SUHAS H POPHALE vs. ORIENTAL INS.CO.LTD.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1970 OF 2014 (@ out of SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.20625/2010) Dr. Suhas H. Pophale … Appellant Versus Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Its Estate Officer … Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. JUDGMENT Leave granted. 2 . This appeal by special leave raises the question as to whether the rights of an occupant/licensee/ tenant protected under a State Rent Control Act (Bombay Rent Act, 1947 and its successor the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, in the instant case), could be adversely affected by application of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Page 1 2 Occupants) Act, 1971 (‘Public Premises Act’ for short)? This question arises in the context of the eviction order dated 28.5.1993 passed by the respondent No. 2, Estate Officer of

appellant since 20.12.1972. The eviction order has been upheld by the Bombay High Court in its impugned judgment dated 7.6.2010, rejecting the Writ Petition No.2473 of 1996 filed by the appellant herein. The facts leading to this appeal are this wise:- 3. One Mr. Eric Voller was a tenant of the Indian Mercantile Insurance Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the erstwhile Insurance Co.), the predecessor in title of the first respondent in respect of the premises being Flat No.3, JUDGMENT Second Floor, Indian Mercantile Mansion (formerly known as Waterloo Mansion), Wodehouse Road, Opposite Regal Cinema, Colaba, Mumbai. This Mr. Voller executed a leave and licence agreement in respect of these premises on 20.12.1972 in favour of the appellant initially for a period of two years, and put him in exclusive possession thereof. Mr. Page 2 3 Voller, thereafter migrated to Canada with his family. The appellant is a practicing physician. The erstwhile insurance company did not object to the appellant coming into

of the tenancy to the appellant, the General Manager of the said insurance company, by his reply dated 16.1.1973, accepted the appellant as the tenant, though for residential purposes only. The said erstwhile insurance company, thereafter, started accepting the rent directly from the appellant. It is also the case of the appellant that on 14.3.1973, he wrote to the said General Manager seeking a permission for a change of user i.e. to use the premises for his clinic. It is also his case that on 18.4.1973, the General JUDGMENT Manager wrote back to him that the erstwhile insurance company had no objection to the change of user, provided the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai gave no objection. 4. The erstwhile insurance company subsequently merged on 1.1.1974 into the first respondent company which Page 3 4 is a Government Company. The management of the erstwhile insurance company had however been taken over by the Central Government with effect from 13.5.1971, pending its

notice dated 12.7.1980 to Mr. E. Voller terminating his tenancy with respect to the said premises, and then filed a suit for eviction against Mr. E. Voller and the appellant being R.A.E. Suit No.1176/3742 of 1981 in the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai, under the provisions of the then applicable Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 (‘Bombay Rent Act’ for short). Initially the suit came to be dismissed for default, but an application was made under Order 9 Rule 9 of Code of Civil Procedure to set JUDGMENT aside the said order. The application was allowed, and the suit remained pending. 5. The appellant then sent a letter dated 22.11.1984 to the first respondent requesting them to regularize his tenancy as a statutory tenant. The first respondent, however, served the appellant notices under Section 4 and 7 Page 4 5 of the Public Premises Act, to show cause as to why he should not be evicted from the concerned premises, and to pay damages as specified therein for unauthorised occupation as

Officer under the Public Premises Act, to evict Mr. E. Voller and the appellant, and also to recover the damages. After initiating these proceedings, the first respondent withdrew on 22.2.1994 the suit filed in the Court of Small Causes. It is, however, relevant to note that in paragraph No. 4 of their case before the Estate Officer, the first respondent specifically accepted that Mr. E. Voller had sublet or given on leave and licence basis or otherwise transferred his interest in the said flat to the appellant in or about 1972, though JUDGMENT without any authority from the respondent No. 1. The first respondent alleged that the appellant had carried out structural changes. The appellant denied the allegation. He claimed that he had effected some essential minor repairs for maintenance of the premises since the first respondent was neglecting to attend the same. The appellant filed a reply Page 5 6 pointing out that he had been accepted as a tenant by the predecessor of the first respondent by their earlier referred letter dated 16.1.1973. The first respondent, however,

second respondent thereafter passed an order on 28.5.1993 directing eviction of Mr. E. Voller and the appellant, and also for recovery of damages at the rate of Rs.6750 per month from 1.9.1980. 6. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed an appeal before the City Civil Court at Mumbai under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act, which appeal was numbered as Misc. Appeal No.79/93. The City Civil Court set aside the order of damages, and remanded the matter to the JUDGMENT second respondent to reconsider that aspect, but upheld the order of eviction by its judgment and order dated 17.1.1996. The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition bearing No.2473/1996 before the High Court on 15.4.1996 to challenge that part of the appellate order which upheld the order of eviction. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition, Page 6 7 by the impugned judgment and order dated 7.6.2010, with costs. 7. The principal contention raised by the appellant

his occupation of the concerned premises was protected under the newly added S 15A of the Bombay Rent Act with effect from 1.2.1973, i.e. prior to the first respondent acquiring the title over the property from 1.1.1974. Therefore, he could not be evicted by invoking the provisions of Public Premises Act, and by treating him as an unauthorised occupant under that act. The impugned order of the High Court rejected the said submission holding that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act were not applicable to JUDGMENT the premises concerned, and the said premises were covered under the Public Premises Act. The High Court principally relied upon the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank reported in 1990 (4) SCC 406 . As per the view taken by the High Court, this judgment rejects the contention that Page 7 8 the provisions of the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to the premises which fall within the ambit of a State Rent Control Act. The High Court held that the Public Premises Act

Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 wherefrom the management of the erstwhile insurance company was taken over by the Central Government, and not from the date of merger i.e. 1.1.1974. It is this judgment which is under challenge in the present appeal. 8. Mr. Rohinton F. Nariman, learned senior counsel has appeared for the appellant and Mr. Harin P. Raval, learned senior counsel has appeared for the respondents. The principal issue involved in the matter:- JUDGMENT 9. To begin with, it has to be noted that the relationship between the erstwhile insurance company as the landlord and the appellant as the occupant, at all material times was governed under the Bombay Rent Act. Like all other rent control enactments, this Act has been passed as a welfare measure, amongst other reasons to protect the Page 8 9 tenants against unjustified increases above the standard rent, to permit eviction of the tenants only when a case is made out under the specified grounds, and to provide for a

Maharashtra thought it necessary to protect the licensees also in certain situations. Therefore, this act was amended, and a section was inserted therein bearing Section No.15A to protect the licensees who were in occupation on 1.2.1973. This Section reads as follows:- “ 15A. Certain licensees in occupation st on 1 February 1973 to become tenants (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or anything contrary in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract where any person is on the st 1 day of February 1973 in occupation of any premises, or any part thereof which is not less than a room, as a licensee he shall on that date be deemed to have become, for the purpose of this Act, the tenant of the landlord, in respect of the premises or part thereof, in his occupation. JUDGMENT (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not affect in any manner the operation of sub-section (1) of section 15 after the date aforesaid.” We may note that S 15(1) prohibits sub-letting of premises. Page 9 10 10. As far as the insurance business in India is concerned, prior to independence, it was owned and operated by private entities. The governing law for insurance

that the Life Insurance industry in India was to be nationalised. Therefore, the Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956 was passed creating the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC), as a statutory corporation, and transferring the assets of all the private life insurance companies in India to LIC. Sometimes around 1970-71, it was felt that the general insurance industry was also in need of nationalisation. Therefore, first the General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 was passed by the Parliament which provided for JUDGMENT the taking over of the management of general insurance business. Though the Act received the assent of the President on 17.6.1971, it was deemed to have come into force on 13.5.1971 from which date the Central Government assumed the management of General Insurance Business as an initial step towards the nationalisation. Thereafter, the Page 10 11 General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was passed on 20.9.1972. Section 16 of this Act contemplated the merger of the private insurance companies into certain other

(a) The National Insurance Company Ltd., (b) The New India Assurance Company Ltd., (c) The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., and (d) The United India Insurance Company Ltd. These four companies are fully owned subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation of India which is a Government Company registered under Companies Act, 1956, but incorporated as mandated under Section 9 of the above referred Nationalisation Act. The Central Government JUDGMENT holds not less than 51 per cent of the paid up share capital of the General Insurance Corporation. The above referred Indian Mercantile Insurance Company Ltd. merged into the first respondent-Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. w.e.f. 1.1.1974. Page 11 12 11. There is one more important development which is required to be noted. The Public Premises Act, 1971 (40 of 1971) came to be passed in the meanwhile. As per its

matters ” such as removal of unauthorised construction, recovery of arrears of rent etc. It came into force on 23.8.1971, but Section 1(3) thereof states that it shall be deemed to have come into force on 16.9.1958, except Section 11 (on offences and penalty) and Sections 19 and 20 (on repeal and validation). This is because from 16.9.1958, its predecessor Act viz. The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act (32 of 1958) was in force for similar purposes, and which was repealed by the above JUDGMENT referred Section 19 of the 1971 Act. As provided under Section 2 (e) (2) (i) of this Act, the definition of ‘Public Premises’, amongst others, covers the premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any company in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital Page 12 13 was held by the Central Government. The definition of public premises under Section 2(e) of this Act reads as follows:-

or on behalf of,— (i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company, (ii) any Corporation [not being a company as JUDGMENT defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or a local authority] established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, (iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act, (iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961), (v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963), Page 13 14 (vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted

the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924); and] (3) in relation to the [National Capital Territory of Delhi],— (i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any municipal committee or notified area committee, (ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority, [and] [(iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory;]” JUDGMENT 12. The consequence of this development was that in view of the merger of the erstwhile insurance company into the first respondent, (of which not less than 51 per cent share holding was that of the Central Government,) the Public Premises Act became applicable to its premises. It is the contention of the appellant that although the Act is otherwise Page 14 15 deemed to have come into force from 16.9.1958, as far as the present premises are concerned, the Act became applicable to them from 1.1.1974 when the erstwhile

Government Company. However, since the appellant’s occupation of the said premises was protected by Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act which Section had become enforceable prior thereto from 1.2.1973, he could not be said to be in ‘unauthorised occupation’ and, therefore, could not be evicted by invoking the provisions of the Public Premises Act. On the other hand, the contention of the respondents is that the Public Premises Act became applicable to the concerned premises from 13.5.1971 itself, when the JUDGMENT management of the erstwhile insurance company was taken over by the Central Government, and the rejection of the writ petition by the High Court on that ground was justified. The principal issue involved in this matter is thus about the applicability of the Public Premises Act to the premises occupied by the appellant. Page 15 16 Submissions of the rival counsel:- 13 . Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Nariman submitted that the finding of the High Court that the

Central Government assumed the management of the erstwhile private insurance company. The erstwhile insurance company continued to exist until it merged in the appellant-company w.e.f. 1.1.1974. In the circumstances, although the Public Premises Act came into force on 23.8.1971 (with deemed date of coming into force being 16.9.1958), and although the appointed date for assuming management was 13.5.1971, the premises could be said to have ‘belonged’ to the first respondent as per the definition JUDGMENT under Section 2(E)(2)(i) of the Act, only from 1.1.1974, when the merger took place. Prior thereto the Bombay Rent Act had been amended and the licensees in occupation, were declared as deemed tenants, by virtue of Section 15A of the said Act. The appellant has been in continuous occupation of the said premises as a licensee from 20.12.1972. On Page 16 17 1.2.1973 his status got elevated to that of a ‘deemed tenant’ which was prior to the respondent No. 1 becoming owner of the building from 1.1.1974. The submission of Mr. Nariman

since the Public Premises Act became applicable from 1.1.1974, the rights of the tenants and also those of the licensees protected under the State Act prior to 1.1.1974, could not be taken away by the application of the Public Premises Act which can apply only prospectively. In his submission the eviction proceedings under the Public Premises Act against the appellant were therefore, null and void. The only remedy available for the first respondent for evicting the appellant would be under the Bombay Rent Act JUDGMENT or under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 which has replaced the said Act with effect from 31.3.2000. We may note at this stage that Mr. Nariman made a statement that the appellant is making out a case on the basis of his legal rights as a protected licencee, and not on the basis of the Page 17 18 earlier mentioned correspondence between the appellant and the erstwhile insurance company. 14. Learned senior counsel for the respondents Mr.

over, the Public Premises Act became applicable. Therefore, it was fully permissible for the first respondent to initiate the proceedings to evict the appellant from the public premises. In his view, the legal position, in this behalf, has been settled by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the above referred Ashoka Marketing case, and the view taken by the High Court with respect to the date of applicability of the Public Premises Act was in consonance with the said judgment. JUDGMENT 15. As against that, it is the submission of the Mr. Nariman that the judgment in Ashoka Marketing (supra) has to be understood in its context, and that it did not lay down any such wide proposition as Mr. Raval was canvassing. He pointed out that the judgment in Ashoka Marketing (supra) was with respect to the overriding effect of the Page 18 19 Public Premises Act vis-à-vis the Delhi Rent Control Act, which are both Acts passed by the Parliament, and where the premises fall within the ambit of both the enactments. In the

his submission, the Public Premises Act must firstly apply to the concerned premises, and in his submission the concerned premises did not fall within the ambit of that act. That being so, in any case, the rights of the tenants who were protected under the State Act prior to passing of this Act, could not be said to have been extinguished by virtue of coming into force of the Public Premises Act. Consideration of the submissions The Judgment in the case of Ashoka Marketing JUDGMENT 16. Inasmuch as, the judgment in the case of Ashoka Marketing (supra) is crucial for determining the issue in controversy, it would be relevant to refer to the said decision in detail. When we analyse the judgment in Ashoka Marketing (supra), we have to first see as to what was the subject matter of the controversy before this Court in Ashoka Page 19 20 Marketing? It was with respect to the eviction of the occupants from the premises owned by Punjab National Bank and Allahabad Bank which are both nationalised banks, and

Constitution Bench, the question framed by the Court for its consideration was as follows:- “ whether a person who was inducted as a tenant in premises, which are public premises for the purpose of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Public Premises Act’), and whose tenancy has expired or has been terminated, can be evicted from the said premises as being a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and whether such a person can invoke the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rent Control Act’). In short, the question is, whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments .” JUDGMENT (emphasis supplied) 17. We may refer to the definition of “unauthorised occupation” as provided under Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act at this stage. It reads as follows:- Page 20 21

As can be seen from this definition, it consists of two parts. In paragraph 30 of the above judgment also, this Court noted that the definition of ‘unauthorized occupation’ in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act, was in two parts. The first part of this definition deals with persons who are in occupation of the Public Premises ‘without authority for such occupation’, and the second part deals with those in JUDGMENT occupation of public premises, whose authority to occupy the premises ‘has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever’. As stated in paragraph 1 of the judgment, the Constitution Bench was concerned with the second part of the definition. As far as these two parts are concerned, the Court observed in paragraph 30 as follows:- Page 21 22

JUDGMENT 18. Thereafter, the Court dealt with the issue of conflict between the two enactments and whether the Public Premises Act, would override the Delhi Rent Control Act. As Page 22 23 this Court noted in paragraph 49 of the said judgment, both these statutes have been enacted by the same legislature, i.e. Parliament, in exercise of the legislative powers in

State Legislatures, this Court observed in paragraph 46 as follows:- “ 46. As regards rent control legislation enacted by the State Legislature the position is well settled that such legislation falls within the ambit of Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution (See. Indu Bhushan Bose Vs. 1 Rama Sundari Devi , V. Dhanpal Chettiar 2 case ; Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi Vs. 3 Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. 4 Vs. Union of India .” 1. (1969) 2 SCC 289 : (1970) 1 SCR 443, 2 . (1979) 4 SCC 214 : (1980) 1 SCR JUDGMENT 334 3. (1980) 3 SCC 162 : (1980) 3 SCR 224, 4. (1988) 4 SCC 324 19. As far as Public Premises Act is concerned, paragraph 48 of this judgment, referred to the earlier judgments in Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India reported in 1988 (4) SCC 324 , and Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. reported in 1989 (1) SCC 272. In Accountant and Page 23 24 Secretarial Service Pvt. Ltd. (supra) , this Court had held that the Public Premises Act is also referable to Entries 6, 7 and 13 of the Concurrent List. At the end of paragraph 48, of

20. Thereafter, on the question as to whether the Public Premises Act overrides the Delhi Rent Control Act, this Court observed as follows at the end of paragraph 49:- JUDGMENT “ In our opinion the question as to whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act override the provisions of the Rent Control Act will have to be considered in the light of the principles of statutory interpretation applicable to laws made by the same legislature.” In this context, the Court noted that the two principles which are to be applied are (i) later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, and (ii) a general provision does not derogate from a Page 24 25 special one. In paragraph 54, the Court noted that Public Premises Act is a later enactment having been enacted on 23.8.1971, whereas the Delhi Rent Control Act, was enacted

55 as follows:- “ 55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass an order of eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a designated officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such an order. Therefore, the JUDGMENT Page 25 26

(emphasis supplied) 21. In paragraph 62, this Court noted the objects and reasons of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which are as follows:- 62. …. (a) to devise a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenants; (b) to provide for the determination of the standard rent payable by tenants of the various categories of premises which should be fair to the tenants, and at the same time, provide incentive for keeping the existing houses in good repairs, and for further investments in house construction; and (c) to give tenants a larger measure of protection against eviction…….. JUDGMENT 22. In paragraph 63, this Court noted the statement of objects and reasons of the Public Premises Act, which are as follows:- Page 26 27

Thereafter, the Court observed:- “63……. This shows that the Public Premises Act, has been enacted to deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorized occupation of public premises by providing a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation…….” JUDGMENT (emphasis supplied) 23. In paragraph 64, this Court then noted that the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act operated in two different areas, and the properties ‘belonging to’ the Central Government, Government Companies or Corporations would Page 27 28 be excluded from the application of the Rent Control Act. The Court observed to the following effect:-

(emphasis supplied) Thereafter, the Court observed:- JUDGMENT “…..The reason underlying the exclusion of property belonging to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act, is that the Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest ……” (emphasis supplied) Page 28 29 24. Paragraph 66 of the judgment makes it clear that this Court was concerned with a contractual tenancy and ruled out a dual procedure for eviction. In that context it

JUDGMENT It is relevant to note that, it is in this context that the Court rendered its decision in Ashoka Marketing , and upheld the orders of eviction under Public Premises Act. 25. It was submitted by Mr. Nariman, that as can be seen from above, the Court was concerned with the second part of the definition of “unauthorised occupation” under Page 29 30 Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act, which is concerning expiry or determination of the authority to occupy. He submitted that the ‘determination of tenancy’ is referable to

quoted above specifically refers to the Transfer of Property Act. He submitted that the latter part of this definition was indicating a reference to contractual tenancy, and in this behalf referred to the above referred paragraph 66 which also speaks about the contractual tenancy. His submission was that since the first part of the definition under Section 2(g) referred to a person who is occupying the premises without any authority, it would exclude a person who is occupying the premises under the authority of law. In his JUDGMENT submission, since the appellant was a deemed tenant under the state law, such a statutory tenant will have to be considered as protected by authority of law and cannot be called a person in “unauthorised occupation”. He referred to the judgment of this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in 1986 (3) SCR Page 30 31 866 , which held that the amendment brought about by section 15A was an attempt to protect very large number of legitimate persons in occupation. The judgment also made a

statutory tenant is entitled to create a licence, whereas a contractual tenant can create a sub-lease. However, the proposition canvassed by Mr. Nariman would mean that a licensee protected by statute will not be in an unauthorised occupation, but a contractual tenant could be, since, his authority to occupy can be determined, and he would be in an unauthorised occupation thereafter. Thus, a protected licensee would be placed on a pedestal higher than that of a principal contractual tenant. In our view, this judgment does JUDGMENT not state so, nor can it lead us to accept any such proposition as it would mean accepting an incongruous situation.

26. The question that is required to be examined, however, is whether the tenants as well as licencees, who are protected under the State Law, could be called Page 31 32 unauthorised occupants by applying the Public Premises Act to their premises as ‘belonging’ to a Government Company, and if so from what date. As we have noted earlier, to initiate

Section 2(e) of the Act. Besides, as far as the present premises are concerned, it is necessary that they must belong to a Government Company. The definition of public premises will, therefore, have to be looked into, and it will have to be examined as to from what date the premises can be said to be belonging to a Government Company. Section 19 of the Public Premises Act, 1971 repeals the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. While repealing this predecessor Act, Section 1(3) of the JUDGMENT 1971 Act lays down that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 16th day of September, 1958 except sections 11, 19 and 20 which shall come into force at once (i.e. from 23.8.1971). Section 11 deals with offences and penalties. Section 19 is the repealing Section as stated above, and Section 20 is the section on validation of any Page 32 33 judgment, decree or order of any competent court which might have been passed under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958. The conjoint reading of

the Act of 1971 are deemed to have come into force from 16.9.1958, they will apply to the concerned premises only from the date when they become public premises. 27. Thus, in the case of a company under the Companies Act, 1956 as in the present case, it is necessary that the premises must belong to or must be taken on lease by a company which has not less than 51 per cent paid up share capital held by the Central Government. The submission of the respondents is that the date on which the JUDGMENT management of the erstwhile Insurance Company was taken over i.e. 13.5.1971 would be the relevant date, and from that date the premises would be said to have become public premises. It was submitted that after coming into force of the said Act, it was not open to the erstwhile company to transfer or otherwise dispose of any assets or create any charge, Page 33 34 hypothecation, lease or any encumbrance thereto without the previous approval of the persons specified by the Central Government. It was contended that as a result, the

1971. 28. The submission of the respondent was accepted by the High Court by relying upon an earlier judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of M. Mohd vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 Bombay 443 . In para 22 thereof, the High Court held as follows:- “ …..There is no doubt that the expression “belonging to” does not mean the same thing as “owned by”. The two expressions have two different connotations. The expression “belonging to” will take within its sweep not only ownership but also rights lesser than that of ownership.” JUDGMENT It is relevant to note that the appellants therein were government employees occupying premises allotted to them as service premises. The premises were situated in privately owned buildings, and taken on lease by the Government. The appellants had retired from their services, but were not Page 34 35 vacating the premises, and hence eviction orders were passed against them under the Public Premises Act. The premises were admittedly taken on lease, and were therefore

follows, “ Once the factum of lease is established, which has been done in the present case, the authorities under the act get jurisdiction to inquire under the act.” The submission of the appellants therein was that the premises could not be said to be belonging to the respondents, and therefore, not public premises. It is in this context that the High Court held that the expression ‘belonging to’ will take within its sweep rights lesser than that of ownership. The observations quoted above will have to be read in that context. It is JUDGMENT however, relevant to note what the Division Bench has thereafter added:- “ It must be remembered in this connection that the expressions used in the statute are to be interpreted and given meaning in the context in which they are used.” It is material to note that it was not a case like the present one, where the occupant has claimed protection under the Page 35 36 State Rent Control Law available to him prior to the Public Premises Act becoming applicable. The High Court had relied upon a judgment of this Court in Mahomed Amir Ahmad

“ Though the word “belonging” no doubt is capable of denoting as absolute title, is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense.” This was a matter wherein the appellant was alleged to have disputed the title of the respondent landlord by contending that the premises were belonging to the appellant. The Court noted that all that he meant by using the word ‘belonging’ was that he was a lessee, and nothing more. It was in this sense that this Court observed as above while allowing his JUDGMENT appeal. 29. In the present matter we are concerned with the question, whether the respondents could resort to the provisions of the Public Premises Act at a time when the merger of the erstwhile insurance company into the first respondent was not complete. The question is whether taking over of the management of the erstwhile company can Page 36 37 confer upon the respondent No. 1 the authority to claim that the premises belong to it to initiate eviction proceedings under the Public Premises Act, to the detriment of an

we may profitably refer to the judgment of this Court concerning another welfare enactment in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Nagpur Vs. Model Mills, Nagpur and Anr. reported in AIR 1984 SC 1813. The issue before the Court was whether upon the appointment of an authorised controller under Section 18A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDR Act short) in respect of an industrial undertaking, when it is run by him under the authority of a Department of the Central Government, the JUDGMENT employees of the undertaking would get excluded from the application of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, in view of the provision contained in Section 32(iv) of the Bonus Act. The court made a distinction between the concept of taking over of management and taking over of ownership. Inasmuch as the taking over of the management did not result into the Page 37 38 Central Government becoming the owner of the textile mills, the right of the workmen to receive bonus was not extinguished. The Court held as follows:

JUDGMENT (emphasis supplied ) A similar approach was adopted by the Court in Bhuri Nath and Ors. Vs. State of J&K and Ors. reported in AIR 1997 Page 38 39 SC 1711. Here the issue before the Court was with respect to the constitutionality of the Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988 (XVI of 1988) which was made

endowments, all temples, and sum total of the properties, movable and immovable, attached or appurtenant to the Shrine. While addressing an argument with respect to the violation of Article 31 of the Constitution, the Court observed in para 29 as follows: “29. ………. The right to superintendence of management, administration and governance of the Shrine is not the property which the State acquires. It carries with it no beneficial enjoyment of the property to the State. The Act merely regulates the management, administration and governance of the Shrine. It is not an extinguishment of the right. The appellants-Baridarans were rendering pooja, a customary right which was abolished and vested in the Board. The management, administration and governance of the Shrine always remained with the Dharamarth Trust from whom the Board has taken over the same for proper administration, management and governance. In other words, the effect of the enactment of the Act is that the affairs of the JUDGMENT functioning of the Shrine merely have got transferred from Dharmarth Trust to the Board. Page 39 40 The Act merely regulates in that behalf; incidentally, the right to collect offerings enjoyed by the Baridarans by rendering service of pooja has been put to an end under the Act. The State, resultantly, has not acquired that right onto itself. ……..” (emphasis supplied) 30. As far as the present matter is concerned it is required to be noted that the Principal Agencies floated by the promoters of the erstwhile private Insurance Companies were controlling their business. In the ‘History of Insurance of India’ published by Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority’ (IRDA) on its official website on 12.07.2007 under Ref: IRDA/GEN/06/2007 it is stated as follows: “ The Insurance Amendment Act of 1950 abolished Principal Agencies. However, there were a large number or insurance companies and the level of competition was high. There were also allegations of unfair trade practices. The Government of India, therefore, decided to nationalize insurance business.” JUDGMENT Thus, as far as the erstwhile Insurance Company in the present case is concerned, as an initial step, its management was taken over by the Central Government w.e.f. 13.5.1971, and it was entrusted with the custodian appointed by the Central Government. It would definitely entail a right in the Page 40 41 custodian to take necessary steps to safeguard the property of the erstwhile insurance company. But it was a transitory arrangement. The properties of the erstwhile insurance

undoubtedly provides a speedy remedy to recover the premises from the unauthorised occupants. At the same time, we have also to note that in the instant case the occupant is claiming a substantive right under a welfare provision of the State Rent Control Act, which gave him a protected status in view of the amendment to that Act. The question is whether this authority of management bestowed on the Government Company can take in its sweep the right to proceed against such protected tenants under the Public JUDGMENT Premises Act, by contending that the premises belonged to the Government Company at that stage itself, and that the State Rent Control Act no longer protected them. Considering that the Rent Control Act is a welfare enactment, and a further protective provision has been made therein, can it be permitted to be rendered otiose and made inapplicable to Page 41 42 premises specifically sought to be covered thereunder, and defeated by resorting to the provisions of the Public Premises Act? In the present case, it must also be noted that the

respondent No. 1 is undoubtedly not without a remedy, and it can proceed to evict an unauthorised occupant under the Rent Control Act, if an occasion arises. It can certainly resort thereto until the managerial right fructifies into a right of ownership. However by enforcing a speedier remedy, a welfare provision cannot be rendered nugatory. The provisions of the two enactments will have to be read harmoniously to permit the operation and co-existence of both of them to the extent it can be done. Therefore, the JUDGMENT term ‘belonging to’ as occurring in the definition of Public Premises in Section 2(e) will have to be interpreted meaningfully to imply only the premises owned by or taken on lease by the Government Company at the relevant time. In the facts of this case what we find is that the appellant had the status of a deemed tenant under the Bombay Rent Act, Page 42 43 1947 prior to the concerned premises ‘belonging to a Government Company’ and becoming public premises. If at all he had to be evicted, it was necessary to follow the due

Rent Control Act, 1999, and not the one which is provided under the provisions of the Public Premises Act. Can the Public Premises Act be given retrospective effect? 31. There is another aspect of the matter. Mr. Raval, learned senior counsel for the respondents has contended that the appellant’s submission that he was protected under the Bombay Rent Act, and that protection has been JUDGMENT continued under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, is not available before the Estate Officer. The question, therefore, comes to our mind as to what happens to the rights of the appellant made available to him under the State Act at a time when the erstwhile company had not merged in the first respondent Government Company? Can it be said Page 43 44 that he was occupying the premises without the authority for such occupation? Can it be said that with the application of the Public Premises Act to the premises occupied by the appellant, those rights get extinguished? It has been laid down by this Court time and again that if there are rights created in favour of any person, whether they are property rights or rights arising from a transaction in the nature of a contract, and particularly if they are protected under a statute, and if they are to be taken away by any legislation, that legislation will have to say so specifically by giving it a retrospective effect. This is because prima facie every legislation is prospective (see para 7 of the Constitution Bench judgment in Janardan Reddy Vs. The State reported in AIR 1951 SC 124 ). In the instant case, the JUDGMENT appellant was undoubtedly protected as a ‘deemed tenant’ under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act, prior to the merger of the erstwhile insurance company with a Government Company, and he could be removed only by following the procedure available under the Bombay Rent Act. A ‘deemed tenant’ under the Bombay Rent Act, Page 44 45 continued to be protected under the succeeding Act, in view of the definition of a ‘tenant’ under Section 7(15)(a)(ii) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Thus, as far as the

deemed tenants under the Bombay Rent Act continued to have their protection under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Should the coverage of their premises under the Public Premises Act make a difference to the tenants or occupants of such premises, and if so, from which date? 32. It has been laid down by this Court through a number of judgments rendered over the years, that a legislation is not be given a retrospective effect unless specifically provided for, and not beyond the period that is JUDGMENT provided therein. Thus, a Constitution Bench held in Garkiapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 that in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to be retrospective, it cannot be so constructed, as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the act Page 45 46 was passed. In that matter, the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether the appellant’s right to file an appeal continued to be available to him for filing an appeal to the

concerning the rights of tenants and in paragraph 8 of the JUDGMENT judgment the Court held that:-

Page 46 47

Constitution bench was concerned with the issue as to

IV, Ward G, Ahmedabad Vs. Induprasad Devshanker

provision of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the matter of reopening of assessment orders. In that matter the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether the Income Tax Officer could re-open the assessment under Section 297(2) (d) (ii) and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, although the right to re-open was barred by that time under the earlier Page 47 48 Income Tax Act, 1922. This Court held that the same was

paragraph 4 thereof as follows:- JUDGMENT “4. It is a well-settled rule of construction that no provision in a statute should be given retrospective effect unless the legislature by express terms or by necessary implication has made it retrospective and that where a provision is made retrospective, care should be taken not to extend its retrospective effect beyond what was intended.” 36. In Ex-Capt., K.C. Arora Vs. State of Haryana reported in 1984 (3) SCC 281 , this Court was concerned Page 48 49 with a service matter and with the issue as to whether an amendment in the law could take away the vested rights with retrospective effect. The Court held that such an amendment

Page 49 50 substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxations of the law, whether relating to form or to substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings. (See: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, paras 921, 922, 925 and 926).” 38. In the case of Gajraj Singh Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal reported in AIR 1997 SC 412 , the Court was concerned with the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act and repealing of some of its provisions. In para 30 referring rd to Southerland on Statutory Construction (3 Edition) Vol.I, JUDGMENT the Court quoted the following observations:- “30……Effect on vested rights Under common law principles of construction and interpretation the repeal of a statute or the abrogation of a common law principle operates to divest all the rights accruing under the repealed statute or the abrogated common law, and to halt all proceedings not concluded prior to the repeal. However, a right which has become vested is not dependent upon the common law or the statute under which it was acquired for its assertion, but Page 50 51

39. Having noted the aforesaid observations, it is very clear that in the facts of the present case, the appellant’s status as a deemed tenant was accepted under the state enactment, and therefore he could not be said to be in “unauthorised occupation”. His right granted by the state enactment cannot be destroyed by giving any retrospective application to the provisions of Public Premises Act, since there is no such express provision in the statute, nor is it JUDGMENT warranted by any implication. In fact his premises would not come within the ambit of the Public Premises Act, until they belonged to the respondent No. 1, i.e until 1.1.1974. The corollary is that if the respondent No. 1 wanted to evict the appellant, the remedy was to resort to the procedure available under the Bombay Rent Act or its successor Page 51 52 Maharashtra Rent Control Act, by approaching the forum thereunder, and not by resorting to the provisions of the Public Premises Act.

40. In the context of the present controversy, we must refer to one more aspect. As we have noted earlier in paragraph 63 of Ashoka Marketing , the Constitution Bench has referred to the objects and reasons behind the Public Premises Act wherein it is stated that it has become impossible for the Government to take expeditious action even in ‘flagrant cases of unauthorised occupation’ of public premises. The Court has thereafter observed in that very paragraph that the Public Premises Act is enacted to deal JUDGMENT with mischief of ‘rampant unauthorised occupation’ of public premises.

of the use of the powers under the Public Premises Act, and the manner in which they are used in an arbitrary way to evict the genuine tenants from the public premises causing serious hardships to them. The Central Government itself has Page 52 53 therefore, issued the guidelines to prevent such arbitrary use of these powers. These guidelines were issued vide

Page 53 54

Page 54 55

emphasized in Clause 2(i) thereof, that the Act was meant to evict (a) totally unauthorised occupants of the public

Clause 2 (iii) of these guidelines is very important. It states JUDGMENT on the one hand that it will be open for the public authority to secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the provision of the Rent Control Act in each state, and to move under genuine grounds under the Rent control Act for resuming possession. This Clause on the other hand states that the public authorities would have rights similar to private Page 55 56 landlords under the Rent Control Act in dealing with genuine legal tenants. This clause in a way indicates that for resuming possession in certain situations, where the tenants

the release of premises or change of tenancy should be JUDGMENT decided at the level of Board of Directors of Public Sector Undertakings. Clause 2(v) goes further ahead and instructs all public undertakings that they should review all pending cases before the Estate Officer or Courts with reference to these guidelines, and withdraw the proceedings against Page 56 57 genuine tenants on grounds otherwise than as provided under the guidelines.

effectuate the statutory provision. The guidelines do throw JUDGMENT some light on the intention behind the statute. The guidelines are issued with good intention to stop arbitrary use of the powers under the Public Premises Act. The powers are given to act for specified reasons, and are expected to be used only in justified circumstances and not otherwise. The overall consequence Page 57 58 44. In Ashoka Marketing (supra) , this Court was concerned with the premises of two Nationalised Banks and the Life Insurance Corporation. As far as Life Insurance

Therefore, as far as the premises of LIC are concerned, they will come under the ambit of the Public Premises Act from 16.9.1958, i.e the date from which the Act is brought into force. As far as Nationalised Banks are concerned, their nationalization is governed by The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, and therefore, the application of Public Premises Act to the premises of the Nationalised Banks will be from the particular date in the year 1970 or thereafter. For any premises to JUDGMENT become public premises, the relevant date will be 16.9.1958 or whichever is the later date on which the concerned premises become the public premises as belonging to or taken on lease by LIC or the Nationalised Banks or the concerned General Insurance Companies like the first respondent. All those persons falling within the definition of Page 58 59 a tenant occupying the premises prior thereto will not come under the ambit of the Public Premises Act and cannot therefore, be said to be persons in “unauthorised

all of those who fall within the definition of a tenant under the Bombay Rent Act have, are continued under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If possession of their premises is required, that will have to be resorted to by taking steps under the Bombay Rent Act or Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If person concerned has come in occupation subsequent to such date, then of course the Public Premises Act, 1971 will apply. 45 . It is true that Section 15 of the Public Premises Act JUDGMENT creates a bar of jurisdiction to entertain suits or proceedings in respect of eviction of any person in an unauthorised occupation. However, as far as the relationship between the respondent No. 1, the other General Insurance Companies, LIC, Nationalised Banks and such other Government Companies or Corporations, on the one hand and their Page 59 60 occupants/licencees/tenants on the other hand is concerned, such persons who are in occupation prior to the premises belonging to or taken on lease by such entities, will continue

such occupation after such date. Thus, there is no occasion to have a dual procedure which is ruled out in paragraph 66 of Ashoka Marketing. We must remember that the occupants of these properties were earlier tenants of the erstwhile Insurance Companies which were the private landlords. They have not chosen to be the tenants of the Government Companies. Their status as occupants of the Public Insurance Companies has been thrust upon them by the Public Premises Act. JUDGMENT 46. This Court has noted in Banatwala and Co. Vs. LIC reported in 2011 (13) SCC 446 that the Public Premises Act, 1971 is concerned with eviction of unauthorised occupants and recovery of arrears of rent or damages for such unauthorised occupation, and incidental matters specified under the act. As far as the Maharashtra Rent Page 60 61 Control Act is concerned, this Court noted in paragraph 25 of that judgment that as per the preamble of the said Act, it is an Act relating to five subjects, namely (i) control of rent, (ii)

investment by the landlord, and (v) matters connected with the purposes mentioned above. In that matter, the Court was concerned with the issue of fixation of standard rent and restoration and maintenance of essential supplies and services by the landlord. It was held that these two subjects were not covered under the Public Premises Act, and infact were covered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. Operative para 99(c) of the judgment therefore specifically held as follows:- JUDGMENT “ 99 (c) The provisions of the Maharashtra Rent control Act, 1999 shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings and their occupants to the extent this Act covers the other aspects of the relationship between the landlord and tenants, not covered under the Public Premises Act, 1971.” 47. A judgment of a bench of three Judges of this Court in M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. L.I.C Page 61 62 reported in (1980) 4 SCC 435 was relied upon by Mr. Raval. In this matter also a plea was raised on behalf of the appellant tenant for being covered under the Delhi Rent

the effect that Section 2(g) merely requires occupation of any public premises to initiate the action. Mr. Nariman on the other hand pointed out that in the earlier part of the very paragraph the Court had observed, although after referring to the provision of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery), Act 1959 that if the entry into possession had taken place prior to the passing of the act, then obviously the occupant would not be an unauthorized occupant. That apart, Mr. Nariman submitted that the JUDGMENT judgment was essentially on the second part of Section 2(g) defining ‘unauthorised occupation’. It is, however, material to note that in that case the premises were owned by LIC from 19.7.1958, i.e. prior to the Delhi Rent Control Act becoming applicable from 9.2.1959. Besides, the issue of protection under a welfare legislation being available to the tenant prior Page 62 63 to the premises becoming public premises, and the issue of retrospectivity was not under consideration before the Court. The observations of the Court in that matter will have to be understood in that context. 48. As far as the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises is concerned, undoubtedly it is covered under the Public Premises Act, but it is so covered from 16.9.1958, or from the later date when the concerned premises become public premises by virtue of the concerned premises vesting into a Government company or a corporation like LIC or the Nationalised Banks or the General Insurance Companies like the respondent no.1. Thus there are two categories of occupants of these public corporations JUDGMENT who get excluded from the coverage of the Act itself. Firstly, those who are in occupation since prior to 16.9.1958, i.e. prior to the Act becoming applicable, are clearly outside the coverage of the Act. Secondly, those who come in occupation, thereafter, but prior to the date of the concerned premises belonging to a Government Corporation or a Company, and are covered under a protective provision of Page 63 64 the State Rent Act, like the appellant herein, also get excluded. Until such date, the Bombay Rent Act and its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act will continue to

and corporations on the other. Hence, with respect to such occupants it will not be open to such companies or corporations to issue notices, and to proceed against such occupants under the Public Premises Act, and such proceedings will be void and illegal. Similarly, it will be open for such occupants of these premises to seek declaration of their status, and other rights such as transmission of the tenancy to the legal heirs etc. under the Bombay Rent Act or its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, and also to seek JUDGMENT protective reliefs in the nature of injunctions against unjustified actions or orders of eviction if so passed, by approaching the forum provided under the State Act which alone will have the jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings. 49. Learned senior counsel for the respondents Mr. Raval submitted that the judgment of the Constitution Bench Page 64 65 in Ashoka Marketing had clarified the legal position with respect to the relationship between the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act. However, as noted above, the

Court, and naturally it has not been gone into it. It was submitted by Mr. Raval that for maintenance of judicial discipline this bench ought to refer the issue involved in the present matter to a bench of three Judges, and thereafter that bench should refer it to a bench of five Judges. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Pradip Chandra Parija Vs. Pramod Chandra reported in 2002 (1) SCC 1 in this behalf. He also referred to a judgment of this Court in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija Vs. Collector, JUDGMENT Thane, Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 1989 (3) SCC 396 and particularly paragraph 18 thereof for that purpose. What is however, material to note is that this paragraph also permits discretion to be exercised when there is no declared position in law. The Bombay Rent Act exempted from its application only the premises belonging to the government or Page 65 66 a local authority. The premises belonging to the Government Companies or Statutory Corporations were however covered under the Bombay Rent Act. This position was altered from

applied thereafter to the Government Companies and Statutory Corporations, and that position has been reiterated under the Public Premises Act of 1971 which replaced the 1958 Act. Under these Acts of 1958 and 1971, the Premises belonging to the Government Companies or Statutory Corporations are declared to be Public Premises. Thus, the Parliament took away these premises from the coverage of the Bombay Rent Act under Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. This was, however, in the matter of the subjects JUDGMENT covered under the Public Premises Act, viz. eviction of unauthorised occupants and recovery of arrears of rent etc. as stated above. Thereafter, if the State Legislature wanted to cover these subjects viz. a viz. the premises of the Government Companies and Public Corporations under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, it had to specifically Page 66 67 state that notwithstanding anything in the Public Premises Act of 1971, the Government Companies and Public Corporations would be covered under the Maharashtra Rent

Companies and Public Corporation would have continued to be covered under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 in view of the provision of Article 254(2). That has not happened. Thus, the Government Companies and Public Corporations are taken out of the coverage of the Bombay Rent Act, and they are covered under Public Premises Act, 1971, though from the date specified therein i.e. 16.9.1958. After that date, the Government Companies and Public Corporations will be entitled to claim the application of the JUDGMENT Public Premises Act, 1971 (and not of the Bombay Rent Act or its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999), but from the date on which premises belong to these companies or corporations and with respect to the subjects specified under the Public Premises Act. In that also the public companies Page 67 68 and corporations are expected to follow the earlier mentioned guidelines. 50. We have not for a moment taken any position

the submission of Mr. Nariman, that only contractual tenancies were sought to be covered under that judgment, and not statutory tenancies. Tenancies of both kinds will be covered by that judgment, and they will be covered under the Public Premises Act for the subjects specified therein. The only issue is with effect from which date. That aspect was not canvassed at all before the Constitution Bench, and that is the only aspect which is being clarified by this judgment. We are only clarifying that the application of the JUDGMENT Public Premises Act will be only from 16.9.1958, or from such later date when concerned premises become Public Premises on the concerned landlord becoming a Government Company or Public Corporation. When the law laid down by the different Benches of this Court including by the Constitution Benches on retrospectivity is so clear, and so are the Page 68 69 provisions of the Public Premises Act, there is no occasion for this Court to take any other view. When this judgment is only clarifying and advancing the proposition laid down in Ashoka

should not be decided by this bench but ought to be referred to a larger bench. 51 . In this context we may note that since the issue of retrospective application of the Public Premises Act, to tenancies entered into before 16.9.1958, or before the property in question becoming a public premises, was neither canvassed nor considered by the bench in Ashoka Marketing (supra), the decision does not, in any way, prevent this Bench from clarifying the law regarding the JUDGMENT same. This follows from the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Ranbir @ Rana reported in (2006) 5 SCC 167 wherein it was held that a decision, it is well-settled, is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The following observations of this court from paragraph 39 of Page 69 70 Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. M/s. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. reported in AIR1993 SC 43 are also pertinent:

supplied) It is clear from a reading of the very first paragraph of Ashoka Marketing that the question before it was JUDGMENT ‘ whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments.’ The Court answered this in the affirmative, and we respectfully agree with the same. However, Ashoka Marketing (supra) can not be said to be an authority on the retrospective application of the Public Page 70 71 Premises Act, or where the premises fall within the ambit of only one act, as that issue was not before the Court. 52. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal

Petition No. 2473 of 1996. The said Writ Petition shall stand allowed, and the judgment and order dated 17.1.1996 passed by the City Civil Court, Mumbai, as well as the eviction order dated 28.5.1993 passed by the respondent No. 2 against the appellant will stand set aside. The proceedings for eviction from premises, and for recovery of rent and damages initiated by the first respondent against the appellant under the Public Premises Act, 1971, are held to be bad in law, and shall therefore stand dismissed. We however, make it clear, JUDGMENT that in case the respondents intend to take any steps for that purpose, it will be open to them to resort to the remedy available under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, provided they make out a case therefor. The parties will bear their own costs. Page 71 72 …………………………………..J. [ H.L. Gokhale ] …………………………………… J. [ J. Chelameswar ] New Delhi Dated: February 11, 2014 JUDGMENT Page 72 JUDGMENT Page 73