KAMALJEET SINGH(IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY) vs. STATE

REPORTED
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL. APPEAL NO.28/2007 and Crl. M.A. Nos.336 and 338/2007
DATE OF DECISION: January 29, 2008
KAMALJEET SINGH (IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY) ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Aman Lekhi, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Madhukar Pandey, Mr. Jaspreet S.
Rai, Mr. Rajan K. Chourasia, Mr. Rakesh
Kumar and Mr. Rohit Nagpal, Advocates
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Mukta Gupta, Standing
Counsel for the State
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REVA KHETRAPAL
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed
to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?
JUDGMENT
: REVA KHETRAPAL, J.
1. By this appeal filed under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Control of
Organised Crimes Act, 1999 (for short the MCOCA), the appellant seeks to
th
October, 2006 and the charge dated
assail the order on charge dated 12
3-11-2006 whereby the learned Special Judge, MCOCA, New Delhi has
charged the appellant under Sections 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic
(Prevention) Act, 1956 (for short the ITP Act), Sections 3(1) (ii), 3(4), 3(5)
and Section 4 of the MCOCA and Section 420 read with Section 120-B of the
IPC in FIR No.96/2005, Police Station Chanakya Puri.
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 1 of 36

th
April,
2. The brief facts as they emerge from the record are that on 19
2005, SI Sajjan Singh, on receipt of information that the appellant Kamaljeet
Singh and his associate Pappi supply girls for prostitution in Five Star Hotels
and carry on their business through mobile No.9810645454, passed on the said
information to ACP Kumar Gyanesh, who directed SI Sajjan Singh to strike a
deal on the above mobile number. SI Sajjan Singh accordingly struck a deal on
Phone No.26109027 from the ARC Office Crime Branch and upon talking to
the person receiving the call identified himself as Pappi, and agreed to provide
a girl for sexual purposes for two hours which would cost Rs.20,000/-. He was
asked to call again on the same telephone number after two minutes, and on his
doing so, SI Sajjan Singh was told that he should meet him outside the main
gate of Taj Palace Hotel at 4.00 p.m., and asked to pay Rs.5,000/- in advance
for the chosen girl.
3. On the above information, a raiding party was organised with the decoy
customer, and currency notes in the sum of Rs.5,000/- in the denomination of
Rs.500/- each, signed by the A.C.P., were handed over to the decoy customer
Charan Singh, who was briefed to enter into a deal and to give a fixed signal
once the deal was struck. SI Sajjan Singh was made a shadow witness to
watch the transaction. At about 4.15 p.m., a white Maruti car bearing No.DL
3CG 0609 stopped at the main gate of the Hotel, and two girls and a man got
down from the car and started conversing with the decoy customer–Charan
Singh. On the latter giving the required signal, the raiding party rushed to the
car and overpowered Arvinder Pal Singh @ Pappi and the two girls with him,
whose names were subsequently revealed as Pooja @ Bijli and Sonali.
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 2 of 36

4. The decoy customer, Charan Singh told SI Sajjan Singh that Arvinder
Pal Singh @ Pappi while presenting both the girls had told him that, to have
sex with them Rs.20,000/- each would be charged and Rs.5,000/- had to be
paid in advance. Meanwhile, Pooja while winking her left eye and stretching
herself made gestures presenting herself for sex and the other girl Sonali also
displayed vulgar gestures. Arvinder Pal Singh demanded the advance money
and Charan Singh handed over the said ten currency notes in the denomination
of Rs.500/- each, which Arvinder Pal Singh kept in his shirt pocket.
5. SI Sajjan Singh, who was a shadow witness corroborated the above
facts. Thereafter, on search of Arvinder Pal Singh by SI Ashok Kumar, he was
found in possession of the same ten numbered currency notes in the
denomination of Rs.500/- each, signed by the IO. The said currency note were
kept in a white polythene, sealed with the seal of SSY, and taken into
possession. All the accused persons were apprehended and arrested under
Section 4/5/8 ITP Act.
6. In the course of investigation, accused Arvinder Pal Singh alias Pappi
made a disclosure statement that he was carrying on a prostitution racket at the
behest of the appellant Kamaljeet Singh, who is a known pimp, and that out of
the proceeds of the said business, the major share of 50% was that of
Kamaljeet Singh, whereas the remaining amount was equally shared between
him (Arvinder Pal Singh) and the chosen girl. During interrogation, accused
Pooja @ Bijli and Sonali Parveen also disclosed that the appellant was
indulging in the dubious trade of prostitution in five star hotels, guest houses
and posh colony flats. They further disclosed that the said business was being
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 3 of 36

transacted from various cities such as Mumbai, Calcutta, Bangalore, etc. and
that Arvinder Pal Singh was acting as the conduit for the appellant. It was also
disclosed that Kamaljeet Singh had a wide network and was assisted by Maya
Keshwani @ Varsha, Mrinal Kumar, M.K. Menon, William, Tejinder Singh
Walia etc., who were the active associates of Kamaljit Singh. He also
disclosed that the appellant Kamaljit mainly used to contact college girls and
models who offered their services to his clients and used to charge
exorbitantly. This business was mainly coordinated through mobile phones of
Kamaljit Singh and his associates. Later on, a raiding team was constituted
and raid was conducted at H. No.102, Jal Vaiyu Vihar, where appellant
Kamaljit Singh was arrested.
7. During investigation, it was revealed that appellant Kamaljit Singh was
involved in prostitution racket since 1985-86 and had amassed huge property
both movable and immovable out of this trade. So far accused Arvinder Pal
Singh is concerned, during the investigation two mobile phones 9810224004
and 9810645454 were seized from his possession, which were registered for
billing in the name of Kamaljit Singh and the third phone 9871047373 seized
from Kamaljit Singh was in the name of Raj Kumar Rana and during call
analysis it was found that 911 calls were made from mobile No.9810224004 to
9871047373 during 1/1/05 to 20/4/05 and 13 calls were between the mobile
No.9810645454 and 9871047373. As many as 475 incoming outgoing calls
were traced out from Mobile No.9891939197 in the name of Arvinder Pal
Singh to 9810224004 during the aforesaid period. 858 calls were exchanged
between the mobile of Arvinder Pal Singh and Kamaljit Singh. One other
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 4 of 36

mobile telephone No.9871375297 activated on 25/3/05 was found to be in the
name of Arvinder Pal Singh but at the address of appellant Kamaljit Singh i.e.
M 65 GK Part II, New Delhi. In view of the facts and circumstances of the
case and the conduct of the accused persons provisions of Section 3/4 MCOCA
were invoked against the accused persons.
8. During investigation the accused Neeraj Chopra @ Dev Chopra was
found to be an active associate of Kamaljit Singh, who was arrested under
Section 21 NDPS Act by the NCB on 2/9/05 and was found to be involved in
as many as four cases since 16/1/96 till the date of his arrest, the details of
which are given in the charge sheet. Out of four cases, three cases are pending
under ITP Act and one case under Section 376/34 IPC. Later on, accused
Neeraj Chopra was arrested in the present case on the disclosure statement of
his co-accused Arvinder Pal Singh. In terms of the provisions of Section 18
MCOCA his confessional statement was recorded by the DCP/N and the CP,
the designated officer. He disclosed that in the year 1993 he was introduced to
appellant Kamaljit Singh at Mumbai by one Vijay Solanki, who was stated to
be working for Kamaljit Singh. Vijay Solanki had employed Neeraj Chopra as
his driver and he used to collect payments from Five Star Hotel from various
clients but was never told about the business. After about 7-8 months he left
Mumbai and came back Delhi. He was advised by Vijay Solanki to contact
Kamaljit Singh at M-65, GK Part II, New Delhi, for his balance salary. When
he met Kamaljit Singh at his residence, he was employed by him as his driver.
Thereafter on the instructions of Kamaljit Singh, he used to collect air tickets
from airports and also used to transport young and glamorous girls and
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 5 of 36

dropped them in lobby of various Five Star Hotels, where Arvinder Pal Singh,
Varsha Keshwani and SJ Menon used to receive them. Gradually he came to
know that Kamaljit Singh and his associates were running a prostitution racket
spread over several cities.
9. The pendency of a dozen criminal cases spanning more than a decade
against the appellant under the ITP Act having been disclosed in the course of
investigation, the investigating agency sought and obtained sanction for
prosecuting the appellant under the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 8 ITP Act,
Section 3 of the MCOCA and Sections 420/120-B IPC, which was granted by
th
October, 2005, the
the order of the Addl. CP/Crime dated 11.10.2005. On 14
appellant Kamaljeet Singh and five others were charge-sheeted for offences
punishable under Sections 4/5/8 ITP Act, Sections 420/120-B IPC and Sections
3 and 4 of the MCOCA. The charge-sheet unravelled the long association of
accused Arvinder Pal Singh and his co-accused with the kingpin, Kamaljeet
Singh, for more than a decade.
10. From the investigation and an in-depth analysis of the call details, as
noticed in the charge-sheet, it emerged that the appellant was operating from
his residence M-65, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi. The call details further
revealed that the appellant was in constant touch with the girls coming from
outside the city, who were made to stay in five star hotels, mainly in the
Ashoka Hotel, Chanakya Puri, New Delhi. Another fact which emerged during
the course of investigation was the meticulous modus operandi of the appellant
in booking air tickets from M/s. Southened Travels, reflecting the organised
manner in which the prostitution racket was being run. The seizure of the bills
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 6 of 36

and the copies of the ledger accounts also revealed the manner in which cash
deposits were made at the Standard Chartered Bank or the ICICI Bank, Greater
Kailash Branches, and credited to the account of the concerned
model/coordinator. The relevant portion of the charge-sheet regarding the
modus operandi adopted by the appellant reads as under:
“ The whole modus operandi and evidences that has emerged
against all the accused during investigation may be analyzed
and appreciated in light of following:
• Several phone connections in the name of Kamaljit
Singh and his associates.
•
Abnormally high calls between Kamaljit Singh and his
associates and amongst themselves without any
explainable business or personal relationship.
•
Mindboggling phone bills for short durations.
•
High number of calls made to five star hotels without
any related business with them.
•
Documentary evidence from Bank and hotels
corroborating the disclosures of Kamaljit Singh and
Arvinder Pal Singh.
•
Confessional statement made by co-accused Neeraj
Chopra before DCP and Chief Judicial Magistrate.
• High number of air tickets (Mostly PTA) booked by
Kamaljit Singh and his associates.
•
The criminal history of Kamaljit Singh with more than
a dozen cases to his name spanning for more than a
decade along with his associates speaks for itself the
organised manner in which he was running the show.
• Last but not the least that all subsequent evidences
collected were totally either based on details found in
SMS of Arvinder Pal Singh or documents collected
during search in presence of accused. Moreover, all
the analysis has been for a short duration of time
selected randomly which if seen in totality will take
huge proportions.”
11. As noticed above, the charge-sheet of the case was filed in the Special
Court, MCOCA and charges framed against the appellant under Sections 4 and
5 ITP Act, Sections 3(1)(ii), 3(4), 3(5) and Section 4 of the MCOCA and
Section 420/120-B IPC by the impugned order dated 03.11.2006 leading to the
filing of the present appeal impugning the charges framed.
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 7 of 36

12. Detailed arguments have been addressed by Mr. Aman Lekhi, the
learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant and Ms. Mukta Gupta, the
learned Standing Counsel for the State.
13. Before considering the submissions of the appellant and the counter
submissions made on behalf of the respondent/State, it is deemed expedient to
refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, which appear to
have a direct bearing on the matter in issue and read as under:
“ Statement of Objects and Reasons.– Organised crime has
for quite some years now come up as a very serious threat
to our society. It knows no national boundaries and is fueled
by illegal wealth generated by contract killings, extortion,
smuggling in contrabands, illegal trade in narcotics,
kidnapping for ransom, collection of protection money and
money laundering, etc. The illegal wealth and black money
generated by the organised crime is very huge and has
serious adverse effect on our economy. It is seen that the
organised criminal syndicates make a common cause with
terrorist gangs and foster narco terrorism which extend
beyond the national boundaries. There is reason to believe
that organised criminal gangs are operating in the State
and thus, there is immediate need to curb their activities.
It is also noticed that the organised criminals make
extensive use of wire and oral communications in their
criminal activities. The interception of such communications
to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent
their commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement
and the administration of justice.
2. The existing legal frame work i.e. the penal and
procedural laws and the adjudicatory system are found to
be rather inadequate to curb or control the menace of
organised crime. Government has, therefore, decided to
enact a special law with stringent and deterrent provisions
including in certain circumstances power to intercept wire,
electronic or oral communication to control the menace of
the organised crime.
3. ...................................................................................”
14. Section 2(d), (e) and (f) of the Act define the terms “continuing
unlawful activity”, “organised crime” and “organised crime syndicate” as
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 8 of 36

under:
“2. Definitions. - (1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires, -
(a) ........................
(b)..........................
( c ).........................
(d) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity
prohibited by law for the time being in force, which is a
cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment of three
years or more, undertaken either singly or jointly, as
member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of
such syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-
sheets have been filed before a competent Court within the
preceding period of ten years and that Court has taken
cognizance of such offence;
(e) “organised crime” means any continuing unlawful
activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a
member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of
such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence or
intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means, with the
objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue
economic or other advantage for himself or any other
person or promoting insurgency;
(f) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of two or
more persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as a
syndicate or gang indulge in activities of organised crime;”
15. Section 3 of the MCOCA which deals with punishment for organised
crime is as follows:
“ 3. Punishment for organised crime.– (1) Whoever
commits an offence of organised crime shall,–
(i) if such offence has resulted in the death of any person, be
punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall
also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees
one lac;
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a
fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates,
abets or knowingly facilitates the commission of an
organised crime or any act preparatory to organised crime,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall be not less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine,
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 9 of 36

subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(3) Whoever harbours or conceals or attempts to harbour or
conceal, any member of an organised crime syndicate shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine,
subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime
syndicate shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than five years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine,
subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(5) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from
commission of an organised crime or which has been
acquired through the organised crime syndicate funds shall
be punishable with a term which shall not be less than three
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and
shall also be liable to fine, subject to a minimum fine of
rupees two lacs.”
16. Mr. Aman Lekhi on behalf of the appellant has mounted an assault on
the order framing charge principally on the ground that the alleged offences
under Sections 4 and 5 of the ITP Act read with Section 420/120-B IPC were
not intended by the legislature to be covered within the ambit of the MCOCA,
1999 as extended to Delhi. According to Mr. Lekhi, the ingredients of Section
3 of the MCOCA are not made out, inasmuch as the appellant has never been a
member of any “organised syndicate” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the
MCOCA nor has indulged in any “continuing unlawful activity”, as envisaged
by Section 2(e) of the MCOCA. According to him, it is the case of the
prosecution that the appellant and his associates were involved in an
“apparently soft crime” and as such the alleged offences by the appellant did
not involve the “use of violence on threat of violence or intimidation or
coercion” nor is there any allegation to this effect in the charge-sheet filed by
the prosecution.
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 10 of 36

17. The further contention of Mr. Aman Lekhi is that in view of the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of MCOCA, the words “other unlawful
means” contained in Section 2(e) be read as ejusdem generis/noscitur a sociis
with the words: (i) violence, (ii) threat of violence, (iii) intimidation or (iv)
coercion. It is submitted that none of the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant are alleged to involve the use of (i) violence, (ii)
threat of violence, (iii) intimidation or (iv) coercion and hence the provisions
of Sections 3 and 4 of MCOCA are not applicable to the present case.
18. In order to fortify his contention that the words “other unlawful activity”
necessarily involve “the use of violence, threat of violence, intimidation or
coercion”, Mr.Lekhi relied upon the well-established principle of statutory
interpretation that:
“To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute the court
must look at the whole statute, at what precedes and at what
succeeds and not merely at the clause itself.” (Principles of
th
Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 9 Edn. 2004 417,
page 32).

Reliance was also placed by him upon the observations made in
Canada
Sugar Refining Co. Vs. R, (1898) AC 735 p. 742 wherein Lord Davey said:
“ Every clause of statute should be construed with reference
to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as
possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute
or series of statutes relating to the subject matter”.

19. Reference was also made by Mr.Lekhi to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Dr. Devender M. Surti Vs. The State of Gujarat AIR 1969 SC 63
wherein the following observations were made by the Supreme Court at page
66 of the Report:
“5.....................It is true that Section 2(4) of the Act has used
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 11 of 36

words of very wide import and grammatically it may include
even a Consulting room where a doctor examines his patients
with the help of a solitary nurse or attendant. But, in our
opinion, in the matter of construing the language of Section
2(4) of the Act we must adopt the principle of noscitur a
sociis. This rule means that, when two or more words which
are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together
they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. The
words take as it were their colour from each other that is, the
more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less
general. “Associated words take their meaning from one
another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis the philosophy
of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be
ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated
with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim Ejusdem
Generis..................................”
20. Next, strong reliance was placed by Mr.Lekhi on a recent three-Judge
judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeet Sing Sharma Vs.
wherein it was observed as follows:
State of Maharashtra 2005 (5) SCC 294,
(SCC, page 312)
“23. Interpretation clauses contained in Sections 2(d), 2(e)
and 2(f) are interrelated. An “organised crime syndicate”
refers to an “organised crime” which in turn refers to
“continuing unlawful activity”. As at present advised, it may
not be necessary for us to consider as to whether the words “or
other unlawful means” contained in Section 2(e) should be
read “ejusdem generis”/”noscitur a sociis” with the words (i)
violence, (ii) threat of violence, (iii) intimidation, or (iv)
coercion. We may, however, notice that the word “violence”
has been used only in Sections 146 and 153-A of the Indian
Penal Code. The word “intimidation” alone has not been used
therein but only Section 506 occurring in Chapter XXII thereof
refers to “criminal intimidation”. The word “coercion” finds
place only in the Contract Act. If the words “unlawful means”
are to be widely construed as including any or other unlawful
means, having regard to the provisions contained in Sections
400, 401 and 413 IPC relating to commission of offences of
cheating or criminal breach of trust, the provisions of the said
Act can be applied, which prima facie, does not appear to have
been intended by Parliament.
24. The Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly states as
to why the said Act had to be enacted. Thus, it will be safe to
presume that the expression “any unlawful means” must refer
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 12 of 36

to any such act which has a direct nexus with the commission of
a crime which MCOCA seeks to prevent or control. In other
words, an offence falling within the definition of organised
crime and committed by an organised crime syndicate is the
offence contemplated by the Statement of Objects and Reasons.
There are offences and offences under the Indian Penal Code
and other penal statutes providing for punishment of three
years or more and in relation to such offences more than one
charge-sheet may be filed. As we have indicated hereinbefore,
only because a person cheats or commits a criminal breach of
trust, more than once, the same by itself may not be sufficient to
attract the provisions of MCOCA. Furthermore, mens rea is a
necessary ingredient for commission of a crime under
MCOCA.”
21. For the proposition that a statute being penal in its application, a strict
interpretation is called for, reference was made by the learned counsel for the
appellant to the observations made by LIVINGSTON HALL in FRIEDMANN,
nd
Edition), p.82, which read as under:
Law in a Changing Society (2
“As the boundaries of crime have been extended to include
more and more conduct made criminal only because in
seeming conflict with some vague ideal of social policy, or to
reach some potential evil in an indirect manner, the need for a
clear and comprehensive statement of the prohibited acts has
become increasingly pressing. A canon of strict construction,
limiting the statute to its obvious meaning, and excluding
potentialities, perhaps implicit to the Legislature, but uncertain
of application to the uninformed reader, does much to prevent
injustice.”
22. In the same context, Mr. Lekhi relied upon the Constitutional Bench
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Tolaram and Relumal & Anr. Vs.
State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 496 . The relevant observations made by the
Constitution Bench read as under: [AIR SC, p.496 at page 498]
“It may be here observed that the provisions of section 18(1)
are penal in nature and it is a well settled rule of construction
of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable
constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the court must
lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from
penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is not
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 13 of 36

competent to the court to stretch the meaning of an expression
used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the
Legislature. As pointed out by Lord Macmillan in 'L & N.E.
Rly. Co. v. Berriman', 1946 AC 278 at p.295 (B),
“Where penalties for infringement are imposed it is not
legitimate to stretch the language of a rule, however beneficient
its intention, beyond the fair and ordinary meaning of its
language”.”
23. Next, Mr. Lekhi urged that the learned Special Judge, MCOCA, New
Delhi failed to appreciate that Section 2(f) of the ITP Act as amended defines
prostitution as “the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for commercial
purposes”. The ITP Act, 1956 was amended in 1986 and prior to the 1986
amendment, the word prostitution was defined to mean “the act of a female
offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire whether in
money or in kind, and whether offered immediately or otherwise, and the
expression “prostitute” shall be construed accordingly”. The intent of the
legislature in substituting the present definition of prostitution in place of the
previous definition by the Amending Act No.45 of 1986 was to prevent the
sexual exploitation and abuse of girls and hence the act of a major female
offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire, whether in
money or in kind, on her own volition and without any threat, pressure or
coercion was not intended to be covered by the present definition. In the
absence of an allegation in the F.I.R. that the girls were abused or sexually
exploited so as to force them to offer their body for promiscuous sexual
intercourse, the offences under Sections 4, 5 and 8 of the ITP Act, 1956 as
amended till date are not made out against the appellant.
24. Mr. Lekhi further submitted that despite the fact that the prosecution has
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 14 of 36

filed hundred of pages of phone calls records and despite the fact that the
police officials have also seized the phone from one of the girls alleged to be a
prostitute, the prosecution has not placed on record a single call between the
mobile phones allegedly belonging to the appellant and the said girls. In fact,
no connection whatsoever has been shown by the prosecution between the
appellant and the girls arrested in this case, nor, in fact, there is material on
record regarding the procurement or inducing or taking the co-accused girls for
the purpose of prostitution or causing or inducing the co-accused girls to carry
on prostitution and as such offences under the I.T.P. Act are not made out
against the appellant.
25. He contended that the learned Special Judge, MCOCA had failed to
appreciate that the confessional statement of co-accused Neeraj Chopra @ Dev
Chopra recorded under Section 18 of the Act had not been recorded in terms of
the guidelines laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
the case of Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab , 1994 Crl.L.J 3139 while dealing
with Rule-15 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1987,
which is parametrical to Section 18 of the MCOCA, and, therefore, the said
confessional statement cannot be relied upon. As borne out by the records,
Neeraj Chopra had been asked by the police officials to co-operate, otherwise
he will get involved in this case. Hence, the said confessional statement was
not voluntary in nature as Neeraj Chopra had been forced to make the
statement before the CMM, Delhi, while in police custody. Further, the said
confessional statement by Neeraj Chopra was not inculpatory in nature and as
such ought not be relied upon.
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 15 of 36

26. The learned Special Judge, he further contended, had paid no heed to
the fact that under Section 23(2) of the MCOCA, the previous sanction of a
police officer not below the rank of Additional Commissioner of Police is a
sine qua non for taking cognizance of any offence under the MCOCA. The
sanction for prosecution in the instant case is cryptic in nature and does not
show any application of mind. Nowhere the sanctioning authority makes it
clear as to what were the materials/records placed before it and what is the
opinion on each of these records and how the sanctioning authority has come
to this finding that the prosecution of the appellant under the MCOCA is
required.
27. Countering the aforesaid submissions made by Mr. Aman Lekhi, the
learned senior counsel for the appellant, Ms.Mukta Gupta, the learned Standing
Counsel for the State strongly contended that when the language of the Act is
plain and unambiguous, no question of construction of the statute arises for the
Act speaks for itself. When a statute is to be interpreted as far as possible an
ordinary meaning is to be given to the words contained therein and only when
the words are vague or ambiguous are the principles of statutory interpretation
to be resorted to. Ms. Gupta submitted that the words “any unlawful means”
are plain and unambiguous and thus they have to be given their natural
meaning.
28. Rebutting the contention of Mr.Aman Lekhi, the learned senior counsel
for the appellant that the rule of noscitur a sociis should be applied for the
interpretation of the words “any unlawful means”, Ms. Gupta urged that the
said rule is merely a rule of construction and cannot apply in a case where the
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 16 of 36

intention of the Legislature is made clear by the statute itself. Reliance was
placed by Ms. Gupta, in this context, upon the observations made in the case of
State of Bombay Vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610:
“Noscitur a Sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot
prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been
deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word
correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the
legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower
significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear that the rule of
construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied
where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful;
but, where the object of the Legislature in using wider words is
clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question
cannot be pressed into service.”
29. In the alternative, Ms. Gupta submitted that assuming arguendo that the
words “other unlawful means” are vague, even then the offences under ITP Act
would fall within the ambit of “other unlawful means” as cognate to violence,
threat of violence, intimidation and coercion. 'Prostitution' is a form of
physical violence where the body of a woman is sexually abused. 'Prostitution'
is defined under the ITP Act as “the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for
commercial purposes”. The meaning of the words threat, violence, intimidation
and coercion as defined in the CHAMBERS DICTIONARY (1983 Edition) are
as under:
(a) Threat:- A declaration or indication of an intention
to inflict, punish or hurt.
(b) Violence:- The state or quality of being violent :
excessive, unrestrained or unjustifiable force : outrage :
profanation : injury : rape.
(c) Intimidation:- The use of violence or threats to
influence the conduct or compel the consent of another.
(d) Coercion:- To restrain by force : to compel.
Thus from the above definitions it is clear that “Prostitution” would also
fall within the ambit of “other unlawful means” as cognate to violence, threat
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 17 of 36

of violence, intimidation or coercion.
30. It was further submitted by Ms. Gupta that the preamble of a statute like
the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to construction.
Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope,
object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title. It may
recite the ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be
remedied or the doubts which may be intended to be settled. Ms. Gupta relied
upon the following:
(i) The words of SIR JOHN NICHOLL: “It is to the preamble more
specially that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every
statute, rehearsing this, as it ordinarily does, the evils sought to
be remedied, or the doubts purported to be removed by the
statute, and so evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory
manner, the object or intention of the Legislature in making or
passing the statute itself.”
(ii) The enunciation by TINDAL, C.J., in delivering the opinion of
the judges who advised the House of Lords in the Sussex
Peerage case, “If any doubt arise from the terms employed by
the Legislature, it has always been held a safe means of
collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of
making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which
according to CHIEF JUSTICE DYER is a 'key to open the
minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they
intended to redress'.
(iii) The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, where
MUDHOLKAR, J., speaking for the court in Burakar Coal Co.
reported as para-5
Ltd. Vs. UOI AIR 1961 SC Pg. 954
observed:
It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that
where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble
must be disregarded though, where the object or
meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble
may be resorted to explain it. Again, where very
general language is used in an enactment which, it is
clear must be intended to have a limited application,
the preamble may be used to indicate to what
particular instances, the enactment is intended to
apply. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 18 of 36

construing the provisions of an Act, though we would
be justified in resorting to it, nay, we will be required
to do so, if we find that the language used by
Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in
point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a
limited application. The courts cannot , therefore, start
with the preamble for construing the provisions of an
Act, though they would be justified in resorting to it,
nay they will be required to do so, if they find that the
language used by parliament is ambiguous or is too
general though in point of fact Parliament intended
that it should have a limited application”.
(iv) The observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Rajasthan Vs. Mrs. Leela Jain & Ors. reported as AIR
:
1965 SC 1296
“ Unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it would
not be in accord with any sound principle of
construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of
a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them
their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which
are not in accord with the notions of propriety or
justice entertained by the Court. No doubt, if there are
other provisions in the statute which conflict with them,
the court may prefer the one and reject the other on the
ground of repugnance. When the words in the statute
are reasonably capable of more than one
interpretation, the object and purpose of the statute, a
general conspectus of its provisions and the context in
which they occur might induce a court to adopt a more
liberal or a more strict view of the provisions, as the
case may be, as being more consonant with the
underlying purpose. But it is not possible to reject
words used in an enactment merely for the reason that
they do not accord with the context in which they occur,
or with the purpose of the legislation as gathered from
the preamble or long title. The preamble may, no doubt,
be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of
words which may have more than one meaning, but it
can, however, not be used to eliminate as redundant or
unintended, the operative provisions of a statute.”
(v) The principle laid down in the judgment of
Rashtriya Mill
Mazdoor Sangh Vs. National Textile Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
reported as 1995 (6) Scale 609 at page 615:
“It is one of the cardinal principles of the statutory
construction that where the language of an Act is clear,
the Preamble cannot be invoked to curtail or restrict
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 19 of 36

the scope of the enactment and only where the object
or meaning of an enactment is not clear the Preamble
may be resorted to explain it”.
31. Referring to the preamble of the Act, Ms. Gupta laid particular emphasis
on the following:
“ It knows no national boundaries and is fueled by illegal wealth
generated by contract killing, extortion, smuggling in
contrabands, illegal trade in narcotics, kidnapping for ransom,
collection of protection money and money laundering, etc. The
illegal wealth and black money generated by the 'organised
crime' is very huge, and has serious adverse effect on our
economy. It is seen that the organised criminal syndicates
make a common cause with terrorist gangs and foster narco
terrorism which extend beyond the national
boundaries.....................”
32. A reference to the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002, Ms. Gupta contended, shows that Sections 5/6/8/9 of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act are offences under Schedule 'A' of the said Act and as
per the said Act, the proceeds of the crime i.e. the property derived directly or
indirectly by a person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence is an offence of money laundering, which is specifically referred to in
the Aims and Objectives of MCOCA as “organised crime”. Thus, looked at it
from any angle, the provisions of the MCOCA are clearly attracted to the
present case.
33. Next, assailing the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
that the definition of 'Prostitution' defined in the Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
Act is an artificial definition as wholly misconceived and erroneous, Ms.Gupta
submitted that though the MCOCA does not define the word “offence”, a
conjoint reading of section 2(2) of the MCOCA and section 2(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure makes it abundantly clear that the offence of 'Prostitution'
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 20 of 36

as defined in the ITP Act falls within the scope and ambit of offences under the
MCOCA.
34. Section 2(2) of the MCOCA reads as under:-
“2(1)...........................
2(2). Words and expressions used but not defined in this Act
and defined in the Code shall have the meanings respectively
assigned to them in the Code.
The term “offence” as defined in Section 2(n) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure reads as follows:
“2(n). 'Offence' means any act or omission made
punishable by any law for the time being in force and
includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be
made under Section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871 (1
of 1871)”
35. Thus, the offence of 'Prostitution', it was urged, which is clearly an
offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, by virtue of Section 2(2) of the
MCOCA, by necessary implication, is an offence under the MCOCA as well.
36. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
that though hundred of pages of phone call records have been filed, there is no
material on record regarding the procurement or inducement or taking the co-
accused girls for the purpose of prostitution, Ms. Gupta pointed out that the
charge sheet filed by the prosecution clearly mentioned that during
he two numbers used by Arvinder Pal Singh,
investigation it was found that t
who was arrested along with the two prostitutes by the police team, were in the
name of the appellant Kamaljit Singh. Further, there were 594 calls within two
months on the phone being used by the appellant from the mobiles of the girls,
which were also in the name of the appellant. These calls were made at late
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 21 of 36

hours from Five Star Hotels. Further, money was transferred by the co-
accused on the basis of bank account numbers sent by the appellant through
SMS into the accounts of the prostitutes and their men, and a staggering
amount i.e. Rs.9.05 lakhs was spent by the organised crime syndicate on
mobile bills in only 3 years. These facts, Ms. Gupta urged, clearly revealed the
nexus between the appellant and his associates including the prostitutes, who
were thriving on the prostitution racket. It also emerged in the course of
investigation that the appellant who had no other known source of income was
leading a lavish life style.
37. Before embarking upon the merits of the respective contentions of the
parties, it is deemed expedient to notice a few decisions rendered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of the menace of prostitution and the
general development of the law pertaining to organised crime including
trafficking of women.
38. In Shanker @ Gauri Shanker Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 4 SCC
, while dealing with “organised crime” and expressing anxiety over the fact
478
that “organised crime” including prostitution had taken deep roots, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations, [SCC at p.519 para
61]:
“In large urban areas this kind of organised crime has taken
deep roots. It has become the way of life of these organised
criminal groups particularly indulging in underground unlawful
activities. Eventually the underground economy has entered on
the vitals of the society gradually rendering it malignant. The
organised crime has profit as its primary goal to be achieved at
any cost. The potential for criminal violence in such crimes is
inherently present in an organised crime group. The activities
such crime groups indulge in may vary numerously.
Prostitution is an activity bad in social sense as witnessed and
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 22 of 36

is prohibited legally. Yet for many potential buyers the services
of prostitutes are goods in the strict economic sense of the term
“goods”. The buyers are willing to pay for these goods in the
market transaction. It is these monetary values, though illegal,
underlying that eventually lead to growth of these organised
crimes and further criminal specialisation whose only common
aim is attainment of wealth primarily, of course and then if
possible power and influence by illegal means. It has thus
become an enterprise not infrequently aiming at purchase of
respectability. After all money is money and that which is
illegally gained can seemingly be legally spent to achieve social
status......................................................”
39. In Vishal Jeet Vs. UOI 1990 3 SCC 318 , there was a PIL against forced
prostitution of girls, d ev dasis and jogins , and for their rehabilitation. In the
said PIL, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that
despite stringent and rehabilitative provisions under the various Acts, the
results were not as desired and called for severe and speedy legal action against
exploiters, such pimps, brokers and brothel owners.
40. In Gaurav Jain Vs. UOI (1997) 8 SCC 114, the Court again took
judicial notice of the fact that the minimal number of 'prostitutes' get into flesh
trade either voluntarily or by organised gangsters, who force women and girls
by offering rosy future to innocent fallen women and trap them often with the
connivance of the police. In para-19 of its judgment, the Supreme Court held
as follows:
“19. Therefore, prostitution is not confined, as in the ITP Act,
to offering of the body to a person for promiscuous sexual
intercourse. Normally, the word “prostitution” means an act of
promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire or offer or agreement to
perform an act of sexual intercourse or any unlawful sexual act
for hire as was the connotation of the Act. By amendment the act
of a female and exploitation of her person by an act or process of
exploitation for commercial purpose making use of or working up
for exploitation of the person of the women taking unjust and
unlawful advantage of trapped women for one's benefit or sexual
intercourse has been brought within its frame. The word
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 23 of 36

“abuse” has a very wide meaning – everything which is contrary
to good order established by usage amounts to abuse. Physical
or mental maltreatment also is an abuse. An injury to genital
organs in an attempt of sexual intercourse also amounts to sexual
abuse. Any injury to private parts of a girl constitutes abuse
under the JJ Act..........................”
41. The Supreme Court in the Gaurav Jain's case accordingly passed an
order directing, inter alia, for the constitution of a Committee to make an in-
depth study of the problem. In 1998, the Central Govt., pursuant to the
directions issued by the Supreme Court constituted “Committee on
Prostitution, Children Prostitutes and Children of Prostitutes and Plan of
Action to Combat Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Women
and Children”.
42. In the same year, i.e., in the year 1998 itself in a Report containing an
Action Plan prepared by the Deptt. of Woman and Child Development,
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, detailed
recommendations were made with a view to arrest the systematic problem,
including issues relating to law enforcement and legal reforms. However, it
was found subsequently that Govt. of India's Action Plan of 1998 to combat
trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of women and children had not
delivered the desired results and more stringent measures were the crying need
of the day. It was noticed that the penal statutes of other countries dealt with
'organised crime' in supplying goods and services, including gambling,
prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, racketing and other unlawful activities.
43. In December, 2002 India became a signatory to “UN Convention
Against Trans-National Organised Crime”, which includes the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 24 of 36

Children. By becoming the participant in the Convention, a global instrument
which advocates international and national action against organised crime , the
Government of India has given a clear mandate to confront evils of trafficking
of women and children.
44. In the meantime, Interpol defined organised crime as “any enterprise or
group of enterprises engaged in continuing illegal activity which has its
primary activities that bring together a client-public relationship which
demands a range of good and services which are illegal.”
45. In Usha Badri Poonawala Vs. K. Kuriam Babu AIR 2002 Bombay
a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court (Hon'ble Mr.Justice
292,
D.Y.Chandrachud, J) while upholding the claim by women litigants on the
basis of act of alleged defamation, held that the same would constitute a case
relating to violence and that the expression “violence” must be construed
liberally so as to include violence of a kind which will damage the reputation
of women. In para-5 of the said judgment, the definition of “violence” was
given as follows:
“5..........................Violence against women takes several
forms: rape, child sexual abuse, trafficking in women ,
domestic violence, pornography, selective abortion of female
foetuses and dowry deaths are all forms of violence which
denigrate the dignity of women. (For a comprehensive
analysis, see “Domestice Violence And Law: Report of
Colloquium on Justice for Women-Empowerment Through
Law, Butterworths India, 2000 Edition page xliii). The
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence
Against Women was adopted by the General Assembly of
th
United Nations on 20 December, 1993. Article 1 defines
violence against women as meaning any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical,
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 25 of 36

private life. According to Article 2, violence against women
encompasses: (a) physical, sexual and psychological violence
occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of
female children in the household, dowry related violence,
marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and
violence related to exploitation, (b) Physical, sexual and
psychological violence occurring within the general
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment
and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and
elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution , (c)
Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or
condoned by the State wherever it occurs.”
46. In a recent Report by Sumita Sarkar and Arvind Tiwari on “Combating
Organised Crime : A Case Study of Mumbai City”, it was noticed that a
majority of countries are now confronted by the challenge of transnational
organised crime and the major patterns of organised crime variously
documented in recent years include:
●
Illicit Drug Smuggling;
●
Alien Smuggling;
●
Money Laundering;
●
Financial Fraud;
●
Counterfeiting;
●
Illegal Arms Trafficking;
●
International Car Theft Rings; and
●
Prostitution .
47. It is in this backdrop that the provisions of the Maharashtra Control of
Organised Crime Act, 1999 must be viewed and their scope and ambit
examined in the context of the present case.
48. Before doing so, however, it is proposed to extract the relevant portion
of the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Bail
Appln.No.2033/2006 decided on 20.08.2007 entitled
Kamal Jeet Singh Vs.
State before whom bail was sought by the appellant on the same grounds as
urged in the present appeal. While rejecting the bail plea of the appellant, the
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 26 of 36

learned Judge held as follows:
“10. Even de hors the charge under MACOCA, there are
serious allegations against the petitioner for which charges
under ITP Act are also framed. Learned Counsel for the
respondent had taken me through the record and also the
allegations, note whereof has already been taken above. He
also pointed out that as many as 15 cases were registered
against the petitioner out of which 12 are under ITP Act . He
also referred to the various calls made from one mobile phone
to other between the co-accused inter se as well as between the
accused persons and the girls involved in sex trade, who were
recovered. He pointed out that these girls were also provided
with mobile phones, who were residing in other cities and there
were calls made by co-accused persons to those girls on those
phones. He also referred to the statements of the accused
persons recorded during investigation throwing light on the
manner in which air ticket bookings for these girls used to be
made and the modus of making payments to these girls adopted
by the petitioner and other co-accused. It is, however, not
necessary to go into these allegations in detail. Suffice it to
state that the charges against the petitioner are of serious
nature and I am, therefore, not inclined to grant bail to the
petitioner. This petition is accordingly dismissed at this stage.”
49. Now a look at the judicial pronouncements on the subject. In Bharat
Shanti Lal Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 1 Bom.L.R.
, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, while upholding the
527
constitutional validity of Sections 2(d), (e) and (f) and Sections 3 and 4 of the
MCOCA, with reference to the provisions of Section 2(1) (d) which defines
“continuing unlawful activities” observed as follows:
“......is intended to prevent and control 'organized crime' is
something which is continued unlawful activity and that
'continuing unlawful activity' as repeatedly indulging or
facing charge of indulgence in a crime punishable with
three years or more. The definition, therefore, thus defines
with clarity what is meant by 'continuing unlawful activity'
for the purpose of achieving the object of the Act. There is,
therefore, no vagueness nor any violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution”.
50. The aforesaid judgment of the Bombay High Court assumes importance
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 27 of 36

for the reason that the Bombay High Court after minutely examining the
provisions of section 2(1) (d) has clearly laid down that what has been defined
as 'continuing unlawful activity' by a member of an 'organised crime syndicate'
is an activity prohibited by law and done repeatedly, i.e., more than once for
which the charge-sheet has been filed in the Court of competent jurisdiction in
the past ten years.
51. In a recent judgment in
State of Maharashtra Vs. Lalit Somdutta
Nagpal reported in 2007 (3 Scale) page 49 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
examined the question of applicability of MCOCA to offences under the
Essential Commodities Act. It was held that the authorities were not precluded
from applying the provisions of MCOCA to offences under Sections 3 and 7 of
the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as well as under the 1981 Act. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, granted bail to the accused persons on the
ground that the sanction under Section 23(1) (a) granted by the authorities for
the invocation of MCOCA revealed complete non-application of mind as the
same had been given upon consideration of an enactment which was non est
(Petroleum Storage and Distribution Act, which enactment did not exist on the
relevant date). The Supreme Court further held that the 'organised crime'
referred to in the sanction order, with regard to the alleged violation of sales
tax and excise laws, in the view of their Lordships, was not intended to be the
basis for application of the provisions of the MCOCA, for, to apply the
provisions of MCOCA something more in the nature of coercive acts and
violence is required to be spelt out so as to bring the 'unlawful activity'
complained of within the definition of 'organised crime' under Section 2(a) of
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 28 of 36

the MCOCA.
52. The present case not being a case for violation of any tax or excise laws,
but clearly being a case involving provisions of the ITP Act and the IPC, it is
not possible to hold that the invocation of MCOCA to the present case was
unjustified.
53. The reliance of the learned counsel for the Appellant on the decision of
(supra) is also, in my view, wholly
Ranjit Singh Brahmjit Singh Sharma
unjustified in view of the fact that the Supreme Court in the said case was
dealing with the bail applications of persons charged for offences under
Sections 120-B/255/249/472/474/260/263 (a) & (b) 478 read with Section 34
IPC and it was in this context that the Supreme Court expressed a prima facie
opinion that if the words 'any unlawful means' are widely construed having
regard to commission of the offences of cheating or criminal breach of trust,
the provisions of MCOCA can be applied, which prima facie, does not appear
to have been intended by the Parliament.
54. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the support sought to be drawn
by the learned counsel for the appellant from the aforesaid judgment in Ranjit
Singh's case clearly cannot be drawn. On the contrary, paragraph-24 of the
judgment clarifies the position of law as follows:-
“24. The Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly states
as to why the said Act had to be enacted. Thus, it will be
safe to presume that the expression “any unlawful means”
must refer to any such act which has a direct nexus with the
commission of a crime which MCOCA seeks to prevent or
control. In other words, an offence falling within the
definition of organised crime and committed by an
organised crime syndicate is the offence contemplated by
the Statement of Objects and Reasons. There are offences
and offences under the Indian Penal Code and other penal
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 29 of 36

statutes providing for punishment of three years or more
and in relation to such offences more than one charge-
sheet may be filed. As we have indicated hereinbefore, only
because a person cheats or commits a criminal breach of
trust, more than once, the same by itself may not be
sufficient to attract the provisions of MCOCA.
Furthermore, mens rea is a necessary ingredient for
commission of a crime under MCOCA.”
55. The charges in the present case not being for cheating simplicitor or for
violation of any tax or excise laws, and the present being a case of 'continuing
unlawful activity' by an 'organised crime syndicate' with a wide network for
illegal trafficking and prostitution, in my considered opinion, it is not possible
to hold that the invocation of MCOCA in the present case was unjustified. It is
also not possible to hold that the words “other unlawful means” contained in
Section 2(e) are to be read as ejusdem generis/noscitur a sociis with the words
violence, threat of violence, intimidation or coercion. However, even assuming
the words “other unlawful means” are to be so construed, illegal trafficking of
persons can safely be said to involve the use of violence, threat of violence,
intimidation or coercion.
56. Adverting next to the contentions of the learned counsel for the
appellant that the confessional statement of Neeraj Chopra @ Dev Chopra
under Section 18 of the MCOCA was not voluntary in nature and that sanction
for prosecution in the instant case was given without application of mind and
even otherwise was cryptic in nature, it is deemed expedient to reproduce
Section-18 and 23 of the MCOCA, which read as under:
“ 18. Certain confessions made to police officer to be taken
into consideration. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in the
Code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), but
subject to the provisions of this section, a confession made by
a person before a police officer not below the rank of the
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 30 of 36

Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer
either in writing or on any mechanical devices like cassettes,
tapes or sound tracks from which sounds or images can be
reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person or
co-accused, abettor or conspirator:
Provided that, the co-accused, abettor or conspirator is
charged and tried in the same case together with the accused.
(2) The confession shall be recorded in a free atmosphere
in the same language in which the person is examined and as
narrated by him.
(3) The police officer shall, before recording any confession
under sub-section (1), explain to the person making it that he
is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it
may be used as evidence against him and such police officer
shall not record any such confession unless upon questioning
the person making it, he is satisfied that it is being made
voluntarily. The concerned police officer shall, after
recording such voluntary confession, certify in writing below
the confession, putting the date and time of the same.
(4) Every confession recorded under sub-section (1) shall be
sent forthwith to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the
Chief Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in
which such confession has been recorded and such
Magistrate shall forward the recorded confession so received
to the Special Court which may take cognizance of the
offence.
(5) The person from whom a confession has been recorded
under sub-section (1) shall also be produced before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate to
whom the confession is required to be sent under sub-section
(4) along with the original statement of confession, written or
recorded on mechanical device without unreasonable delay.
(6) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief
Judicial Magistrate shall scrupulously record the statement, if
any, made by the accused so produced and get his signature
and in case of any complaint of torture, the person shall be
directed to be produced for medical examination before a
Medical Officer not lower in rank than of an Assistant Civil
Surgeon”.
Section 23(2) of MCOCA reads as follows:
“ 23(2). No Special Court shall take cognizance of any
offence under this Act without the previous sanction of
the police officer not below the rank of Additional
Director General of Police.”
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 31 of 36

57. A bare glance at the provisions of Section 18 of the MCOCA
reproduced above, makes it abundantly clear that confession made by a person
before the police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police and
recorded by such officer in the manner provided in the said section, shall be
admissible in the trial of such person or his co-accused, abettor or conspirator.
58. It is not in dispute that the confession of Neeraj Chopra @ Dev Chopra
in the instant case was recorded by a police officer not below the rank of
Superintendent of Police, i.e., the Dy. Commissioner of Police, Shri
A.S.Cheema in the manner provided in section 18 of the MCOCA. Thus, there
is no warrant for the assumption that the said confession was not properly
recorded or was not recorded in accordance with the guidelines laid down by
the Supreme Court in the Kartar Singh case, as alleged by the counsel for the
appellant, for, it is well settled that once a statutory provision has been
complied with, the confession recorded by the authorized officer must be
deemed to be recorded in a proper manner. So far as the reliability of the
confession is concerned, it is trite law that the same cannot be adjudged at the
stage of framing of charge and must be decided during trial when the witnesses
are examined.
59. Dealing next with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
that the confession was not a voluntary one, the said contention does not
appear to be borne out from the record. A perusal of the record shows that
Neeraj Chopra @ Dev Chopra was arrested on 26.9.2005 and produced before
the Addl. Sessions Judge on 27.9.2005, when two days of police custody
remand was granted. As per his own admission, he was not beaten up or
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 32 of 36

subjected to any sort of custodial torture and on 28.9.2005 he was taken to the
DCP, A.S.Cheema where he gave a statement of his own free will. On the
following day, i.e., 29.9.2005, he was produced before the Ld.CMM, Delhi,
Ms. Reena Singh Nag, where he made the following statement which was
certified by the learned CMM:
“ IN THE COURT OF MS. REENA SINGH NAG, CMM, DELHI
FIR No.96/05
P.S. CHANAKYA PURI
U/S. 4/5/8 ITP ACT AND SECTION 3 OF MCOC ACT.
STATE VERSUS NEERAJ CHOPRA
29.9.05
Present: Shri Kumar Gyanesh IO ACP AATS.
Accused Neeraj Chopra @ Dev Chopra @ sunny s/o
Gurmeet Singh produced in police custody in case FIR
No.96/05 under Section 4/5/8 ITP Act and 3 of MCOC Act,
Sections 420/120-B IPC, P.S.Chanakyapuri. An application
has been moved intimating regarding the confessional
statement of the aforesaid accused recorded under the
provisions of Section 18 of MCOC Act. A sealed envelope
intact with the seal of DCP, CP Delhi has also been produced
which consists of confessional statement of the accused for
further necessary action. I have sent the ACP and the
constable in whose custody, accused has been produced
outside the chamber. It is 10:30 a.m. It may be pointed out
that this accused was produced on 28.9.05 also at 4:20 p.m.
Accused was produced in police custody for the aforesaid
purpose. Since I was to go to computer class at Karkardooma
Judicial Academy, the case was fixed for today in the
morning. There is no one in the chamber and the proceedings
are being recorded on dictation being given to Mrs. Sunita
Seth. I have also verbally interrogated from the accused as to
what he wants to state today to which he stated that he has
nothing to say. I have gone through his confessional
statement produced before me today in sealed envelope on
the basis of the same I have enquired from the accused
whether he was produced before DCP on 28.9.05 to which he
has replied in affirmative. It would be apt if his statement is
recorded. Statement of accused Neeraj Chopra @ Dev
Chopra @ Sunny s/o Gurmeet Singh, age 32 years R/o A-117,
Sharda Puri Ramesh Nagar studied upto a Fine Arts (Under
Graduate) can read Hindi, English and Gurmukhi, helping
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 33 of 36

his father in his interior decoration business.
Without oath.
The same is recorded by me in vernacular on a separate
sheet as its Annexure A.

sd/-
29.9.05
CMM”
“Annexure A
IN THE COURT OF MS. REENA SINGH NAG, CMM,
DELHI
IN THE MATTER OF:
STATE VERSUS NEERAJ
CHOPRA
FIR NO.96/05, P.S. CHANAKYA PURI
I was arrested by the police on 26.9.05. I was not beaten
in any manner but it was definitely said that if I do not
cooperate then I will be implicated. On 26.9.05 I was
produced before Judge Sahib (Garg Sahib), he gave one
day PC remand. On 27.9.05, I was again produced before
Judge Sahib (Bhayana sahib) and two days of PC remand
was granted from there. On 28.9.2005 I was taken to
DCP A.S. Cheema, there I gave statement out of my own
will.
Accused read over entire statement recorded by DCP,
Shri A.S.Cheema. He admits that he had made the
statement as recorded except that he did not use the
words glamorous.
I do not want to get myself medically examined. I believe
that I shall be given one opportunity for reformation and
leniency will be shown.
Sd/-
29.9.05
sd/-
Neeraj Chopra
(NEERAJ CHOPRA)
Since from the above, it can be informed that
accused has not alleged any torture, so there is no need
for sending him for medical examination.
I have signed the two pages of statement recorded by the
DCP Shri Cheema.
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 34 of 36

The proceedings in closed envelope duly taped and sealed
(RK) be sent to Spl. Judge Shri A.K.Garg, ASJ, Patiala
House immediately. The confessional statement of
accused as recorded by DCP Shri Cheema has been kept
back in the sealed envelope and the same be sent along
with proceedings to the Ld. Spl.. Judge.
Sd/-
29.9.05
CMM”
60. The further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the
sanction under Section 23(2) of the MCOCA is cryptic and shows non-
application of mind, is also wholly misconceived as the sanction order clearly
sets out that all the papers were perused by the sanctioning authority and thus
it cannot be said that there was non-application of mind by the sanctioning
authority as alleged. Apart from this, learned counsel for the appellant has also
not been able to point out any cogent reason to buttress his contention that the
sanction has been wrongly accorded by the sanctioning authority. There is,
therefore, no merit in his contention that Section 23(2) of the MCOCA,
reproduced above, comes to the aid of the appellant.
61. In the result, it is not difficult to concur with the findings of the learned
Special Judge that there is sufficient material for framing of charges against the
accused persons under the various provisions of law and a prima facie case is
made out against the appellant under Sections 4 & 5 of the ITP Act, Section
3(i)(ii), 3(4), 3(5) and Section 4 MCOCA and Sections 420/120-B IPC. Before
parting with the case, however, it is directed that since in the meantime the bail
plea of the appellant has been rejected by this Court, the learned Special Judge
shall proceed with the trial of the case as expeditiously as possible.
62. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Crl. M.A. Nos.336 and 338/2007
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 35 of 36

also stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
A copy of this order be sent to the learned Special Judge, New Delhi for
information and record.
REVA KHETRAPAL, J
JANUARY 29, 2008
km/dc
Crl. A. No.28/2007 Page 36 of 36