Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2622 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO. 1724 of 2018)
Kiran Pal Singh Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI.
India, a vast country, lives in villages. The Gram Sabhas in
the ancient era were conferred certain powers so that there could
be a feeling of participation in the societal and local issues and
also to establish a sociocultural amity among the members of
the collective. History records with satisfaction that panchayats
were able to settle disputes amongst the villagers and they had
many a tool to focus on unity. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the
nation, emphasized on many an occasion that people should go
Signature Not Verified
to the villages to realize the true character of real India. He had
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK GUGLANI
Date: 2018.05.17
15:43:59 IST
Reason:
said with emphasis that “”India lives in her seven hundred
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thousand villages” and “the soul of India lives in its villages”. The
Constituent Assembly debates reflected on the importance of the
villages but it thought appropriate to incorporate the concept of
village panchayats in Article 40 of the Constitution which occurs
in Chapter IV dealing with Directive Principles of State Policy.
The said article provides that the State shall take steps to
organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers
and authorities as may be necessary to enable them to function
as units of selfgovernment. The said article, as is evincible, only
requires the State to take steps to confer such powers.
2. With the passage of time, it was realized that there had been
no real decentralization of powers. In the absence of basic
decentralization of powers travelling to the mores in one of the
largest democracies like India, it was felt that the real purpose of
social transformation could not be achieved. It was acknowledged
and accepted that the people at the grass root level deserved to
be politically, economically and socially empowered and the
Seventy Third Amendment was brought into the framework of our
organic Constitution with the clear intent of having local self
government. The vision, it can be said with certitude, is sacred
and the same is explicit from the Statement of Objects and
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Reasons of the Seventy Third Amendment to the Constitution. It
reads as follows:
“Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have
been in existence for a long time, it has been
observed that these institutions have not been
able to acquire the status and dignity of viable
and responsive people's bodies due to a
number of reasons including absence of
regular elections, prolonged supersessions,
insufficient representation of weaker sections
like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
women, inadequate devolution of powers and
lack of financial resources.
2. Article 40 of the Constitution which
enshrines one of the Directive Principles of
State Policy lays down that the State shall take
steps to organise village panchayats and
endow them with such powers and authority
as may be necessary to enable them to
function as units of selfgovernment. In the
light of the experience in the last forty years
and in view of the shortcomings which have
been observed, it is considered that there is an
imperative need to enshrine in the
Constitution certain basic and essential
features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to
impart certainty, continuity and strength to
them.
3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new Part
relating to Panchayats in the Constitution to
provide for among other things, Gram Sabha
in a village or group of villages; constitution of
Panchayats at village and other level or levels;
direct elections to all seats in Panchayats at
the village and intermediate level, if any, and
to the offices of Chairpersons of Panchayats at
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such levels; reservation of seats for the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
proportion to their population for membership
of Panchayats and office of Chairpersons in
Panchayats at each level; reservation of not
less than onethird of the seats for women;
fixing tenure of 5 years for Panchayats and
holding elections within a period of 6 months
in the event of supersession of any Panchayat;
disqualifications for membership of
Panchayats; devolution by the State
Legislature of powers and responsibilities upon
the Panchayats with respect to the preparation
of plans for economic developments and social
justice and for the implementation of
development schemes; sound finance of the
Panchayats by securing authorisation from
State Legislatures for grantsinaid to the
Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the
State, as also assignment to, or appropriation
by, the Panchayats of the revenues of
designated taxes, duties, tolls and fees; setting
up of a Finance Commission within one year of
the proposed amendment and thereafter every
5 years to review the financial position of
Panchayats; auditing of accounts of the
Panchayats; powers of State Legislatures to
make provisions with respect to elections to
Panchayats under the superintendence,
direction and control of the chief electoral
officer of the State; application of the
provisions of the said Part to Union territories;
excluding certain States and areas from the
application of the provisions of the said Part;
continuance of existing laws and Panchayats
until one year from the commencement of the
proposed amendment and barring interference
by courts in electoral matters relating to
Panchayats.”
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3. The amendment saw the introduction of Articles 243 to
243O which are meant for the panchayats at different levels that
include Article 243(d) which defines ‘Panchayat’ to mean an
institution (by whatever name called) of selfgovernment
(constituted under Article 243B) for the rural areas. The said
articles ignited the spirit of selfgovernance in the pyramidical
structure of local self government. The democratically organized
units have been conferred powers of governance and the purpose
as envisioned is to instill a sense of satisfaction in the people at
the grass root level. It has been so recognized in
Bhanumati etc.
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etc. v. State of U.P. and others . The twoJudge Bench in the
said case has expressed thus with lucidity:
“32. What was in a nebulous state as one of
Directive Principles under Article 40, through
73rd Constitutional Amendment
metamorphosed to a distinct part of
Constitutional dispensation with detailed
provision for functioning of Panchayat. The
main purpose behind this is to ensure
democratic decentralization on the Gandhian
principle of participatory democracy so that
the Panchayat may become viable and
responsive people's bodies as an institution of
governance and thus it may acquire the
necessary status and function with dignity by
inspiring respect of common man.”
1 AIR 2010 SC 3796 : (2010) 12 SCC 1
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4. The singular purpose of so stating is that the source of
power has been incorporated in the Constitution which requires
the States to make law to carry out the constitutional command.
The structure of the panchayats, the concept of Gram Sabha, the
composition of panchayats, reservation of seats, duration of
panchayats, disqualification for membership, powers, authority
and responsibility of panchayats and conferment of power on the
panchayats to impose taxes, duties, tolls and fees, election to the
panchayats, and creation of bar for courts to interfere in electoral
matters clearly show the distinct identity carved out for the
panchayats. The legislations made by the State legislatures,
inter
alia , have fixed the tenure of the panchayats and also grant
protection for continuance of the elected members subject to the
disqualifications and further the method for vote of no
confidence. We shall dwell upon the said aspect after delineation
of the facts of the case.
5. In the instant case, the appellant was elected as Pramukh,
Kshettra Panchayat Vikash Khand Gulawati, District,
Bulandshahr in the election held in the year 2015. Some of the
members of the said panchayat moved an application under
Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila
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Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (for brevity, “the Act”) before the
District Magistrate/Collector, District Bulandshahr for carrying
out a no confidence motion against the Pramukh. As no action
was taken by the District Magistrate/Collector, one of the movers
of the motion preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 49013 of
2017 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad seeking
direction to the competent authority to accept the notice dated
09.10.2017 under Section 15(2) of the Act and to take
appropriate steps for bringing logical end to the no confidence
motion.
6. The Division Bench of the High Court on 24.10.2017 asked
the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel to obtain
instructions and posted the matter on 01.11.2017. On the date
fixed, the Writ Petition was dismissed as not pressed. It is not
necessary to advert under what circumstances the said writ
petition was dismissed as not pressed.
7. As the facts would further uncurtain, on 31.10.2017
another written notice of intention to make the motion of no
confidence was delivered to the District Magistrate/Collector,
Bulandshahr with signature of 35 members. The District
Magistrate/Collector issued notice on 07.11.2017 to convene a
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meeting of Kshettra Panchayat for consideration of the motion of
no confidence at 10.30 a.m. on 27.11.2017 in the office of
Kshettra Panchayat. On the said date, in the presence of the
authorized officer, the vote of no confidence motion was
considered and, eventually, after casting of votes, the no
confidence motion was passed by 32 votes against the appellant.
8. In pursuance of the said proceedings, the post of Pramukh
fell vacant and a public notice was issued on 21.02.2018 for
holding the election on 09.03.2018 and the respondent No.11
was elected. We may hasten to add that we are really not
concerned with the passing of vote of no confidence motion or the
election of the respondent No.11 in the subsequent election.
9. Suffice it to state that the appellant knocked at the doors of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution assailing the
second notice for want of confidence on the foundation of
statutory impermissibility. It was contended before the High
Court that under Section 15(2) of the Act, the District
Magistrate/Collector had completely erred in accepting the notice
of intention to convene a meeting and, therefore, the ultimate
result of the said meeting is sans effect. The High Court, by the
impugned order dated 22.11.2017, negatived the said contention
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and dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the present appeal by
way of special leave.
10. Presently, we shall scrutinize the relevant statutory scheme.
Section 8 of the Act provides for the term of Kshettra Panchayat
and its members. Section 9 deals with the term of Pramukh. It
lays the postulate that save as otherwise provided in the Act the
term of office of a Pramukh of a Kshettra Panchayat shall
commence upon his election and shall extend up to the term of
the Kshettra Panchayat. Section 11 deals with resignation of
Pramukh or a member. Section 13 deals with disqualification for
membership of Kshettra Panchayat. Section 15 deals with motion
of nonconfidence in Pramukh. Subsection (1) of Section 15
stipulates that a motion expressing want of confidence in the
Pramukh of a Kshettra Panchayat may be made and proceeded
with in accordance with the procedure laid down in the
subsequent subsections. Subsection (2) of Section 15 requires
the written notice of intention to make the motion in such form
as may be prescribed, signed by at least half of the total number
of elected members of Kshettra Panchayat for the time being
together with a copy of the proposed motion, to be delivered in
person, by any one of the members signing the notice, to the
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Collector having jurisdiction over the Kshettra Panchayat. Sub
section (3) of Section 15, by employing the word ‘shall’, makes it
obligatory for the Collector, upon receiving a written notice as
aforesaid, to convene a meeting at the office of Kshettra
Panchayat for consideration of the motion within 30 days from
the date on which the notice under Section 15(2) is delivered to
the Collector. Further, the Collector is also obligated to give to
the elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat a notice, in such
a manner as may be prescribed, at least 15 days prior to the
meeting which he is required to convene. That apart, the
explanation appended to subsection (3) to Section 15 stipulates
that for the purposes of calculating 30 days specified in this sub
section, the period during which any stay order issued by a
competent court on a petition filed against the motion is in force
plus such further time as may be required for issuing of fresh
notices of the meeting to the members, shall be excluded.
11. Subsection (4) of Section 15 postulates that the sub
divisional officer of the subdivision in which the Kshettra
Panchayat exercises jurisdiction shall preside over the meeting
convened for consideration of the motion at the office of the
Kshettra Panchayat. The subsequent subsections of Section 15
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stipulate that no debate on the motion under Section 15 shall be
adjourned and the Presiding Officer shall not speak on the merits
of the motion. Also, he is not entitled to vote in the motion.
12. Subsection (11)(a) of Section 15 provides that if the motion
is carried with the support of more than half of the total number
of elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat, the Presiding
Officer shall cause this fact to be published by affixing a notice
on the notice board of the office of the Kshettra Panchayat and
also by notifying the same in the Gazette. Subsection (11)(b) of
Section 15 stipulates the consequences of a successful motion
being carried out to the effect that the Pramukh of the Kshettra
Panchayat ceases to hold office and is required to vacate the
same on and from the date next following that on which the said
notice is fixed on the notice board of the office of the Kshettra
Panchayat.
13. Subsection (12) of Section 15 deals with the situation when
a motion is not carried as contemplated by the aforesaid sub
sections of Section 15. For our purposes, subsection (12) of
Section 15, being pertinent, is reproduced below:
“(12) If the motion is not carried as
aforesaid or if the meeting could not be
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held for want of quorum, no notice of any
subsequent motion expressing want of
confidence in the same Pramukh shall be
received until after the expiration of one
year from the date of such meeting.”
14. The aforesaid provision is absolutely clear and
unambiguous. The conditions precedent for stipulation of the
period of one year after the expiration from the date of such
meeting are dependent on three situations, namely, (i) if the
motion is not carried out as contemplated under subsection (11),
(ii) if the meeting would not be held for want of the quorum and,
(iii) the notice of no confidence motion should be in respect of the
same Pramukh.
15. To appreciate the controversy, we have to understand the
scheme engrafted under Section 15 of the Act. Subsection (2) of
Section 15 provides that a written notice of intention to make the
motion in such form as may be prescribed, signed by at least half
of the total number of elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat
for the time being together with a copy of the proposed motion,
shall be delivered in person, by any one of the members signing
the notice, to the Collector having jurisdiction over the Kshettra
Panchayat. Subsection (3) requires the Collector to convene a
meeting. At this stage, the jurisdiction that the Collector has is
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only to scan the notice to find out whether it fulfills the essential
requirements of a valid notice. The exercise of the said discretion,
as we perceive, has to be summary in nature. There cannot be a
detailed inquiry with regard to the validity of the notice. We are
obliged to think so as subsection (3) mandates that a meeting
has to be convened not later than 30 days from the date of
delivery of the notice and further there should be at least 15
days’ notice to be given to all the elected members of the Kshettra
Panchayat. The Collector, therefore, should not assume power to
enter into an arena or record a finding on seriously disputed
questions of facts relating to fraud, undue influence or coercion.
His only duty is to determine whether there has been a valid
notice as contemplated under Subsection (2) of Section 15. His
delving deep to conduct a regular inquiry would frustrate the
provision. He must function within his own limits and leave the
rest to be determined in the meeting.
16. We may now note the stand that was put forth before the
st
High Court. It was contended that during the pendency of the 1
nd
notice, the 2 notice could not have been issued. There was no
st
assertion that the meeting was convened pursuant to the 1
notice in the manner in which the statute provides for the same.
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The words “not carried out” as aforesaid are of immense
significance. The meeting has to be convened as per the
provisions of the said Section. The second part relates to want of
the quorum. Though the quorum has not been defined under the
Act, yet in the context, it would mean the quorum that requires
the number of members to be present for the purpose of voting.
For example, if the notice of intention is given to the Collector by
more than half of the total members in Kshettra of 40 members
but on the date of the meeting, there are only 10 members,
indubitably there is a lack of quorum. Similarly, when the
quorum is there and voting takes place, but eventually the vote of
no confidence fails then the motion is not carried out as per the
provisions contained in Section 15. To understand the concept of
quorum, we may refer with profit to the authority in The Punjab
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,
University, Chandigarh v. Vijay Singh Lamba and othres
wherein while discussing about quorum, the Court had held:
“7. …‘Quorum’ denotes the minimum number
of members of any body of persons whose
presence is necessary in order to enable that
body to transact its business validly so that
its acts may be lawful. …”
2 (1976) 3 SCC 344
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17. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 74 , the word ‘quorum’
has been defined as follows:
“The word ‘quorum’, now in common use, is
from the Latin and has come to signify such a
number of officers or members of any body, as
is competent by law or constitution to transact
business;… Quorum of a body is an absolute
majority of it unless the authority by which the
body was created fixes it at a different
number.”
18. In Black’s Law Dictionary (Second Edition) , the word
‘quorum’ is defined as under:
| “When a committee, board of directors. | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| meeting of shareholders, legislative or other | |||
| body of persons cannot act unless a certain | |||
| number at least of them are present, that | |||
| number is called a “quorum.” Sweet. In the | |||
| absence of any law or rule fixing the quorum, | |||
| it consists of a majority of those entitled to act. | |||
| See | Ex parte Willcocks, 7 Cow. (N.Y.) 409, 17 | ||
| Am. Dec. 525; State v. Wilkesville Tp.. 20 Ohio | |||
| St. 293; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125, 4 | |||
| Atl. 136, 57 Am. Rep. 308; Snider v. Rinehart, | |||
| 18 Colo. 18, 31 Pac. 716.” |
19. In this context, reference to subsection (6) of Section 15 is
fruitful. It reads thus:
“(6) As soon as the meeting convened under
this section commences, the Presiding Officer
shall read to the Kshettra Panchayat the
motion for the consideration of which the
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meeting has been convened and declare it to
be open for debate.”
It is quite clear that only when the number of persons are
present and the meeting takes place, the debate under sub
section (6) comes into play. Thus, in the absence of quorum, the
said provision will not come into play.
20. In the case at hand, there is no allegation that the meeting
th
was convened to consider the previous notice dated 9 October,
2017, as provided in Section 15 and the motion was not
challenged on any other ground or the lack of quorum. What is
singularly contended is that once a notice is given under Section
15(2), another notice of no confidence shall not be received until
after expiration of one year. The said submission is without any
substance inasmuch as the prohibition under Section 15(12)
would only come into play when there is meeting and the motion
is “not carried out” as per the provisions of Section 15 or meeting
could not be held for want of quorum. As the facts of the instant
case would reveal that no meeting was convened to consider the
th
previous notice dated 9 October, 2017, as per the provisions of
the Act. Mere receipt of a notice by the Collector will not allow the
prohibition under Section 15(12) to come into play. That is not
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the purpose of the provision. That being the position, the ground
urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that subsection
15(12) would come into play is sans substratum. Neither of the
conditions precedent is satisfied to attract the prohibition
engrafted under Section 15(12) of the Act.
21. As we have stated earlier, the legislature being empowered
by the Constitution has legislated to provide for the
establishment of Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats in the
Districts of Uttar Pradesh to undertake certain Governmental
functions at Kshettra and District levels respectively in
furtherance of the principles of democratic decentralisation of
Governmental functions. It intends to empower the Panchayats
and that is why, Section 9 clearly provides that the term of the
office of Pramukh is for five years from the date appointed for its
first meeting. That brings stability to the administration of the
Gram Panchayat. Simultaneously, it also provides that the
democracy at the rural level must cherish the values of
democracy and, therefore, a Pramukh can be removed when a
vote of no confidence is passed against him. Once the no
confidence motion fails, it cannot be brought again for one year.
It is worthy to note here that subsection (13) of Section 15
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provides that no notice of a motion under Section 15 shall be
received within two years of the assumption of office by a
Pramukh. This is in consonance with the principle of stability of
rural governance. There are provisions for removal in case of
misconduct and certain other situations with which we are not
concerned. We have referred to this aspect to highlight how the
legislature has visualized the democracy at the grass root level.
22. In view of the premised reasons, the appeal, being devoid of
merit, stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
……………………….....CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
………………………….….J.
(A.M. Khanwilkar)
……………………………..J.
(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
May 17, 2018