Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SHOBHA RANI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MADHUKAR REDDI
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1987
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
BENCH:
SHETTY, K.J. (J)
RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 121 1988 SCR (1)1010
1988 SCC (1) 105 JT 1987 (4) 433
1987 SCALE (2)1008
ACT:
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Section 13(1)(i-a)-‘Cruelty’-
Demand for dowry-Whether cruelty-Whether wife entitled to
decree for dissolution of marriage-‘Intention’-Whether
necessary to constitute and prove cruelty in matrimonial
cases.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: ‘Dowry’-Demand of-Whether
amounts to cruelty entitling wife to decree for dissolution
of marriage.
Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 498A-‘Cruelty’-What
is-Demand for dowry-Whether amounts to cruelty-Whether wife
entitled to decree for dissolution of marriage.
HEADNOTE:
%
The appellant-wife, a post-graduate in biological
sciences, married the respondent-husband, a medical doctor
on December 19, 1982. Soon after, relations between them
became bitter. Ultimately, the appellant-wife moved the
court for divorce on the ground of cruelty. Her main
complaint was about the dowry demanded by the husband or his
parents.
The trial court rejected the appellant’s case on the
ground that there was no satisfactory evidence that the
demands were such as to border on harassment.
The High Court also rejected her case and held that the
appellant appeared to be hypersensitive and imagined too
much and too unnatural things, that the demand for money had
to be viewed from a proper angle, and that there was nothing
wrong in the respondent, who was a doctor, asking his rich
wife to spare some money.
Allowing the appeal by special leave,
^
HELD: 1.1 In order to curb the evil practice of dowry,
the Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
prohibiting the giving or taking of dowry. But, as the
pernicious practice continued in some communities, the Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enac-
1011
ted with considerable changes in the parent Act. Likewise,
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was amended by introducing an
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entirely new offence with regard to criminal jurisdiction.
Section 498A was introduced providing for punishment to the
husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjecting her to cruelty. [1015F-H]
new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty.
Explanation to s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code provides
that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or likely to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical of the woman), and harassment of the
woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security would constitute cruelty. [1016E-F]
1.2 Cruelty simpliciter is a ground for divorce under
section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, the word
‘cruelty’ has not been defined. Indeed, it could not have
been defined. It has been used in relation to or in respect
of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of
conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The
cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or
unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no
problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and
degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the
nature of cruel treatment and the impact of such treatment
in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable
apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live
with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to
be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct
and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may,
however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is
bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact
or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired
into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be
established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.
[1013E-H; 1014A]
1.3 The matrimonial conduct which constitutes cruelty
as a ground for dissolution of marriage, if not admitted,
requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities
as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in
criminal cases. [1016G]
1.4 Evidence as to harassment to the wife to meet any
unlawful demand for money is necessary to constitute cruelty
in criminal law. This is the requirement of the offence of
cruelty defined under s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. It
is not so under s. 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu
1012
Marriage Act, 1955. The cruelty need not be only
intentional, wilful or deliberate. It is not necessary to
prove the intention in matrimonial offence. From the context
and the set up in which the words ‘cruelty’ has been used in
s. 13(1)(i-a), intention is not a necessary element in
cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary
sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention
to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of
the conduct or brutal act complained or, cruelty could be
easily established. But the absence of intention should not
make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in
human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be
regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be
denied on the ground that there has been deliberate or
wilful ill-treatment. [1020F-H; 1021A-C]
1.5 The matrimonial duties and responsibilities are of
varying degrees from house to house or person to person.
Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment
of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court
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should not search for standard in life. In matrimonial
cases, the Court is not concerned with the ideals in family
life. It has only to understand the spouses concerned as
nature made them, and consider their particular grievance.
[1014B,F]
Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] 2 ALL E.R. 257, 259, Gollins
v. Gollins, [1963] 2 All E.R. 966 1972 and Narayan Ganesh
Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane, [1975] 3 SCR 967 1978,
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3013 of
1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.1986 of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.A.O. No. 1491 of 1985.
S. Madhusudan Rao, K.K. Gupta and Rakesh Kumar Gupta
for the Appellant.
K.V. Sreekumar and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. We grant special leave and
proceed to dispose of the appeal.
Shobha Rani is the appellant. Her husband is Madhukar
Reddi who is respondent before us. The wife is post-graduate
in biological
1013
sciences. The husband is a medical doctor. They were happily
married on December 19, 1982. But their happiness did not
last longer. They started exchanging letters with bitter
feelings. Then they began to accuse each other. At one
stage, they thought of winding up by mutual consent. It was
perhaps out of disgust. it would have been better, if it had
happened. But unfortunately, it did not materialise.
Ultimately they landed themselves in the Court. The wife
moved the Court for divorce on the ground of cruelty.
Before referring to further facts, let us consider the
law. The cruelty simpliciter is now a ground for divorce
under Sec. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (Act 25 of 1955).
Section 13 provides, so far as it is material:
"13 Divorce (1) Any marriage solemnized whether
before or after the commencement of this Act, may,
on a petition presented by either the husband or
the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on
the ground that the other party .....
(i) .......
(i-a) has, after the solemnization of the
marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty, or
xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
Section 13(1)(i-a) uses the words "treated the
petitioner with cruelty". The word "cruelty" has not been
defined. Indeed it could not have been defined. It has been
used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is
the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial
duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one
which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be
mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is
physical the court will have no problem to determine it. It
is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental the
problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin
as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact
of such treatment in the mind of the spouse. Whether it
caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or
injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter
of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature
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of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse.
There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of
itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then
the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need
not be enquired into or
1014
considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established
if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.
It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has
been marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial
duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea
change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or
person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint
about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or
relations, the Court should not search for standard in life.
A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be
so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend
upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their
economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon
their culture and human values to which they attach
importance. We, the judges and lawyers, therefore, should
not import our own notions of life. We may not go in
parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us
and the parties. It would be better if we keep aside our
customs and manners. It would be also better if we less
depend upon precedents. Because as Lord Denning said in
Sheldon v. Sheldon, [1966] 2 All E.R. 257 (259) "the
categories of cruelty are not closed." Each case may be
different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are
not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no
limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty.
New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon
the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate
the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful/realm of
cruelty.
These preliminary observations are intended to
emphasize that the Court in matrimonial cases is not
concerned with ideals in family life. The Court has only to
understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and
consider their particular grievance. As Lord Reid observed
in Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 2 All. E.R. 966 (1972):
"In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing
with objective standards, it is not a matrimonial
offence to fall below the standard of the
reasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are
dealing with this man or this woman."
Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in Narayan Ganesh Dastane
v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane, [1975] 3 SCR 967 (978) said:
"The Court has to deal, not with an ideal
husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such
exist) but with parti-
1015
cular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or
a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to
go to a matrimonial court, for, even if they may
not be able to drown their differences, their
ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss
over mutual faults and failures."
With these principles in mind, we may now unfold the
story with which the wife came to the Court seeking
dissolution of her marriage. She made several grievances. We
may ignore all but one. The one and the only one with which
we are concerned is her complaint about the dowry demand by
the husband or his parents. The dowry is a deep rooted evil
in the society. It started as customary presents with love
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and affection. In olden days, it was customary to give some
presents to the bride and bridegroom and his family at the
time of marriage. The parents of the bride or their
relations out of affection and good intention used to
provide the couple something to fall back upon in case of
need. The system started at a time when girls were generally
not very much educated and even if they were educated they
were unwilling to take up gainful employment. There was also
less opportunity for them either to supplement the family
income or to become financially independent. There was yet
another reason for such customary gifts. The daughter then
was not entitled to a share in the joint family properties
when she had a brother. Hence the father out of affection or
other consideration used to give some cash or kind to the
daughter at the time of marriage. The right of the father to
give a small portion of even the family property as a gift
to the daughter at the time of her marriage was recognised.
But unfortunately over the years new practice developed. The
boy or his family members started demanding cash or kind
from the brides parents. They started demanding dowry as a
matter of right. The demand more often extended even after
the marriage. There were instance of harassment of the wife,
if the demand was not complied with. In order to curb this
evil practice, the Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition
Act, 1961 (Act No. 28 of 1961). The Act prohibited the
giving or taking of dowry. But in spite of this enactment,
the pernicious practice continued in some communities. The
Joint Committee of Parliament appointed to examine the
working of the Dowry Prohibition Act remarked "the evil
sought to be done away with by the Act, on the other hand,
increased by leaps and bounds and has now assumed grotesque
and alarming proportions." Again the Parliament intervened.
The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was enacted with
considerable changes in the parent Act. Likewise the Indian
Penal Code was amended by introducing of an entirely new
offence hitherto unknown to criminal jurisprudence. Sec-
1016
tion 498 A has been introduced in the following terms:
"498 A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty; whoever, being
the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section
"cruelty" means:
(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on
account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand."
A new dimension has been given to the concept of
cruelty. Explanation to Sec. 498 A provides that any wilful
conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a
woman to commit suicide would constitute cruelty. Such
wilful conduct which is likely to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical
of the woman) would also amount to cruelty. Harassment of
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the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security would also constitute
cruelty.
We are, however, not concerned with criminal offence
either under the Dowry Prohibition Act or under the Indian
Penal Code. We are concerned with a matrimonial conduct
which constitutes cruelty as a ground for dissolution of
marriage. Such cruelty if not admitted requires to be proved
on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and
not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. This
Court has not accepted the test of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. As said by Chandrachud, J. in Dastane case (Ibid at
p. 976):
"Neither section 10 of the Act which
enumerates the
1017
grounds on which a petition for judicial
separation may be presented nor section 23 which
governs the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a
decree in any proceedings under the Act requires
that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court
the power to pass a decree if it is "satisfied" on
matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the
section. Considering that proceedings under the
Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word
"satisfied" must mean "satisfied" on a
preponderance of "probabilities" and not
"satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt". Section 23
does not alter the standard of proof in civil
cases."
Let us now turn to the evidence in this case. It
consists of that of wife as P.W. 1 as against the evidence
of husband as R.W. 1. The parties have also produced the
letters exchanged between them. There appears to be no doubt
that the husband or his parents were demanding dowry from
the appellant. The husband in his letter Ex. Al dated August
28, 1983 wrote to the wife:
"Now regarding Dowry point, I still feel that
there is nothing wrong in my parents asking for
few thousand rupees. It is quite a common thing
for which my parents are being blamed, as
harassment."
The wife in her evidence before the Court has stated:
"My Mother-in-law always used to make demand
for money from my parents. I used to tell my
parents about what was happening to me in that
house. I used to keep silent when my mother-in-law
made demands for money. The respondent also
sometimes used to make demands for money.
I used to tell him as to why should I ask money
from my parents, and I also used to tell him that
I would not ask my parents. But he used to reply
that such things were only there in olden times
and not now and that therefore, I should ask money
from my parents. There were fixed deposits
receipts in my name in the Bank upto one and a
half to two lakhs. Besides this there was house
plot in my name at Jubilee Hills. I was afraid of
telling my husband and my parents in law that I
would not ask my parents for money.
1018
This I was afraid because I had an apprehension
that something would be done to me either
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physically or mentally if I told them so. I
entertained this apprehension because this went on
regularly every day, that is their demands for
money.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
I was afraid to go back again to the respondent’s
house because I felt that the pestering for money
will go on like this. I, therefore, developed
aversion for going back to the respondent. For
that reason, I joined as a school teacher."
The trial court or the High Court did not state that
there was no demand for money. The case of the wife was,
however, rejected on the ground that there was no
satisfactoy evidence that the demands were such as to border
on harassment. The trial court said:
"Though one would not justify demands for
money, it has to be viewed in this perspective.
The respondent is a young up coming doctor. There
is nothing strange in his asking his wife to give
him money when he is in need of it. There is no
satisfactory evidence that the demands were such
as to border on harassment."
In regard to the admission by the husband in his letter
dated August 28, 1983 as to the dowry demanded by his
parents, the trial court observed:
"The letter should be read as a whole. The
respondent has an explanation to make and has made
one in the cross-examination. He is trying to
confess. It is clear from the attitude of the
petitioner that she is prone to exaggerate things.
That is evident from her complaint of food and the
habit of drinking."
xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx
"Either because of her over sensitivity or because
of her habit of exaggeration, she has made a
mountain of mole-hill. Further, for the reasons
best known to her, the petitioner
1019
has not examined her father. There is no
explanation why he has not been examined in
support of her contention that the respondent and
his parents were harassing her for money."
The High Court also went on the same lines. The High
Court said that the wife appears to be hypersensitive and
she imagines too much and too unnatural things. The High
Court then observed:
"Though one would not justify demands for
money it has to be viewed in the circumstances
from a proper angle. The respondent is a doctor,
if he asks his rich wife to spare some money,
there is nothing wrong or unusual."
This is not a case where the husband requested his wife
to give some money for his personal expenses. The High Court
appears to have misunderstood the case. It has evidently
proceeded on a wrong basis. It proceeded on the ground that
the husband wanted some money from his wife for his personal
expenses. If the demand was only of such nature we would
have thrown this appeal away. The wife must extend all help
to husband and so too the husband to wife. They are partners
in life. They must equally share happiness and sorrow. They
must help each other. One cannot take pleasure at the cost
of the other. But the case on hand is not of a failure on
that front. It has been admitted by the husband himself in
his letter dated August 28, 1983 addressed to the wife that
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his parents demanded dowry. But he wrote to the wife that
there was nothing wrong in that demand of his parents. This
is indeed curious. He would not have stated so unless he was
party to the demand. The wife has stated in her evidence
that there were repeated demands for money from her monther-
in-law. Her evidence cannot be brushed aside on the ground
that she has not examined her father. It was not the case of
the wife that the dowry was demanded directly from her
father. The evidence of the father was therefore not
material. It is also not proper to discredit the wife as
hypersensitive or prone to exaggeration. That would be
judging the wife by our style of manners and our standard of
life. That we cannot apply. We must try to understand her
feelings and then search for the nugget of truth in the
entire evidence.
The contents of Ex. Al should not be read in isolation.
It must be viewed against the background of accusations in
the letter dated December 26, 1983 written by advocate for
the wife to his counter-part. The relevant portion of the
letter reads:
1020
"In the background of these, the worst form
of ill trestment that is meted out to our client
was constant harassment for monies. It may be
brought to your notice that prior to marriage on
demand by your client’s father a sum of Rs. 17,000
was given and also a Scooter thereafter. It may be
brought to your notice that one other main reason
for your client to dowry deaths which are very
frequently seen now-a-days in papers. It may be
pointed out that your clients philosophy is that
since our client’s are financially sound, there is
no wrong for your client’s parent to ask for few
more thousands. It may be pointed out and brought
to your notice that it appears your client’s sole
object of marriage was to get the monies standing
in the name of our client transferred to his name.
It would be better to understand that money that
stand in our client’s name are somwhere about two
lakhs. It is not out of place to mention that your
client’s behaviour and treatment with our client
could only be said to be a pointer for seeking
these monies alone and marriage was a
device..........."
The cumulative effect of all the circumstances and the
evidence of parties lead to the conclusion that the demand
of dowry went on with the support of the husband. The High
Court while dealing with this part of the case has observed
that there is no evidence to show that the demands were such
as to cause harassment to the wife. The High Court appears
to have misconstrued the scope of cruelty in matrimonial
affairs. The evidence as to harassment to the wife to meet
any unlawful demand for money is necessary to constitute
cruelty in criminal law. It is the requirement of the
offence of ‘cruelty’ defined under sec. 498A of the Indian
Penal Code. Sec. 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act
provides that the party has after solemanization of the
marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty. What do these
words mean? What should be the nature of cruelty? Should it
be only intentional, wilful or deliberate? Is it necessary
to prove the intention in matrimonial offence? we think not.
We have earlier said that cruelty may be of any kind and any
variety. It may be different in different cases. It is in
relation to the conduct of parties to a marriage. That
conduct which is complained of as cruelty by one spouse may
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not be so for the other spouse. There may be instance of
cruelty by the unintentional but inexcusable conduct of any
party. The cruel treatment may also result by the cultural
conflict of the spouses. In such cases, even if the act of
cruelty is established, the intention to commit cannot be
1021
established. The aggrieved party may not get relief. We do
not think that that was the intention with which the
Parliament enacted sec. 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage
Act. The context and the set up in which the word ’cruelty’
has been used in the section, seems to us, that intention is
not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be
understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial
affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be
inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act
complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the
absence of intention should not make any difference in the
case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act
complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. The
relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that
there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. The
same is also the line of reasoning adopted by the House of
Lords in Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 2 All E.R. 966 at 976
where Lord Evershed said:
"I am unable to accept the premise that
"cruelty" in matrimonial proceedings requires or
involves of necessity the element of malignity-
though I do not of course doubt that if malignity
be in fact established it would be highly relevant
to a charge of cruelty. In my opinion, however,
the question whether one party to a marriage has
been guilty of cruelty to the other or has treated
the other with cruelty does not, according to the
ordinary sense of the language used by Parliament,
involve the presence of malignity (or its
equivalent); and if this view be right it follows,
as I venture to think, that the presence of
intention to injure on the part of the spouse
charged or (which is, as I think, the same thing)
proof that the conduct of the party charged was
"aimed at" the other spouse is not an essential
requisite for cruelty. The question in all such
cases is, to my mind, whether the acts or conduct
of the party charged were "cruel" according to the
ordinary sense of that word, rather than whether
the party charged was himself or herself a cruel
man or woman.............
Bearing in mind the proper approach to matrimonial
offence, we are satisfied that the facts and circumstances
brought out by the appellant in this case do justify an
inference that there was demand for dowry. The demand for
dowry is prohibited under law. That by itself is bad enough.
That, in our opinion, amounts to cruely entitling the wife
to get a decree for dissolution of marriage.
1022
In the result, we allow the appeal and in reversal of
the judgments of the courts below, we grant a decree for
dissolution of the marriage. In the circumstances of the
case, however, we make no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.
1023