MANOJ vs. STATE OF HARYANA

-1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1853 OF 2012 MANOJ & ORS. ...APPELLANTS Versus STATE OF HARYANA     ...RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. The appellants in this case were found guilty of  offence   punishable   under   Sections   498­A   and   304­B  Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) by the Sessions  Judge,   Bhiwani.   They   were   sentenced   to   undergo  imprisonment   for   life   for   the   offence   under   Section  JUDGMENT 304­B IPC and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  three   years,   besides,   payment   of   fine   of   Rs.5,000/­  each   and   in   default   of   which   to   undergo   further  imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence  under Section 498­A IPC. Their appeal against the said  judgment and conviction to the High Court of Punjab &  Haryana   at   Chandigarh   got   dismissed   except   with   a  modification   in   the   sentence   of   imprisonment   from  Page 1 -2 imprisonment for life to imprisonment for 10 years for  the offence under Section 304­B IPC.  2. The   prosecution   case,   in   brief,   is   that   on 

regarding admission of Meena Devi wife of Manoj Kumar  (appellant no.1) resident of Village Hetampura in burnt  condition, ASI Chattarmal (PW­11) of P.S. Sadar,Bhiwani  along   with   other   police   officials   reached   the   said  hospital   and   collected   medical   ruqa   (memo)   alongwith  medico­legal report of injured Meena.  After obtaining  the   opinion   of   the   Doctor   regarding   fitness   of   the  injured   to   make   statement   when   he   brought   the   Duty  Magistrate to record her statement in the hospital, the  Doctor   had   already   referred   her   to   PGIMS   Rohtak.  Thereafter,   he   alongwith   Magistrate   reached   PGIMS,  Rohtak and collected two medical ruqas from Incharge,  JUDGMENT Police   Post,   PGIMS   Rohtak   out   of   which   one   was  regarding   death   of   Meena.   Then   he   reached   in   the  gallery of emergency ward where complainant Vedpal (PW­ 9) met him and got recorded his statement (Ex.PA).  It  is alleged by the complainant­Vedpal (PW­9) that he had  one daughter and two sons.   His daughter was married  with Manoj (appellant no.1) son of Mahabir about five  years earlier (the actual date of marriage found to be  6.05.2000)   to   the   incident   that   had   occurred   on  Page 2 -3 14.04.2005 .   He further stated that in the marriage of  his daughter, he had given dowry beyond his financial  capacity.  However, his daughter on her return from her 

were   given   in   marriage.   The   complainant   had   given  double bed, T.V., fridge, cooler, sofa set, almirah, 21  utensils and clothes etc., besides, Rs.2100/­ in cash.  When the daughter of the complainant (PW­9) went to her  matrimonial home for the second time, his son­in­law  Manoj   (appellant   no.1),   the   mother­in­law   of   his  daughter   namely   Chameli   Devi   (appellant   no.2),   the  father­in­law   namely   Mahabir   (since   acquitted)   and  Jethani   (husband's   elder   brother's   wife)   of   his  daughter namely Suman (appellant no.3) raised a demand  for a motor cycle and started torturing her (beating)  for   this.     Therefore,   Meena   Devi   (deceased)   started  living   with   him   (complainant).     She   stayed   with   her  JUDGMENT father   (complainant)   for   fourteen   months.   About   ten  months earlier from the date of incident that  occurred  on 14.04.2005, the complainant (PW­9) made his daughter  understand   and   sent   her   back   in   the   presence   of  panchayat of Hetampura and Sant Mann Singh s/o Chandu  Ram r/o Hissar.   However, even then the accused were  demanding a motor cycle and kept troubling his daughter  for dowry.   On 14.04.2005, at about 8.00 a.m, Mahabir  informed him on telephone from the Hospital at Bhiwani  Page 3 -4 that   Meena   Devi   (deceased)   had   been   admitted   in   the  Government   Hospital,   Bhiwani   with   burn   injuries.   On  receiving this information, the complainant (PW­9)  and 

Meena   Devi   (deceased)   had   been   referred   to   PGIMS,  Rohtak. Then they all reached PGIMS, Rohtak where he  met   his   daughter   in   the   emergency   ward   of   PGIMS,  Rohtak. His daughter told him that in the morning on  that   day,   her   mother­in­law   namely   Chameli   Devi  (appellant no.2) had called her in the room and her  husband Manoj (appellant no.1) poured kerosene oil on  her and her husband's elder brother's wife (Jethani)  namely Suman (appellant no.3) lit a matchstick and set  her on fire on account of which she got burnt. After  sometime   Meena   Devi   (deceased)   while   she   was   under  treatment   breathed   her   last.   It   it   alleged   by   the  complainant (PW­9) that on account of greed of dowry,  JUDGMENT his daughter Meena Devi (deceased) had been set on fire  by pouring kerosene oil on her by her husband Manoj  (appellant no.1), mother­in­law Chameli Devi (appellant  no.2)   and   husband's   elder   brother's   wife   (Jethani)  Suman (appellant no.3) after colluding with each other.  He further requested for action being taken against the  accused.  Page 4 -5 3. On the basis of such complaint FIR No.103 dated  14.4.2005   under   Sections   304­B/498­A/406/34   IPC   was  registered.   Subsequently,   on   the   basis   of   above 

and 406 r/w Section 34 of the IPC to which they pleaded  not guilty and claimed trial.   4. All together eleven witnesses were produced by the  prosecution   in   support   of   their   case.   Exhibits   were  proved through the prosecution witnesses. Defence also  produced two witnesses in its favour.  5. The   Sessions   Judge,   Bhiwani   by   judgment   dated  4.09.2006   acquitted   Mahabir   father­in­law   of   the  deceased and held the appellants guilty for the offence  under   Sections   498­A   and   304­B   of   the   IPC.     The  Sessions Judge further held that the prosecution has  miserably failed to prove its case against all the four  JUDGMENT accused for the offence under Sections 302 and 406 r/w  Section 34 IPC and, hence, all the four accused were  acquitted for the said offence.  6. An appeal was preferred by the appellants against  the judgment passed by the Sessions Judge, Bhiwani and  another appeal was preferred by the complainant­Ved Pal  (PW­9)   against   acquittal   of   Mahabir.   By   impugned  judgment   dated   15.02.2012   the   Division   Bench   of   the  High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at   Chandigarh  Page 5 -6 dismissed   the   appeal   preferred   by   Ved   Pal­ complainant(PW­9). The judgment passed by the Sessions  Judge   was   affirmed   with   the   modification   in   the 

7. In this appeal, learned counsel appearing for the  appellants contended that in view of severity of burn  injuries of the deceased she could not have been in a  fit   state   of   mind   or   condition   to   make   a   dying  declaration. The said dying declaration is purported to  be   made   in   presence   of   Dr.   Rajender   Rai   (PW­4).   In  absence of any other material to corroborate the same,  the dying declaration should not be relied upon.  8. It was submitted that PW­7, the Police Inspector  who had prepared a report under Section 173 Cr.PC, in  his statement admits that there was no mention of the  statement   of   the   deceased   allegedly   recorded   by   the  JUDGMENT Doctor at the time of her MLR.  Even under Section 313  Cr.PC, no question was ever put to the accused with  regard to his signing of the said MLR in question. The  said dying declaration raises suspicion and doubt. It  may not be an absolute proposition of law that a dying  declaration should be recorded by a Magistrate but if  in   a   given   case,   there   is   ample   time   and  opportunity,the   services   of   a   Magistrate   should   be  called upon in order to lend credence to the said dying  Page 6 -7 declaration.   The   I.O   (PW­11)   has   stated   that   after  reading of the statement Ex.PF, he did not approach the  deceased   to   verify   from   her   if   she   had   made   such  statement or not. 

prosecution,   the   dying   declaration   recorded   by   Dr.  Rajinder   Rai   (PW­4),   Medical   Officer   is   reliable.  There is nothing on record to suggest that Dr. Rajinder  Rai (PW­4) is an unreliable witness. To the contrary,  he is a natural witness and his testimony has not been  shaken during a long cross examination. The theory of  tutoring is also ruled out in the present case as the  accused   persons   only   were   present   with   the   deceased  during that time and none of the family members of the  deceased were present when the dying declaration was  recorded by the Doctor. The husband (appellant no.1)  Manoj   has   also   affixed   his   signature   on   the   MLR   on  JUDGMENT which the dying declaration was recorded by the Doctor.  The   evidence   of   PW­4   is   trustworthy,   cogent   and  reliable.  10. Further according to the learned counsel for the  prosecution   an   alternate   charge   under   Section   302  shall be framed in addition to Section 304­B and in  view of dying declaration of the deceased, which has  been believed by both the courts below. A grave error  of law has been committed by the trial Court as well as  Page 7 -8 the High Court by not convicting the accused persons  under Section 302. It was submitted that this is a fit  case wherein this Court may exercise its extraordinary 

304­B to Section 302 IPC. 11. Coming to the evidence of Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW­4)  who conducted medico­legal examination and recorded the  statement of the deceased, we find that he specifically  deposed   that   the   deceased   Meena   was   brought   to   the  Hospital with the history of burns. Kerosene like smell  was present. Smell was also present in the clothes.  On  examination she was conscious. There were superficial  to   deep   burns   about   100%   with   in   a   duration   of   12  hours. Dr. Rajender Rai (PW­4) stated that the deceased  told him that   she was called inside and the door was  latched from inside.   Kerosene oil was sprinkled upon  JUDGMENT her and her Jethani Suman had ignited the fire by the  match stick. Her husband and mother­in­law were also  involved in it.   After recording the statement of the  deceased, he signed it. The statement was again read  over to the patient by him in Hindi. She stated Yes.  He again asked the patient whether the above statement  was correct and she again stated Yes. He again signed  the   endorsement   and   put   the   time   of   7.55   a.m.   He  prepared   MLR   including   statement   of   the   patient  Page 8 -9 recorded by him in his handwriting and his endorsement.  He further stated that he had sent ruqa (Ex.PG) to the  Incharge,   Police   Post,   General   Hospital,   Bhiwani   at 

opinion   regarding   fitness   of   Meena   Devi   to   make  statement, on which, he opined vide endorsement Ex.PH/1  at   8.45   a.m   that   she   was   fit   to   make   statement   and  thereafter   he   referred   the   patient   to   PGIMS,   Rohtak  vide endorsement Ex.PH/2. He had recorded the statement  of deceased Meena Ex.PF correctly without any addition  thereto and on the basis of whatever had been stated  before him.  12. The Defence had tried to make a futile effort to  prove that   Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW­4) was an interested  witness   because   cousin   of   the   deceased   and   his   wife  were   posted   in   the   same   Hospital   and,   thus,   undue  JUDGMENT influence was exercised upon him by them but it was not  believed by both the courts in absence of any evidence  on the file that alleged cousin of the deceased and his  wife were posted in Government Hospital, Bhiwani at the  time  the deceased was medico­legally examined at 7.30  a.m on 14.4.2005.  Contrary to it, evidence was brought  on record that aforesaid cousin of the deceased and his  wife   were   posted   in   some   private   nursing   home   in  Page 9 -10 Siwani,   which   was   about   70   kilometers   away   from  Bhiwani.  13. There   is   another   glaring   factor   in   the   present 

investigating   officer   Chhattarmal   (PW­11)   might   not  have   made   any   effort   to   call   the   Magistrate   for  recording   the   statement   of   the   deceased.   The   law   is  well   settled   that   if   the   declaration   is   made  voluntarily   and   truthfully   by   a   person   who   is  physically in a condition to make such statement, then  there   is   no   impediment   in   relying   on   such   a  declaration.   Such   view   was   taken   by   this   Court   in  Kanaksingh Raisingh Rav v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 1  SCC 73  wherein this Court held:   “5.   ….... The question then is, can a conviction  be based primarily on the dying declaration of the  deceased in this case? In this regard we do not  think it is necessary for us to discuss the cases  cited   by   the   learned   counsel   which   are   noted  hereinabove because, in our opinion,  the law  is  well   settled   i.e.   if   the   declaration   is   made  voluntarily   and   truthfully   by   a   person   who   is  physically in a condition to make such statement,  then there is no impediment in relying on such a  declaration. In the instant case, the evidence of  PW   5,   the   doctor   very   clearly   shows   that   the  deceased was conscious and was medically in a fit  state to make a statement. It is because of the  fact that a Judicial Magistrate was not available  at that point of time, he was requested to record  the   statement,   which   he   did.   His   evidence   in  regard   to   the   state   of   mind   or   the   physical  condition   of   the   deceased   to   make   such   a  JUDGMENT Page 10 -11

14. In  Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 1 SCC  166  this Court noticed that if it was a case of death  by burning, entries of injury report in the bed head  ticket can be construed as dying declaration. In the  JUDGMENT said case this Court held:   “11.  Entries in the injury report which have been  construed as dying declaration by the two courts  below   were   severely   criticised   and   it   was  submitted   that   although   dying   declaration   was  admissible   in   evidence   and   conviction   could   be  recorded   on   it   without   corroboration   yet   the  circumstances   in   which   it   was   recorded   created  doubt if it was genuine. The High Court for very  good reasons rejected similar arguments advanced  before it. We also do not find any substance in  it. When the deceased was examined by Dr Temani he  having   found   her   condition   to   be   serious  immediately sent message to the police station and  Page 11 -12

15 . What we find in the present case is that the dying  declaration (Ext.PF) which was recorded by Dr.Rajinder  JUDGMENT Rai (PW­4) was also signed by Manoj (appellant no.1)  which indicates that appellant No.1 was present when  statement   was   recorded.     Nothing   on   the   record   to  suggest that any of the relation of the deceased was  present to influence Dr. Rajinder Rai (PW­4).  16 . Thus, we find that there is no infirmity in the  finding of the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High  Court. Page 12 -13 17. Admittedly, the death of Meena Devi (deceased) is  caused   by   burns   i.e.   otherwise   than   under   normal  circumstances within seven years of her marriage.  The 

sofa   set,   T.V.,   cooler   and   other   domestic   articles,  besides,   gold   ornaments   of   4   tolas,   21   utensils   and  Rs.2100/­ in cash.  However, his daughter told him that  her   in­laws   were   not   satisfied   with   those   articles.  When  his daughter visited her matrimonial home for the  second time, all the accused started taunting her and  harassing her raising demand for a motor cycle.   She  was   turned   out   of   her   matrimonial   home   after   giving  beatings.  Thereafter, she started living with him (PW­ 9) and stayed with him for 14 months.  Then he convened  a panchayat consisting of Sant Man Singh, Krishan of  Hetampura and others i.e. his brother Satyawan and his  brotherhood from village Khera.  In that panchayat, the  JUDGMENT accused     assured   not   to   harass   Meena   in   future   and  then accused Mahabir and Chameli came to take her away  and she was accordingly sent to her matrimonial house  about 10 months prior to her death.  After four days,  they   again   started   harassing   her   by   demanding   motor  cycle and continued beating her.   His brother Satpal  (PW­10)   has   also   corroborated   his   deposition.   No  mitigating   circumstances   are   found   on   record   to  disbelieve their statements.  Page 13 -14 18. In view of such evidence on record both the courts  have come to definite conclusion that soon before her  death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by 

to convict the appellants under Section 304­B of the  IPC.   The   prosecution   proved   beyond   reasonable   doubts  that the appellants are guilty for the offence under  Section 498­A of the IPC.  19. In these circumstances, we find that the Sessions  Judge has recorded cogent and convincing reasons for  convicting   the   appellants   for   the   offences   under  Sections 304­B and 498­A IPC.  20. So   far   as   conviction   of   the   appellants   under  Section 302 IPC, as suggested by counsel for the State,  we find no wrong to alter the conviction to Section 302  IPC.   JUDGMENT 21 . In   Muthu Kutty and Another v. State by Inspector  of Police, Tamil Nadu (2005) 9 SCC 113  this Court held  that   when   it   was   found   that   the   accused   were  responsible   for   setting   the   deceased   on   fire   and  causing her death, Section 302 instead of Section 304­B  was attracted. On facts, no prejudice would be caused  to   accused­appellants   of   the   said   case   if   the  conviction   is   altered   to   Section   304   Pt.   II   on   the  basis of conclusions arrived at by the trial court as  Page 14 -15 they   were   originally   charged   for   offence   punishable  under Section 302 alongwith Section 304­B IPC.  22 . In the present case, we have noticed that after 

prosecution   has   miserably   failed   to   prove   its   case  against   all   the   four   accused   for   the   offence   under  Sections 302 and 406 r/w Section 34 IPC and, hence, all  the four accused were acquitted under the said offence.  Against the acquittal of Mahabir Singh the complainant  (PW­9) filed an appeal which has been dismissed by the  impugned judgment.  No appeal has been preferred by the  complainant or the State against the acquittal of all  the accused for the offences under Section 302 and 406  r/w   Section   34   IPC.   The   finding   of   Sessions   Judge  having reached finality, the question of altering the  present   sentence   under   Section   304­B   to   Section   302  JUDGMENT does not arise.  23. Lastly,   it   was   submitted   on   behalf   of   the  appellants to consider reducing the sentence awarded to  the appellants from 10 years to 7 years which is the  minimum   sentence   prescribed   under   Section   304­B   IPC  considering the facts and circumstances of the case. In  the   present   case   we   find   that   the   appellants   were  sentenced for life for the offence under Section 304­B  IPC   by   the   trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   already  Page 15 -16 considered the facts and circumstances of the case and  reduced   the   sentence   from   life   imprisonment   to   10  years. 

the appeal is dismissed.   25. Bail   bonds   of   the   appellant   nos.   2   and   3   are  cancelled. Appellant nos. 2 and 3 are directed to be  taken   into   custody   to   serve   out   remainder   of   the  sentence. ………………………………………………………………………………J.        (T.S.THAKUR) ………………………………………………………………………………J.            (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA) JUDGMENT NEW DELHI, JULY 9,2013. Page 16