Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
M/s. T. V. SUNDRAM IYENGAR & SONS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MADRAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT10/10/1974
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
GUPTA, A.C.
CITATION:
1974 AIR 2309 1975 SCR (2) 372
1975 SCC (3) 424
CITATOR INFO :
R 1976 SC2108 (45)
D 1977 SC1505 (7)
RF 1977 SC1537 (25)
RF 1989 SC 962 (24)
ACT:
Sales Tax-Construction of bus bodies and fitting to chassis
provided by customers-Property in the material used by
assessee, whether passed to their customers daring the
course of construction.
HEADNOTE:
In Civil Appeals Nos. 2229, 2230 and 2231 of 1969. the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal
held that the appellant company was liable to pay sales tax
under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, in respect of
bodies constructed and fitted by it to the chassis provided
by the customers. No formal agreements were produced by the
assessee and the nature of the transactions relating to the
supply of bus bodies has been found on the basis of "repair
orders".These appeals on certificate have been filed against
the judgment of the Madras High Court by the appellant-
assessee company. Civil Appeals Nos. 290 and 291 of 1970
have been filed on certificate by the Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes Mysore against the judgment of the Mysore
High Court. The return filed by the assessee-firm for the
year 1960-61 showed receipt of Rs. 9174,460 on account of
the bus bodies constructed under agreement dated January 23,
1959 between the assessee-firm and the Government for the
construction of bus bodies on the chassis supplied by the
Govt. The Commercial Tax Officer, held that the said amount
represented the prices of the bus bodies received by the
assessee and included it in the taxable turnover under the
Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957. On appeal the Deputy
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes held that the agreement
between the assessee and the Govt. was in the nature of a
works contract and as such there was no sale of bus bodies.
The Commissioner in exercise of his revisional power set
aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and restored that
of the Commercial Tax Officer. In the opinion of the
Commissioner, there was a sale of bus bodies by the
assessee. In appeal, the Mysore High Court set aside the
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order of the Commissioner and restored that of the Deputy
Commissioner. In the opinion of the High Court the
agreement between the assessee and the Govt. was for works
contract. It was contended for the assessee that the
construction of the bus bodies and the supply of the same by
the assessees to their customers was in pursuance of a
contract for work and labour.
HELD : (i) The Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and the
Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, have been enacted respectively
in pursuance of the powers contained in entry 48, List 11,
Schedule VII of the Government of India Act 1935, and entry
54, List 11, Schedule VII of the Constitution of India,
1950. It is now settled law that the words "sale of goods"
have to be construed not in the popular sense but in their
legal sense and should be given the same meaning which they
carry in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The expression "sale
of goods" is a nomen juris, its essential ingredients being
an agreement to sell movables for a price and property
passing therein pursuant to that agreement. [377 F-G]
The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (1958) 9
S.T.C. 353 followed.
(ii)The salient features of the dealings between the two
assessees disclose that the property in the material used
by the assessees in constructing the bus bodies never passed
to their customers during the course of construction. It
was only when the complete bus with the body fitted to
chassis was delivered to the customer that the property in
the bus body passed to the customer. There was nothing to
prevent the assessee from removing a plank, or other
material after fixing it to a chassis, and using it for a
different purpose or for a different bus body. The present
is also not the case wherein the assessee undertakes to
construct some building or set up a factory wherein the
material used can be said to become the property of the
other party by invoking the theory of accretion. It is no
doubt true that the bus bodies supplied by the assessees
were not ready made and had, if necessary, to be constructed
bit by bit and plank by plank, according to specifications,
but that fact would not make any material difference. [379-
H; 380 A-B]
37 3
Patnaik and Company v. The State of Orissa, (1965) 16 STC
364, and Mekenzies Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra (1965)
16 STC 518 followed, Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Hazi Abdul
Majid, (1963) 14 STC referred to.
(iii)The use of a different nomenclature in describing the
assessee would not affect the basic character of the
contract between the parties and justify differentiation if
the terms of the contract in other respects are
substantially the same. It is true that in the present
cases there was no express mention of a sale of bus bodies
in the agreement. But it is not necessary that to
constitute a sale, the word ’sale’ has to be used. [380 D-E]
Chandra Bhan Gosain v. The State of Orissa & Ors. (1963) 14
STC 766 referred to.
(iv)There is nothing in the agreements between the assessee
and their customers in the present appeals which vested the
ownership of unfinished bodies in the customers.
The State of Gujarat v. Kailash Engineering Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.,
(1967) 19 STC 13 distinguished. the State of Madras v.
Richardson & Cruddas Ltd., (1968) 21 STC 245, State of
Rajasthan & Anr. v. Man Industrial Corporation Ltd., (1969)
24 STC 349, State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Nenu Ram (1970) 26
STC 268, State of Himachal, Pradesh & Ors. v. Associated
Hotels of India Ltd. (1972) 29 STC 474, Commissioner of
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Commercial Taxes, Mysore Bangalore v. Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd. (1972) 29 STC 438 and Anglo Egyptian Navigation Co. v.
Rennie, (1875) LR 10 CP 271 referred to. Bajoria Halwasiya
Service Station v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 26 STC 108
and Pothular Subba Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh 30 STC
69 approved.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2229 to
2231 of 1969 and Civil Appeals Nos. 290-291 of 1970.
Appeals from the Judgment & Order dated the 29th September
1967 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case Nos. 164-166 of
1965.
S. Swaminathan and S. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants
(in C. As. Nos. 2229-2231/69.)
H. B. Datar and M. Veerappa, for the appellant (in C. As.
No. 290 of 1970).
M. Veerappa, for the appellant in C.A. No 291/70.
S. T. Desai, A. V Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the
respondent in C.As. 2229-2231/69.
S, Swaminathan and S. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents
(in C.A. No. 290-291/70).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KNANNA J. Whether the supply for consideration by an
assessee of bus bodies constructed and fitted to chassis
provided by the customers amounts to sale chargeable to
sales tax is the short question which arises for
determination in these five civil appeals Nos. 2229. 2230
and 2231 of 1969 and 290 and 291 of 1970. Appeals Nos.
2229, 2230 and 2231 of 1969 have been filed on certificate
by T. V. Sundram Iyengar & Sons Pvt. Ltd. Madurai against
the judgment of the Madras High Court. The other two
appeals have been filed on certificate by the Commissioner
of Commercial Taxes Mysore against the judgment of the
Mysore High Court. This judgment would dispose of all the
five appeals.
3 74
The matter relates in the three appeals against the judgment
of the Madras High Court to assessment years 1955-56, 1956-
57 and 1957-58. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and
the Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant company was
liable to pay sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax
Act, 1939 in respect of bus bodies constructed and fitted by
it to chassis provided by the customers. On the matter
having been taken up in revision by the appellant company to
the High Court, the High Court referred to the fact that no
contracts or agreements as such were produced by the
appellant company. It was observed that the nature of the
transactions relating to the supply of bus bodies had to be
determined on the basis of forms of "repair orders" which
the appellant company used to get filled in by as customers.
on the basis of the material on record, the High Court
agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. The
matter was, however, remanded to the Tribunal to enable the
appellant company to produce the actual agreements, if any,
between the appellant company and its customers. The High
Court in this context observed as under :
"As the evidence stands, we accept the
conclusion rightly arrived at by the Tribunal
on this question. It is not clear whether
there were actually contracts entered into by
the assessee which the customers and if they
were so, why they were not produced. Any way,
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in the interests of justice we are inclined to
think that the question may be re-examined by
the Tribunal if the contracts are filed before
it. If none is filed. the view that the
transactions are sales of goods will stand."
Mr. Swaminathan who appears for the assessees in all the
five appeals submits that after the remand order of the High
Court, no agreements between the appellant company, and its
customers were filed by the appellant company before the
Tribunal and, as such, the Tribunal reiterated the liability
of the appellant company for the payment of sales tax in
respect of the above item. Although revision petition has
been filed by the appellant company against the order of the
Tribunal after the remand to the High Court, the real
grievance of the appellant company, according to Mr.
Swaminathan, is against the judgment of the High Court
appealed against as the question of the liability of the
appellant company to pay sales tax in the absence of a
formal agreement has been determined by this judgment.
We may set out the mode of dealings between the appellant
company and its customers in the three appeals mentioned
above. As stated already, no formal agreements were
produced by the assessee and the nature of transactions
relating to the supply of bus bodies has been found on the
basis of "repair orders". The repair order, to take a
typical case, besides containing the name of the appellant
company, gives the date of the order, name and address of
the customer, the make, model and condition of chassis
supplied by the customer. Apart from other details, the
repair order contains a column, according to which the
assessee appellant undertook "to construct and mount one
semi saloon mofussil type bus bddy, with 7 plywood for the
floor, ally wood for sides and frames". in another column
375
tealing with amount balled to the customer a sum of Rs.
9,000 is mentioned. The following is written under the head
"Description" :
"Aluminium Sheets & Aluminium Beadlings for
panels, rubber cushion for seats, rubber sq.
wab for back all covered with green leather,
cloth with seating capacity 51 in all 4 seats
extra"
for all of which a sum of Rs. 450 is charged. Several
specific items provide for windshield glass; rubber squbas;
handles for entrances; helper canvass; electric buzzer;
invoice lamp and roof lamps. Other specific items mentioned
are leather cloth; protective flaps for curtains; felt cover
for engine and electric wiper. The total bill comes to Rs.
10,171.50. Signatures of customers were also obtained under
the following writing :
"I hereby agree and definitely understand that
M/s. T. V. Sundram lyengar & Sons Private
Ltd. assume no responsibility for loss or
damage by whatever means to vehicles or spares
placed with them for storage; sale or repair.
The above vehicle/spares left in your premises
or driven by your employees is entirely at my
employer’s/owner’s risk as regards accidents;
damage by fire or any other causes."
The Tribunal on consideration of the material
on the record recorded the following finding :
"On an overall consideration of the entire
material before us, we are inclined to hold
that the predominating element in the
transactions was the sale of built body, that
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the work and labour were only subsidiary, that
it was immaterial whether a body was prepared
in accordance with the specifications given by
the customer, then and there and fitted on the
chassis or the body had been already prepared
prior to the order and was readily fitted with
the chassis, that the sale of the property was
the predominating element, that the use of
labour and skill was only incidental and that
therefore, the element of sales predominated
over the element of contract of work and
labour."
The High Court in this context observed as
under :
"The terms as far as we are able to gather
from the limited material before us disclose
that the property in the completed bus body
passed only at the time of the delivery there
of such as specific chattel though fitted on
to the chassis. There is no evidence that the
property in the materials passed to the
customer as and when they were worked into the
chassis in the process of body building. The
provision as to insurance of risk also
confirms this view. In some of the appeals,
we find that specific articles are mentioned
the prices of which are given separately. As
the evidence stands, we accept the conclusion
rightly arrived at by the Tribunal on this
question."
We may now set out the facts giving rise to civil appeals
Nos. 290 and 291 of 1970 which relate to assessment years
1960-61 and 1961-62-
376
The Store Purchase Committee on behalf of the State of
Mysore called for tenders from persons who were willing to
construct bus bodies on the chassis supplied by the
Government. Condition (8) of the tender was that the rate
quoted should be per bus body. ’finder of the assessee-
firm; M. G. Brothers Automobile Dealers Bellary; who along
with others subraitted tenders, was accepted. Agreement
dated 1 January 23, 1969 was thereafter executed by the
assessee and the State Government. Some of the important
clauses of the agreement were as under :
" (5) The contractors shall not be entitled to
claim an sort of concession whatever on
account of the rise in prices of raw materials
or cost of labour due to whatsoever causes
during the contract period.
(6)The contractors shall agree to keep up the
delivery period strictly otherwise the penal
clause shall be enforced and if there should
be undue delay it would be open to the Mysore
Government Road Transport Department to cancel
the order or remaining portion of the order as
a last resort.
(7)The contractors shall make good to
Government any loss, which may arise from the
failure to accomplish the work satisfactorily
in time or in accordance with required
specifications as noted in the order or by
Government having to get the work done from
other sources at rates higher than those cort-
racted for due to the negligence, delay or
incomplete workmanship on the part of the
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contractors.
(8) The contractors shall insure the chassis
at their cost
for safe custody of the same at their
premises.
(10) The contractors agree to give a warranty
of 6 months
in respect of each and every bus built by them
against all defects in the construction of the
body. If any defects are found or develop in
the bus built by the contractors during the
course of the warranty period of 6 months from
the date they are handed over to our units,
the contractors hereby agree to rectify the
same by deputing their own representatives
with sufficient tools and materials as
required to the operating centres of the
buses, free of cost.
(11)The contractors shall send the bills of
cost in triplicate to the General Manager,
Mysore Government Road Transport Department,
Bangalore, who will arrange payment of 90%
against the delivery of complete bus and the
balance of 10 % after completion of the entire
order."
The return filed by the assessee firm for the year 1960-61
showed receipt of Rs. 9,74,460 on account of the bus bodies
constructed under the above agreement., The Commercial Tax
Officer held that the said amount represented the prices of
the bus bodies received by the assessee and included it in
the taxable turnover under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957.
On appeal the Deputy Commissioner of Commer-
377
cial Taxes held that the agreement between the assessee and
the Government was in the nature of a works contract and as
such there was no sale of the bus bodies. The Commissioner
in exercise of his revisional power set aside the order of
the Deputy Commissioner and restored that of the Commercial
Tax Officer. In the opinion of the Commissioner, there was
a sale of bus bodies by the assessee. The matter was then
taken up by the assessee in appeal to the Mysore High Court.
The High Court set aside the order of the Commissioner and
restored that of the Deputy Commissioner. In the opinion of
the High Court, the agreement between the assessee and the
Government was for works contract. The High Court in this
context gave certain reasons to which reference would be
made at the appropriate stage hereafter.
The question with which we are concerned, as would appear
from the resume of facts given above, is whether the
construction of the bus bodies and the supply of the same by
the assesees to their customers was in pursuance of a
contract of sale as distinguished from a contract for work
and labour. The distinction between the two contracts is
often a fine one. A contract of sale is a contract whose
main object is the transfer of the property in and the
delivery of the possession of, a chattel as a chattel to the
buyer. Where the main object of work undertaken by the
payee of the price is not the transfer of a chattel qua
chattel, the contract is one for work and labour. The test
is whether or not the work and labour bestowed end in
anything that can properly become the subject of sale,
neither the ownership of the materials, nor the value of the
skill and labour as compared with the value of the
materials, is conclusive, although such matters may be taken
into consideration in determining in the circumstances of a
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particular case, whether the contract is in substance one
for work and labour or one for the sale of a chattel (see
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 34, pl. 6, Third Edition).
The Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Madras Act 9 of
1939) was enacted in pursuance of the powers contained in
entry 48 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Government of
India Act, 1935 which deals with sale of goods. The
corresponding entry in the Constitution is entry No. 54 in
List 11 of Seventh Schedule. It was in exercise of the
powers under this entry that the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957
(Mysore Act No. 25 of 1957) was enacted. It is now settled
law that the words "sale of goods" have to be construed not
in the popular sense but in their legal sense and should be
given the same meaning which they carry in the Sale of Goods
Act, 1930. The expression sale of goods" is a nomen juris,
its essential ingredients being an agreement to sell
movables for a price and property passing therein pursuant
to that agreement (see The State of Madras v. Gannon
Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. (1). This Court in that case
was concerned with a ’building contract which was one and
indivisible. it was held that in the case of such a
contract, the property in materials used does not pass to
the other party to the contract as movable
(1) (1958)9S.T.C.353.
378
property. It would so pass if that was the agreement
between the parties. If there was no such agreement and the
contract was only to construct a building, in that case the
materials used therein would become the property of the
other party only on the theory of accretion.
There are two cases wherein this Court was concerned with
the construction of bus bodies and fitting of the same to
the chassis supplied by the customers. The cases were heard
by the Constitution Bench and the Court considered the
question whether the party constructing the bus bodies and
fitting the same to the chassis supplied by the customers
did so in pursuance of a contract of sale or a works
contract. The two cases which were decided on the same day
arc Patnaik and Company v. The State of Orissa(1)and
McKenzies Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra.(2) main judgment
was given in the case of Patnaik and Company by Sikri J. (as
he then was) on behalf of the majority. The appellants in
that case entered into an agreement with the State of Orissa
for the construction of bus bodies on the chassis supplied
by the Governor. The agreement provided, inter alia, that
the appellants were responsible for the safe custody of the
chassis from the date of their receipt from the Governor
till their delivery to the Governor and that they had to
insure their premises including the chassis against fire,
theft, damage and riot at their own cost. The appellants
had to construct the bus bodies in the most substantial and
workmanlike manner, both as regards material and otherwise
in every respect in strict accordance with the
specifications and were to deliver the bodies to the
Governor on or before the dates specified in the agreement.
The appellants guaranteed the durability of the body for two
years from the date of the delivery. The agreement,also
provided that the work should throughout the stipulated
period of the contract be carried on with all due diligence,
that the appellants were liable to pay to the Governor a
certain sum as liquidated damages for every day that the
work remained unfinished after the date fixed, that all
works under the contract should be open to inspection by
the, Controller or officers authorised by him in that
behalf, that they had the right to stop any work which had
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been executed badly or with materials of inferior quality
and that on receipt of a written order the appellants had to
dismantle or replace such defective work or material at
their own cost. The appellants were entitled to 50 per cent
of the cost of body-building at the time of delivery and the
rest within one month thereafter. In answering the question
whether the agreement was a contract for work or a contract
for sale of goods, the majority consisting of Gajendragadkar
C.J., Hidayatullah, Sikri and Bachawat, JJ. (Shah J.
dissenting) held that the contract as a whole was a contract
for sale of goods and therefore the appellants were liable
to sales tax on the amount received from the State of Orissa
for the construction of the bus bodies. In arriving at the
above conclusion, Sikri J. speaking for the majority
observed as under :
"Then, looking at the contract as a whole,
what was the real intention of the parties?
It will be noticed that the bus
(1) (1965) 16 S.T.C. 364. (2)
(1965) 16 S.T.C. 518.
379
bodies are throughout the contract spoken of
as a unit or as a composite things to be put
on the chassis, and ’his composite body
consists not only of things actually fixed on
the chassis but movable things [like seat
cushions, and other things though fixed but
which can be very easily detached, e.g., roof
lamps, wind screen wipers, luggage carrier,
too] box, box for first Lid equipment, etc.
The next point to be noticed is that under the
contract the property in the bus body does not
pass to the Government till the chassis with
the bus body is delivered at the destination
or destinations to be named by the Controller
except in the case contemplated in clause 6 of
the agreement. That clause provides that if
some work is not satisfactorily done and the
Body Builder on receipt of a written order
does not dismantle or replace such defective
work or material at his own cost within seven
days, the Controller would be entitled to get
the balance of the work done by another agency
and recover the difference in cost from the
Body Builder. The Controller is entitled for
this purpose to take delivery of the
unfinished body. But even in this case the
property in the unfinished body would not pass
to the Government till the unfinished body is
seized.
Suppose a fire were to take place on the
premises of the appellant and before delivery
the bus bodies were destroyed or spoilt. On
whom would the loss fall? There can only be
one answer to this question and that is that
the loss would fall on the appellant. Clause
1 of the agreement provides for insurance of
the chassis but there is no provision
regarding insurance of bus bodies. Therefore,
it follows that till delivery is made, the bus
bodies remain the property of the appellant.
It could, if it chose to do so, replace parts
or whole. of the body at any time before
delivery. It seems to us that this is an
important indication of the intention of the
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parties. If the property passes at delivery,
what does that pass in.? Is it movable
property or immovable property? It will not
be denied that the property passes in movable
property. Then was this the very goods
contracted for? Here again the answer is
plainly in the affirmative."
The dictum laid down by this Court in the case of Patnaik
and Company (supra), in our opinion, fully applies to the
case of the two assessees with which we are concerned in
these five appeals. We agree with the High Court in the
case of T.V. Sundram Iyengar & Sons that the property in the
completed bus body passed only at the time of the delivery
thereof as specific chattels fitted on to chassis. Same is
also true, in our opinion, of the bus bodies constructed by
M.G. Brothers.
The salient features of the dealings between the two
assessees with whom we are concerned and their customers as
they emerge from the facts given above are that the property
in the material used by the assessees in constructing the
bus bodies never passed to their customers
3 80
during the course of construction. It was
only when the complete bus with the body
fitted to the chassis was delivered to the
customer that the property in the bus body
passed to the customer. There was nothing to
prevent the assessees from removing a plank,
or other material after fixing it to a
chassis, and using it for a different purpose
or for a different bus body. The present is
also not the case wherein the assessee
undertakes to construct some building or set
up a factory plant wherein the material used
can be said to become the property of
the other party by invoking the theory of
accretion. It is no doubt true that the bus
bodies supplied by the assessees were not
readymade and had, if necessary, to be
constructed bit by bit and plank by plank,
according to specifications, but that fact
would not make any material difference. The
observation of the Allahabad High Court in
Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Haji Abdul
Majid(1) that it makes no difference whether
an article is readymade article or is prepared
according to the customer’s specifications as
also whether the assessee prepares it.
separately from the thing and then fixes it on
or does the preparation and the fixation
simultaneously in one, operation was expressly
approved by this Court in the case of Patnaik
and Company (supra).
In holding that the case was not covered by
the dictum laid down in Patnaik and Company’s
case, the Mysore High Court referred to the
fact that the assessee was described in the
agreement entered into with the Government as
a contractor, while in the case of Patnaik and
Company the assessee was described as a body
builder. The use of a different nomenclature
in describing the assessee would not, in our
opinion, affect the basic character of the
contract between the parties and justify
differentiation if the terms of the contract
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in other respects are substantially the same.
Another ground on which the High Court
distinguished the case of the assessee from
Patnaik and Company was that in the case of
Patnaik and Company the bus bodies were to be
delivered as a unit, while this was not so in
the case of the assessee firm. We are unable
to agree with the High Court in this respect
because the terms of the agreement show that
the assessee had to construct and supply the
bus body fitted to the chassis provided by the
Government. Clause II expressly refers to the
delivery of a complete bus. The prices which
were quoted were also for each bus body. It
can, therefore, be said that the bus body was
delivered as a unit. The High Court has also
referred to the fact that there was no express
mention of the sale of bus bodies in the
agreement. This fact by itself is not of much
significance. In the case of Chandra Bhan
Gosain V. The State of Orissa & OrS.(2) the
appellant manufactured and supplied large
quantities of bricks to a company under a
contract. There was a clause in the
contract
providing that "land will be given free" by
the company. The appellant contended that the
contract was only for labour or for work done
and material found, and that there was really
no sale of an) goods on which sales tax could
be levied. It was held by this Court that the
essence of the contract was the delivery of
the bricks and that it was a contract for the
transfer of chattels qua chattels. Argument
was advanced in that case that the contract
(1) (1963) 14 S.T.C. 435. (2)
(1963) 14 S.T.C. 766.
381
nowhere used the word "sale" in connection
with the supply of bricks This contention was
repelled and it was observed that
"it is not necessary that to constitute a
sale, the word ’sale’ has to be used. We have
said enough to show that under the contract
there was a transfer of property in the bricks
for consideration and, therefore, a sale
notwithstanding that the word ,sale’ was not
used."
Mr. Swaminathan on behalf of the assessees has referred to
the case of The State of Gujarat v. Kailash Engineering Co.
(Pvt.) Ltd.(1) The respondent in that case was an
engineering concern. it constructed three coaches over the
chassis supplied by the Western Railway Administration and
received money therefor. It was provided in the contract
between the parties that as soon as the plant and: materials
were brought on the side where the coaches were to be con-
structed, the ownership in them would vest in the Railway.
The coach bodies were not separately described as units or
components to be supplied by the respondent to the Railway,
The duty of the respondent was described throughout the
contract to be that of constructing, erecting and furnishing
coach bodies on the underframes supplied. At no stage did
the contract mention that ready coach bodies were to be
delivered by the respondent to the Railway. From the
earliest stage during the process of construction of the
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coach bodies, the unfinished bodies in the process of
erection were treated, under the terms of the contract, as
the property of the Railway. Since those unfinished: bodies
were to be in the charge of the respondent during
construction. the respondent was made liable under the con-
tract to reimburse the Railway for loss by fire. It was
held that as the term, of the contract indicated that the
respondent was not to be the owner of the ready coaches and
that the property in those bodies vested in the Railway even
during the process of construction, the transaction was a
works contract and did not involve any sale. No assistance,
in our opinion, can be derived by the assessees in these
appeals from the case of Kailo-h Engineering Co. As has been
pointed out above, the ownership in the material brought on
the site under the terms of the contract was to vest in the
Railway in the case of Kailash Engineering Co. The same
cannot be said of the material used for the construction of
the bus bodies by the two assessees with whom we are con-
cerned. Unlike the terms of the contract in the case of
Kailash Engineering Co. there was nothing in the agreements
between the assessees and their customers in the present
appeals which vested the ownership of unfinished bodies in
the customers. It may be mentioned that the case of Petnaik
and Company (supra) was cited before this Court in the case
of Kailash Engineering Co. Shah J. speaking for the Court
pointed out the essential differences between the two cases.
The case of the assessees in these appeals, as mentioned
earlier, falls squarely within the rule laid down in the
case of Patnaik and Company. The case of Kailash
Engineering Co. cannot,. therefore, be of much assistance to
the assessees.
(1) (1967) 19 S.T.C. 13.
382
Equally of no assistance to the assessees are the
fourcases,The State of Madras v. Richardson & Cruddas
Ltd.(1) State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Man Industrial
Corporation Ltd.(2), State of Rajaasthan & Ors. v. Menuh
Ram(3) and State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Associated
Hotels of India Ltd.(4) to which reference has been made by
Mr. Swaminathan on behalf of the assessees. The case of
Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. related to a contract for the
fabrication supply and. erection of steel structures for a
sugar factory. This Court on consideration of the material
produced on record held that the contract was for a works,
contract and not one for sale. The case Man Industrial
Corporation Ltd. related to a work for fabricating and
fixing certain windows in accordance with specifications
designs drawing and instructions. The windows were to be
fixed to the building with rawl plugs in cut stone works.
It was held that the window leaves did not pass Linder the
terms of the contract as window leaves and that only on the
fixing of the windows as stipulated could the contract be
fully executed. The property in the windows it was observed
passed on the completion of the work and not before. The
contract was, therefore, held to be a contract for execution
of work and not for sale of goods. Nenu Ram’s case related
to a work of supplying and fixing wooden windows and doors
together with frames. The windows had also thereafter to be
painted. It was held that under the contract the goods were
not sold as movable and that the property therein passed
only when the windows and frames were fixed on the site.
The liability to pay sales tax was consequently not
attracted. The question which arose for determination in
the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. was whether a
hotelier was liable to pay sales tax in respect of’ meals
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served to the guest coming there for stay. It was held that
the hotelier served meals as part of the amenities
incidental to the services. The revenue was held not
entitled to split up the transaction into two parts, one of
service and the other of sale of foodstuff. No liability to
pay sales tax could consequently be fastened on the
hotelier.
It is plain that there is no parallel between the facts of
the present appeals and those of the above mentioned four
cases.
v. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.(5) related to the
Manufacture and supply of three models of railway
coaches to the Railway Board. Advance"on account" payment
to the extent of 90 per cent of the material to be used was
made to the assessee on production of the inspection
certificate. The stores were held as the property of the
President and in trust for him on account of the advance.
The property in the materials which were used for the
construction of the coaches became the property of the
President before they were used. The construction was done
at a separately located shed and no other construction was
undertaken therein. There was no possibility of any
material for which advance was not drawn being used for the
construction of the
(1) (1968) 21 S.T.C. 245. (2) (1969) 24 S.T.C. 349. (3)
(1970) 26 S.T.C. 268. (4) (1972) 29 S.T.C. 474.
(5) (1972) 29 S.T.C. 438.
383
coaches. It was held that the transaction for the
manufacture and supply of the coaches was a pure works
contract. When all the materials used in the construction
of a coach belonged to the railways, there could be no sale
of the coach itself. The difference between the price of a
coach and the cost of material could only be the cost of the
services rendered by the assessee. Bare narration of the
facts of the above case would show the difference between
this case and the cases which are the subject matter of
these appeals.
Reference has also been made by Mt-. Swaminathan to
observations on page 167 of Benjamin on Sales (8th Edition)
which were based on the case of Anglo-Egyptian Navigation
Co. v. Rennies(1) Those observations were also referred to
in the case of Patnaik, and Company (supra). Sikri J. then
dealt with the facts of the case of Anglo-Egyptian
Navigation Co. and held that case was not authority for the
proposition that whenever a contract provides for the fixing
of a chattel to another chattel, there is no sale of goods.
The learned Judge in this connection gave an illustration of
a dealer fitting tires supplied by him to the car of the
customer. Could anyone deny that there had been sale of the
tyres by the dealer to the customer, even though the fitting
of the tyres A as not an easy operation and needed an expert
hand?
It may also be mentioned that the Allahabad High Court in
the case of Bajoria Halwasiya Service Station v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.(2) and Andhra Pradesh High Court in
the case of Pothula, Subbo Rao v. The State of A.P.(3) have
held that a transaction relating to the construction of the
bus bodies by the assessee on chassis supplied by Customers
constitutes a contract of sale of goods.
As a result of the above, we hold that the supply of the bus
bodies by the assessees in these five appeals after fitting
them to the chassis supplied by the customers amount-- to
sale of goods for which the assessees would be liable to pay
sales lax. We accordingly dismiss civil appeals Nos. 2229,
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2230 and 2231 of 1965 with costs. We accept civil appeals
Nos. 290 and 291 of 1970 with costs set aside the judgment
of the High Court and restore that of the Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes Mysore. One hearing fee
V.M.K. C. As. Nos. 2229-2231 of 1969 dismissed.
c. 4s. No. 290-291 of 1970 allowed.
(1) (1875) L. R. 10 C.P. 271.
(2) 26 S.T.C. 108.
(3 ’)30 S.T.C. 69.
384