Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11975 OF 2016
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.30710 OF 2014)
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
KRISHNA DISTRICT COOPERATIVE
CENTRAL BANK LTD. AND ANOTHER .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
K. HANUMANTHA RAO AND ANOTHER .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Leave granted.
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2. A departmental inquiry was conducted against respondent No.1
herein, an employee of appellant, viz. Krishna District
Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., into certain charges of
misconduct. In the said inquiry, charges were proved and as a
result the disciplinary authority inflicted the punishment of
dismissal from service upon respondent No.1. The High Court
vide impugned judgment has altered the said penalty of dismissal
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to that of stoppage of two increments for a period of three years.
Whether it was permissible for the High Court to do so in
the facts of the present case, is the question that needs to be
determined in the instant appeal.
3. The events leading to the filing of this appeal are recapitulated in
brief as under:
Respondent No. 1 was a Supervisor of five Primary
Agricultural Cooperative Societies (PACS). He failed in
discharging his duties properly in supervising the same, which led
to cheating by the members of the Nidamanuru Primary
Agricultural Cooperative Society (PACS) resulting in
misappropriation of the society funds, for which disciplinary action
was initiated against him. The precise charges against him, vide
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charge memo dated 08.03.2002, were that he had derelicted his
duties as Supervisor leading to misappropriation of the funds of
the society. Details of fifteen such accounts/instances were given
wherein frauds had taken place and the amount of fraud involved
in each such case totalling upto Rs.46,87,950.10. Names of the
persons who had misappropriated these amounts were also
given. It was mentioned that respondent No.1 worked as a
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Supervisor of the society and it was his duty to have close
supervision over the affairs of the society and bring to the notice
of the Bank the fraud which took place and safeguard the funds of
the society and the Bank. However, he failed to discharge his
legitimate duties of supervision leading to huge misappropriation
that had taken place, which he could not detect and thwart. Thus,
by derelicting his legitimate duties he paved way for huge
misappropriation and thereby committed grave misconduct.
Inquiry was held and charge of dereliction of duty was proved as
per the report given by the Inquiry Officer.
4. There is no dispute that this inquiry was conducted in accordance
with the principle of natural justice giving fair chance to
respondent No.1 to defend himself. In fact, as per the report of
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Inquiry Officer, respondent No.1 had even admitted dereliction of
duties on his part.
5. The General Manager, Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank
Ltd., after examining the report of the Inquiry Officer in detail,
observed that the charged employee committed grave
misconduct and acted in a way unbecoming of an employee of
the Bank and passed an order of dismissal from service of the
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Bank. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 05.10.2002,
respondent No. 1 herein filed an appeal/mercy petition before the
Chairman, Person In-charge Committee of the Krishna
Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., and prayed to consider the case
sympathetically on humanitarian grounds and issue reinstatement
orders, which was also dismissed on 22.01.2003. Respondent
No. 1 thereafter filed writ petition bearing W.P. No.4238/2003
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.
6. The learned single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad, after considering the material available on record and
after hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties, held
that respondent No.1 was negligent in performing his duties and
committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank which
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resulted in serious loss to the Bank. The Single Judge of the
High Court further observed that because of the negligence of
respondent No.1, an amount of Rs.46,87,950.10 had been
misappropriated by the staff and members of Nidamanuru PACS.
It was held that there were no grounds to interfere with the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed
by the appellate authority.
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7. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 18.07.2005, respondent
No.1 preferred Writ Appeal No. 1640/2005, which has been partly
allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court vide its impugned
order dated 17.08.2014. The Division Bench of the High Court
has, in fact, interfered with the penalty imposed. Reason for such
a course of action adopted by the High Court given in the
impugned judgment is that there was no allegation of
misappropriation against respondent No.1. The accusation was
lack of proper supervision which holds good against the top
administration as well.
8. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the view that
the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is
unsustainable. There are more than one reason for coming to
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this conclusion, which are stated hereunder:
(i) The observation of the High Court that accusation of lack of
proper supervision holds good against the top administration as
well is without any basis. The High Court did not appreciate that
respondent No.1 was the Supervisor and it was his specific duty,
in that capacity, to check the accounts etc. and supervise the
work of subordinates. Respondent No.1, in fact, admitted this
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fact. Also, there is an admission to the effect that his proper
supervision would have prevented the persons named from
defrauding the Bank. The High Court failed to appreciate that the
duties of the Supervisor are not identical and similar to that of the
top management of the Bank. No such duty by top management
of the Bank is spelled out to show that it was similar to the duty of
respondent No.1.
(ii) Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid
reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that
Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such
matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the
nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary
authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the
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same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found
that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/
employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it
shakes the conscience of the Court, that the Court steps in and
interferes.
No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to
the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for
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interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited
power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on
the doctrine of proportionality which is a well recognised concept
of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment should
appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial
conscience. (See State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Kamal Prasad
1
& Ors. ). It would also be apt to extract the following
observations in this behalf from the judgment of this Court in
Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors.
2
v. J. Hussain :
“8. The order of the appellate authority while
having a relook at the case would, obviously,
examine as to whether the punishment imposed
by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not.
If the appellate authority is of the opinion that the
case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the
penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority.
Such a power which vests with the appellate
authority departmentally is ordinarily not
available to the court or a tribunal. The court
while undertaking judicial review of the matter is
not supposed to substitute its own opinion on
reappraisal of facts. (See UT of Dadra & Nagar
Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad [(2010) 5 SCC 775 :
(2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 101] . In exercise of power
of judicial review, however, the court can
interfere with the punishment imposed when it is
found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in
defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial
review is permissible and interference is
available only when the punishment is shockingly
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1 (2014) 7 SCC 223
2 (2013) 10 SCC 106
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disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith.
Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the
court lesser punishment would have been more
appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with
the discretion of the departmental authorities.
9. When the punishment is found to be
outrageously disproportionate to the nature of
charge, principle of proportionality comes into
play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this
principle would be attracted, which is in tune with
the doctrine of Wednesbury [ Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680
(CA)] rule of reasonableness, only when in the
facts and circumstances of the case, penalty
imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of
charge that it shocks the conscience of the court
and the court is forced to believe that it is totally
unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of
proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock
in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
the Civil Service [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR
1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL)] in the following
words: (AC p. 410 D-E)
“...Judicial review has I think developed to a
stage today when without reiterating any
analysis of the steps by which the
development has come about, one can
conveniently classify under three heads of the
grounds upon which administrative action is
subject to control by judicial review. The first
ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second
‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural
impropriety’. This is not to say that further
development on a case by case basis may not
in course of time add further grounds. I have in
mind particularly the possible adoption in the
future of the principle of ‘proportionality’.”
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10. An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle
was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit
Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 :
1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] .
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Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he
then was) emphasising that “all powers have
legal limits” invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the
following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25)
“25...The question of the choice and quantum
of punishment is within the jurisdiction and
discretion of the court martial. But the
sentence has to suit the offence and the
offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly
harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to
the offence as to shock the conscience and
amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias.
The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the
concept of judicial review, would ensure that
even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within
the exclusive province of the court martial, if
the decision of the court even as to sentence
is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the
sentence would not be immune from
correction. Irrationality and perversity are
recognised grounds of judicial review.”
No such finding is arrived at by the High Court to the effect
that the punishment awarded to respondent No.1 was shockingly
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disproportionate.
Even otherwise, we do not find it to be so having regard to
the fact that respondent No.1 did not perform his duties with due
diligence and his negligence in performing the duties as a
Supervisor has led to serious frauds in number of accounts by the
subordinate staff. It was, therefore, for the disciplinary authority
to consider as to whether respondent No.1 was fit to continue in
the post of Supervisor.
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(iii) The impugned order is also faulted for the reason that it is not the
function of the High Court to impose a particular punishment even
in those cases where it was found that penalty awarded by the
employer is shockingly disproportionate. In such a case, the
matter could, at the best, be remanded to the disciplinary
authority for imposition of lesser punishment leaving it to such
authority to consider as to which lesser penalty needs to be
inflicted upon the delinquent employee. No doubt, the
administrative authority has to exercise its powers reasonably.
However, the doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably
has to be reconciled with the doctrine that the Court must not
usurp the discretion of the public authority. The Court must strive
to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding
authority the full range of choice. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin
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3
Bank & Anr. v. Rajendra Singh , this principle is formulated in
the following manner:
“13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of
law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the
appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide
the nature of punishment to be given to a
delinquent employee keeping in view the
seriousness of the misconduct committed by
such an employee. Courts cannot assume and
usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. In
3 (2013) 12 SCC 372
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Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.
Chopra [(1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
405] this principle was explained in the following
manner: (SCC p. 773, para 22)
“22...The High Court in our opinion fell in error
in interfering with the punishment, which could
be lawfully imposed by the departmental
authorities on the respondent for his proven
misconduct. … The High Court should not
have substituted its own discretion for that of
the authority. What punishment was required
to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances
of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority and did not warrant any interference
by the High Court. The entire approach of the
High Court has been faulty. The impugned
order of the High Court cannot be sustained
on this ground alone.”
14. Yet again, in State of Meghalaya v. Mecken
Singh N. Marak [(2008) 7 SCC 580 : (2008) 2
SCC (L&S) 431], this Court reiterated the law by
stating: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 14 and 17)
“14. In the matter of imposition of sentence,
the scope of interference is very limited and
restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction
of the High Court, to interfere with the
quantum of punishment is limited and cannot
be exercised without sufficient reasons. The
High Court, although has jurisdiction in
appropriate case, to consider the question in
regard to the quantum of punishment, but it
has a limited role to play. It is now well settled
that the High Courts, in exercise of powers
under Article 226, do not interfere with the
quantum of punishment unless there exist
sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority unless shocking to the
conscience of the court, cannot be subjected
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to judicial review. In the impugned order of the
High Court no reasons whatsoever have been
indicated as to why the punishment was
considered disproportionate. Failure to give
reasons amounts to denial of justice. The
mere statement that it is disproportionate
would not suffice.
xx xx xx
17. Even in cases where the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to
be shocking to the conscience of the court,
normally the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority should be directed to
reconsider the question of imposition of penalty.
The High Court in this case, has not only
interfered with the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority in a routine manner but
overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the
appellate authority to impose any other
punishment short of removal. By fettering the
discretion of the appellate authority to impose
appropriate punishment for serious misconducts
committed by the respondent, the High Court
totally misdirected itself while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this
background, the conclusion of the Division
Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as
proper at all. The High Court has interfered with
the punishment imposed by the competent
authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the
appeal will have to be accepted.”
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9. In any case, insofar as the instant matter is concerned, since we
find that the punishment imposed was not shockingly
disproportionate, no question of remitting the case to the
disciplinary authority arises. We, thus, allow this appeal and set
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aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 09, 2016.
JUDGMENT
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