REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1928 OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO. 11220 OF 2019)
THE STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR
(NOW U.T. OF JAMMU & KASHMIR) & Ors. …APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SHUBAM SANGRA …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :
| “Rape is one of the most terrible crimes on earth and it happens<br>every few minutes. The problem with groups who deal with rape is<br>that they try to educate women about how to defend themselves.<br>What really needs to be done is teaching men not to rape. Go to<br>the source and start there.” | | |
|---|
| - Kurt Cobain | |
1. This appeal is at the instance of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (now
U.T. of Jammu & Kashmir) and is directed against the order passed by the
High Court of Jammu & Kashmir at Jammu dated 11.10.2019 by which the
Signature Not Verified
High Court rejected the Criminal Revision Application No. 27 of 2018 filed
Digitally signed by
Sanjay Kumar
Date: 2022.11.16
15:20:30 IST
Reason:
by the appellant State herein, thereby affirming the order passed by the
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Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua dated 27.03.2018 holding the respondent
accused herein to be a juvenile on the date of the commission of the
alleged offence.
2. This litigation originates from the most unfortunate Kathua rape case.
The Kathua rape case involved the abduction, gang rape and murder of an
eight year-old Muslim girl by name ‘X’ by six Hindu men and the respondent
herein (claiming to be a juvenile) in January, 2018 in the Rasana village
near Kathua in Jammu & Kashmir. The victim belonged to the nomadic
Bakarwal community. She disappeared for a week before her body was
recovered by the villagers a kilometer away from the village. In all eight
individuals were arrested in connection with the ghastly crime which
includes the respondent herein. Since the respondent herein claimed to be
a juvenile, his trial was separated. The other six co-accused were put to
trial and vide the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2019 passed by the trial
court, six of the seven accused stood convicted and one accused was
acquitted. Three of those convicted were sentenced to life imprisonment
and remaining three to five years rigorous imprisonment. The Special
Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted to probe into the entire matter and
ultimately chargesheet came to be filed against all the accused persons.
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The father of the victim namely ‘Y’ lodged a complaint in the Hira Nagar
Police Station stating that his daughter had gone missing.
3. On 17.01.2018, the body of the victim was found and taken into
custody by the police. The body was sent for autopsy. The post-mortem
was conducted by a team of doctors at the District Hospital, Kathua on the
same day. On 22.01.2018, investigation of the case was transferred to the
Crime Branch and Crime Headquarters.
4. The post-mortem revealed the presence of clonazepam in the body of
the deceased girl. The examination by the doctors found that the deceased
had been drugged which was sedative, before she was raped and
murdered. The forensic evidence suggested that she had been held on
several dates by Sanji Ram, one of the accused persons of the crime. The
strands of hair recovered from the temple matched those taken from the
deceased. The forensic examination stated that the deceased had been
raped multiple times by different men and that she had been strangulated
to death as well as hit on the head by a heavy stone.
5. The Delhi Forensic Science Laboratory analysed fourteen packets of
evidence containing vaginal swabs, hair strands, blood samples of four
accused, viscera of the deceased girl, the girl’s frock and salwar, simple
clay and blood-stained clay. The vaginal swabs matched with the DNA of
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the accused as did some other samples. The hair strands found in the
temple, where the deceased was raped, matched that of the girl and the
accused.
6. One of the accused persons namely Sanji Ram along with the
respondent herein was found to be the main accused in the case. He at the
relevant point of time was the priest of the family temple where the incident
allegedly took place. The respondent herein happens to be the nephew of
the Sanji Ram.
7. On 10.06.2019, six of the seven accused persons were found to be
guilty and one was acquitted. Sanji Ram, Deepak Khajuria and Parvesh
Kumar were sentenced to life imprisonment for 25 years with a fine of Rs.
One lakh each. The other three accused persons namely Tilak Raj, Anand
Dutta and Surinder Kumar were sentenced to five years in jail for
destroying crucial evidence in the case. Vishal Jangotra S/o Sanji Ram
came to be acquitted due to lack of evidence. The eighth accused, who is
yet to be tried claiming to be a juvenile at the time of commission of the
offence, is the respondent herein.
8. The specific case put up by the prosecution against the respondent
herein is contained in the chargesheet reads thus:
" ... He immediately rushed down stairs, took 3 Manars and
keys to Devisthan and told 'X ' that he had seen her horses.
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He led her to jungle and also called accused Mannu who was
already waiting for his signal. Sensing some trouble the victim
tried to flee away. The JD stopped her by catching hold of her
neck and covered her mouth with one of his hands and
pushed her and she fell on the ground. Accused Mannu held
her legs and the JCL (respondent) administered Manars one
by one forcibly to the victim. The victim fell unconscious and
was raped by JCL...Later on, they took the girl and kept her
inside Devisthan under the table over two Chatayees (plastic
mats) and then covered her two Darees (cotton thread
Mats) ...
At about 8.30 a.m. the JCL again went to Devisthan and
administered 3 sedatives tablets to the girl while she was
unconscious with empty stomach ....
... The accused Vishal Jangotra @Shamma raped 'X'.
Thereafter, JCL also raped the girl in presence of the accused
Mannu. The investigation also revealed that after committing
the rape, JCL directed accused Vishal Jangotra @ Shmma
and accused Mannu to leave Devisthan. JCL again took out
03 tablets out of the strip which he had kept under a heap of
garbage near an electric pole outside the Devisthan and gave
the same to the girl and again covered here with mats and
dropped the utensil container in front of her in order to hide
her ...
During investigation it has been found that after distributing
Lohri to relatives in the evening JCL informed accused Sanji
Ram that he and accused Vishal Jangotra had committed
gang rape with 'X' inside Dev!sthan .... On the spot accused
Deepak Khajuria @Deepu told JCL to wait as he wanted to
rape the girl before she is killed. As such once again the little
girl 'X' was gang raped firstly by accused Deepal Khajuria
@Deepu and then by JCL. After committing the barbaric act
of rape on his left thigh and started applying force with his
hands on her neck in order to kill her. As accused Deepak
Khajuria @Deepu was unsuccessful in killing her another
accused JCK killed her by pressing his knees against her
back and strangulated the girl by applying force on both the
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ends of Chunni. Thereafter, accused JCL, in order to make
sure that the victim is dead, hit her twice on head with
stone ...
... As per plan JCL along with accused Vishal Jangotra
@Shamma went to Devisthan. Accused Vishal Jangotra
@Shamma opened the door while JCL lifted the dead body
on his shoulder. The accused Vishal Jangotra @Shamma
locked the door and JCL disposed the dead body by throwing
it inside the jungle while accused Vishal Jangotra @Sham ma
was guarding outside bushes ... "
Further, in the Supplementary Charge Sheet dated 09-08-
2018 it has been observed as under:-
... "During the course of investigation, it has already been
established that victim was administered sedatives by
accused during her captivity. Two tablets recovered on
the disclosure of Juvenile in conflict with law near
Devsthan Rasana were sent to forensic lab for analysis.
The chemical analysis report obtained thereof, revealed
the present of Clonazepam salt in the said tablets. To
ascertain the effect of sedatives 'Mannar' as well as
Clonazepam on the victim with empty stomach, the
concerned expert (Professor and Head, Pharmacology,
GMC Jammu) has opined that the sedative Clonazepam
(Epitril 0.Smg) has the following effects:- (1) Drowsiness,
(2) Confusion, (3) Impaired, ( 4) Coordination, (5) Slow
reflexes, (6) Slowed or stopped breathing, (7) Coma (loss
of consciousness) and Death. As per the final opinion of
the expert "the peak concentration of Clonazepam is
achieved in the blood after one hour to 1.5. hours of oral
administration. Clonazepam absorption from the enteral
route is complete irrespective of administered either with
or without food". ...”
9. The crime that the respondent accused herein has been charged with
is heinous; its execution was vicious and cruel, by any stretch of
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imagination. The entire crime was calculated and ruthless. This case
captured the attention and indignation of the society across the country,
more particularly, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as a cruel crime that
raised alarm regarding safety within the community.
10. Our adjudication in the present litigation is restricted to the question
whether the respondent was a juvenile on the date of commission of the
offence? It all started with the order dated 21.02.2018 passed by the High
Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the OWP No. 259 of 2018 with M.P. No. 1 of
2018. The order reads thus:
“In compliance of the order dated 09.02.2018, Mr. W S Nargal,
learned Senior Additional Advocate General has produced the
copy of the status report. After hearing learned counsel for the
parties and from perusal of the status report, I deem it
appropriate to issue the following directions to the SIT:
1. That the SIT shall take steps for ascertaining the age of
Shubam Sangra within a period of 10 days from today by
Medical Board which shall be constituted by Principal,
Government Medical College, Jammu;
2. That the SIT shall also ascertain the whereabouts of Mannu
whose name is mentioned in paragraph 6 of the status report
and shall take steps for apprehending the aforesaid Mannu;
3. That the SIT shall also obtain the copy of the post mortem
report along with detailed questionnaire which has been
supplied by it to the doctors of the Boards conducting the post
mortem.
Let a fresh status report with regard to the aforesaid points be
filed within a period of two weeks from today.
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Taking into account the fact that the part of the status report
dated 19.02.2018 has been published in daily newspaper,
namely, Greater Kashmir, in extensor and taking into account
the sensitivity of the matter as well as to ensure free and fair
trial, I deem it appropriate to direct that the proceeding of the
instant writ petition shall not be published in any newspaper.
List on 09.03.2018 at the bottom of the list.
11. In due compliance with the directions issued by the High Court in its
order referred to above, the Special Investigation Team vide its letter dated
26.02.2018 requested the Principal, Government Medical College, Jammu
to constitute a medical board for the determination of age of the respondent
herein.
12. The Principal and Dean of the Government Medical College, Jammu
constituted a Special Medical Board comprising the following doctors:
| S.<br>No. | Name | Designation |
|---|
| 1 | Dr. Mritunjay | Professor., Department of Physiology |
| 2 | Dr. Ashwani | Assistant Professor, Department<br>of Anatomy |
| 3 | Dr. Satvinder<br>Singh | Lecturer, Department of Oral<br>Diagnostic Department, IGGDC,<br>Jammu |
| 4 | Dr. Shivani<br>Mehta | Lecturer, Department of Forensic<br>Medicine |
| 5 | Dr. Jeevitesh<br>Khuda | Registrar, Department of Radio-<br>Diagnosis |
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13. The Special Medical Board constituted, as above, undertook the
medical examination of the respondent herein and gave its report dated
03.3.2018 which reads thus:
AGE ESTIMATION REPORT
Name SHUBHAM SANGRA @ SHUBOO Sex: MALE
S/o. Sh. Om Parkash Sangra
Address Hiranagar, Ward No. 10, NP Rasana
Age as alleged by person/miscellaneous data 15 years
Brought by/Authority Dy SP Shwetamber Sharma
Standing Medical Board, No. GMC/2018/SMBd KPS -
125747
Court Case 12176 Dated 26/02/2016 Crime Branch
Jammu.
Purpose of examination Assessment of age of Subham
Sangra Sd/-
(Signature/Thumb Impression of Individual)
Marks of Identification: 1. Black mole above left angle of
mouth
2. Scar mark on right eyebrow
1. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
(i) Height 5'3" (ii) Weight 48 Kg
(ii) Built Average (ii) Voice Masculine
(v) Secondary Sex Characters Well developed
II. DENTAL EXAMINATION
| (U. Right)<br>8765432<br>1 | (U. Left)<br>1234567<br>8 |
|---|
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| 8765432<br>1<br>(L. Right) | 1234567<br>8 (L.<br>Right) |
|---|
Referred to Deptt of Oral Diagnosis IGGDC Jammu for
dental age estimation by Dr Satvinder Singh.
03/03/2018 -On Clinical examination, all permanent teeth
erupted except 18, 28, 38 & 48 on OPG (radiographic)
examination; 18 & 28 show V2 root formation
approximately 38 & 48 show near complete root formation
with open (illegible). On the cavity this findings, the dental
of patient is of 19+ years.
III. RADIOLOGICAL EXAMINATION: Referred to
Department of Radio diagnose for X-rays for age
estimation. Advised (1) X-ray (Rt.) Humerus (Shoulder Jt)
AP (2) X-ray Hip (Pelvis) - AP (3) X-ray (RF) Knee Jt-AP (4)
X-ray (Rt) Elbow Joint AP Lat (5) X-ray (Rt) Hand & wrist-
AP.
OPINION - reserved till the receipt of reports from IGGDC
Jammu and the Deptt of Radio diagnosis.
Sd/- Sd/-
Dr. Mrityunjay Shivani Mehta
(Deptt of Physiology) (Deptt of Forensic Medicine)
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
Dr. Jeevitesh Khuda Dr. Ashwani Dr. Satvinder
(Deptt of Radio (Deptt of Anatomy) (IGDDC Jammu)
Diagnosis)
3/03/2018 FINAL OPINION – Received R/8" x 10" x four (4)
films reported by Dr. Jeevitesh Khoda with the opinion-
keeping in view the above findings the age of the patient in
my opinion is between Nineteen to Twenty Three (19-23)
years of age.
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FINAL OPINION - On the basis of Physical Dental &
Radiological Examination the approximate age of above
individual is above nineteen years (19 +)
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
Dr. Mrityunjay Dr. Ashwani Dr. Satvinder
(Deptt of Physiology) (Deptt of Anatomy) (Deptt of Oral
Diagnosis)
Sd/- Sd/-
Dr. Shivani Mehta Dr. Jeevitesh Khuda
(Deptt of Forensic Medicine) (Deptt of Radio Diagnosis)”
14. The High Court thereafter passed an order dated 14.03.2018 in the
OWP No. 259 of 2018 with M.P. No. 1 of 2018 which reads thus:
“When the matter was taken up today, learned Senior
Additional Advocate General submitted that despite request
being made to the Medical Superintendent, District Hospital
Kathua, till today, the post-mortem report has not been
handed over to the Investigating Officer. In view of the
aforesaid submission, the Medical Superintendent, District
Hospital, Kathua is directed to hand over the copy of the
post-mortem report as well as reply to the questionnaire to
the officer heading the Special Investigating Team within a
period of three days from the date of receipt of certified copy
of the order passed today.
With regard to the averments in para 7 of the status report
which has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, it is
submitted that the Special Investigating Team shall obtain
the warrant of arrest in respect of absconding accused,
namely, Sanjhi Ram and shall take all effective steps to
arrest him and shall interrogate him as well as other persons
who are related to the offences in question whose names
have been mentioned in para 7 of the status report. Let the
aforesaid exercise be carried out with three weeks from
today.
Mr. Nargal, learned Sr. AAG further submitted that since the
matter is pending before this Court, the Chief Judicial
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Magistrate, Kathua is not ascertaining the age of the
accused, namely, Shubam Sangra. In view of the aforesaid
submissions and taking into account the provisions
contained under Section 8 of the J and K Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2013 as well as Rule
74 of the Rules framed under the Act, the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kathua is directed to ascertain the age of the
accused, namely, Shubam Sangra within a period of ten
days from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order
passed today, without being influenced by the report
submitted to the District Medical Board.
List on 09.04.2018.
Let a copy of this Order be supplied to learned counsel for
the parties under the seal and signatures of the bench
secretary of this Court.”
15. The Tehsildar of Hira Nagar vide his communication dated
14.03.2018 informed the Superintendent of Police, In-charge SIT Crime
Branch that the original record in respect of date of birth of the respondent
herein was not traceable. The letter of the Tehsildar dated 14.03.2018
reads thus:
"Government of Jammu & Kashmir Revenue Department
“OFFICE OF THE TEHSILDAR, EXECLJTIVE
MAGISTRATE
1st CLASS, HIRANAGAR (Kathua)
The Dy. Superintendent of Police
SIT Member Crime Branch, J&K,
Jammu.
No. JC/232 Dated: 14.03.2018
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Sub:- Investigation of Case Fir No. 10/2018 u/s
363/302/343/376/201/120- B RPC of P/S
Hiranagar.
Ref:- CB/FIR/10-2018/127 dated 13.03.2018
R/Sir,
In reference to your office letter No.CB/FIR/10-2018/127
dated 13.03.2018 regarding the subject cited above.
In this context if is hereby submitted that original, record
pertaining to the order No. 22/JC dated 15.04.2004 issued
from this office in respect of date of birth of Shubam Sangra
S/o Om Parkash R/o Hiranagar is not traceable in this office.
Moreover, the old miscellaneous record has been
dilapidated for which undersigned is not in position to submit
the original record of the same.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
Gourav Sharma,
Tehsildar, Hiranagar”
16. The Block Medical Officer, Health & Family Welfare, Hira Nagar by
his communication dated 15.03.2018 informed the Superintendent of
Police, In-Charge SIT Crime Branch, Jammu & Kashmir that the verification
of the records available in the institution reveals that no delivery in the
name of Smt. Tripta Devi W/o Om Prakash, mother of the respondent
herein, had taken place on 23.10.2002. The date of 23.02.2002 assumes
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significance as it is the case of the respondent that he was born on
23.10.2002.
17. On 20.03.2018, the respondent herein preferred an application in the
Court of the CJM, Kathua under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2013 (for short, ‘the
Act, 2013’) for determination of his claim as a juvenile.
18. The appellant State filed detailed objections to the aforesaid
application filed by the respondent herein under Section 8. The objections
read thus:
“a. On 12.01.2018 one Mohd. Yousuf S/o Sahib Din caste
Bakarwal R/o Rasana Mohara Plakh Phawara Tehsil
Hiranagar produced an application in Urdu before the P/S
Hiranagar stating therein that his daughter Miss Asifa Age 8
years had gone for grazing horses in the nearby forest on
10.01.2018. She was seen with the horses at about 14:00
hrs. At about 16:00 hrs, the horses returned back in the dera
but Asifa did not return. On this Mohd. Yousuf along with
others started search in the forest but Asifa could not be
traced out. He has the suspicion that some miscreants have
kidnapped his daughter. Consequently, Case FIR No.
10/2018 u/s 363 RPC was registered in P/S Hiranagar and
section 302 and 343 RPC were added after recovery of the
dead body of the prosecutrix. The investigating officer of P/s
Hiranagar, on the basis of a secret information had
apprehended a Juvenile delinquent namely Shubam Sangra
@ Chuboo on 19.01.2018 and was produced before the Ld.
Chief Judicial Magistrate Kathua on 20.01.2018 for seeking
remand. The investigation of the case was subsequently
transferred to Crime Branch Jammu vide PHQ order No.
374/2018 dated 22.01.2018 for further investigation. The case
was formally handed over to Crime Branch on 27.01.2018.
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During the course of the investigation the offences u/s, 376,
201· and 120-B RPC came to be included.
b. The Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua has granted
remand for lodgment of Shubam Sangra @ Chuboo in
observation home R.S Pura, the details of which is as under:-
i. 20.01.2018 to 29.01.2018 = 10 days
11. 29.01.2018 to 03.02.2018 = 6 days
ill. 03.02.2018 tol2.03.2018= 10 days
iv. 12.02.2018 to 26.02.2018 = 15 days
v. 26.02.2018 to 12.03.2018 = 15 days
vi. 12.03.2018 to 22.03.2018 = 11 days
Total - 67 days, (62 days as per the calendar entries)
Apart from this, the Ld. Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate
Kathua vide order dated 30.01.2018, 05.02.2018, 19.02.2018
and 26.02.2018 has granted the custody of juvenile
delinquent Shubam Sangra for 3 days + 3 days + 3 days +
1day respectively. This way, the juvenile was granted a total
of 10 days police custody for the purpose of investigation.
The juvenile delinquent during the course of sustained
questioning also admitted to have committed the offences of
kidnapping, rape and murder of deceased Asifa. Even as in
the chain of events, on the basis of statement of witnesses
u/s 161 and 164-A Cr. PC and circumstantial evidence the
offences u/s 363, 343, 302, 376, 120-B/RPC have been prima
facie made out against Shubam Sangra@ chuboo.
c. Moreover, during investigation it also transpired that the
Date of Birth Certificate of the Juvenile obtained from
Municipal Committee Hiranagar and the one obtained from
Modem Public Higher Secondary School Hiranagar were at
variance. In the mean time. the Hon'ble High Court on
21.02.2018 in OHP No. 259 of 2018 titled Mohd. Akhter Vs.
State had interallia passed the following direction:-
"SIT shall take steps for ascertaining the age of Shubam
Sangra within a period of 10 days from today by a
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Medical Board to be which shall be constituted by
Principal GMC Jammu".
In compliance to the above direction of Hon'ble High Court
J&K Jammu, the Principal GMC Jammu was requested vide
this office letter No. CBJ/FIR/l0 2018/56 dated 26.02.2018 to
constitute a Medical Board for determination of age in respect
of juvenile delinquent Shubam Sangra @ Chuboo. In
response to which, the Principal GMC Jammu constituted
board of doctors comprising of (i). Dr. Mrityinjay, department
of physiology (ii). Dr. Shivani Mehta, department of Forensic
Medicine (iii). Dr. Jeevitesh Khtida, department of Radio
Diagnosis (iv). Dr. Ashawani, department of Anatamy and (v).
Dr. Satvinder Singh, department of Indira Gandhi Govt.
Dental College Jammu (IGGDC). The board of doctors so
constituted examined the juvenile delinquent Shubam Sangra
on 28.02.2018 and accordingly Principal GMC Jammu
submitted the opinion of the board vide letter No.
GMC/2017 /SMVC/court case/2209 dated 05.03.2018.
Final Opinion :-
On the basis of Physical, Dental and Radiological
examination the approximate age of above mentioned
individual is above Nineteen years (19+). (The copy of the
Medical report is appended as Annexure A for reference).
d. On the basis of questioning from Juvenile delinquent
Shubam Sangra, statement of witnesses u/s 161 and 164-A
CrPC and circumstantial evidence accused persons namely
(i). Deepak Khajuria @ Deepu S/o Updesh Khajuria (ii).
Surinder Kumar S/o Sain Dass R/o Dhamiyal Hiranagar and
(iii). Parvesh Kumar @ Mannu S/o Ashok Kumar R/o Rasana
Hiranagar, (iv). VishalJangotra@ Shamma and (v). Sanji Ram
were arrested and put to sustained interrogation. The
investigation conducted so far reveals that the accused
De'epak Kumar Khajuria and the juvenile delinquent hatched
a criminal conspiracy with Sanji Ram S/o Des Raj R/o
Rasana for kidnapping, rape and murder of deceased Asifa,
d/o Mohd. Yousuf of village Rasana and in furtherance of this
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criminal conspiracy the accused persons namely Surinder
Kumar S/o Sain Dass R/o Dhamiyal Hiranagar, Parvesh
Kumar @ Mannu S/o Ashok Kumar R/o Rasana Hiranagar
and Vishal jangotra @ Shamma became a part of the
conspiracy as well as the execution plan.
e. Further, during investigation it has also transpired that
the officers and officials of P/s Hiranagar were a part of the
criminal conspiracy as the clothes of deceased Asifa were
washed up in the premises of Police Station Hiranagar on
17.01.2018 before being sent to FSL for forensic examination.
On the basis confessional statements of accused persons,
and statement of witnesses uls 161 Cr. PC as well as other
circumstances HC Tilak Raj of P/S Hiranagar and S.I Anand
Dutta, the erstwhile I/O of instant case of P/s Hiranagar have
been arrested for disappearance of evidence, done with the
intention of screening out the offender from legal punishment.
Both the police officials are on police remand and lodged in
P/s Crime Branch Jammu.
f. That as per the opinion of Board of Doctors Shubam
Sangra @ Chuboo is above nineteen years of age and thus
he is an adult. Further it is submitted that in the writ petition
titled Mohd. Akhter Vs. State OWP No. 259 of 2018, pending
adjudication before the Hon'ble High Court of J&K, Jammu a
detail status report reflecting the opinion of board of doctors
of GMC Jammu was filed before the Hon'ble court on
09.03.2018 in sealed cover for the perusal of the Hon'ble
High Court.
2. It is also relevant to submit before this Hon'ble Court that,
Tehsildar Hiranagar was requested vide office letter no.
CB/FIR/10-20181127 dated 13.03.2018 to provide the file
regarding issuance of order to executive officer Municipal
Committee Hiranagar for making the entry of date of birth in
respect of said Shubam Sangra in the record of Municipal
Committee. In response to the above communication,
Tehsildar Hiranagar vide letter no. JC/232 dated 14.03.2018
has intimated that the file in question is not traceable in his
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office. (The reply of Tehsildar is annexed for reference and
marked as Annexure -B).
3. Further it is also submitted that Executive officer of
Municipal Committee Hiranagar has made an entry in the
date of birth register of Municipal Committee in respect of
juvenile Shubam Sangra mentioning there in that the said
individual was born in Hiranagar Hospital. However, contrary
to this, in response to this office letter no. CB/FIR/10-
2018/135 dated 14.03.2018 the Block Medical Officer Health
and Family Welfare Hiranagar vide office letter No.
BMO/CHC/HGR/ Acctts/2214 dated 15.03.2018 has intimated
that on verification of records available in the institution it is
found that no delivery in the name of Smt. Tripata Devi w/o
Sh. Om Parkash R/o Hiranagar has taken place on
23.10.2002, which clearly indicates that the entry made by
Executing officer Municipal Committee Hiranagar is not based
on facts and even the order of the Tehsildar Hiranagar for
making the said entry has become doubtful. (Photocopy of
letter of BMO Hiranagar is annexed for reference and marked
as Annexure-C}.
4. That it is also relevant to place on record that the aforesaid
mentioned writ petition was listed before the Hon'ble court of
14.03.2018 wherein the Hon'ble court after going through the
status report filed in the sealed cover was please to issue the
3 directives, out of which the one pertaining to the issue in
hand was for the sake of reference is reproduced here in
under:-
"Taking into account the provisions contained under
Section 8 of the J&K ]uvenile]ustice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act; 2013 as well as Rule 74 of
the Rules framed under the Act; the Chief Judicial
Magistrate Kathua is directed to ascertain the age of the
accused, namely, Shubam Sangra with in a period of
ten days from the date of receipt of certified copy of the
order passed today, without being influenced by the
report submitted by the District Medical Board".
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The certified copy of court order has already been sent to the
Ld. Court through CPO, vide letter no. CB/FIR/10-2018/154
dated 16.03.2018. However, another photocopy of the of the
court order is again annexed for reference, marked as
Annexure-D.
5. That in view of the aforementioned reply of the Tehsildar
Hiranagar as well as the Block Medical officer Health and
Family Welfare Hiranagar and coupled with the report of the
Medical Board, it is submitted that the applicant Shubam
Sangra @ Chuboo may not be declared as juvenile and
rather in view of the role played by him in the gruesome and
dastardly act as well as his conduct and behavior,
forthcoming from the investigation conducted so far, he is
rather mature and not a juvenile. Further it is also placed on
record that the date of arrest of the Shubam Sangra as per
the CD file is 19.01.2018 and not 12.01.2018 as reflected in
the application.
In the light of the aforesaid submission it is humbly prayed
that the aforesaid application may kindly be rejected and the
applicant Shubam Sangra @ Chuboo S/o Om Parkash R/o
Ward No. 10 Hiranagar Np Village Rasana, Tehsil- Hiranagar
may kindly be declared as an adult or alternatively not a
juvenile, so that the investigation of instant case is finalized
on merits.
Superintendent of Police,
I/GSIT Crime Branch, J&K,
Jammu”
19. For the purpose of adjudicating the application filed by the
respondent herein under Section 8 of the Act, 2013 referred to above, the
CJM, Kathua recorded the deposition of the Executive Officer, Municipal
19
Committee, Hira Nagar and of the father of the respondent herein namely
Om Prakash.
20. Ultimately the CJM, Kathua passed the final order dated 27.03.2018
holding the respondent herein to be a juvenile. The relevant part of the
order passed by the CJM, Kathua reads thus:
“Having discussed legal position qua determination of
juvenility in terms of rule 74 supra and section 8 of Juvenile
Justice Act, let focus now be shifted to the facts of the case at
hand.
Executive Officer, Municipal Committee Hiranagar appeared
on 23-03-2018 along with record pertaining to date of birth of
petitioner. He was examined on the same day. According to
him date of birth of petitioner is recorded as 23-10-2002 in the
Birth and Death Register maintained by his office; that
parentage of petitioner is : son of Om Parkash and Smt.
Tripta. Further, according to this witness, date of birth entry of
petitioner has been recorded on 15-04-2004 in the records of
Municipal Committee; that said entry has been made by then
Executive Officer whose signatures and seal is at serial no. 80
of register concerned; that this entry was recorded pursuant to
order of Executive Magistrate 1st Class Hiranagar bearing no.
22/JC dated 15-04-2004; that father of petitioner had moved
an application before then Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar)
Hiranagar seeking direction for making entry of date of birth of
petitioner; that in-terms of order no. 22/JC dated 15-04-2004
entry of three children of Om Parkash (father of petitioner) was
directed to be made by Executive Magistrate 1st Class
Hiranagar; that date of birth of petitioner was entered in
compliance with this order of Executive Magistrate 1st Class
only; that signature father of petitioner exists at serial no. 80 of
register concerned; that date of birth certificate the photocopy
of which is on the file of this court has been issued from his
office in which date of birth of petitioner is recorded as 23-10-
20
2002 and this entry is correct and true according to original
record etc. etc.
In cross examination, witness deposed that incumbent
Executive Officer ensures signatures of any application on the
birth register in his presence; that with regard to place of birth
of new born, entry is made on the basis of information given
by an applicant and no verification is made in this regard
because entry is made on the basis of order of Magistrate;
that order no. 22/JC does not mention place of birth of
petitioner and that after year 2012 orders pertaining to entry in
date of birth are issued by courts and not by Executive
Magistrate etc. etc.
Another witness namely Om Parkash who is father of
petitioner was examined on 24-03-2018.
According to this witness, petitioner is his real son; that date of
birth of petitioner is 23-10-2002; that this date of birth of
petitioner is also entered in the record of Municipal Committee
Hiranagar and same was made on 15-04-2004; that prior to
this he moved an application for making entry of date of birth
of petitioner before Executive Magistrate 1st Class Hiranagar
and also led evidence and finally Tehsildar Hiranagar issued
order in the name of Municipal Committee Hiranagar pursuant
to which date of birth of petitioner was recorded as 23-10-
2002; that name of his wife is Tripta Devi. Petitioner was
admitted in Modern Public Higher Secondary School
Hiranagar in the first class; that there also he disclosed date of
birth of petitioner as 23-102-2002; that petitioner was admitted
in said school 10 years back; that however a wrong entry of
date of birth of petitioner has been made in school records;
that date of birth of petitioner shown in school is 23-10-2003;
that he came to know about this wrong entry of date of birth of
petitioner in school only when FIR was registered against him
(petitioner) pursuant to which he went to school to get date of
birth certificate of petitioner etc. etc.
On cross examination, witness deposed that he has three
children; that the youngest one is petitioner. Because of
21
ignorance he moved application for making entry of date of
birth of his children as late as in year 2004 even though his
eldest issue was born in the year 1996; that he cannot say the
age at which Shubam Sangra was admitted in the school and
that he is 4th class employee in the education department etc
etc.
Be it noted that evidence of Executive Officer, Municipal
Committee Hiranagar puts in perspective the process which
ultimately culminated in recording date of birth of petitioner in
the record of Municipal Committee Hiranagar way back in the
year 2004. As a matter of record, it stands established that
date of birth of petitioner was recorded in the birth register of
Municipal Committee Hiranagar vide registration no.80 on 15-
04-2004 right in line with the order no.22/JC dated 15-04-2004
passed by then Executive Magistrate 1st Class (Tehisildar)
Hiranagar. The fact that birth certificate issued by Municipal
committee supra on 17-03-2018 is in accord with and
conforms to original record, have been vividly demonstrated,
both, by records of Municipal Committee supra as also by the
testimony of its Executive Officer. Date of birth certificate
issued by Municipal Committee Hiranagar in favour of
petitioner on 17-03-2018 depicting his date of birth as 23-10-
2002, in the obtaining circumstances as outlined here-in-
above - therefore cannot be said to have been manufactured,
engineered or fabricated. Also, once it (Date of birth
certificates of petitioner) does not give a prima facie sense of
concoction or trickery, then to mull over an idea of over
scrutiny of same, if I say so, would indeed be a fallacy directed
at the very ambit and scope of section 8 of Juvenile Justice
(Care and protection of Children) Act and rule 74 framed
thereunder. Notably also, the narrative un-wound by father of
petitioner is in sync with account given by Executive Officer,
Municipal Committee Hiranagar and relevant official record.
There is another crucial aspect of the matter which cannot be
afforded to be over looked or side tracked. That is this: Date of
birth of petitioner was recorded in the birth register maintained
in the course of official business by Municipal Committee
Hiranagar way back on 15-04-2004. Committee did not record
22
this entry suomoto but in compliance with order issued in that
end by Executive Magistrate 1st Class Hiranagar. Occurrence
in which involvement of petitioner is alleged is of January
2018. To insinuate therefore that date of birth entry was so
caused to be made in favour of petitioner as if he knew that
after more than thirteen years later he would seek to derive
benefit in a criminal indictment would not only be an over-
statement but also an erroneous and in-substantial
assumption to say the least.
No sooner as birth certificate issued by Municipal Committee
concerned in favour of petitioner is found to be prima facie
legitimate than recourse to other modes of age determination
is not allowable. This essentially is the mandate of rule 74
framed under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act.
For all what is discussed hereinabove, and in deference to the
standard of proof required for the purpose of section 8 of the
Act supra and Rule 74 and in light of proof offered, it is held
that birth certificate issued by Municipal Committee Hiranagar
in favour of petitioner Shubam Sangra depicting his date of
birth as 23-10-2002 is legitimate, un-tainted and fair and
therefore credence needs to be given to it for the purpose of
Juvenile Justice Act supra. Reckoning date of birth of
petitioner as 23- 10-2002, it is held that age of petitioner as on
date of passing of this order is less than sixteen years. Age of
petitioner is accordingly ascertained in compliance with
directive of Hon'ble High Court dated 14-03-2018 in OWP no.
259/2018.”
21. The appellant State being dissatisfied and aggrieved with the
aforesaid order passed by the CJM, Kathua dated 27.03.2018 challenged
the same by filing the Criminal Revision Application before the High Court.
The High Court rejected the Revision Application affirming the order passed
by the CJM, Kathua holding the respondent herein to be a juvenile on date
23
of the commission of the offence. The impugned order of the High Court
reads thus:
“26. Admittedly, the date of birth of the respondent in the
Municipal record as well as school record is shown as
23.10.2002, meaning thereby on the date of registration of the
FIR, he was below the age of 18 years. Moreso, the petitioners
have not denied the authenticity of the aforesaid record. Once
there is clear proof of the respondent in the shape of birth
certificate of the Municipal Committee and certificate issued by
the school authority, the medical examination regarding the age
of the respondent automatically loses its significance.
27. Next question raised by Mr. Pant is with regard to the
maintainability of the Revision Petition. As held by the Apex
Court in Jabar Singh Vs. Dinesh and another 2010(3) SCC
757, the scope of Revision is very limited. The relevant
paragraph of the judgment is reproduced as under:
"29. A plain reading of Section 52 of the Act shows that no
statutory appeal is available against any finding of the court
that a person was not a juvenile at the time of commission
of the offence. Section 53 of the Act which is titled
"Revision", however, provides that the High Court may at
any time, either of its own motion or on an application
received on that behalf, call for the record of any
proceeding in which any competent authority or court of
session has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order, and
may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit. While
exercising such revisional powers, the High Court cannot
convert itself to an appellate court and reverse the findings
of fact arrived at by the trial Court on the basis of evidence
or material on record, except where the High Court is not
satisfied as to the legality or propriety of the order passed
by the trial Court."
28. It is admitted by the petitioners that the scope of Revision is
the same as the scope of Revision under Code of Criminal
24
Procedure. Section 52 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2013 referred to
by the petitioners also refers to the facts that Court has to
satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of any such order, as
such, the factual findings of fact cannot be upset by the Court
unless and until it is found to be perverse. In the present case
where, factual finding has been given by the Court below,
therefore, there is no illegality or impropriety in the order, as
such, there is no question of interference with the findings of the
Court below.
29. In the instant case, the trial Court has given finding of fact
relying upon the evidence and has acted in conformity with Rule
74 of the Rules of 2014 and that there is no perversion in the
findings of fact, as such, the trial Court has not committed any
illegality or impropriety which warrants interference in this
Revision Petition. Accordingly, this Revision Petition is
dismissed along with connected CrlM(s).
Record, if any, be sent down. Interim direction, if any, shall
stand vacated.
Jammu Tashi Rabstan)
11.10.2019 Judge”
22. In view the aforesaid the appellant State is here before this Court with
the present appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant State:
23. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant State vehemently submitted that the orders passed by the CJM,
Kathua and the High Court could be termed as palpably erroneous and
thereby rendering the dispensation of justice to a mockery. The learned
25
senior counsel came down very heavily while criticizing both the orders
submitting that the two courts have conveniently ignored about the
statutory rules governing the determination of age of a juvenile. He
submitted that there is no cogent, clear and convincing documentary
evidence on record to suggest or indicate that the respondent was born on
23.10.2002. He invited the attention of this Court to an order passed by the
Executive Officer Municipal Committee, Hira Nagar dated 15.04.2004
specifying the date and place of birth of three children of Om Prakash
Sangra. This order dated 15.04.2004 came to be passed pursuant to an
application said to have been filed by the father of the respondent herein
namely Om Prakash under Section 19 (3) of the Registration of Births and
Deaths Act, 1956 r/w Rule 19(3) of the Rules. The order reads thus:
“Application U/S 19(3) of Registration of Birth and Deaths Act,
1956 (illegible) with Rule 19(3) of the J&K Registration of Births
and Deaths (illegible) of birth certificate of the (illegible) Son
Rahul Sangra Riya Sangra Shubam Sangra District Hiranagar,
Tehsil Hiranagar.
ORDER
The applicant has moved an application for the issuance of
date of birth certificate. The applicant Om Parkash Sangra has
stated that he/she was born on 23-11-97, 21-2-98, 23-10-02
Village Hiranagar Tehsil Hiranagar and submitted that the of
birth has not been recorded by the M.C. Hiranagar. The
applicant has filed an application in this Court supported by duly
sworn affidavit avering therein that due to ignorance of the
concerned his/her date of birth could not be recorded.
26
The applicant has examined (illegible) S/o Ram Krishan of
Tehsil Hiranagar besides himself as his own witnesses in
support of the averments made in the application. The applicant
has supported the contents of the application and Hiranagar,
Ward No. 7 Distt Kathua witnesses appearing for the applicant
have corborated the material averments of the applicant.
I have gone through the application, affidavit and the
statements of witnesses from the above it has been established
that the (illegible) of the applicant's son Rahul Sangra has
taken place at village Tehsil Hiranagar on 23-11-97, 21-2-98,
23-10-02 keeping in view the material placed before this Court,
it is ordered that entry of the above named applicant's. ____ be
made in the Register of __ as mentioned above in terms of
Rule 19(3) of the Registration of birth and __ Rules.
The child particulars are stated as under :-
S.No. Name Father Date & Place of birth
1. Rahul Sangra Om Parkash 23-11-97
2. Riya Sangra R/o Hiranagar 21-02-98
3. Shubam Sangra 23-10-02
No: 22/JC Sd/-
Date 15-4-04 ............ Hiranagar
Copy of this order shall be forwarded to the M.C. Hiranagar for
information and necessary action.
Sd/-
Executive Officer
Municipal Committee
Hiranagar ”
27
24. The learned senior counsel submits that no reliance could have been
placed on the aforesaid order for the purpose of coming to the conclusion
that the date of birth of the respondent herein is 23.10.2002.
25. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the first child of Om Prakash
namely Rahul Sangra is shown to have been born on 23.11.1997 whereas
the second child i.e. the daughter namely Riya Sangra is shown to have
been born on 23.01.1998 i.e. just within three months from the date of birth
of the eldest child. The date of birth of the respondent herein is shown to
have been 23.10.2002.
26. As against the aforesaid, the learned senior counsel invited the
attention of this Court to a birth certificate said to have been issued by
Modern Public Higher Secondary School dated 06.09.2017. The same
reads thus:
“Modern Public Higher Secondary School
(10+2)
Ward. N .. 10-11 Hiranagar (Kathua) J&K
Recognised by J&K Govt. and Affiliated to J&K State Board of
School
Education
No. Dated 06/09/2017
28
DATE OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE
Certified that the Date of Birth of Shubam Sangra Son of
Sh Om Parkash / Tripta Devi is (In Figures) 23/10/2003 (In
Words) Twenty Third Oct. Two Thousand Three as per School
Records.
His Admission No. is 1435. He was reading in Class 10th.
Address
W/ No. 10, P.O Hiranagar, Teh Hiranagar,
Distt Kathua, Pin 184142
Sd/-
Principal
Modern Public Higher Sec. School
Hiranagar”
27. Thus, in the aforesaid certificate the date of birth is shown to be
23.10.2003. Our attention was thereafter drawn to an extract of the
admission withdrawal register of the primary department school, Modern
Public Higher Secondary School, which is at page 58 of the paper book
Annexure-P-3, wherein the name of the respondent is at S. No. 1757 and
the date of birth is shown to be 23.10.2003.
28. After highlighting the contradictions in the date of birth as above, the
learned senior counsel invited our attention to the Jammu & Kashmir
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2014, (for short,
‘the Rules, 2014’) more particularly Rule 74. Rule 74 is with respect to the
29
determination of age. Although what is relevant for our purpose is sub-rule
(3) of Rule 74 of the Rules, 2014, yet we deem it appropriate to reproduce
the entire Rule 74, which reads thus:
“ 74. Determination of age .—(1) Whenever an alleged offender
who appears to be below the age of 21 years is produced
before a Court not being the Board, it shall on the very first date
of production question the alleged offender about his age,
satisfy itself that he is not a juvenile, make a note of its findings
and order immediate transfer of the matter to the Board where
necessary.
(2) When a juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with the law
is produced before the Board or the Committee as the case
may be, it shall determine and declare his age within a period of
thirty days from the date of such production.
(3) The Board or the Committee, as the case may be shall, as
far as possible, decide the juvenility or otherwise, on the basis
of physical appearance or documents available, if any. Where
an inquiry is instituted by the Board or the Committee for
determination of age, such inquiry shall be conducted on the
basis of following evidence: —
(i) the birth certificate issued by a Corporation or a
Municipal Committee or any other notified authority; or
(ii) the matriculation or equivalent certificate; or
(iii) in absence of the certificates mentioned in sub-clauses
(i) and (ii) or in case of any contradiction arising therefrom,
the authority deciding the age issue may refer the matter to
a duly constituted Medical Board, which shall record its
findings and submit to the Juvenile Justice Board.
(4) All Government Hospitals shall constitute Medical Boards for
medical age examination, consisting of a Physiologist, a Dental
Examiner and a Radiologist or Forensic Expert, of whom one
shall be notified as the Chairperson.
30
(5) All the Members of the Medical Board shall give their
individual findings on age, which shall then be forwarded to the
Chairperson of the Board to give the final opinion on the age
within a margin of one year.
(6) The duly constituted Medical Boards shall give their report
with the findings on age within 15 days of request being made
in this regard.”
29. The learned senior counsel submitted that sub-rule (3) of the Rule 74
makes it abundantly clear that in case of any contradiction between the
certificates mentioned in sub clause (i) and (ii) of the sub-rule (3), the
authority deciding age may refer the matter to a duly constituted medical
board which, in turn, shall record its findings and submit it to the Juvenile
Justice Board.
30. The learned senior counsel submits that there is an apparent
contradiction in the documentary evidence on record in the form of various
certificates and in such circumstances the matter had to be referred to a
duly constituted medical board and the age has now to be determined on
the basis of the report of the medical board which is on record.
31. The learned senior counsel submitted that the certificate issued by
the medical board makes it abundantly clear that the age of the respondent
herein at the time of commission of the offence could be between 19 and
23 years.
31
32. In the last, the learned senior counsel submitted that the case on
hand is one of a very heinous crime committed on a minor girl aged 08
years. He would submit that if the plea of juvenility or the fact that the
accused had not attained the age of discretion so as to understand the
consequences of his heinous act is not free from ambiguity or doubt, such
plea cannot be allowed to be raised merely on doubtful certificates
evidencing age and in such circumstances the medical evidence will have
to be given due weightage while determining the age of the accused. In the
aforesaid context, the learned senior counsel placed strong reliance on the
decision of this Court in Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of
Assam , (2001) 5 SCC 714.
33. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Patwalia, the learned
senior counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same be
allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside
and it be held that the respondent was not a juvenile on the date of the
commission of the offence.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent accused:
34. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent
vehemently opposed the present appeal submitting that no error, not to
speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the
32
courts below in determining the age of the respondent. According to him,
sub-rule (3) of Rule 74 has no application in the present case as there is no
contradiction in the certificates evidencing the age of the respondent
accused. He would submit that the respondent accused was born on
23.10.2002 is crystal clear and the same is evident from the admission
form of the respondent duly filled while seeking admission in the Modern
Public Higher Secondary School, Hira Nagar in the year 2008. He
submitted that howsoever the heinous crime may be but on the date of
commission of the alleged offence if the accused is a juvenile then he has
to be tried as a juvenile in accordance with law and not like any other
accused. He would submit that heinousness or brutality of the crime has
nothing to do with the object of the Juvenile Justice Act. He further argued
that no reliance could be placed on the opinion of the medical board
because ultimately it is an expert opinion and cannot be said to be
conclusive as regards the age. The learned counsel vehemently submitted
that the court may take notice of the relevant fact that there is no
certificate / document in the case on hand which indicates that the
respondent was not a minor or a major as on the date of the alleged
offence. He argued that in the event the school record (Admission Form)
indicating the date of birth is not be treated as falling in the category
33
mentioned in sub-rule (3) (ii) of Rule 74, then in view of the Order No.
22/JC/certificate issued by the Municipal Committee being available,
recourse to Rule 74(3)(ii) is not at all warranted.
35. The learned counsel in support of his aforesaid submissions placed
reliance on the following decisions of this Court:
(i) Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh ,
(2012) 9 SCC 750
(ii) Darga Ram alias Gunga v. State of Rajasthan ,
(2015) 2 SCC 775
36. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent accused prayed that there being no merit in
the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.
Analysis
37. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for
our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing
the impugned order?
38. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 74 referred to by us in Para 28 above, makes it
abundantly clear that in the absence of the certificates mentioned in sub-
clause (i) to (iii) or in the event of any contradiction arising therefrom, the
34
authority deciding the issue of age may refer the matter to a duly
constituted medical board which, in turn, would record its findings and
submit to the Juvenile Justice Board. The materials on record as looked
into by us above reveal no manner of doubt that there are discrepancies in
the certificates on record disclosing the date of birth of the respondent. We
fail to understand as to why the Courts below were not able to take
cognizance of such discrepancies or contradictions. We are not at all
impressed with the submission canvassed on behalf of the respondent that
even if there are contradictions or discrepancies in the documentary
evidence of record there is not a single date emerging on record on the
basis of which it could be said that the respondent was major on the date of
the alleged offence. It is a very unreasonable argument. That is not the
correct way of looking at the core issue. The correct way of looking at the
core issue is to closely examine whether there is any cogent or convincing
evidence as regards the correct date of birth of the respondent accused
and after ascertaining the same, reach to an appropriate conclusion. If,
there is any doubt in this regard, there is no good reason why the matter
should not be referred to a duly constituted medical board which shall, in
turn, record its findings and submit to the Juvenile Justice Board. The word
35
“may” should be read as “shall” having regard to the very object of sub-rule
(3) of Rule 74.
39. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the word ‘may’ when
used in a legislation by itself does not connote a directory meaning. If in a
particular case, in the interests of equity and justice it appears to the court
that the intent of the legislature is to convey a statutory duty, then the use
of the word ‘may’ will not prevent the court from giving it a mandatory
colour. This Court in Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur
reported in (2008) 12 SCC 372, held as under:
“18. It is well settled that the use of the word “may” in a statutory
provision would not by itself show that the provision is directory in
nature. In some cases, the legislature may use the word “may” as
a matter of pure conventional courtesy and yet intend a mandatory
force. In order, therefore, to interpret the legal import of the word
“may”, the court has to consider various factors, namely, the object
and the scheme of the Act, the context and the background
against which the words have been used, the purpose and the
advantages sought to be achieved by the use of this word, and the
like. It is equally well settled that where the word “may” involves a
discretion coupled with an obligation or where it confers a positive
benefit to a general class of subjects in a utility Act, or where the
court advances a remedy and suppresses the mischief, or where
giving the words directory significance would defeat the very
object of the Act, the word “may” should be interpreted to convey a
mandatory force. As a general rule, the word “may” is permissive
and operative to confer discretion and especially so, where it is
used in juxtaposition to the word “shall”, which ordinarily is
imperative as it imposes a duty. Cases, however, are not wanting
where the words “may”, “shall” and “must” are used
36
interchangeably. In order to find out whether these words are
being used in a directory or in a mandatory sense, the intent of the
legislature should be looked into along with the pertinent
circumstances.”
40. Similarly, this Court in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P .
reported in (2007) 8 SCC 338, held:
“36. ….In our judgment, mere use of word “may” or “shall” is not
conclusive. The question whether a particular provision of a
statute is directory or mandatory cannot be resolved by laying
down any general rule of universal application. Such controversy
has to be decided by ascertaining the intention of the legislature
and not by looking at the language in which the provision is
clothed. And for finding out the legislative intent, the court must
examine the scheme of the Act, purpose and object underlying the
provision, consequences likely to ensue or inconvenience likely to
result if the provision is read one way or the other and many more
considerations relevant to the issue.”
41. We may also refer to Section 8 of the Act, 2013. Section 8 provides
for the procedure to be followed, when the claim of juvenility is raised
before any court. Section 8 reads thus:
“ 8. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is
raised before any court .—(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is
raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an
accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of
the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence
as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine
the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the
person is a juvenile or not, stating his age as nearly as may be :
37
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any
court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final
disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in
terms of the provisions contained in the Act and the rules made
thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or
before the date of commencement of the Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order
and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to
have no effect.”
42. The plain reading of Section 8 referred to above indicates that
whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or the court is of
the opinion that the accused person was a juvenile on the date of the
commission of the offence, then it is mandatory for the court to make an
inquiry and in the course of such inquiry, the court may take such evidence
as may be necessary, however, not an affidavit, so as to determine the age
of such person. At the end of the inquiry, if the court finds a person to be a
juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section (1) of
Section 8, then in such circumstance, the court is obliged in law to forward
the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate order and
the sentence.
38
43. We may also look into Section 48 of the Act, 2013. Section 48 is in
regard to the presumption and determination of age. Section 48 reads thus:
“48. Presumption and determination of age .—(1) Where it
appears to a competent authority that person brought before it
under any of the provisions of the Act (otherwise than for the
purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile or the child, the
competent authority shall make due inquiry so as to the age of
that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as
may be necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall record a finding
whether the person is a juvenile or the child or not, stating his
age as nearly as may be.
(2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have
become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person
in respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile or
the child, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be
the age of person so brought before it, shall for the purpose of
the Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
44. Section 48 referred to above talks about a competent authority,
whereas, Section 8 of the Act 2013 referred to above, is in respect to the
court. However, what is relevant to note is that in both the Sections i.e.,
Section 8 as well as Section 48 the word ‘shall’ has been used.
45. There is one another aspect of this matter. It is the High Court who
thought fit to pass the order dated 21.02.2018 referred to by us in para 9 as
above, directing the Special Investigation Team (SIT) to take steps for
ascertaining the age of the respondent herein. It is pursuant to such
39
directions issued by the High Court that a Special Medical Board
comprising of five medical experts on different subjects was constituted and
it is this medical board comprising of five medical experts whose report we
are looking into so far as the approximate age of the respondent is
concerned. When we have reached to the conclusion that there is no
cogent and convincing documentary evidence on record as regards the
date of birth or age of the respondent accused on the date of the alleged
crime then there is no good reason for us not to look into or ignore the
medical report prepared by the Special Medical Board which is on record.
In such circumstances, the argument canvassed on behalf of the
respondent in regard to the applicability of sub-rule (3)(iii) of Rule 74 pales
into insignificance. In other words, the argument that the Special Medical
Board should not have been constituted pales into insignificance because
the Special Board was constituted under the directions issued by the High
Court.
46. Let us see what this Court has to say in the case of Darga Ram @
Gunga (supra) upon which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of
the learned counsel appearing for the respondent accused. In Darga Ram
@ Gunga (supra), this Court held as under:
| “ | 16. | | The medical opinion given by the duly constituted Board |
|---|
| comprising Professors of Anatomy, Radiodiagnosis and | | | |
40
| Forensic Medicine has determined his age to be “about” 33 | |
|---|
| years on the date of the examination. The Board has not been | |
| able to give the exact age of the appellant on medical | |
| examination, no matter the advances made in that field. That | |
| being so, in terms of Rule 12(3)(b) the appellant may even be | |
| entitled to the benefit of fixing his age on the lower side within | |
| a margin of one year in case the Court considers it necessary | |
| to do so in the facts and circumstances of the case. The need | |
| for any such statutory concession may not however arise | |
| because even if the estimated age as determined by the | |
| Medical Board is taken as the correct/true age of the appellant | |
| he was just about 17 years and 2 months old on the date of | |
| the occurrence and thus a juvenile within the meaning of that | |
| expression as used in the Act aforementioned. Having said | |
| that we cannot help observing that we have not felt very | |
| comfortable with the Medical Board estimating the age of the | |
| appellant in a range of 30 to 36 years as on the date of the | |
| medical examination. | |
| 17. | | The general rule about age determination is that the age |
|---|
| as determined can vary plus minus two years but the Board | | |
| has in the case at hand spread over a period of six years and | | |
| taken a mean to fix the age of the appellant at 33 years. We | | |
| are not sure whether that is the correct way of estimating the | | |
| age of the appellant. What reassures us about the estimate of | | |
| age is the fact that the same is determined by a Medical Board | | |
| comprising Professors of Anatomy, Radiodiagnosis and | | |
| Forensic Medicine whose opinion must get the respect it | | |
| deserves. That apart, even if the age of the appellant was | | |
| determined by the upper extremity limit i.e. 36 years the same | | |
| would have been subject to variation of plus minus 2 years | | |
| meaning thereby that he could as well be 34 years on the date | | |
| of the examination. Taking his age as 34 years on the date of | | |
| the examination he would have been 18 years, 2 months and | | |
| 7 days on the date of the occurrence but such an estimate | | |
| would be only an estimate and the appellant may be entitled to | | |
| additional benefit of one year in terms of lowering his age by | | |
41
| one year in terms of Rule 12(3)(b) (supra) which would then | |
|---|
| bring him to be 17 years and 2 months old, therefore, a | |
| juvenile.” | |
47. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant State submitted that Darga Ram @ Gunga (supra) came to be
considered by this Court in the case of Mukarrab v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (2017) 2 SCC 210, and this Court in Mukarrab (supra) observed
as under:
| “22. | | A reading of the above decision in | | | | Darga Ram case | | |
|---|
| (supra) shows that courts need to be aware of the fact that | | | | | | | | |
| age determination of the persons concerned cannot be | | | | | | | | |
| certainly ascertained in the absence of original and valid | | | | | | | | |
| documentary proof and there would always lie a possibility | | | | | | | | |
| that the age of the person concerned may vary plus or minus | | | | | | | | |
| two years. Even in the presence of medical opinion, the Court | | | | | | | | |
| showed a tilt towards the juvenility of the accused. However, | | | | | | | | |
| it is pertinent to note that such an approach in | | | | | | | | Darga Ram |
| case | | | (supra) was taken in the specific facts and | | | | | |
| circumstances of that particular case and any attempt of | | | | | | | | |
| generalising the said approach could not be justifiably | | | | | | | | |
| entertained.” | | | | | | | | |
| 48. | | Thus, in | Mukarrab | (supra), this Court made itself clear that | Darga |
|---|
| Ram | @ Gunga | (supra) was rendered in the peculiar facts & circumstances |
|---|
of that case & any attempt of generalizing the said approach could not be
justifiably entertained.
| 49. | | Before we proceed further, we may clarify that | Darga Ram @ Gunga |
|---|
(supra), was under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
42
Act, 2000 (for short, ‘the Act, 2000’) . We may give a fair idea in regard to
the scheme of procedure to be followed, when claim of juvenility is raised
under the Act, 2000.
50. Section 7A of the Act, 2000 reads as under:
“ 7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is
raised before any Court-
(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a
court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on
the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an
inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an
affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall
record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or
not, stating his age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any
Court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final
disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in
terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made
thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or
before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders
and the sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to
have no effect.”
| From a reading of | | Section 7A | , | | what becomes very obvious is that |
|---|
whenever a claim of juvenility is raised, an inquiry has to be made and such
inquiry would take place by receiving evidence which would be necessary
but not an affidavit so as to determine the age of such person.
43
| 52. The procedure to be followed for the determination of age is provided<br>under Rule 12(3)(b) of the 2007 Rules, which reads as: | | | | | | |
|---|
| “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age.—(3)<br>In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law,<br>the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or<br>the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking<br>evidence by obtaining—<br>(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if<br>available; and in the absence whereof;<br>(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school<br>(other than a play school) first attended; and in<br>the absence whereof;<br>(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a<br>municipal authority or a panchayat;<br>(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of<br>clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from<br>a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the<br>age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of<br>the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as<br>the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be<br>recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give<br>benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age<br>on lower side within the margin of one year.<br>and,<br>while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into<br>consideration such evidence as may be available, or the<br>medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in<br>respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any<br>of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof,<br>clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards<br>such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.” | “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age.—(3)<br>In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law,<br>the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or<br>the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking<br>evidence by obtaining— | | | | | |
| | | (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if<br>available; and in the absence whereof; | | | |
| | | | | (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school<br>(other than a play school) first attended; and in<br>the absence whereof; | |
| | | | (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a<br>municipal authority or a panchayat; | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of<br>clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from<br>a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the<br>age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of<br>the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as<br>the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be<br>recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give<br>benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age<br>on lower side within the margin of one year. | | | |
| | and, | | | | |
| | while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into<br>consideration such evidence as may be available, or the<br>medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in<br>respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any<br>of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof,<br>clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards<br>such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.” | | | | |
53. Sub-clause (3) of the aforesaid Rule clearly mandates that while
conducting an inquiry about the juvenility of an accused, the Juvenile
44
Justice Board would seek evidence by obtaining the matriculation or
equivalent certificates and in the absence whereof the date of birth
certificate from the school first attended and in absence whereof the birth
certificate given by a corporation or a Municipal authority or a Panchayat. It
is made clear by sub-clause (b) that only in the absence of the aforesaid
three documents, medical information would be sought from a duly
constituted Medical Board which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.
Thus, it is only in the absence of the aforesaid documents that the Juvenile
Justice Board can ask for medical information/ossification test.
54. Mukarrab (supra), referred to above was also under the Act, 2000.
| 55. | | We shall now look into the decision of this Court in the case of |
|---|
| Ashwani Kumar Saxena | (supra) wherein this Court observed in para 34 |
|---|
as under:
| “34. … There may be situations where the entry made in the<br>matriculation or equivalent certificates, date of birth certificate from<br>the school first attended and even the birth certificate given by a<br>corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat may not be<br>correct. But court, Juvenile Justice Board or a committee<br>functioning under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a<br>roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates to examine the<br>correctness of those documents, kept during the normal course of<br>business. Only in cases where those documents or certificates are<br>found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court, the Juvenile<br>Justice Board or the committee need to go for medical report for<br>age determination.” |
|---|
| |
45
56. Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra), referred to above, also deals with
the Act, 2000.
57. After observing the aforesaid this Court in Ashwani Kumar Saxena
(supra) proceeded to examine the essential differences between the words
“inquiry, investigation and trial” as we find in the Criminal Procedure Code
(for short “CrPC”). Thereafter the Court proceeded to hold that the
procedure to be followed under the Juvenile Justice Act in conducting the
inquiry is the procedure as laid down in that statute itself i.e. Rule 12 of
2007 Rules and held that the age determination inquiry contemplated under
the Juvenile Justice Act and the Rules had nothing to do with the inquiry
under other legislations like entry in service, retirement and promotion. The
Court observed that where the entry made in the school certificates is
available, the Court or the Juvenile Justice Board is not expected to
conduct a roving inquiry and go beyond those certificates to examine their
correctness when those documents have been kept during the normal
course of business. The Court held that the credibility and acceptability of
the documents, including the school leaving certificate, would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule as
such could be laid down in that regard. This Court also held that the
certificates should not be viewed as doubtful on a notion that the parents
46
| usually get wrong date of birth entered in the admission registers. The<br>decision of Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) has been pressed hard in<br>service by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent to make good<br>his submission that the Court should not conduct a roving inquiry and go<br>beyond the documentary evidence on record. | |
|---|
| 58. This Court in Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of U.P., (2022) 8 SCC<br>602, after due consideration of its following earlier decisions,: | |
| (i) Parag Bhati v. State of U.P., | |
| (2016) 12 SCC 744, | |
| (ii) Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, | |
| (2019) 12 SCC 370, | |
| (iii) Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal, | |
| (2012) 10 SCC 489, | |
| (iv) Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, | |
| (2012) 9 SCC 750, | |
| (v) Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand, | |
| (2008) 13 SCC 133, | |
| (vi) Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, | |
| (2000) 5 SCC 488, | |
| (vii) Jitendra Ram alias Jitu v. State of Jharkhand, | |
47
(2006) 9 SCC 428.
pointed out the difference in the procedure under the two enactments, i.e.,
the Act, 2000 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2015 (for short, ‘the Act, 2015’) , as to the inquiry into determination of
age of the juvenile and also the power to seek evidence, how and when to
exercise that power and when to go for the ossification test. This Court
held that each case may be dealt with in the light of its own peculiar facts
and circumstances while keeping certain principles as the guiding factor in
mind as described in the concluding para of the judgment of this Court. We
shall reproduce the concluding para a little later.
59. In Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra), this Court pointed out the
similarity between the Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 and sub-section (2) of
Section 94 of the Act, 2015, as substantive provisions. This Court referred
to its decisions in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) and Abuzar Hossain
@ Gulam Hossain (supra) highlighting the fact that only in the cases
where certificates are found to be fabricated and manipulated, the Juvenile
Justice Board need to go for medical report and also highlighted the fact
that the yardstick for relying on the school certificates may be a bit different
48
where the school leaving certificate or voter list etc. is obtained after
conviction.
60. Thus, this Court kept in mind the facts and circumstances attached to
the production of documents/certificates, as required by the provisions of
the Juvenile Justice Act before those documents could be relied upon. In
other words, even if the documents are found to be prima facie correct,
there may be facts and circumstances to alert the Court to go into the
inquiry to satisfy itself as to correctness of the claim. In the same breath,
this Court referred to an opinion given in the judgment of Abuzar Hossain
@ Gulam Hossain (supra) that when any claimant or any of the parents or
siblings in support of the claim of the juvenility raised for the first time in
appeal or revision depends on mere affidavits, it shall not be sufficient to
justify the inquiry for determination of age unless there exist circumstances
which cannot be ignored.
61. In Sanjeev Kumar Gupta (supra), the credibility and authenticity of
the matriculation certificate for the purpose of determination of age under
Section 7(A) of the Act, 2000 came up for consideration. In the said case,
the Juvenile Justice Board had rejected the claim of the juvenility and that
decision of the Juvenile Justice Board was restored by this Court by
rejecting the order of the High Court. It was observed therein that the
49
records maintained by the C.B.S.E. were purely on the basis of final list of
the students forwarded by the Senior Secondary School where the juvenile
had studied from Class 5 to 10 and not on the basis of any other underlying
documents. On the other hand, there was clear and unimpeachable
evidence of date of birth which had been recorded in the records of another
school, which the second respondent therein had attended till class 4 and
which was supported by voluntary disclosure made by the accused while
obtaining both, the Aadhaar Card and driving license. It was observed that
the date of birth reflected in the matriculation certification could not be
accepted as authentic or credible. In the said case, it was held that the
date of birth of the second respondent there was 17.12.1995 and that he
was not entitled to claim juvenility as the date of the alleged incident was
18.08.2015.
62. This Court in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta (supra) considered the
judgments in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) and Abuzar Hossain @
Gulam Hossain (supra), and observed that the credibility and acceptability
of the documents including the school leaving certificate would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule as
such could be laid down in that regard. This Court reproduced the
50
observation of itself in Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain (supra) which
is below:
“ 48. … directing an enquiry is not the same thing as declaring the
accused to be a juvenile. The standard of proof required is
different for both. In the former, the court simply records a prima
facie conclusion. In the latter, the court makes a declaration on
evidence, that it scrutinises and accepts only if it is worthy of
such acceptance. …”
63. Abuzar Hossain (supra) is also under the Act, 2000.
64. In Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra), after due consideration of all its
earlier decisions, this Court held as below:
“33 . What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the
aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage of a
criminal proceeding, even after a final disposal of the case. A
delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for
rejection of such claim. It can also be raised for the first time
before this Court.
33.2. An application claiming juvenility could be made either
before the Court or the JJ Board.
33.2.1. When the issue of juvenility arises before a Court, it
would be under sub-section (2) and (3) of section 9 of the JJ Act,
2015 but when a person is brought before a Committee or JJ
Board, section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 applies.
33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming
juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ
Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-
section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of
51
recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as
may be.
33.2.3. When an application claiming juvenility is made under
section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 before the JJ Board when the
matter regarding the alleged commission of offence is pending
before a Court, then the procedure contemplated under section
94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would apply. Under the said provision if
the JJ Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding
whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Board
shall undertake the process of age determination by seeking
evidence and the age recorded by the JJ Board to be the age of
the person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of the JJ
Act, 2015, be deemed to be true age of that person. Hence the
degree of proof required in such a proceeding before the JJ
Board, when an application is filed seeking a claim of juvenility
when the trial is before the concerned criminal court, is higher
than when an inquiry is made by a court before which the case
regarding the commission of the offence is pending (vide section
9 of the JJ Act, 2015).
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on
the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the
initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)
(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act,
2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be
sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of
the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be
raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of
the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra
evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same
thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought
before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the
concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records
a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of
age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a
52
declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age
recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of
the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an
inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the
determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be
made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if
worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an
abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be
on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of
evidence adduced by the parties in each case.
33.7. This Court has observed that a hyper- technical approach
should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of
the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court
should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in
borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the
JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with
law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act,
2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after
having committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of
evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same
would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian
Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document
maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater
credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public
documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted
by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is
credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age
determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a
person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion
53
by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive
evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in
the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ
Act, 2015.”
65. Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra) is under the Act, 2015.
66. With a view to compare Section 48 of the Act, 2013 with Section 94 of
the Act, 2015, we may also reproduce hereinbelow Section 94 of the Act,
2015:
“ 94. Presumption and determination of age. —(1) Where, it is
obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance
of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this
Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said
person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such
observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and
proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the
case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable
grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it
is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be,
shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking
evidence by obtaining —
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall
be determined by an ossification test or any other latest
medical age determination test conducted on the orders of
the Committee or the Board:
54
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order
of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen
days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be
the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this
Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.”
67. This Court after referring to the fact that there was no other document
contradicting the date of birth as shown in the matriculation certificate, held
that the medical evidence was not required and thereby upheld the order of
the High Court affirming the judgment of the Sessions Court as well as the
Juvenile Justice Board. Thus, the decisions relied upon by the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent accused should be looked into and
appreciated as aforesaid. The decisions do not help the respondent
accused in any manner. On the contrary, the ratio discernable from all the
decisions discussed above, is that the credibility and acceptability of the
documents including the school leaving certificate etc. would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule as such
could be laid in that regard.
| 68. In Parag Bhati (supra), after referring to Abuzar Hossain case<br>(supra) and other decisions, this Court held as under: | | |
|---|
| “34. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and<br>unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile accused that he<br>was a minor below the age of 18 years on the date of the | |
55
| incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie<br>proves the same, he would be entitled to the special<br>protection under the JJ Act. But when an accused commits a<br>grave and heinous offence and thereafter attempts to take<br>statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or<br>cavalier approach while recording as to whether an accused<br>is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are<br>enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object of<br>protecting the confidence of common man in the institution<br>entrusted with the administration of justice.<br>35 . The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation<br>attached to the JJ Act would thus apply to only such cases<br>wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of at<br>least prima facie evidence regarding his minority as the<br>benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of<br>the alleged accused who is involved in grave and serious<br>offence which he committed and gave effect to it in a well-<br>planned manner reflecting his maturity of mind rather than<br>innocence indicating that his plea of juvenility is more in the<br>nature of a shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot<br>be allowed to come to his rescue.”<br>(emphasis<br>added) | incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie<br>proves the same, he would be entitled to the special<br>protection under the JJ Act. But when an accused commits a<br>grave and heinous offence and thereafter attempts to take | | |
|---|
| statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or | | |
| cavalier approach while recording as to whether an accused | | |
| is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are | | |
| enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object of | | |
| protecting the confidence of common man in the institution | | |
| entrusted with the administration of justice. | | |
| | | |
| 35 . The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation | | |
| attached to the JJ Act would thus apply to only such cases | | |
| wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of at | | |
| least prima facie evidence regarding his minority as the | | |
| benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of | | |
| the alleged accused who is involved in grave and serious | | |
| offence which he committed and gave effect to it in a well- | | |
| planned manner reflecting his maturity of mind rather than | | |
| innocence indicating that his plea of juvenility is more in the | | |
| nature of a shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot | | |
| be allowed to come to his rescue.” | | |
| | (emphasis<br>added) | |
| | | |
| The dictum of the aforesaid is that the purpose of the Act, 2000 is not<br>to give shelter to the accused of grave and heinous offences. | | | |
69. This Court in several of its decisions including Ramdeo Chauhan
alias Raj Nath (supra) dealing with a similar situation which fortifies what
we have stated, observed as follows:
56
| “…….. it is clear that the petitioner neither was a child nor near | | | | |
|---|
| about the age of being a child within the meaning of the | | | | |
| Juvenile Justice Act or the Children Act. He is proved to be a | | | | |
| major at the time of the commission of the offence. | | | | No doubt, |
| much less a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the | | | | |
| Court, for the accused entitling him to the benefit of a lesser | | | | |
| punishment. It is true that the accused tried to create a | | | | |
| smokescreen with respect | | | to his age but such efforts appear to | |
| have been made only to hide his real age and not to create any | | | | |
| doubt in our mind. The judicial system cannot be allowed to be | | | | |
| taken to ransom by having resort to imaginative and concocted | | | | |
| grounds by taking advantage of loose sentences appearing in | | | | |
| the evidence of some of the witnesses, particularly at the stage | | | | |
| of special leave petition. The law insists on finality of judgments | | | | |
| and is more concerned with the strengthening of the judicial | | | | |
| system. The courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties | | | | |
| with the object of strengthening the confidence of the common | | | | |
| man in the institution entrusted with the administration of | | | | |
| justice. Any effort which weakens the system and shakes the | | | | |
| faith of the common man in the justice dispensation system has | | | | |
| to be discouraged.” | | | | |
(Emphasis supplied)
70. The above-noted observations in Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath
(supra) no doubt were recorded by the learned Judges of this Court while
considering the imposition of death sentence on the accused who claimed
to be a juvenile, nevertheless the views expressed therein clearly lend
weight for resolving an issue where the court is not in a position to clearly
draw an inference wherein an attempt is made by the accused or his
guardian claiming benefit available to a juvenile which may be an effort to
57
extract sympathy and impress upon the court for a lenient treatment
towards the so-called juvenile accused who, in fact was a major on the date
of incident. (See Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan (2012) 5 SCC 201).
| 71. In Om Prakash (supra), this Court in paras 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38<br>resply observed as under: | | | | | | | |
|---|
| | | | | | | |
| “33. | | | Similarly, if the conduct of an accused or the method and | | | |
| manner of commission of the offence indicates an evil and a | | | | | | |
| well-planned design of the accused committing the offence | | | | | | |
| which indicates more towards the matured skill of an accused | | | | | | |
| than that of an innocent child, then in the absence of reliable | | | | | | |
| documentary evidence in support of the age of the accused, | | | | | | |
| medical evidence indicating that the accused was a major | | | | | | |
| cannot be allowed to be ignored taking shelter of the principle | | | | | | |
| of benevolent legislation like the Juvenile Justice Act, | | | | | | |
| subverting the course of justice as statutory protection of the | | | | | | |
| Juvenile Justice Act is meant for minors who are innocent | | | | | | |
| law-breakers and not the accused of matured mind who use | | | | | | |
| the plea of minority as a ploy or shield to protect himself from | | | | | | |
| the sentence of the offence committed by him. | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 34. | | The benefit of benevolent legislation under the Juvenile | | | | |
| Justice Act obviously will offer protection to a genuine child | | | | | | |
| accused/juvenile who does not put the court into any | | | | | | |
| dilemma as to whether he is a juvenile or not by adducing | | | | | | |
| evidence in support of his plea of minority but in absence of | | | | | | |
| the same, reliance placed merely on shaky evidence like the | | | | | | |
| school admission register which is not proved or oral | | | | | | |
| evidence based on conjectures leading to further ambiguity, | | | | | | |
| cannot be relied upon in preference to the medical evidence | | | | | | |
| for assessing the age of the accused. | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 35. | | While considering the relevance and value of the medical | | | | |
| evidence, the doctor's estimation of age although is not a | | | | | | |
| sturdy substance for proof as it is only an opinion, such | | | | | | |
| opinion based on scientific medical tests like ossification and | | | | | | |
58
| radiological examination will have to be treated as strong | | | | |
|---|
| evidence having corroborative value while determining the | | | | |
| age of the alleged juvenile accused. | | | | |
| | | | |
| 36. In Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of<br>Assam [(2001) 5 SCC 714 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 915] , the<br>learned Judges have added an insight for determination of<br>this issue when they recorded as follows: (SCC p. 720 d-e) | | | | |
| “Of course the doctor's estimate of age is not a sturdy | | | |
| substitute for proof as it is only his opinion. But such | | | |
| opinion of an expert cannot be sidelined in the realm | | | |
| where the court gropes in the dark to find out what | | | |
| would possibly have been the age of a citizen for the | | | |
| purpose of affording him a constitutional protection. In | | | |
| the absence of all other acceptable materials, if such | | | |
| opinion points to a reasonable possibility regarding the | | | |
| range of his age it has certainly to be considered.” | | | |
| (emphasis supplied) | | | | |
| The situation, however, would be different if the academic<br>records are alleged to have been withheld deliberately to hide<br>the age of the alleged juvenile and the authenticity of the<br>medical evidence is under challenge at the instance of the<br>prosecution. In that event, whether the medical evidence<br>should be relied upon or not will obviously depend on the<br>value of the evidence led by the contesting parties. | | | | |
| | | | |
| 37. | | In view of the aforesaid discussion and analysis based on | | |
| the prevailing facts and circumstances of the case, we are of | | | | |
| the view that Respondent 2 Vijay Kumar and his father have | | | | |
| failed to prove that Respondent 2 was a minor at the time of | | | | |
| commission of offence and hence could not have been | | | | |
| granted the benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act which | | | | |
| undoubtedly is a benevolent legislation but cannot be allowed | | | | |
| to be availed of by an accused who has taken the plea of | | | | |
| juvenility merely as an effort to hide his real age so as to | | | | |
| create a doubt in the mind of the courts below who thought it | | | | |
| appropriate to grant him the benefit of a juvenile merely by | | | | |
| adopting the principle of benevolent legislation but missing its | | | | |
| vital implication that although the Juvenile Justice Act by itself | | | | |
59
| | | is a piece of benevolent legislation, the protection under the | | | | | | | |
|---|
| | | same cannot be made available to an accused who in fact is | | | | | | | |
| | | not a juvenile but seeks shelter merely by using it as a | | | | | | | |
| | | protective umbrella or statutory shield. We are under | | | | | | | |
| | | constraint to observe that this will have to be discouraged if | | | | | | | |
| | | the evidence and other materials on record fail to prove that | | | | | | | |
| | | the accused was a juvenile at the time of commission of the | | | | | | | |
| | | offence. | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | 38. | | The Juvenile Justice Act which is certainly meant to treat | | | | | |
| | | a child accused with care and sensitivity offering him a | | | | | | | |
| | | chance to reform and settle into the mainstream of society, | | | | | | | |
| | | the same cannot be allowed to be used as a ploy to dupe the | | | | | | | |
| | | course of justice while conducting the trial and treatment of | | | | | | | |
| | | heinous offences. This would clearly be treated as an effort to | | | | | | | |
| | | weaken the justice dispensation system and hence cannot be | | | | | | | |
| | | encouraged.” | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 72. | | Thus, it is no doubt true that if there is a clear and unambiguous case | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| in favour of the juvenile accused that he was a minor on the date of the | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| incident and the documentary evidence at least | | | | | | | | prima facie | establishes the | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| same, he would be entitled to the special protection under the Juvenile | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Justice Act. However, when an accused commits a heinous and grave | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| crime like the one on hand and thereafter attempts to take the statutory | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| shelter under the guise of being a minor, a casual or cavalier approach | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| while recording as to whether an accused is a juvenile or not cannot be | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| permitted as the courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties with the | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| object of protecting the confidence of a common man in the institution | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| entrusted with the administration of justice. As observed by this Court in | | | | | | | | | | |
60
| Parag Bhati | | | | (supra), the benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation |
|---|
| | | | |
| attached to the Juvenile Justice Act would thus be extended to only such | | | | |
| | | | |
| cases wherein the accused is held to be a juvenile on the basis of at least | | | | |
| | | | |
| prima facie | | | evidence inspiring confidence regarding his minority as the | |
| | | | |
| benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of the alleged | | | | |
| | | | |
| accused who is involved in grave and serious offence which he is alleged | | | | |
| | | | |
| to have committed and gave effect to it in a well-planned manner reflecting | | | | |
| | | | |
| his maturity of mind rather than innocence indicating that his plea of | | | | |
| | | | |
| juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, | | | | |
| cannot be allowed to come to his rescue. | | | | |
| cannot be allowed to come to his rescue. | | | | |
| | | | |
| 73. | | It appears from the material on record that the father of the | | |
| | | | |
| respondent at the time of preferring the application under Section 19(3) of | | | | |
| | | | |
| the Registration of Birth and Deaths Act, 1956 r/w 19(3) of the Rules | | | | |
| | | | |
| declared before the Executive Officer Municipal Committee, Hira Nagar that | | | | |
| | | | |
| the medical committee, Hira Nagar had failed to record the birth of his three | | | | |
| | | | |
| children including the respondent herein and in such circumstances he | | | | |
| | | | |
| sought an order from the authority concerned as regards the date and | | | | |
| | | | |
| place of birth under Section 19(3) of the Act, 1956. However, the letter | | | | |
| | | | |
| dated 15.03.2018 addressed by the Block Medical Officer of the Health and | | | | |
| | | | |
| Family Welfare, Hira Nagar to the Superintendent of Police, Jammu stating | | | | |
61
| that no delivery in the name of Smt. Tripta Devi, W/o Om Prakash had | | |
|---|
| | |
| taken place on 23.10.2002 at the municipal hospital makes the picture | | |
| abundantly clear. | | |
| abundantly clear. | | |
| | |
| 74. | | There is no good reason why we should overlook or ignore or doubt |
| | |
| the credibility of the final opinion given by a team of five qualified doctors, | | |
| | |
| one from the Department of Physiology, one from the Department of | | |
| | |
| Anatomy, one from the Department of Oral Diagnosis, one from the | | |
| | |
| Department of Forensic Medicine and one from the Department of Radio | | |
| | |
| Diagnosis, all saying in one word that on the basis of the physical, dental | | |
| | |
| and radiological examination, the approximate age of the respondent could | | |
| be fixed between 19 and 23 years. | | |
| be fixed between 19 and 23 years. | | |
75. We may only add that there are better techniques available and are
used for determination of age across the world. For example, the United
States Immigration Department uses ‘wisdom teeth’ technique for
determination of age. Under this technique, the doctors examine the third
molar which usually erupts between 17 to 25 years of age. The average
error, in this technique is also significantly lower than the ossification of
any other bone. Another technique is ‘epigenetic clock’ technique. The
Epigenetic clock is DNA clock which measures DNA methylation levels to
estimate the age of a tissue or an organ. The median error in this
62
technique can be reduced to less than four weeks. What we are trying to
convey is that such techniques should be introduced in our country as
well. (Reference : Shamin T, Age Estimation: A Dental Approach, Journal
of Punjab Academy of Forensic Medicine & Toxicology, Vol. 6 Issue 1.
ISSN-0972-5687)
| 76. | | As observed by this Court in | Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath |
|---|
(supra), the medical expert’s estimate of age may not be a statutory
substitute for proof and is only an opinion but such opinion of an expert
should not be brushed aside or ignored when the Court itself is in doubt in
regard to the age of a citizen claiming constitutional protection. In the
absence of all other acceptable materials, if such opinion of the experts
points to a reasonable possibility regarding range of his age, the Court
must consider the same in the interest of justice. This is not a case
wherein the appellant State has been accused of deliberately withholding
the necessary records only with a view to hide or conceal the age of the
alleged juvenile and the authenticity of the medical evidence is challenged
at the instance of the prosecution. If such would have been the case then
whether the medical evidence should be relied upon or not would
obviously depend on the value of the evidence that may led by the
contesting parties.
63
| 77. | | It is pertinent to note that nothing much has been said on behalf of |
|---|
| | |
| the respondent accused in regard to the credibility of the medical report | | |
| | |
| prepared by the Special Medical Board constituting of five medical experts. | | |
| | |
| At the cost of repetition, the only argument is that ignore the medical report | | |
| | |
| as there is proof of the date of birth to be found in the various documents | | |
| | |
| on record. We have made ourselves very clear that the documents | | |
| | |
| evidencing date of birth does not inspire any confidence and there is no | | |
| | |
| other option but to fall back on the report of the Special Medical Board in | | |
| the interest of justice. | | |
| the interest of justice. | | |
| | |
| 78. | | In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the order |
| | |
| passed by the High Court affirming the CJM’s order is not sustainable in | | |
| law. | | |
| law. | | |
rate of juvenile delinquency in India is a matter of concern and requires
immediate attention. There is a school of thought, existing in our country
that firmly believes that howsoever heinous the crime may be, be it single
rape, gangrape, drug peddling or murder but if the accused is a juvenile, he
should be dealt with keeping in mind only one thing i.e., the goal of
reformation. The school of thought, we are taking about believes that the
goal of reformation is ideal. The manner, in which brutal and heinous
64
crimes have been committed over a period of time by the juveniles and still
continue to be committed, makes us wonder whether the Act, 2015 has
subserved its object. We have started gathering an impression that the
leniency with which the juveniles are dealt with in the name of goal of
reformation is making them more and more emboldened in indulging in
such heinous crimes. It is for the Government to consider whether its
enactment of 2015 has proved to be effective or something still needs to be
done in the matter before it is too late in the day.
| 80. | | In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The |
|---|
| | |
| impugned order passed by the CJM, Kathua and the High Court is set | | |
| | |
| aside. It is held that the respondent accused was not a juvenile at the time | | |
| | |
| of commission of the offence and should be tried the way other co-accused | | |
| were tried in accordance with the law. Law to take its own course. | | |
| were tried in accordance with the law. Law to take its own course. | | |
| | |
| 81. | | It is needless to clarify that the guilt or the innocence of the |
| | |
| respondent accused shall be determined strictly on the basis of the | | |
| | |
| evidence that may be led by the prosecution and the defence at the time of | | |
| | |
| the trial. All observations made in this judgment are meant only for the | | |
| purpose of deciding the issue of juvenility. | | |
| purpose of deciding the issue of juvenility. | | |
| | |
| | |
82. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
65
| | | | | | | ....…......………….………….J. | |
|---|
| | | | | | | (AJAY RASTOGI) | |
| | | | | | | | |
|---|
| | | | | | ...……...…………….………..J. | | |
| | | | | | | (J.B. PARDIWALA) | |
| NEW DELHI; | | | | | | | | |
| NOVEMBER 16, 2022 | | | | | | | | |
66