Full Judgment Text
2024 INSC 215
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1215 OF 2011
NAVAS @ MULANAVAS …Appellant (s)
Versus
STATE OF KERALA ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. The present Appeal arises out of the judgment of a
Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam
in D.S.R. No. 4 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal No. 1620 of
2007 dated 09.02.2010. The Death Sentence Reference
and the Criminal Appeal arose out of the judgment of the
Court of the III Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
satish kumar yadav
Date: 2024.03.18
17:52:51 IST
Reason:
1
Track Court No. 1, Thrissur in Sessions Case No. 491 of
2006.
2. The trial Court found the appellant (the sole accused)
guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and
449 IPC for having committed the murder of Latha (aged 39
years), Ramachandran (aged 45 years), Chitra (aged 11
years) and Karthiayani Amma (aged 80 years) after
committing house-trespass. After committing the above
said act, the accused attempted to commit suicide for which
he was also found guilty under Section 309 IPC. The trial
Court sentenced the accused to death for the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC. For the offence under
Section 449 IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment
for six months. The accused was also sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of
2
Rs.500/- for the offence under Section 309 IPC, and in
default of the payment of fine to undergo simple
imprisonment for one month.
3. When the matter went for confirmation before the High
Court, the High Court, while confirming the conviction,
modified the sentence. The sentence of death was modified
and reduced to imprisonment for life with a further direction
that the accused shall not be released from prison for a
period of 30 (thirty) years including the period already
undergone with set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. alone.
Aggrieved, the appellant is before us in the present appeal
by way of special leave.
Brief Facts :
4. The prosecution story, in brief, is that in the household
of the deceased Ramachandran, there were four people
residing. Apart from Ramachandran, there was his wife
Latha, their daughter Chitra and Ramachandran’s mother
3
Karthiayani Amma. The appellant, according to the
prosecution, had, at an earlier point in time, illicit intimacy
with Latha so much so that Latha even became pregnant,
later leading to termination of pregnancy. It is the
prosecution case that after Latha tried to distance herself,
the appellant was seriously aggrieved, and they advert to an
occurrence of 03.02.2005 when the appellant is supposed to
have trespassed into the house where Latha lived and even
tried to harm her. They rely on Ext. P-9 to Ext.P-11
complaints.
5. The macabre incident, out of which the present case
arose, happened on the night intervening 03.11.2005 and
04.11.2005. It is alleged that the accused reached the house
of the deceased late at night on 03.11.2005. Having reached
the house, he made a hole in the eastern side wall of the
house and gained access into the house. It is the
prosecution case that, having gained access and being
armed with 2 (two) knives and an iron rod, he caused the
4
death of Ramachandran and Chitra with the iron rod in the
upper floor room in the northern side of the house; that he
caused serious injuries to Karthiayani Amma in the northern
room on the ground floor (resulting in her death
subsequently) and caused the death of Latha with multiple
stab injuries in the hall near the stairs on the ground floor.
6. The prosecution case is that PW-1 Thankamani, the
domestic help, who had seen the family hale and hearty the
previous evening i.e., 03.11.2005, had come to sweep the
house on the morning of 04.11.2005 at around 07:00 a.m.
While sweeping the courtyard, she found that, unlike on
normal days when the family would come out of the house
in the morning, no one came out that day. While sweeping,
she found that a hole had been dug on the eastern side wall
of the house and to her horror also found that blood was
dripping from a pipe adjoining the western side wall of the
house. She raised an alarm resulting in the neighbours
converging on the property.
5
7. It is PW-2 (Shyama Sundaran), a neighbour, who
called the police after witnessing the commotion outside the
house. PW-30 (KT Kumaran) the ASI rushed to the spot
with his police party and reached at 08:25 AM. He also
found a hole in the wall on the eastern side of the house and
also that telephone cable was cut. He instructed PW-6
(Balan) & PW-23 (Rajan) to break open the door on the
western side of the house first. PW-6 & PW-23 broke open
the outer door but found that the inner door was also locked
and it could not be opened. It was then decided to break
open the door on the front side of the house. PW-4
(Sandeep) removed the tile portion above the porch and
entered the porch. He then broke open the door using a
pestle and entered the poomukham (veranda). PW-4 then
broke the glass ventilator above the main door and inserted
his hand to open the door latch. As they entered, they found
Latha’s dead body in the passage near the stairs. The body
of Ramachandran and Chitra were found dead in the upper
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floor room on the northern side of the house. Karthiyani
Amma was found in the northern room on the ground floor
unconscious. PW-6 & PW-23 took Karthiyani Amma to
hospital. It was PW-32 (Ajaya Kumar), the Investigating
Officer of the case, who reached the spot at 09:15 AM and
saw blood droplets starting from the northern room on the
ground floor to the room on the south. When he opened the
door, he found the accused lying on the floor with a cut
injury on his left wrist.
8. PW-30, ASI registered the suo motu FIR and PW-32,
conducted the investigation. The appellant was sent up for
trial. In all, the prosecution examined 32 witnesses (PWs 1-
32) and proved Exhibits P1 to P45 series. Material Objects
[M.Os.] 1-122 were also marked by the prosecution. The
accused did not examine any defence witnesses; but proved
Exhibits D1-D5. The accused also gave a statement while
being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. At the Section
313 stage, he advanced a version to the effect that there was
7
a pact between him and Latha to commit suicide; that he
had come to the house of Latha on 03.11.2005 with the
intention that both of them shall commit suicide; that Latha
had kept the door open as usual and he gained entry into the
house through such door; that after he entered the house, he
found Latha and others were all lying dead/injured; that on
account of grief, he had cut his left wrist in an attempt to
commit suicide and that he was found available in the house
in an unconscious state. The appellant was clearly implying
that somebody else had gained access into the house and
caused the death of all victims. It is then that he proceeded
to commit suicide.
9. The case entirely rests on circumstantial evidence.
Both the trial Court and the High Court have closely
marshalled the circumstantial evidence in the case to arrive
at the conclusion that the accused alone is responsible for
the death of the four deceased. Additionally, it also relied
on the fact that the accused having been found present in the
8
house had offered no plausible and cogent explanation
about the sequence of events that had transpired inside,
leading to the sole and irresistible conclusion that the
accused has perpetrated the heinous crime.
Contentions :
10. We have heard Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel
for the appellant, who advanced elaborate arguments,
covering the entire spectrum by making available a chart
setting out the summary of the deposition of the prosecution
witnesses, the relevant exhibits marked and the argument of
the defence in separate columns. He mainly contended that
the case made out by the prosecution falls short of the proof
needed in a case which is based entirely on circumstantial
evidence. Learned counsel contended that with the available
evidence it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction and
pleaded for outright acquittal. The specific contentions of
the learned counsel challenging certain individual
circumstances have been dealt with hereinbelow while
9
tabulating the circumstances. Alternatively, learned counsel
pleaded that the sentence of 30 years without remission is
excessive and prayed that the sentence may be appropriately
tailored to meet the ends of justice.
11. Shri Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior counsel, for the
State vehemently rebutted the arguments of the counsel for
the appellant and contended that the trial Court and the High
Court have correctly arrived at the conclusion of guilt.
Learned senior counsel contended that the case actually
warranted death penalty but the High Court has modified it
to a sentence of imprisonment for 30 years without
remission for the offence under Section 302. According to
the learned senior counsel, the sentence did not deserve any
further modification.
Discussion :
12. We have carefully considered the submissions of the
learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused
the material on record, including the relevant original trial
10
Court records. The circumstances that unerringly point to
the guilt of the appellant as it emerges from the deposition
of the witnesses and the duly proved exhibits can be
summarized as under:
(i) There was the incident on 03.02.2005 when the accused
allegedly trespassed into the house and had thrown a
koduval (curved sword) at deceased Latha. This highlights
the friction between the accused and deceased Latha. Ext.
P9 - P11 complaint of 03.02.2005 has been marked by the
prosecution. It also forms an important piece of evidence to
establish motive.
ii) PW-3, Raman, an auto driver, deposed that on the
night of 03.11.2005, the accused engaged his services to go
to Orumanayur. The accused asked him to stop at a place
called Muthenmavu (which is the place where the house of
the deceased was situated) and he paid him Rs.70/-. We
have seen the original deposition and it clearly records that
it was at 10.30 PM on the night of 03.11.2005 that the
11
accused engaged the services of PW-3 at Guruvayur auto
stand to reach the area where the house of the deceased was
located. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, has
challenged the evidence of PW-3 on the ground that no test
identification parade was held and the identification was for
the first time at the police station. This submission need not
detain the court as nothing much turns on it. The presence
of the accused even otherwise, at the scene of occurrence
has been spoken to by PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-23,
PW-30 and PW-32, as has been discussed hereinbelow.
iii) PW-1 Thankamani has clearly spoken about the fact
that, on 03.11.2005, when she left the house after her work
at 7.30 p.m. all the deceased were hale and hearty. On the
morning of 04.11.2005, it was she who detected the
dripping of the blood from the pipe adjoining the western
wall, and a hole being made in the eastern side wall of the
house.
12
iv) The evidence of PW-1, 2, 4, 6, 23, 30 and 32 speaks
about the appellant lying in the southern room of the house
and being taken to the hospital from there. PWs 1,2,4,6,23
& 30 also speak about the hole that has been made on the
eastern wall of the house. The seizure of M.O.
29,30,31,32,33 & 34 items i.e., 2 (two) knives, 2 (two) knife
sheaths, iron rod and bag recovered also contributes as a
link in the chain.
v) On 4.11.2005, M.O. 29 & 30 (Knives found in the
southern room on the ground floor where the accused was
found) were seized and taken into custody under Ext. P-12
(Scene Mahazar). M.O. 33 (Iron rod) was also seized and
taken from the northern room in the upper floor, vide the
same Ext. P-12.
vi) Another important circumstance is the report of the
Finger Print Expert (Ext.P-22). The Finger Print Expert has
opined that the chance finger print on the water bottle found
at the scene of the crime (marked as C-9 by the Expert) was
13
identified as the left thumb impression of the appellant in
the slip made available with the Expert for verification
(marked as “S” by the expert). The Expert concluded in P-
22 that since the identical ridge characteristics are present in
their nature and relative possessions, the finger impressions
“C9” and “S” are identical i.e. that they are the impressions
of the same finger of the person. The Expert concluded
that, in his opinion, that the chance print marked as C-9 and
developed by him from the scene of crime on 04.11.2005 is
made by the left thumb of the appellant.
vii) The prosecution case is also that there were writings on
the wall and on certain objects in the southern room of the
ground floor where the accused was found. The writings
indicate that these were parting messages of the accused (as
the High Court labels them) since he had decided to commit
suicide. The writings were in the following words “ Do not
enter here ”; “ Shyaman, you are a O, you should not desire
the ruppam of a woman, money will make people traitors,
14
you are O, you should not destroy the local area ”; The
mirror had the writing with pen on it reading ' Latha, I love
you ' and same was underlined and below that it was written
' Salim, I love you' and 'Yahio I lo ” and below that ' Shabna I
lo ”; The aforesaid wall had one wall clock with the label
'Samaya Quartz' inside. On it, it was written with marker
pen ' Latha, I love you '; On the wall, below the clock, it was
written “ My name is Nawas, reason for my death is Latha,
so myself and Latha decided to die together.....Confirm by
Navaz P.M.”; “Yahayikka knows that now I shall not be
there, wherever, no harm should happen to Yahayikka. I
may be an idiot ”; “ For Salim to know, even if I am not
there, you shall always be in my eyes”. Near to that it was
written “night =12 O’clock, I am at the house of Latha” in
two lines. Below that it was written “6 to 7= Finishing”; “I
have no role in the looting of 6 lakhs. I was present in the
said vehicle. This is true ” and near to that it was written “ for
15
police to know where I was for all these days, no child
knows ”.
Specimen of these writings was taken and referred to
the handwriting expert. The Handwriting Expert produced
P-42 report. PW-32, the Investigating Officer spoke about
the seizure of a mirror, a samaya quartz clock and the
November-December, 2005 page of Guruvayur Cooperative
Urban Bank Calendar. All these items had writings on them
at the scene of the crime. Twenty black and white
photographs of the handwritings were taken. These were
termed ‘question’ writings and marked by the Handwriting
Expert in the report for his reference as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4,
Q5, Q5A, Q6, Q6A to Q6P. The Expert was also furnished
with the ‘standard’ writings by Appellant marked by the
Expert for his reference as S1 to S49. In Ext. P-42, the
Handwriting Expert concludes that, on comparison, the
‘question’ and ‘standard’ writings are by the same person.
16
He concluded that they agree in general writing
characteristics such as skill, speed, spacing, relative size and
proportionate spelling errors. The Expert opined that
similarities found between the question and standard
writings are significant and numerous and there did not
exist any material differences. Only with regard to the
signature stamp in Q6(q), the expert concluded that it was
not possible to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding
the authorship for want of sufficient data on that score.
With regard to all others, it was concluded that the person
who wrote the blue enclosed writings stamped and marked
as ‘standard’ writings also wrote the red enclosed ‘question’
writings. The High Court has found that this aspect of
handwriting was not even seriously challenged by the
accused. Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, contended
that the handwriting expert had not been examined. In
support thereof, he relies on the judgment of this Court in
Padum Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35 .
17
The submission flies in the face of Section 293 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Exhibit P-42 Report is prepared by
Dr. K.P. Jayakumar, Joint Director (Research), Forensic
Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram. The report is
duly marked and exhibited and proved as Exhibit P-42. The
Joint Director who occupies a position above the Deputy
Director and Assistant Director, is encompassed in the
phrase “Director” used in Section 293(4)(e). This position is
expressly settled by the judgment of this Court in Ammini
& Others v. State of Kerala, (1998) 2 SCC 301 . The
relevant para of which is extracted hereinbelow:
“11. …..The trial court was also wrong in holding that the
report given by the Forensic Science Laboratory with
respect to the contents of MO 44 was not admissible in
evidence as it was signed by its Joint Director and not by
the Director. On a true construction of Section 293(4)
CrPC it has to be held that Joint Director is
comprehended by the expression “Director”. The
amendment made in clause (e) of Section 293(4) now
indicates that clearly. If the Joint Director was not
comprehended within the expression Director then the
legislature would have certainly named him while
amending the clause and providing that Section 293
applies to the Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a
18
Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic
Science Laboratory. A Joint Director is a higher officer
than a Deputy Director or an Assistant Director and,
therefore, it would be unreasonable to hold that a
report signed by Joint Director is not admissible in
evidence though a report signed by the Deputy
Director or Assistant Director is now admissible. In
our opinion the High Court was right in holding that the
report made by the Joint Director was admissible in
evidence and that it deserved to be relied upon.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
Hence, the report Ex. P-42 is admissible even without
the examination of Dr. K. P. Jayakumar. (See also
Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab , (1988) 3 SCC 513 &
State of H.P. v. Mast Ram , (2004) 8 SCC 660 )
viii) The evidence of the doctors PWs-10 & 19, who
conducted the post-mortem of Latha & Chitra respectively,
fixed the timing of death between 6-18 hours prior to 6.25
PM on 04.11.2005. Evidence of PW-25, Doctor who
conducted post-mortem of Ramachandran stated that the
death occurred 12-18 hours prior to 6:25PM. This
synchronizes with the time that the accused made entry into
the house.
19
ix) The hair strands found on the body of Chitra were
found to be similar and identical to the hair of the accused.
In Ext.P41(b), which is the report of Dr. R. Sreekumar,
Assistant Director (Biology) in the forensic laboratory, it is
opined that the hairs in Item 45 (hairs from the belly of
Chitra) are human scalp hairs which are similar to the
sample scalp hairs in Item 58 (a tuft of black hairs) which is
the combed hair and cut hair of the appellant. Challenging
the circumstances, Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel,
contends that PW-27 Annamma John does not speak about
the hair being seized and that there was no seizure memo
spoken to in her 161 statement. This submission has no
merit since Exhibit P-26 is the seizure mahazar of the
objects collected by PW-27 on 04.11.2005, the day the
sordid incident was unravelled. In the Inquest Report also
PW-14 mentions about the collection of hair from the body
of the deceased Chitra by PW-27.
20
x) It is also important to note that the 2 (two) strands of hair
found on one of the knives, was found to be Latha’s as per
FSL Report (Ex. P. 41(b)).
xi) The testimonies of the Doctors PWs, 10, 19, 25 and
26, clearly bring out that the injuries sustained by the
deceased could be caused by means of M.O. 29, 30 and 33.
This is an additional circumstance.
xii) Ext.P41(c), which is the report of the Scientific
Assistant (Chemistry), FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, clearly
establishes that the black coloured ink in Item 66 (the
marker pen with trade brand label as Kolor Pik permanent
XL marker) and 67 (1 black coloured plastic cap) is similar
to the ink used in the black coloured writings in Item 63
(wooden frame) item 64 (wall clock) with trade label samay
and item 65 (calendar of Guruvayur Cooperative Urban
Bank). Item numbers referred to here are the ones given for
reference by the Scientific Assistant in her report. The
Marker pen (part of M.O. 95) was recovered from the
21
southern room where the Appellant was found, and rightly
an inference has been drawn that the writings on M.O. 43
(Wall Clock) M.O. 90 (Mirror) and M.O. 94 (2005
Calendar) are the writings of the accused by using M.O 95
(marker pen)
xiii) At the site where the hole was drilled, soil/powder was
available. It is found in the forensic report that the
soil/powder on M.O. 34 bag (found in the room where the
accused was found) and seized as per Ext.P-12 scene
mahazar, was apparently similar to the soil/powder seized
near the hole. Equally so, in the M.O. 71 shirt belonging to
the accused, apparently similar soil/powder was found.
These are established by the FSL report (Exh. 41(a)).
Further, the nail clippings of the accused taken by PW-31
dated 14.11.2005 revealed apparently similar soil/powder to
the soil/powder found at the site of the hole as per FSL
report (Exh. 41(a)). This is a circumstance relied upon by
the prosecution to establish that the accused gained access
22
through the hole that he dug. The argument of the accused
that the nail clippings were taken on 14.11.2005 and no
importance could be attached has rightly been rejected by
the High Court saying that it is not even the case of the
accused that the soil/powder detected from the hole at the
scene of occurrence was planted on his nail. Mr. Renjith B.
Marar, learned counsel for the appellant contended that
Exhibit P-41(a) report was not put in the Section 313
questioning in the context of the soil particles on the wall
tallying with the soil particles in the nail clippings and on
the shirt and the bag found in the room where the accused
was present. We have called for the original record and
examined the Section 313 statement and had the Malayalam
version read over to us. We have also seen the translated
version of Section 313. Exhibit P-41(a) was put in question
no. 52 but it was in the context of item 68 cable and as to
how it could be cut with the knives (item 22 and 23). To
that extent, Mr. Renjith B. Marar is right that the report was
23
not put in this context. The report was put to the accused
albeit in the context of the cable and knives. However,
viewed in the conspectus of the other circumstances even if
this circumstance is eschewed, it will not make any
difference to the ultimate conclusion. The further argument
that there was no seizure memo for the nail clippings is
clearly incorrect. PW-31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar has clearly
deposed that he had collected the nail clippings and hair
samples and the blood of the accused-appellant and after
sealing and labeling them handed it over to the police
constable-4628. Exhibit P-45(i) marked by PW-32 Ajay
Kumar, Investigating Officer as part of the property list,
mentions about the collection of nail clippings, hair sample
and sodium fluoride tube. Hence, the contention that the
chain of custody is not established cannot be countenanced.
There is no reason to disbelieve PW-31 Dr. Hitesh Shankar
and the documents in support of the same.
24
xiv) The evidence of the prosecution witnesses and even
the version of the accused establishes his presence at the
scene of occurrence. His explanation that deceased Latha
would always leave the door open for him to enter and that
when he entered, he found them already dead and lying on
the floor wounded has been found to be false. If the
appellant’s own case is that he entered the house that night,
no cogent explanation has been given as to who opened the
door. However, we have not gone by his version. His
presence at the scene of crime is established by the evidence
of PW-1, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-23, PW-30 and PW-32.
xv) The appellant was the only other person inside the
house, with the other three being dead and one Karthiayani
Amma, who was injured and unconscious and who later
died in that state itself. There is no cogent and plausible
explanation forthcoming from the accused as to what
transpired at the scene of occurrence on the night
intervening 03.11.2005 and 04.11.2005. This coupled with
25
the fact that his relationship with the deceased Latha was
strained clearly point to his guilt. Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 states that when any fact is especially
within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving
that fact is upon him. We are conscious of the warning
administered by Justice Vivian Bose, rightly, in Shambhu
Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, 1956 SCR 199 to the
effect that Section 106 is not intended to relieve the
prosecution of its duty. However, Shambhu Nath Mehra
(supra) itself recognizes that in exceptional cases where it
could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately
difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are
especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden
will be on the accused since he could prove as to what
transpired in such scenario, without difficulty or
inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like multiple
murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the initial
burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. Once the
26
prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon it,
the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other
person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent
and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be
committed. The appellant has miserably failed on that score.
This can be considered as a very important circumstance,
constituting a vital link in the chain.
13. Though the trial Court and the High Court have
adverted to few other circumstances, we are satisfied that
the circumstances set out hereinabove are by themselves
consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the
accused alone is the perpetrator of these murders which
were most foul.
14. It is also to be noted that the law on the appreciation
of circumstantial evidence is well settled and it will be an
idle parade of familiar learning to deal with all the cases.
We do no more than set out the holding in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC
27
116 , which dealt with the panchsheel or the five principles
essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in
a case based on circumstantial evidence:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
( 1 ) the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri)
p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can
convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
( 2 ) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to
say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
( 3 ) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
( 4 ) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
( 5 ) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
28
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence.”
15. We are convinced that the circumstances presented in
evidence in this case more than meets the ingredients that
are required to be established. We find no reason to
interfere with the concurrent conviction recorded by the trial
Court and the High Court against the appellant for the
offences under Section 302 (murder), 449 (house-trespass)
and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) and we maintain the
conviction.
Discussion on Sentence:
16. Coming to the sentencing, while the trial Court
imposed the sentence of death, the High Court has modified
it to that of imprisonment for 30 years with no remission.
Mr. Renjith B. Marar, learned counsel, made an
impassioned plea as part of his alternative submission that
29
imprisonment for 30 years without remission is excessive
and disproportionate. Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj, learned senior
counsel, left no stone unturned in contending that the
appellant has got away lightly and that he is fortunate to
have escaped the gallows.
17. The question before us is what should be the
appropriate sentence and whether the High Court was
justified in adopting the Swamy Shraddananda v. State of
Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 line of cases and even it
was justified whether the fixing of the quantum at 30 years
without remission was the appropriate sentence, in the facts
and circumstances of the case?
18. The trial court imposed the sentence of death as far as
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC was
concerned. The trial court recorded that the appellant had
committed the murder of four persons; that the appellant
was blood-thirsty; that he had illicit love affair with
deceased Latha, the wife of deceased Ramachandran; that
30
she even became pregnant because of him and then fell out
with the appellant; that there was an attempt to cause
bodily injury earlier to Latha by throwing a koduval
(curved sword) on 03.02.2005; that the nature of the
injuries inflicted upon the deceased persons indicate that
the murders were committed in an extremely brutal and
dastardly manner; that they were premeditated and cold
blooded murders; that the entire family was eliminated
including an innocent child aged eleven years and a hapless
80 years old lady and that the collective conscience of the
community was shocked. The trial court also noted that the
accused attempted to commit suicide by cutting the vein in
his left forearm but however discarded that circumstance
and passed a sentence of death.
19. The High Court first recorded that there was no
question of interfering with the sentence under Sections
449 and 309 IPC and the question was only whether the
sentence of death ought to be confirmed or not. Thereafter,
31
the High Court delved into the balance sheet of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. The High Court, while
recording the argument of the prosecution, noticed that
there was prior planning; that four lives were snuffed out
and the entire family was wiped out including a child and
an aged woman; that the deceased were unarmed and
defenceless and no provocation or resistance was offered
by them; that the offence was committed after
mischievously planning the operation and after gaining
access to the closed house in the night by making a hole on
the wall; that the incident reflected a dare devil attitude;
that the nature of weapons used by the accused, namely,
the knife and the iron bar is also taken as an aggravating
circumstance; that the nature and number of injuries
inflicted on deceased Latha (43 of which 38 were stab
injuries) was also an aggravating circumstance and that
there were prior instances of involvement by the accused in
attempting to assault Latha.
32
20. Dealing with the mitigating circumstance, the High
Court noticed the contention of the defence, to the effect
that there was no semblance of any element of gain, profit
or advantage for the accused; that rightly or wrongly the
accused was labouring under an impression of deprivation
in love; that the accused was in an extremely agitated and
excited state of mind; that there was indication to show
that at some point of time deceased Latha had herself
suggested commission of suicide together; that the
accused had no motive whatsoever against
Ramachandran, Chitra and Karthiayani Amma; that he
had great affection for Chitra and referred to
Ramachandran in endearing terms; that he had not used
any weapon against Karthiayani Amma; that he did not
make any attempt to flee from justice and in fact
attempted to commit suicide; that he was a young man of
twenty eight years; that he was still young and not lost to
33
civilization and humanity and the final contention of the
defence that he was not a menace to the society.
21. Thereafter, the High Court dealt with the precedents
laid down by this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 , Machhi Singh v. State of
Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 to examine whether the litmus
test, namely, that the alternative option being
unquestionably foreclosed was fulfilled or not. Thereafter,
the High Court noticed the judgment of this Court in
Swamy Shraddananda (supra) and the holding thereon
that to avoid a sentence of death, it is possible for the
courts to device a graver form of sentence of
imprisonment for life beyond fourteen years which would
ensure that the society is insulated from the criminal for
such period as the court may specify, including if the facts
warranted, the entire rest of his life.
34
22. Thereafter applying Swamy Shraddananda (supra) ,
the High Court observed as follows:
"54. A question still remains whether the instant case is
one in which the graver alternatives of a life sentence are
also unquestionably foreclosed. We have rendered our
anxious consideration to all that all the relevant inputs.
We are unable to agree that all the options now available
can be said to be unquestionably foreclosed in the given
circumstances. In every case of death sentence, the court
must consider the purpose of the sentence. The theory of
reformation will have no place whatsoever in a case of
imposition of death sentence. In a case like the instant
one, the consideration of compensation/restoration cannot
also have any place, as all the members of the family
have been liquidated by the conduct of the accused. The
purpose of a death sentence - of eliminating the menace
to the society in the form of a hardened criminal and to
save society from the activities of such criminal may not
also have much role, given the alternative option of a life
sentence which will ensure that the accused does not
come into contact with the society thereafter.
59. Let it not be assumed that this court does not perceive
the instant one to be a serious and dastardly crime. We, to
say the least, are convinced that the offence committed
calls for societal abhorrence and disapproval. But, the
totality of circumstances instill in us the satisfaction that
this is not a case where the range of further options
available to the court after Swamy Shraddananda
(supra) are unquestionably foreclosed. Placing fetter on
the powers of the Executive under Section 432 and 433
Cr.P.C. for a prescribed period (and with due caution
administered that the powers under Article 72 and Article
35
161 should not be lightly invoked to get over the
prescription of such period fixed by this Court) a sentence
of imprisonment for life which shall ensure that the
offender does not get exposed to society for a period of
30 years can be imposed. We are not prescribing the
'entire rest of the life' as the period, as fixed by their
Lordships in Swamy Shraddananda (supra), considering
the totality of circumstances and because of the optimistic
faith in the infinite capacity of the human soul to repent
and reform."
Holding so, the High Court modified the sentence of death
to that of imprisonment for life with the further direction
that the accused shall not be released from prison for a
period of 30 (thirty) years including the period already
undergone with set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. alone.
23. The State is not in appeal, having accepted the verdict
of the High Court. It is only the appellant who is in appeal.
It is his submission that the imposition of 30 (thirty) years
sentence without remission is excessive and the counsel
urges that a suitable lesser sentence be imposed under the
Swamy Shraddananda principle. This is the alternative
submission advanced.
36
24. Swamy Shraddananda (supra) , since affirmed
subsequently in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias
Murugan and Others, (2016) 7 SCC 1 , resolved a judge’s
dilemma. Often it happens that a case that falls short of the
rarest of the rare category may also be one where a mere
sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life
imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and
inadequate. The Court may find that while death penalty
may not be warranted keeping in mind the overall
circumstances, a proportionate penalty would be to fix the
period between 14 years and for the imprisonment till rest
of the life without remission. Addressing this issue
felicitously in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) Justice Aftab
Alam speaking for the court, held as follows:
“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different
angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A
sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be
highly disproportionately inadequate . When an appellant
comes to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by
the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this
37
Court may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just
falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel
somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But
at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime,
the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission normally works out to
a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and
inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the Court's
option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence
of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more
than 14 years and the other death, the Court may feel
tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death
penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far
more just, reasonable and proper course would be to
expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of
fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus
between 14 years' imprisonment and death. It needs to be
emphasised that the Court would take recourse to the
expanded option primarily because in the facts of the
case, the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment would
amount to no punishment at all.”
25. In V. Sriharan (supra) , a Constitution Bench of this
Court affirmed the principle laid down in Swamy
Shraddananda (supra) . It first affirmed the principle that
imprisonment for life meant imprisonment for rest of the
life, subject however, to the right to claim remission, as
provided in the Constitution and the statutes. It was further
held that the judgment in Swamy Shraddananda (supra)
38
did not violate any statutory prescription. The Court went
on to observe that all that Swamy Shraddananda (supra)
sought to declare was that within the prescribed limit of the
punishment of life imprisonment, having regard to the
nature of offence committed by imposing life
imprisonment for a specified period would be proportionate
to the crime as well as the interest of the victim. Thereafter,
in the same judgment Ibrahim Kalifulla, J., in a passage
which repays study held as under:
“98. While that be so, it cannot also be lost sight of that it
will be next to impossible for even the lawmakers to think
of or prescribe in exactitude all kinds of such criminal
conduct to fit into any appropriate pigeonhole for
structured punishments to run in between the minimum
and maximum period of imprisonment. Therefore, the
lawmakers thought it fit to prescribe the minimum and
the maximum sentence to be imposed for such diabolic
nature of crimes and leave it for the adjudication
authorities, namely, the Institution of Judiciary which is
fully and appropriately equipped with the necessary
knowledge of law, experience, talent and infrastructure to
study the detailed parts of each such case based on the
legally acceptable material evidence, apply the legal
principles and the law on the subject, apart from the
guidance it gets from the jurists and judicial
39
pronouncements revealed earlier, to determine from the
nature of such grave offences found proved and
depending upon the facts noted, what kind of punishment
within the prescribed limits under the relevant provision
would appropriately fit in. In other words, while the
maximum extent of punishment of either death or life
imprisonment is provided for under the relevant
provisions noted above, it will be for the courts to decide
if in its conclusion, the imposition of death may not be
warranted, what should be the number of years of
imprisonment that would be judiciously and judicially
more appropriate to keep the person under
incarceration, by taking into account, apart from the
crime itself, from the angle of the commission of such
crime or crimes, the interest of the society at large or
all other relevant factors which cannot be put in any
straitjacket formulae.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
It will be clear from the paragraph above that the question
of fixing the number of years within the maximum, in the
case of life imprisonment, was to be left to the courts. It
was mandated that the courts would with its experience,
knowledge of law, the talent and infrastructure after
studying the detailed parts of each case, with the guidance
from the jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed
earlier would decide judiciously about the period of
40
incarceration which the case warranted. It was also
indicated that for this, apart from the crime itself; the angle
of the commission of such crime or crimes; the interest of
society at large and all other relevant facts which cannot be
put in any straitjacket formulae would be taken into
account.
26. Once the court decides that the death penalty is not to
be imposed and also that the convict cannot be released on
the expiry of 14 years, the guidelines set out in Swamy
Shraddananda (supra), V. Sriharan (supra) and the line
of cases which have applied these judgments will have to
be considered and principles, if any, set out therein have to
be applied.
27. How much is too much and how much is too little?
This is the difficult area we have tried to address here. As
rightly observed, there can be no straitjacket formulae.
Pegging the point up to which remission powers cannot be
41
invoked is an exercise that has to be carefully undertaken
and the discretion should be exercised on reasonable
grounds. The spectrum is very large. The principle in
Swamy Shraddananda (supra) as affirmed in V. Sriharan
(supra) was evolved as the normally accepted norm of 14
years was found to be grossly disproportionate on the lower
side. At the same time, since it is a matter concerning the
liberty of the individual, courts should also guard against
any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher side too.
A delicate balance has to be struck. While undue leniency,
which will affect the public confidence and the efficacy of
the legal system, should not be shown, at the same time,
since a good part of the convict’s life with freedom is being
sliced away (except in cases where the Court decides to
impose imprisonment till rest of the full life), in view of his
incarceration, care should be taken that the period fixed is
also not harsh and excessive. While by the very nature of
the task mathematical exactitude is an impossibility, that
42
will not deter the Court from imposing a period of sentence
which will constitute “a just dessert” for the convict.
Precedents can be good pointers as advised in V. Sriharan
(supra) . A survey of the previously decided cases applying
the Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle would be a
safe and legitimate guide. It is in pursuance of that mandate
that we have made a survey of some of the cases to see
how Swamy Shraddananda (supra) had come to be
applied in the course of the last decade and a half.
28. In Swamy Shraddananda (supra) itself, on facts, after
finding that it was a murder of the wife in a systematic
preplanned manner coupled with the fact that it was a
murder for gain, this Court directed that the appellant
therein be not released from prison for the rest of his life.
29. In Haru Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 15
SCC 551 which involved the murder of two individuals and
the attempt to murder the third by the accused who was out
43
on bail in another case, after conviction, this Court while
commuting the death penalty after taking into account the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances imposed a
sentence of 35 (thirty five) years of actual jail sentence
without remission. It was noted that commission of the
offence was not premeditated since he did not come armed
and that the accused was the only bread earner for his
family which included two minor children.
30. In Mulla & Another v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC
508 the accused/appellant, along with other co-accused,
was found guilty of murdering five persons, including one
woman. This Court confirmed the conviction but modified
the sentence. This Court stressed on the fact that socio-
economic factors also constitute a mitigating factor and
must be taken into consideration as in the case the
appellants belonged to extremely poor background which
prompted them to commit the act. The sentence was
44
reduced from death to life imprisonment for full life,
subject to any remission by the Government for good
reasons.
31. In Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2010) 1 SCC 573
which involved the murder of his wife, this Court imposed
a sentence of 20 (twenty) years including remissions.
32. In Ramnaresh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh.,
(2012) 4 SCC 257 the convicts were sentenced to death by
the lower court, with the High Court confirming the
sentence, on finding them guilty of raping and murdering
an innocent woman while she was alone in her house. This
Court confirmed the conviction but found the case did not
fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category for awarding death
sentence. Ultimately, after setting out the well-established
principles and on consideration of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, this Court, while commuting the
45
sentence from death imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment of 21 (twenty one) years.
33. Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766
was a case where the accused committed murder of his
own four-year old daughter. This Court, after considering
the nature of offence, age, relationship and gravity of
injuries caused, awarded the accused 30 (thirty) years in
jail without remissions.
34. In Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC
107 which involved the murder of paramour and the
unborn child (foetus), this Court, while considering the
facts and circumstances awarded a period of 30 (thirty)
years in jail without remission.
35. In Shankar Kisanrao Khade vs State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 5 SCC 546, the accused was convicted for raping
and murdering a minor girl aged eleven years and was
sentenced to death for conviction under S. 302 of IPC, life
46
imprisonment under S. 376, seven years RI under S. 366-A
and five years RI under S. 363 r/w S. 34. This Court
confirmed the conviction but modified the death sentence
to life imprisonment for natural life and all the sentences to
run consecutively.
36. Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 9 SCC
778, concerned killing of five persons including three
children. This Court, taking note of the fact that the guilt
was established by way of circumstantial evidence and the
fact that the High Court had already imposed a sentence of
20 (twenty) years without remission, did not interfere with
the judgment of the High Court.
37. In Gurvail Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2
SCC 713 which involved the murder of four persons, this
Court weighed the mitigating factors i.e., age of the
accused and the probability of reformation and
rehabilitation, and aggravating factors i.e., the number of
47
deceased, the nature of injuries and the totality of facts and
circumstances directed that the imprisonment would be for
a period of 30 (thirty) years without remission.
38. In Alber Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, (2014) 12 SCC
306 which involved the murder by the accused of his live-
in partner and the two children of the partner, this Court,
even though it found the murder to be brutal, grotesque,
diabolical and revolting, applied the proportionality
principle and imposed a sentence of 30 (thirty) years over
and above the period already undergone. It was ordered
that there would be no remission for a period of 30 (thirty)
years.
39. In Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5
SCC 353, which involved the rape and murder of helpless
and defenceless minor girl, this Court commuting the death
penalty imposed a sentence of 35 (thirty five) years in jail
without remission.
48
40. In Selvam v. State, (2014) 12 SCC 274, the accused
was found guilty of rape and murder of nine year old girl.
This Court imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a
period of 30 (thirty) years without any remission,
considering the diabolic manner in which the offence has
been committed against the child.
41. In Birju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 3 SCC
421, the accused was involved in the murder of a one-year-
old child. This Court noted that various criminal cases were
pending against the accused but stated that it cannot be
used as an aggravating factor as the accused wasn’t
convicted in those cases. While commuting the death
penalty, this Court imposed a sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for a period of 20 (twenty) years over and
above the period undergone without remission, since he
would be a menace to the society if given any lenient
sentence.
49
42. In Tattu Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 9
SCC 675 this Court was dealing with an appeal preferred
by the accused who was sentenced to death after he was
found guilty of committing murder of a minor girl and for
kidnapping and attempt to rape after destruction of
evidence. This Court reduced the sentence from death to
life imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years as
it noted that there exists a possibility of the accused
committing similar offence if freed after fourteen years.
This Court also opined that the special category sentence
developed in Swamy Shradhanand (supra) serves a
laudable purpose which takes care of genuine concerns of
the society and helps the accused get rid of death penalty.
43. Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2019)
12 SCC 791 was a case where the accused was found guilty
of murder of three minor children of the sister-in-law of the
accused. This Court, taking note of the fact that the accused
50
was not a previous convict or a professional killer and the
motive for which the offence was committed, namely, the
grievance that the sister-in-law’s family was not doing
enough to solve the matrimonial problem of the accused,
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment till natural death
of the accused without remission.
44. In Parsuram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 8
SCC 382, the accused had raped and murdered his own
student. The Trial Court sentenced the accused to death
which was affirmed by the High Court. This Court took
into consideration the mitigating factors i.e., that the
accused was twenty two years old when he committed the
act and the fact that there exists a possibility of reformation
and the aggravating factors i.e., that the accused abused the
trust of the family of the victim. After complete
consideration and reference to some precedents, this Court
imposed a sentence of thirty years without any remission.
51
45. In Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019)
16 SCC 278, the accused was sentenced to death by the
Trial Court and the High Court for committing rape and
murder of minor girl aged about eight years old. This Court
noted the mitigating factors i.e., age of the accused at the
time of committing the act [50 years] and possibility of
reformation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a
period of 25 (twenty five) years without remission.
46. Swapan Kumar Jha v. State of Jharkhand and
Another, (2019) 13 SCC 579 was a case relating to
abduction of deceased for ransom and thereafter murder by
the accused. This Court took into consideration the
mitigating factors i.e., young age of the accused, possibility
of reformation and the convict not being a menace to
society. On the other side of the weighing scale, was the
fact that the accused had betrayed the trust of the deceased
who was his first cousin and the fact that the act was
52
premeditated. This Court modified the death sentence to
one of imprisonment for a period of 25 (twenty five) years
with remissions.
47. Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of
Maharashtra, (2019) 16 SCC 380 was a case where the
accused was convicted for the rape and murder of minor
girl aged about nine years and sentenced to death by the
trial court which was affirmed by the High Court. This
Court noted the mitigating factors i.e., murder was not pre-
planned, young age of the accused, no evidence to show
that the accused is a continuing threat to society and the
aggravating factors i.e., the nature of the crime and the
interest of society, if petitioner is let out after fourteen
years, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for 30
(thirty years) without remission.
48. In X v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1 the
accused was sentenced to death by this Court on his
53
conviction for committing rape and murder of two minor
girls who lived near his house. However, in review, the
question placed before the Court was whether post-
conviction mental illness be a mitigating factor. This Court
answered it in the affirmative but cautioned that in only
extreme cases of mental illness can this factor be taken into
consideration. The Court reduced the sentence from death
to life imprisonment for the remainder of his life as he still
poses as a threat to society.
49. In Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801, this Court affirmed
conviction of the accused, inter alia, under S. 302 and 376
but modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment
for minimum 30 (thirty years). This Court stated that
mitigating factors such as young age of the accused, no
criminal antecedents, act not being pre-planned, socio-
economic background of the accused and the fact that
54
conduct of the accused inside jail was ‘satisfactory’
concluded that sufficient mitigating circumstances exists to
commute the death sentence.
50. In Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC
817, this Court opined that the facts of the case shocked the
conscience of the Court. The accused was found guilty of
rape and murder of a twenty eight year old married woman
who was returning from her workplace. Despite noting that
the case did not fall under the ‘rarest of rare’ category, the
Court stated that while considering the possibility of
reformation of the accused, Courts held that showing undue
leniency in such a brutal case will adversely affect the
public confidence in the efficacy of the legal system. It
concluded that a fixed term of 30 (thirty years) should be
imposed.
51. In Manoj and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2023) 2 SCC 353, the three accused were sentenced to
55
death by the lower court and confirmed by the High Court
on their conviction under Section 302 for committing
murder, during the course of robbery, of three women. This
Court, while modifying the sentence from death to life
imprisonment for a minimum 25 (twenty five) years, took
into consideration the non-exhaustive list of mitigating and
aggravating factors discussed in Bachan Singh (supra) to
establish a method of principled sentencing. This Court
also imposed an obligation on the State to provide material
disclosing psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the
accused which would help the courts understand the
progress of the accused towards reformation.
52. In Madan vs State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1473, this Court was dealing with a case wherein the
accused was sentenced to death, along with other co-
accused, for murdering six persons of his village. This
Court called for the jail conduct report and psychological
56
report of the accused which were satisfactory and depicted
nothing out of the ordinary. This Court also took into
consideration the old age of the accused and period
undergone [18 yrs.] as mitigating factors. This Court
concluded that the case did not fall under the rarest of rare
category and commuted the death sentence to life
imprisonment for minimum 20 (twenty years) including
sentence undergone.
53. In Sundar vs State by Inspector of Police- 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 310 , this Court, while sitting in review,
commuted death sentence awarded to accused therein to
life imprisonment of minimum 20 (twenty years). The
accused had committed rape and murder of a 7-year-old
girl. Factors that influenced this Court to reach such a
decision were the fact that no court had looked at the
mitigating factors. It called for jail conduct and education
report from the jail authorities and found that the conduct
57
was satisfactory and that accused had earned a diploma in
food catering while he was incarcerated. Apart from the
above, the Court noted the young age of the accused, no
prior antecedents to reach a conclusion warranting
modification in the sentence awarded.
54. In Ravinder Singh vs State Govt. of NCT of Delhi-
(2024) 2 SCC 323, the accused was convicted under
Sections 376, 377 & 506 of the IPC for raping his own 9-
year-old daughter by the Sessions court and conviction was
confirmed by the High Court. The Sessions Court, while
imposing life imprisonment, also stated that the accused
would not be given any clemency by the State before 20
years. This Court clarified that, as discussed in V. Sriharan
(supra) , the power to impose a special category sentence
i.e., a sentence more than 14 years but short of death
sentence can only be imposed by the High Court or if in
appeal, by this Court. Considering the nature of the
58
offence committed by the accused and the fact that if the
accused is set free early, he can be a threat to his own
daughter, this Court imposed a minimum 20 (twenty years)
life imprisonment without remissions.
55. A survey of the 27 cases discussed above indicates
that while in five cases , the maximum of imprisonment till
the rest of the life is given; in nine cases , the period of
imprisonment without remission was 30 years; in six cases ,
the period was 20 years (In Ramraj (supra) , this Court had
imposed a sentence of 20 years including remission); in
four cases , it was 25 years; in another set of two cases , it
was 35 years and in one case , it was 21 years.
56. What is clear is that courts, while applying Swamy
Shraddananda (supra) , have predominantly in cases
arising out of a wide array of facts, keeping the relevant
circumstances applicable to the respective cases fixed the
range between 20 years and 35 years and in few cases have
59
imposed imprisonment for the rest of the life. So much for
statistics. Let us examine how the judgments guide us in
terms of discerning any principle.
57. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove shows
that the fundamental underpinning is the principle of
proportionality. The aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which the Court considers while deciding
commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,
have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of
compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. As a
judicially trained mind pores and ponders over the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and in cases
where they decide to commute the death penalty they
would by then have a reasonable idea as to what would be
the appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under the
Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle too. Matters are
not cut and dried and nicely weighed here to formulate a
60
uniform principle. That is where the experience of the
judicially trained mind comes in as pointed out in V.
Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the process of arriving at
the number of years as the most appropriate for the case at
hand, which the convict will have to undergo before which
the remission powers could be invoked, some of the
relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the
number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their
age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including sexual
assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was
committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when
the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the
premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship
between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust
if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the
convict, if released, would be a menace to the society.
Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the
convict; (2) the probability of reformation of convict; (3)
61
the convict not being a professional killer; (4) the socio-
economic condition of the accused; (5) the composition of
the family of the accused and (6) conduct expressing
remorse.
These were some of the relevant factors that were kept
in mind in the cases noticed above while weighing the pros
and cons of the matter. The Court would be additionally
justified in considering the conduct of the convict in jail;
and the period already undergone to arrive at the number of
years which the Court feels the convict should, serve as
part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before which
he cannot apply for remission. These are not meant to be
exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on
the facts and circumstances therein.
58. How do these factors apply to the case at hand? The
act committed by the accused was pre-
planned/premeditated; the accused brutally murdered 4
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(four) persons who were unarmed and were defenseless,
one of whom was a child and the other an aged lady. It is
also to be noted that by the act of the accused, three
generations of single family have lost their lives for no
fault of theirs; Nature of injuries inflicted on Latha,
Ramachandran and Chitra highlights the brutality and cold-
bloodedness of the act.
59. On the mitigating side, the accused was quite young
when he committed the act i.e., 28 years old; The act
committed by the accused was not for any gain or profit;
accused did not try to flee and in fact tried to commit
suicide as he was overcome with emotions after the
dastardly act he committed; accused has been in jail for a
period of 18 years and 4 months and the case is based on
circumstantial evidence. We called for a conduct report of
the appellant from the Jail Authorities. The report dated
05.03.2024 of the Superintendent, Central Prison and
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Correctional Home, Viyyur, Thrissur has been made
available to us. The report indicates that ever since his
admission to jail, he had been entrusted with prison labour
work such as duty of barber, day watchman and night
watchman. Presently, he has been assigned the job as
convict supervisor for the last one and a half years. The
report clearly indicates that no disciplinary actions were
initiated against him in the prison and that the conduct and
behavior of the appellant in prison has been satisfactory so
far.
Conclusion:
60. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the
judgment of the High Cout insofar as the conviction of the
appellant under Sections 302, 449 and 309 IPC is
concerned. We also do not interfere with the sentence
imposed on the accused for the offence under Section 449
and Section 309 of IPC. We hold that the High Court was
justified on the facts of the case in following Swamy
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Shraddananda (supra) principle while imposing sentence
for the offence under Section 302 IPC. However, in view
of the discussion made above, we are inclined to modify
the sentence under Section 302 imposed by the High
Court from a period of 30 years imprisonment without
remission to that of a period of 25 years imprisonment
without remission, including the period already
undergone. In our view, this would serve the ends of
justice.
For the reasons stated above, the Appeal is partly
allowed in the above terms.
…....…………………J.
(B. R. Gavai)
…....…………………J.
(K.V. Viswanathan)
…..…………………J.
(Sandeep Mehta)
New Delhi;
March 18, 2024.
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