Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE K C P LIMITED
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/1996
BENCH:
MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)
BENCH:
MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
KIRPAL B.N. (J)
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Majmudar, J.
Leave granted.
This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment
and order dated 4th April, 1995 of the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 1186 of 1993. A
Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal of the
appellant company and confirmed the judgment and order of
the learned Single Judge in writ petition No. 611 of 1993
dismissing the same.
A few relevant facts leading to this appeal deserve to
be noted at the outset. The appellant is having an
Engineering Unit at Tiruvottiyur, Madras where it
manufactures machinery for sugar, cement and allied
industries and employs about 500 workmen. Respondent No. 2
is the only recognized and a representative union of all the
workmen in the said establishment. In the past all
industrial disputes were settled by the appellant company on
the basis of long time settlements entered into with the 2nd
respondent union, the last of which was dated December 30,
1991.
In September, 1990 when the issue of bonus for the
financial year 1989-90 was under consideration the workmen
at the instance of 2nd respondent union resorted to go slow
insisting the appellant to pay more bonus even though as
contended by the appellant under the provisions of the
Payment of Bonus Act only minimum bonus of 8.33% of the
earned wages was payable for the financial year 1989-90. The
go slow resorted to by the workmen resulted in total
stoppage of work and an alleged illegal strike on and from
October 26, 1990. It is the case of the appellant that in
view to protect personal security of the Supervisory and
Managerial staff, it had to declare a lock out on October
39, 1990. The appellant also chargesheeted 29 workmen
including respondents 3 to 14 herein on November 5, 1990 for
various acts of miscount allegedly committed by them between
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September 25, 1990 and October 29, 1990 when the workmen has
resorted to go slow and other alleged violent acts of
misconduct.
The explanation given by 29 workmen having not been
found satisfactory the appellant decided to hold inquiry
into the charges involved against the said 29 workmen.
Inquiries were conducted by the two retired District Judges
and during the inquiries all the 29 workmen participated in
the inquiry proceedings which continued from January 8, 1991
to August 21, 1992.
On October 31, 1990 the Government of Tamil Nadu
intervened and initiated conciliation proceedings to bring
about settlement in respect of the pending disputed
including lock out. As on settlement take place during
conciliation proceedings, the conciliation Officer submitted
report to the Appropriate Government on April 9, 1991. On
May 7, 1991 the Government of Tamil Nadu issued three
different orders referring certain industrial disputes for
adjudication. G.O.No. 485 was in respect of revision of
scale of pay, revision of dearness allowance, revision of
house rent allowance etc. By G.O.No. 486 the Government of
Tamil Nadu declined to refer certain disputes such as leave
facility, housing scheme, medical facilities etc. for
adjudication by giving reasons in the said G.O. No. 486. The
third G.O. No.487 was issued under Section 10-B of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Act") directing the appellant to lift lock out on or
before 13.5191 and allow all except 29 workmen to resume
work. In the said G.O. No. 487 the appellant was directed to
maintain status quo obtaining prior to the date of the lock
out in regard to the terms and conditions of service and the
appellant was further directed to complete inquiry
proceedings against 29 workmen on or before 10.6.1991 and to
pay them full wages during the period of disciplinary
proceedings. In the said G.O. No. 487 the workmen were
directed to maintain normal production which they were
giving prior to the date of the High Court order and also to
maintain discipline in the factory. By August 19,1991
inquiries in respect of all the 29 workmen were completed
and on the basis of the findings by the Inquiry Officer and
other extenuating circumstances, the 29 workmen were
dismissed from service between 23.8.1991 to 1.10.1991.
In a meeting held before the Joint Commissioner of
Labour on October 4, 1991 between the appellant and the 2nd
respondent, an agreement was reached on the quantum of
increase in wages, recoverable advance and issue of bonus
for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91. It was further agreed
that the issue of non-employment of 29 dismissed workmen
would be discussed separately and on that basis all workmen
except the said 29 workmen agreed to resume work in a phased
manner not later than October 12, 1991 although the lock out
was lifted on May 13, 1991.
Subsequently, a settlement was arrived at between the
appellant and the 2nd respondent under Section 12(3) of the
Act wherein it was agreed that the issue of non-employment
of 29 dismissed workmen would be discussed in the
proceedings to be initiated by the Joint Labour Commissioner
as early as possible. The joint Labour Commissioner held
meetings between January 8, 1992 and March 6, 1992 and as no
settlement could be reached report with regard to failure of
the conciliation proceedings was submitted to the Government
of Tamil Nadu which by order dated 13.5.1992 referred the
issue of non-employment of 29 workmen for adjudication to
the I.D.No. 708 of 1992 on the file of the 1st respondent.
The said industrial dispute was referred for adjudication
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pursuant to the demand espoused by all the workmen and
raised by the 2nd respondent union under Section 2(k) of the
Act. All the said 29 workmen who were members of the union
has also authorised the 2nd respondent to represent them
before the Conciliation Officer whereafter reference was
made to the 1st respondent. None of the said 29 workmen
raised industrial dispute in their individual capacity under
Section 2A of the Act.
It appears that thereafter the appellant company on the
one hand and second respondent - union on the other held
discussions regarding non-employment of 29 workmen.
Ultimately on 7th November, 1992 an understanding was
reached between the appellant and the 2nd respondent - union
that option would be given to the said 29 workmen either to
accept reinstatement without backwages or a lumpsum amount
of Rs. 75,000/- with other monetary benefits may be accepted
by the concerned workmen.
Respondent Nos. 3 to 14 (in all 12 workmen) out of
these 29 workmen did not accept the proposed settlement and
accordingly addressed a letter to the Commissioner of Labour
on 2nd December, 1992. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent
entered into a settlement with the appellant company under
Section 18(i) of the Act on behalf of all the 29 workmen
whose industrial dispute with regard to non-employment was
espoused and raised by it under Section 2(k) of the Act. On
14th December, 1992 a comprehensive settlement was arrived
at and signed by the appellant and the 2nd respondent -
union. Copies of the said settlement were forwarded to
various authorities as contemplated under the provisions of
the and Rules thereunder.
A joint memorandum signed by the respondent No.2 and
the appellant company was filed before Presiding Officer.
First Additional Labour Court, Madras, respondent No.1
herein, before whom the industrial dispute was pending for
adjudication. It was requested that an award in terms of the
settlement may be passed in the pending industrial dispute
reference No. 708 of 1992. However, respondent No.1, by his
order dated 28th December, 1992 declined to make an award in
terms of the settlement dated 14th December, 1992 on the
ground that the respondent Nos.3 to 14 have not approved the
settlement and therefore industrial dispute in respect of
these respondents will continue and proceed further. It may
be stated that out of the 29 dismissed workmen in connection
with whose dismissal, respondent No.2 - union had raised the
industrial dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act. 17 workmen
had already agreed to abide by the terms of the settlement
and had got reinstated in exercise of their option. Only the
remaining 12 dismissed workmen, respondent Nos. 3 to 14
herein, proceeded with the dispute and did not agree to the
terms of the settlement even though admittedly they were
members of the respondent NO.2 - union who was acting on
their behalf and even till date they have continued to be
the members of the said union.
As the 1st respondent decided to continue the reference
in connection with respondent Nos. 3 to 14 the appellant
company filed Writ Petition No. 611 of 1993 before the
Madras High Court. As seen earlier, the learned Single Judge
by his judgment and order dated 29th September, 1993
dismissed the said Writ Petition. The appellant thereafter
moved the Division Bench of the High Court in appeal which
also got dismissed on the 4th April, 1995 and that is how
the appellant company has moved this appeal on special
leave.
Learned counsel for the appellant company vehemently
submitted that when respondent No. 2 - union had espoused
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the cause of all the 29 dismissed workmen, and the reference
was got made by it under Section 2(k) of the Act, the union
which represented all the workmen including the dismissed
respondents 3 to 14 was entitled to act on behalf of all of
them by way of collective bargaining and could legitimately
enter into the settlement which was for the benefit of all
concerned workmen. Under these circumstances, individual
workmen had no independent right to contest their dismissal
orders and were bound by the settlement which was not shown
by them to be in any way ex-facie, unfair or unjust that it
was a package deal entered into by respondent No. 2 - union
with the appellant company and in such a collective
industrial bargaining there was always give and take that
there were no exceptional grounds for rejecting such a
settlement which was for the benefit of all concerned
workmen and the Labour Court ought to have acted upon the
same. Consequently, the order of the Labour Court refusing
to act upon said settlement so far as respondent Nos.3 to 14
are concerned, was patently erroneous in law and hence, the
order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court
confirming such order of respondent No. 1 and further order
of the Division Bench also equally suffered from patent
errors of law. In support of these submissions, various
decisions of this Court were cited to which we will refer a
little later.
Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 14 on the
other hand submitted that though these respondents were
admittedly members of the respondent - union, they had not
accepted the terms of the settlement and the said settlement
was not binding on them; that in fact, according to the
learned counsel, a settlement was arrived at by respondent
No. 2 - union not on behalf of these contesting workmen but
only for the remaining 17 workmen who had accepted the
settlement by giving it in writing to the President of
respondent No. 2 - union. He also tried to submit that in
any case, the settlement was not fair and just as the
workmen were required to give up all the back wages even
though they were given reinstatement with continuity of
service and they were further required to give a letter in
writing to the Management stating that they would acquit
themselves in an orderly manner and would assure that they
would not give room for any misconduct and disciplinary
action in future. It was submitted that under these
circumstances the contesting respondents were entitled to
insist that their dispute should be adjudicated on merits by
the Labour Court.
Having given our anxious consideration to these rival
submissions, we find that the terms of the settlement cannot
be considered to be in any way exfacie, unjust or unfair and
that the said settlement consequently must be held to be
binding on these contesting workmen also.
It has to be kept in view that the industrial dispute
was raised by respondent No. 2 - union on behalf of all the
29 workmen who were dismissed from service by the appellant
company. It was an industrial dispute as defined by Section
2(k) of the Act raised by the union on behalf of its
members. Respondents Nos. 3 to 14 were at the relevant time,
members of the union and even till date they continue to be
the members of the sponsoring union. This was not a
reference raised by a dismissed employee as per Section 2A
of the Act. Consequently, as which was incharge of the
proceedings and could represent all the 29 dismissed workmen
on whose behalf the dispute was raised by it. When the said
union having considered the pros and cons of the situation,
entered into the settlement on behalf of all the workmen
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from whom it had taken cudgels unless the said settlement
was found to be ex-facie, unjust or unfair it could not be
gone behind by these respondents who can be said to be
parties to the same through their representative union -
respondent No. 2. In this connection a reference is also
required to be made to Section 18(1) of the Act which lays
down as under:
"A settlement arrived at by
agreement between the employer and
workman otherwise than in the
course of conciliation proceeding
shall be binding on the parties to
the agreement.
It is not in dispute that the settlement arrived at by
respondent No. 2 - union with the appellant company was not
in the course of conciliation proceedings. Therefore, it
would be binding to the parties to the agreement, namely,
the appellant company on the one hand and respondent No. 2 -
union representing all the 29 dismissed employees, who wee
its members and on whose behalf it had raised the industrial
dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act, on the other.
Section 2(p) of the Act defines a settlement to mean a
settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceedings
and includes a written agreement between the employer and
workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of
conciliation proceedings where such agreement has been
signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be
prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer
authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and
the Conciliation Officer.
It is also not in dispute that parties to the
settlement were the appellant company on the one hand and
respondent No. 2 - union on the other, which acted on behalf
of all the 29 dismissed workmen for whom reference was
pending in the Labour Court. It was duly signed by both
these parties. Under these circumstances, respondent Nos. 3
to 14 also would be ordinarily bound by this settlement
entered into by their representative union with the company
unless it is shown that the said settlement was ex-facie,
unfair, unjust or malafied. No such case could be even
alleged much less made out by the dissenting respondent Nos.
3 to 14 before the trial court. It is interesting to note
that before the Labour Court the only argument put forward
on behalf of the respondent Nos 3 to 14 was that they were
not parties to the settlement and therefore, it was not
binding on them. Once it is kept in view that the entire
industrial dispute was raised by respondent No. 2 union on
behalf of all the 29 dismissed workmen and as it was not an
industrial dispute covered by Section 2A whereunder
individual dismissed workman could come in the arena of
contest, it could not be held, as wrongly assumed by the
Labour Court that this settlement was not entered into under
Section 18(1) of the Act by these dissenting workmen when
the respondent - union did represent then from beginning to
end and is still representing them as they are members of
the union even at present. In the case of Ram Prasad
Vishwakarma vs. The Chairman Industrial Tribunal 1961 (3)
SCR 196 a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court had an
occasion to consider the effect of a settlement entered into
by the union of workmen which had espoused the cause of its
members by raising an industrial dispute under section 2(k)
of the Act and further question whether under these
circumstances an individual workman had any independent
locus standi in proceedings before the reference court.
Rejecting the contention on behalf of the individual
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workman, it was observed by Das Gupta, J. speaking for the
court that the concerned workman was not entitled to
separate representation when already represented by the
Secretary of the union which espoused his cause. A dispute
between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an
industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act
unless it is taken up by a union of workmen or by a
considerable number of workmen. When an individual workman
becomes a party to a dispute under the Act he is a party,
not independently of the union which has espoused his cause.
It was further observed that although no general rule can be
laid down in the matter, the ordinary rule should be that
representation by an officer of the trade union should
continue throughout the proceedings in the absence of
exceptional circumstances justifying other representation of
the workman concerned.
It is true that the said decision was rendered prior to
the insertion of Section 2-A in the Act by which individual
workmen were also given a right to raise industrial dispute
in case of discharge, dismissal or retrenchment or otherwise
termination of service. It is also true that the present
controversy has arisen after the coming into operation of
Section 2-A but as noted earlier the industrial dispute
raised for 29 dismissed workmen was raised by the union -
respondent no.2 under Section 2(k) of the Act and there was
no reference under Section 2-A of the Act, so far as
respondent nos. 3 to 14 are concerned.
In the case of Herbertsons Ltd. v. The Workmen of
Herbertsons Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1977 SC 322 another Bench of
three learned Judges of this court considered the effect of
a settlement arrived at by recognised union of majority of
workers pending appeal to Supreme Court. It was observed by
Goswami, J., speaking for the Court that when a recognised
union negotiates with an employer the workers as individuals
do not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each
individual worker should know the implications of the
settlement since a recognised union, which is expected to
protect the legitimate interests of labour enteres into a
settlement in the best interests of labour. This would be
the normal rule. There may be exceptional cases where there
may be allegations of mala fides, fraud or even corruption
or other inducements. But in the absence of such allegations
a settlement in the course of collective bargaining is
entitled to due weight and consideration.
In connection with the justness and fairness of the
settlement it was observed that this has to be considered in
the light of the conditions that were in force at the time
of the reference. When, therefore, negotiations take place
which have to be encouraged, particularly between labour and
employer in the interest of industrial peace and well-being,
there is always give and take. The settlement has to be
taken as a package deal and when labour has gained in the
matter of dearness allowance so far as the award is
concerned, it cannot be said that the settlement as a whole
is unfair and unjust. It was further observed that it is not
possible to scan the settlement in bits and pieces and hold
some parts good and acceptable and others bad. Unless it can
be demonstrated that the objectionable portion is such that
it completely outweighs all other advantages gained the
Court will slow to hold a settlement as unfair and unjust.
The settlement has to be accepted or rejected as a whole.
It has to be kept in view that under the scheme of labour
legislations like the Act in the present case, collective
bargaining and the principle of industrial democracy
permitted the relations between the management on the one
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hand and the union which resorts to collective bargaining on
behalf of its members-workmen with the management on the
other. Such a collective bargaining which may result in just
and fair settlement would always be beneficial to the
management as well as to the body of the workmen and society
at large as there would be industrial peace and tranquility
pursuant to such settlement and which would avoid
unnecessary social strife and tribulation on the one hand
and promote industrial and commercial development on the
other hand. Keeping in view the aforesaid salient features
of the Act the settlement which is sought to be impugned has
to be scanned and scrutinized and collective bargaining is
always to be preferred for it is the best guarantee of
industrial peace which is the aim of all legislations for
settlement of labour disputes. In order to bring about such
a settlement more easily and to make it more workable and
effective it may not be always possible or necessary that
such a settlement is arrived at in the course of
conciliation proceedings which may be the first step towards
resolving the industrial dispute which may be lingering
between the employers and their workmen represented by their
unions but even if at that stage such settlement does not
take place and the industrial dispute gets referred for
adjudication, even pending such disputes, the parties can
arrive at amicable settlement which may be binding to the
parties to the settlement unlike settlement arrived at
during conciliation proceedings which may be binding not
only to the parties to the settlement but even to the entire
labour force working in the concerned organization even
though they may not be members of the union which might have
entered into settlement during conciliation proceedings. The
difference between the settlement arrived at under the Act
during conciliation proceedings by parties and the
settlement arrived at otherwise than during conciliation
proceedings has been succinctly brought out by the decision
of this Court in Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik
Parishad etc. etc. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. etc. etc.
(1991) 1 SCC 4 wherein Ahmadi, J. ( as His Lordship then
was) spoke for the Court to the following effect :
"Settlements are divided into two
categories, namely, (i) those
arrived at outside the conciliation
proceedings [Section 18(i)] and
(ii) those arrived at in the course
of conciliation proceedings
[Section 18(3)]. A settlement which
belongs to the first category has
limited application in that it
merely binds the parties to the
agreement. But a settlement arrived
at in the course of conciliation
proceedings with a recognized
majority union has extended
application as it will be binding
on all workmen of the
establishment, even those who
belong to the minority union which
had objected to the same. To that
extent it departs from the ordinary
law of contract. The object
obviously is to uphold the sanctity
of settlements reached with the
active assistance of the
Conciliation Officer and to
discourage an individual employee
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or a minority union from scuttling
the settlement. There is an
underlying assumption that a
settlement reached with the help of
the Conciliation Officer must be
fair and reasonable and can,
therefore, safely be made binding
not only on the workmen belonging
to the union signing the settlement
but also on the others. That is why
a settlement arrived at in the
course of conciliation proceedings
is put on par with an award made by
an adjudicatory authority.
As in the present case the settlement arrived at
between the parties was not during conciliation proceedings,
it would remain binding to parties to the settlement as per
Section 18(1) of the Act. But as we have seen above,
respondent no. 2 union while entering into that settlement
acted on behalf of all the 29 dismissed workmen who were its
members including the present respondent nos.3 to 14 who
are also its members as noted earlier. We have also seen
earlier that the Labour court had erred in taking the view
that respondents 3 to 14 were not parties to the said
settlement as individually they had no locus standi and they
were represented by their union respondent no.2 which had
signed the settlement on behalf of its members for whom the
dispute was raised by the union. Nothing could be alleged by
respondents 3 to 14 to the effect that the said settlement
was in any way unjust or unfair or was a mala fide one.
There were no exceptional circumstances to reject this
settlement qua even the contesting respondents. However, as
learned counsel for the respondent-workmen tried faintly to
suggest to the effect we have carefully gone through the
circumstances which are brought on record which had led to
the settlement. It may be noted that about 500 workmen had
done on strike and that had resulted in the lock-out by the
appellant company and ultimately disciplinary action was
initiated against 29 workmen who had indulged into various
acts of misconduct. It is for these 29 workmen who were
ultimately dismissed from service that the respondent-union
had raised a dispute under Section 2(k) of the Act on their
behalf. Earlier the remaining workmen had gone on strike for
nearly 5 months. Ultimately, the strike was withdrawn; lock-
out was lifted and a broad understanding was reached between
the appellant company and the workmen represented by their
union whereby it was agreed that 29 workmen, who were
dismissed, would be either given Rs75,000/- as compensation
or reinstatement with continuity of service without back
wages and the concerned workmen should express apology for
mis-conduct and also assure good conduct in future.
Out of 29 workmen for whom the industrial dispute was
raised 17 workmen agreed and accepted settlement and joined
the service. Remaining 12 workmen (respondent nos.3 to 14)
have not agreed to the said settlement. It is under these
circumstances that the settlement arrived at by the union on
behalf of all of them has to be scrutinized. It has clearly
transpired on the record of this case that all the 500
workmen excluding 29 dismissed workmen and had struck the
work. Ultimately, when they were reinstated in service
leaving aside the 29 workmen for whom industrial dispute
lingered on, all the remaining workmen lost their wages from
20.10.1990 to 21.5.1991 and also from 13.5.1991 to
6.10.1991. They lost their wages because they were
expressing sympathy for their 29 colleagues who were facing
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disciplinary action and even for these 29 workmen respondent
no.2 union entered into a settlement so that they could be
reinstated in service with continuity of service or could
walk out from service with Rs.75,000/- and other monetary
benefits. All that was agreed to by the union as a condition
for reinstatement was that the workmen would be give up back
wages and had to sign a written undertaking to behave
properly in future. In our view there was nothing
unreasonable or unfair in these terms of settlement. The
relief of reinstatement without back wages could not be said
to be unreasonable as for nearly 12 months all other workmen
lost their back wages only because they supported the cause
of these colleagues of theirs and hence there was no reason
why the workmen who indulged in the acts of misconduct and
who were also to be taken in service should not lose their
wages for 12 months. Relief of reinstatement was made
available to respondents 3 to 14 on the same line as it was
made available to their 17 remaining colleagues who were
covered by the very same settlement and who accepted the
relief of settlement without back wages or a lumpsum
compensation of Rs.75,000/- and other monetary benefits in
lieu of that. In our view such a package deal entered into
by respondents no.2 in the best interest of these workmen
could not be said to be unfair or unjust from any angle. On
the contrary, if the back wages were given to them, then the
remaining workmen against whom there was no disciplinary
action or any alleged misconduct and who had also lost wages
for 12 months only because they were in sympathy with these
29 dismissed workmen would have stood discriminated against.
Consequently, it is not possible to agree with the learned
counsel for respondents nos.13 to 14 that the said
settlement was in any way unfair or unjust. Once this
conclusion is reached it is obvious that the entire
industrial dispute should have been disposed of in the light
of this settlement and an award in terms of the settlement
should have been passed by the first respondent-court in the
case of respondents 3 to 14 also. Consequently, the
judgement and order of the Division Bench of the High Court
dated 4th. April, 1995 and the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 29th September, 1993 are quashed and set aside.
The writ petition filed by the appellant company will stand
allowed with a direction to the first respondent-Labour
Court to pass award in terms of the settlement dated 14th
December, 1992 by treating it to be binding to respondent
nos. 3 to 14 also.
Learned Counsel for these respondents ultimately
submitted that the time during which the concerned workmen
had to exercise their option as per the terms of the
settlement is now over and the appellant company may not
make available the said option to them. His apprehension on
behalf of the respondents was set at rest by learned counsel
for the appellant company who stated that the appellant
company is willing to make available the option to these
respondent nos. 3 to 14 to either accept reinstatement with
continuity of service without back wages on their executing
the writing as per the said settlement or to be paid
Rs.75,000/- each in addition to gratuity as per the payment
of Gratuity Act, wages for unavailed leave and bonus, if any
payable.
In view of this fair stand taken by the appellant
company it is directed that if the respondent nos. 3 to 14
exercise their option as per the procedure laid down in the
settlement dated 14th December 1992 either to get
reinstatement without back wages for the period of non-
employment and with continuity of service or to accept a
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lumpsum monetary compensation as laid down in the settlement
within a period of 8 weeks from today, the appellant company
will act upon the said option exercised by the said workmen
and shall give appropriate benefit of the option as per the
settlement to the concerned workmen. As the period of
lumpsum payment of Rs.75,000/- by instalments (as laid down
by the settlement) is already over, it is directed that if
any of the concerned workmen-respondents 3 to 14 exercises
the option of receiving the lumpsum amount of Rs.75,000/- in
lieu of the reinstatement, a sum of Rs.40,000/- out of the
said amount shall be paid to the concerned workmen within 15
days of the exercise of such option and the balance of
Rs.35,000/- with other monetary benefits as indicated in the
settlement shall be paid to the concerned workmen within a
further period of 2 months thereafter.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
as to costs.