh and the corporate veil and the change of
directorships are all mere devices to screen the said
property and its income from their creditors including the
purchasers aforesaid. Tej Properties Private Limited is
nothing but a fig-leaf and that too an inadequate one - to
cover up the reality. The reality is Tejwant Singh, the
contemner, who is the author of all these deals and devices.
The transfer of share-holding, if any, between the father
and the son [and their respective wives] must also be
treated as a sham transaction. The above course appears
tastified and necessary looked at from any angle, viz., (a)
that the contemnors should not be allowed to enjoy or retain
the fruits pf their contempt; (b) the interests of justice,
which call for the lifting of the corporate veil - the said-
property is in truth and effect the property of Tejwant
Singh and members of his family and must be available to
satisfy the claims of the persons defrauded by him; (c) that
while acting under Article 142 of the Constitution, this
Court must do complete justice between the parties and for
that purpose, it is necessary to ensure that a person who
has defrauded a large number of persons by issuing
advertisements in the leading newspapers published from the
capital inviting people to come and purchase space in the
said building in open and brazen violation of clear and
specific orders of this Court should not be allowed to
benefit from his fraud and/or contemptuous acts.
Accordingly, it is directed that:
(1) the property at No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, shall
be attached, if not already attached - and if it has already
been attached, it shall continue to be under attachment;
(2) the Embassy of Israel in India, New Delhi, the lessee of
the said property, is requested to deposit the monthly rent
payable in respect of the said building in this Court with
effect from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and
continue to deposit the same until further orders. Such
deposit in Court shall discharge- the Embassy of its
obligation to pay rent to ’Maple Leaf’, its landlord.
(3) Tejwant Singh and his wife, Surinder Kaur, are directed
to deposit in this Court a sum of Rupees ten crores within
two months from today. In default, steps will be taken to
sell the property at No.3, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi by
inviting tenders from the public. The said amount of Rupees
ten crores is tentatively arrived at as the amount required
to reimburse the pre-January 29, 1991 purchasers in full, as
explained hereinabove, and also to reimburse the post-
January 29, 1991 purchasers in full. [This shall not be
treated as the final figure required in this behalf.] While
fixing this amount, we have taken into account the fact that
about Rupees six crores is now available with this Court as
stated supra;
(4) the attachment of properties belonging to Tejwant Singh,
his wife and children, already effected, including the
properties mentioned in the application, I.A.No.29 of 1996,
filed by the D.D.A. shall continue to be in force pending
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further orders. It is, however, open to any of them to come
forward with a proposal to sell any of those properties and
if this Court is satisfied about the bonafides of the deal,
the attachment will be lifted on condition that the
confederation so received is deposited into this Court. It
is obvious that any such deposit will be treated as a
deposit towards the direction regarding deposit of Rupees
ten crores contained in Direction No.3 above;
(5) since it is necessary to ascertain the persons who have
paid amounts to Skipper after January 29, 1991 for
purchasing the space in the said building, and to exclude
the claims of non-genuine persons, we appoint Sri
O.Chinnappa Reddy, a former Judge of this Court, as the one-
man Commission to ascertain the number and identity of the
persons who have purchased the space in the building being
raised by Skipper after January 29, 1991 and also to
determine the amounts paid by each of them. The Commission
is requested to submit its Report within a period of six
months, as far as possible. The remuneration and the
expenses of Sri Justice O.Chinnappa Reddy will be borne
entirely by the D.D.A. out of the funds now lying with it,
as per his terms.
Ordered accordingly.
Before parting with this case, we feel impelled to make
a few observations. What happened in this case is
illustrative of what is happening in our country on a fairly
wide scale in diverse forms. Some Persons in the upper
strata [which means the rich and the influential class of
the society] have made the ’property career’ the sole aim of
their life. The means have become irrelevant - in a land
where its greatest son born in this century said "means are
more important than the ends". A sense of bravado prevails;
everything can be managed; every authority and every
institution can be managed. All it takes is to "tackle" or
"manage" it in an appropriate manner. They have developed an
utter disregard for law - nay, a contempt for it; the
feeling that law is meant for lesser mortals and not for
them. The courts in the country have been trying to combat
this trend, with some success as the recent events show. But
how many matters can we handle. How many more of such
matters are still there? The real question is how to swing
the polity into action, a polity which has become indolent
and soft in its vitals? Can the courts alone do it? Even so,
to what extent, in the prevailing state of affairs? Not that
we wish to launch upon a diatribe against anyone in
particular but Judges of this Court are also permitted, we
presume, to ask in anguish, "what have we made of our
country in less than fifty years"? Where has the respect and
regard for lag gone? And who is responsible for it?
On this occasion, we must refer to the mechanical
manner in which some of the courts have been granting
interim orders - injunctions and stay orders without
realizing the harm such mechanical orders cause to the other
side and in some cases to public interest. It is no answer
to say that "let us make the order and if the other side is
aggrieved, let it come and apply for vacating it". With
respect, this is not a correct attitude. Before making the
order, the court must be satisfied that it is a case which
calls for such an order. This obligation cannot be
jettisoned and the onus placed upon the
respondents/defendants to apply for vacating it. Take this
very case: a person purchases a property in auction. He does
not pay as per the stipulated terms. He obtains a series of
extensions. Still he doesn’t deposit and when the vendor
proposes to cancel the allotment, the court is approached
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and it stays the cancellation. The vendor [D.D.A.] applies
for vacating it but nothing happens except repeated
adjournments. This has happened more than once. We find that
as and when Skipper was not able to manage the D.D.A., he
approached the court and it provided him a breather. He then
gets time to manage the D.D.A.. This went on upto the end of
1990 when fortunately the Delhi High Court came with a tonne
of bricks upon Skipper and which order was affirmed two
years’ later by this Court.
Ultimately, no doubt, Skipper has met its nemesis but
meanwhile hundreds of persons are cheated out of their hard
earned monies; their dreams of owning a flat are shattered
rudely.
All this means that each of us in this land should wake
up to his duty and try to live up to it. We do not think we
need say more.
List the matter for further orders on July 16, 1996.
*A copy of this Judgment may be
communicated to Mr.Justice O.Chinnappa
Reddy, a former Judge of this Court, at
the address, Plot No.209, Jubilee Hills
Cooperative Housing Society, Jubilee
Hills, Hyderabad - 500033 within three
days.