Leelavathi N. vs. The State Of Karnataka

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.16562 OF 2024)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.7297 OF 2024)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.11728 OF 2024)
J U D G M E N T
VIJAY BISHNOI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred by the Appellants challenging
the Judgment dated 12.10.2023 (hereinafter referred to as
“ impugned judgment ”) passed in W.A. No.305/2023 (GM-CC) ;
W.A. No.300/2023 (GM-CC); W.A. No.337/2023 (GM-CC); W.A.
No.591/2023 (GM-CC); W.A. No.886/2023 (GM-CC) (hereinafter
referred to as “ the writ appeals ”) by the High Court of Karnataka
at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred as “ the High Court ”). The
Division Bench of the High Court, thereby set aside the
Judgment passed by the Single Judge Bench of the High Court in
W.P. No. 23752 of 2022 (GM-CC) dated 30.01.2023, thus
relegating the matter to the Karnataka State Administrative
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Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “ KSAT ”) to be considered in a
properly constituted application.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. A notification dated 21.03.2022 was issued by the Department of
Public Education, Government of Karnataka inviting applications
for a total number of 15,000 posts of Graduate Primary Teachers
for Classes 6-8 for 35 Educational Districts (hereinafter referred
to as “ recruitment notification ”).
4. Pursuant to the said recruitment notification, examinations were
held on 21.05.2022 and 22.05.2022. The Appellants and the
private Respondents herein applied and participated in the said
examinations. On 17.08.2022, the results of the said
examinations were declared and accordingly, a provisional select
list was published on 18.11.2022.
5. The provisional select list dated 18.11.2022 did not include the
names of certain married individuals/candidates, who had
applied in the OBC category, as they had not produced the caste
cum income certificate (hereinafter referred to as “ certificate ”) of
their husband but rather submitted the one issued in the name
of their father. As a result of non-consideration of the certificate
produced by them, the said individuals were found to be
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ineligible for reservation provided for the OBC category and
hence, their names got reflected in the general merit list.
6. Aggrieved by the same, some of the private respondents herein
approached the High Court by filing the Writ Petition No. 23752
of 2022 (GM-CC), praying to quash the provisional select list
dated 18.12.2022 and seeking consideration of their names in
the said provisional select list.
7. A similarly aggrieved candidate (private respondent herein) filed a
Writ Petition bearing No. 200032 of 2023 before the High Court
of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, which came to be dismissed
vide order dated 12.01.2023 as not maintainable. However, the
Court granted liberty to the said writ petitioner to approach the
Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “ Tribunal ” ) in
view of the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of
India and Ors , reported in (1977) 3 SCC 261. Pursuant to the
same, some similarly situated persons have approached the
KSAT.
8. Despite the Order dated 12.01.2023 being passed by the Kalaburagi
Bench of the High Court, the Single Judge of the High Court
(Principal Bench) entertained the W.P. No. 23752 of 2025,
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presumably because the Order dated 12.01.2023 was not
brought to its notice.
9. The Single Judge of the High Court in the W.P. No. 23752 of 2022
(GM-CC) on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed the
following issues:
“(i) Whether the writ petitions challenging the action of
interpretation of caste and income certificates by the Selecting
Authority - DDPI would be maintainable?
(ii) Whether the caste and income of the husband of the female
applicant should be taken into consideration or the caste and
income of the parents?
(iii) Whether the Selecting Authority – DDPI would get jurisdiction
to interpret caste and income certificates issued by competent
authorities?”
The Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated
10.
30.01.2023 allowed the said writ petitions filed by some of the
private respondents herein, thereby quashing the provisional
select list dated 18.11.2022 insofar as it related to the private
respondents being brought under the General Merit category and
directed the Respondent-State to treat such candidates as
belonging to the OBC category to which they applied for, qua the
certificates appended to the applications. Further, the
Respondent-State was granted liberty to regulate its procedure by
continuing recruitment and taking it to its logical conclusion.
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11. The findings recorded by the Single Judge can be better
understood in the following three parts:
A.
First , on the issue of maintainability of the writ petitions, the
Single Judge, while relying on the judgment of this Court in
T.K. Rangarajan vs. Government of T.N. and Others ,
reported in (2003) 6 SCC 581, held that in cases wherein
thousands of employees are directed to approach the Tribunal,
it would not be in a position to render justice to the cause and,
therefore, in such exceptional circumstances, the High Court
has to entertain the writ petitions and ought not to dismiss
them merely on the ground that an alternative remedy exists
under the statute. The Single Judge deemed this situation
whereby hundreds of applicants, who fell under the category
2A, 2B, 3A and 3B of the OBC Category, were held to be
general merit candidates, as a peculiar situation warranting
immediate and necessary interference. As a result, the writ
petitions were held as maintainable.
B. Secondly , the Single Judge, on the issue of whether the caste
and income of the husband of the applicant should be
considered or that of her parents, held that the creamy layer
status of a candidate is determined on the basis of the status
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of his/her parents and not on the basis of his/her own status
or income, or the status or income of his/her spouse on the
ground that caste is determined by birth and it cannot be
changed by marriage with a person belonging to another caste.
Reliance in this regard was placed on the decision of this
Court in
Surinder Singh vs. Punjab State Electricity
, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 767.
Board, Patiala and Others
C. , on the question of the jurisdiction of the Selecting
Finally
Authority i.e. the Deputy Director of Public Instruction (for
short, “ the DPPI ”) to interpret the certificates, it was held that,
in view of a similar judgment by a Coordinate Bench of the
High Court, the Selecting Authority being the DPPI had no
jurisdiction to interpret the certificates issued by the
competent authorities. The Single Judge noted that the action
of the Selecting Authority, in light of the Government Order
dated 12.12.1986, was unsustainable as the said Government
Order was in and of itself, unsustainable.
12. The Government issued a fresh provisional select list dated
27.02.2023, in lieu of the directions issued by the Single Judge
vide Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2023, after considering
the candidature of the married individuals in terms of their
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husbands, or their parents’ certificate. The names of 451
candidates (including the Appellants), whose names were
included in the provisional select list dated 18.11.2022, were
excluded owing to the fact that their merit position moved lower
on inclusion of candidates who were excluded in the provisional
select list dated 18.11.2022.
13. Several candidates (private respondents herein) aggrieved by the
provisional select list dated 27.02.2023 having not found their
names in the said list, approached the High Court by way of Writ
Petitions led by W.P. No.5009 of 2023, whereby the High Court
disposed of the writ petitions vide order dated 26.05.2023 as not
maintainable while granting liberty to the writ petitioners to
approach the KSAT for redressal of their grievances in light of the
law laid down in Rajeev Kumar and Another vs. Hemraj Singh
Chauhan and Others , reported in (2010) 4 SCC 554 and L.
Chandra Kumar (supra).
14. Subsequently, the Appellants filed their objections before the
Government which were rejected and the Government published
the final select list on 08.03.2023.
15. The Appellants, being aggrieved by the exclusion of their names
in the final select list dated 08.03.2023, published pursuant to
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the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2023, preferred the writ
appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court challenging
the Order dated 30.01.2023 passed by the Single Judge of the
High Court and seeking a direction to the Respondent-State to
proceed with the provisional list dated 18.11.2022 in accordance
with law.
16. The Division Bench vide Order dated 12.10.2023 partly allowed
the writ appeal and set aside the Judgment and Order dated
30.01.2023 passed by the Single Judge. The Division Bench
directed that all the contentions regarding the issues raised
before the Single Judge were left open to be raised before the
KSAT. The Division Bench framed the following issue after
hearing the writ appeal:
“a) Whether writ petition as filed seeking the relief thereunder is
entertainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?”
17. The Division Bench, while relying upon the judgement passed in
L. Chandra Kumar (supra), held that in the matters of
recruitment process, the Tribunal would be the Court of first
instance and the role of Division Bench of the High Court is only
limited to the exercise of judicial review under Article 226/227 of
the Constitution of India.
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18. The Division Bench further held that the Single Judge erred in
placing reliance on the judgment passed in the case of
T.K.
(supra) since, in the present case, the moot question
Rangarajan
revolved around the rejection of certificates of some of the
candidates during the recruitment process. There was no vested
right created in favour of such candidates except expectation of
being selected, and this could not be deemed as “ an
unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel” as laid
out by this Court in (supra).
T.K. Rangarajan
19. However, the Division Bench, taking note of the peculiar fact
situation that had arisen in this case, whereby the appointment
of teachers of Class 6-8 had come to a grinding halt on account
of the rejection of some of the candidates, as a measure of
interim relief, directed the State to proceed with the appointment
of teachers from the selected candidates as per the final select list
dated 08.03.2023, provided that the candidates have submitted
the certificate in the prescribed form.
20. Aggrieved by the said impugned judgment passed by the Division
Bench, the Appellants have preferred the present batch of
appeals, which are classified as follows:
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A. The appellants in the appeals, arising out of SLP (C) Nos.
27984-27988/2023, SLP (C) Nos.28331-28335/2023, SLP (C)
Nos.7298-7303/2024 and SLP (C) No.11728/2024, were the
candidates whose names were included in the provisional
select list dated 18.11.2022 and they are aggrieved by the
order passed by the Division Bench, whereby, the Division
Bench as a measure of interim relief, directed the State to
proceed with appointment process as per the final selection
list dated 08.03.2023.
B. The appellants in the appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.
496/2024, SLP (C) No.497/2024, SLP (C) No.16867/2024, SLP
(C) No. 16575/2024, SLP (C) No.16562/2024 and SLP (C) No.
7297/2024, are the ones whose names were included in the
final select list dated 08.03.2023 as per the directions given by
the Single Judge vide Order dated 30.01.2023. These
appellants are aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench,
whereby, the Division Bench relegated the matter to the
Tribunal.
21. During the pendency of these appeals, certain orders have been
passed by this Court which are as follows:
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A. Vide Order dated 03.01.2024, this Court directed that the
directions issued in paragraph 45-47 of the impugned
judgment dated 12.10.2023 shall be stayed and that any
appointment letters issued by the State in terms of final
selection list dated 08.03.2023 shall be kept in abeyance. The
Order is reproduced herein below:
“ O R D E R
1.Permission to file Petition for Special Leave to Appeal is
granted.
2. Applications seeking exemption from filing certified copy of
the impugned judgment and exemption from filing official
translation are allowed.
3. Delay condoned.
4. Issue notice. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted.
5. Mr. D.L. Chidananda, learned Advocate on Record accepts
notice on behalf of the caveator/respondent.
6. Counter affidavit, if any, be filed within four weeks.
Rejoinder affidavit, if any, be filed within two weeks,
thereafter.
7. Till further orders, the directions issued in paragraphs 45 to
47 of the impugned judgment shall not be given effect to.
Any
appointment letters as stated to have been issued in favour
of the candidates selected in terms of the final selection list
dated 08th March, 2023 shall be kept in abeyance.
8. List after pleadings are complete.
9. Additional documents, if any, be filed, in the meantime.”
B. Vide Order dated 22.01.2024, the Court clarified that the
joining of 11,494 candidates who were already issued
appointment letters and working, would be subject to the
outcome of the present appeals. The Order is reproduced
herein below:
“ O R D E R
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IA No.6067/2024 in SLP (C) Nos.27984-27988/2023, IA
No.6858/2024 in SLP (C) No.496/2024, IA No.6817/2024
in SLP (C) No.497/2024, IA No.6617/2024 in SLP (C)
Nos.28331-28335/2023:
1. On 3rd January, 2024, while issuing notice on this petition, it
was directed that till further orders, the directions issued in
paragraphs 45 to 47 of the impugned judgment shall not be
given effect to. It was further directed that any appointment
letters as stated to have been issued in favour of the candidates
selected in terms of the final selection list dated 08th March,
2023, shall be kept in abeyance.
2. Now an additional affidavit has been filed by the respondent
no.1-State of Karnataka wherein category wise distribution of
13,352 candidates has been reflected in paragraph 3.2. As per
the said tabulated statement, out of a total of 13,352
candidates, who had applied for the subject posts being 15000
in number for 35 Educational Districts, have been included in
the list published on 08th March, 2023, 6649 candidates fall
under the category of general merit, 1953 candidates fall under
the Scheduled Caste category, 428 candidates fall under the
Scheduled Tribe category and 3841 fall under the OBC
candidates. This is besides those who fall under the category of
Married Women who seek to be considered in OBC category
based on their parents’ income and caste certificate. It is stated
that the number of candidates who fall under the category of
Married Women referred to hereinabove, is 481.
3. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the respondents states that it has been clarified that
the authorities have kept aside 481 notified posts to be filled up
subject to the final outcome of the present litigation. In other
words, if married women candidates who claim reservation on
the basis of the income of their parents’ ultimately succeed in
the present petition, they shall be entitled to appointment
against the said posts, subject to their fulfilling all other
eligibility criteria.
4. This would mean that if the married women candidates do
not qualify for appointment on the strength of their parents’
income and caste certificate, they would be considered in the
General Merit Category on the basis of their overall merit. As it
has been submitted that 11494 candidates who were selected
and issued appointment letters were already working prior to
passing of the order on 03rd January, 2024 and their
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appointment orders have been kept in abeyance in compliance
of the aforesaid order, it is clarified that joining of the aforesaid
11494 candidates working on the subject posts is subject to the
outcome of the present petitions. This order shall be duly
intimated to all the said appointees for their information.
5. The applications are allowed and disposed of on the above
terms.
6. List these matters on 12th March, 2024 at 2.00 p.m.”
C. Vide Order dated 04.10.2024, the Court allowed the State to
proceed with the appointment to the vacant seats, however, by
reserving 500 seats as vacant. The Order is reproduced herein
below:
“ O R D E R
1) Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that unserved
respondents are represented in other cases through Advocates
or their service is complete, therefore, they may be deemed to
be served for which Interlocutory Applications have been filed.
Considering the statement made at Bar, we accept the
statement. Interlocutory Applications for dispensing with the
service of notice are allowed.
2) During hearing it is informed that 1,377 candidates
remained to be appointed though they are not affected by the
issue involved in the present cases regarding claim of married
women under creamy layer in Other Backward Classes
category.
3) Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, appearing for
the State submitted that to safeguard rights of the candidates
involved in the litigation the State Government shall keep 500
posts reserved.
4) In view of the aforesaid stand of the State, it is at liberty to
fill up the vacant advertised posts by reserving 500 posts.
5) At present, we are not passing any order regarding seniority
of the persons appointed or who may be appointed on the
posts reserved.
6) List the matters on 12th November, 2024 (Non Miscellaneous
Day).
7) Parties shall complete and exchange the pleadings within
four weeks from today.”
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
22. The learned Counsel for the Appellants in the first set of appeals
(A) submitted that the direction issued by the Division Bench to
continue with the appointments in terms of the final select list
dated 08.03.2023 and not granting the consequential relief of
proceeding as per the provisional select list dated 18.11.2022
after setting aside the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2023, is
unsustainable and without jurisdiction. It was further contended
that pursuant to the final select list dated 08.03.2023, only
13,352 candidates have been appointed against 15,000 notified
vacancies. Accordingly, it was urged by the learned Counsel that
the Appellants, who had been selected in the provisional select
list dated 18.11.2022 but were ousted by virtue of the Order of
the Single Judge dated 30.01.2023, can be accommodated
against the remaining vacancies.
23. The learned Counsel for the Appellants in the second set of
appeals (B) submitted that the Division Bench erred in setting
aside the well-reasoned Judgment of the Single Judge without
properly appreciating the law laid down in T.K. Rangarajan
(supra). It was further contended that the Division Bench was
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not justified in directing the State to defer the appointments of
candidates who had not furnished certificates in the form
prescribed under the notification and in conformity with the
Government Order dated 12.12.1986, and who had been
included in the list only by virtue of the order of the Single
Judge, until disposal of the challenge before the KSAT.
24. The learned Counsel for the Respondent-State has argued that
the contention of the Appellants that since the appointment of
the 481 candidates, who sought to be considered on the basis of
their parents’ income certificate, were directed to be deferred by
the Division Bench, it cannot be unanimously accepted that the
Appellants who had been displaced from the list dated
08.03.2023 on inclusion of 481 candidates, ought to have been
appointed. Further, it was vehemently contended that the present
lis primarily related to the inter-se eligibility of candidates, and
the Respondent-State is merely a formal party and would give
effect to the Orders as passed by this Court.
ANALYSIS
25. We have heard the parties and perused the materials on record.
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26. The Single Judge of the High Court had not ruled that the issue
raised before it by the appellants of the second set of appeals (B)
is outside the jurisdiction of the KSAT while exercising power
under Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred to as “ the Act of 1985 ”) . It is not even the
case of the appellants of the second set of appeals (B) that the
KSAT has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue raised by them
in the writ petitions filed before the High Court. In such
circumstances, it is an admitted position that the KSAT has the
jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue raised by the appellants of the
second set of appeals (B).
27. Now, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether
the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly held that the
Single Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the writ petitions filed on behalf of the appellants of the second
set of appeals (B) in view of the availability of an effective
alternate remedy of filing an appropriate application before the
KSAT. The Constitution Bench of this Court in
L. Chandra
(supra) , has categorically held that in a service dispute
Kumar
covered by Section 15 of the Act of 1985, it will not be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts, even in cases
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where they question the vires of the statutory legislations except
the cases wherein the legislation under which the particular
Tribunal is created is under challenge.
28. Although the Single Judge took note of a specific objection raised
by the State regarding the maintainability of the petitions, the
Single Judge had relied upon the judgment of this Court
rendered in (supra) to hold that the writ
T.K. Rangarajan
petitions filed on behalf of the appellants of the second set of
appeals (B) would be maintainable. It is to be noted that this
Court in T.K. Rangarajan (supra) , has not made any departure
from the binding precedent laid down by the Constitution Bench
in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and only observed that the High
Court therein was faced with an extraordinary circumstance
which called for its interference because the State Government
had dismissed about two lakhs employees for going on strike. It
was held that the High Court was justified in allowing the writ
petitions, having regard to the exceptional circumstances which
rendered the Tribunal incapable of doing justice to the cause,
and thus, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court to
not entertain the petitions in view of the alternate remedy
provided under the statute. At best, the said judgment can be
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termed as an order passed under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India and as such, it is not binding.
29. In the instant case, the Division Bench of the High Court has
taken the view that the “ unprecedented extraordinary situation
having no parallel ”, as existed in T. K. Rangarajan (supra), was
not present in this case. The dispute in the case before us only
concerns the rejection of the certificates of certain candidates
who took part in the recruitment process. It is apposite to note
here that recruitment to any civil post and allied service matters
fall within the domain of the State’s administrative policy.
Further, it is not uncommon for discrepancies to arise in the
recruitment process, including those relating to the eligibility of
candidates on the basis of their certificates, during the
recruitment process. However, the rejection of candidates on the
basis of invalid certificates does not render them remediless so as
to directly approach the High Court. The Tribunals have been
well empowered to deal with such disputes as the court of first
instance. Such situations under no circumstance can be deemed
as an exceptional one to warrant the intervention of the High
Court under its writ jurisdiction.
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30. In view of the aforesaid observations, the present case does not
fall under the category of an exceptional circumstance as the
issue is restricted merely to 481 candidates whose inclusion in
the select list is allegedly illegal.
Significantly, it is pertinent to note that the High Court of
31.
Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, by its order dated 12.01.2023,
had dismissed W.P. No. 200032 of 2023, which was filed on an
identical set of facts by a similarly situated candidate, as not
maintainable, while granting liberty to the petitioner therein to
approach the Tribunal. In a similar vein, the High Court
(Principal Bench), by its order dated 26.05.2023, disposed of a
set of writ petitions led by W.P. No. 5009 of 2023, filed by certain
private respondents herein, who were aggrieved by the
provisional select list dated 27.02.2023, as not maintainable,
once again granting liberty to the petitioners to seek redress
before the KSAT. These orders, echoing the same reasoning, lend
further support to the impugned judgment passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, we do not find any
illegality in the impugned judgment.
32. Otherwise also, the law of alternate remedy is well settled and
has been dealt with by this Court in various judgments. In
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(supra), this Court while relying on the
Rajeev Kumar
Constitution Bench rendered in (supra) has
L. Chandra Kumar
held as under:
“9. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC
261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] held that the power of the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure
of our Constitution (see paras 78 and 79, pp. 301 and 302 of the
Report). The Constitution Bench also held that various tribunals
created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution, will
function as court of first instance and are subject to the power of
judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution. The Constitution Bench also held that these
tribunals are empowered even to deal with constitutional
questions and can also examine the vires of statutory legislation,
except the vires of the legislation which creates the particular
tribunal.
10. In para 93, at p. 309 of the Report, the Constitution Bench
specifically held: (L. Chandra Kumar case [(1997) 3 SCC 261 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 577] )
“93. … We may add that the Tribunals will, however,
continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of
the areas of law for which they have been constituted.”
(emphasis added)
The Constitution Bench explained the said statement of law
by reiterating in the next sentence: (L. Chandra Kumar case
[(1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] , SCC p. 309, para
93)
“93. … By this, we mean that it will not be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases
where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except,
as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the
particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.”
11. On a proper reading of the abovequoted two sentences, it is
clear:
(a) The tribunals will function as the only court of first instance
in respect of the areas of law for which they have been
constituted.
(b) Even where any challenge is made to the vires of
legislation, excepting the legislation under which tribunal has
Page 21 of 35

been set up, in such cases also, litigants will not be able to
directly approach the High Court “overlooking the jurisdiction
of the tribunal”.
12. The aforesaid propositions have been repeated again by the
Constitution Bench (in L. Chandra Kumar case [(1997) 3 SCC 261
: 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] ) in the penultimate para 99 at p. 311 of
the Report in the following words:
“99. … The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like
courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which
they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases
where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except
where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
concerned.”
13. In view of such repeated and authoritative pronouncement by
the Constitution Bench of this Court, the approach made to the
High Court for the first time by these appellants in respect of their
service disputes over which CAT has jurisdiction, is not legally
sustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court, with great
respect, fell into an error by allowing the appellants to treat the
High Court as a court of first instance in respect of their service
disputes for adjudication of which CAT has been constituted.
- xxx -
As the appellants cannot approach the High Court by treating
15.
it as a court of first instance, their special leave petition before
this Court is also incompetent and not maintainable.
The principles laid down in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC
16.
261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] virtually embody a rule of law and in
view of Article 141 of the Constitution the same is binding on the
High Court. The High Court fell into an error by allowing the
appellants to approach it in clear violation of the Constitution
Bench judgment of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar [(1997) 3 SCC
261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] . ”
( Emphasis
Supplied)
33. In
Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of
, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337 , this Court
India and Others
has held as under:
Page 22 of 35

“ 11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions.
There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to
issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and
prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature
of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary
legislation—L. Chandra Kumar v.Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC
261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577]. However, it is one thing to say that in
exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against
any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its
agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed
by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether
different thing to say that each and every petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High
Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved
person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled
law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of
grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the
statutory dispensation.
In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes [AIR 1964 SC 1419]
12.
this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the
writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is
available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423,
para 7)
“7.… The High Court does not therefore act as a court of
appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct
errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under
Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by
statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved
petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another
jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by
a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by
entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed,
and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the
machinery so set up.”
13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1983) 2
SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] this Court observed: (SCC pp.
440-41, para 11)
“11.… It is now well recognised that where a right or
liability is created by a statute which gives a special
remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute
only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great
clarity by Willes, J. In Wolverhampton New Waterworks
Co.v. Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336 : 141 ER 486] in the
following passage: (ER p. 495)
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‘… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may
be established founded upon a statute. … But there is a
third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law
is created by a statute which at the same time gives a
special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The
remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is
not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable
to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute
must be adopted and adhered to.’
The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the
House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers
Ltd. [1919 AC 368 : (1918-19) All ER Rep 61 (HL)] and has
been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of
Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd. [1935
AC 532 (PC)] and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. [(1939-40)
67 IA 222 : AIR 1940 PC 105] It has also been held to be
equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been
followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was
therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.”
14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1997) 5 SCC
536] B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger
Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77)
“77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 32—is concerned, it is obvious that the
provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies.
It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the
power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would
certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the
provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of the enactment.”
15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which,
by and large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam
Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [AIR
1969 SC 556], it has been held that an alternative remedy is not
a bar to the entertaining of writ petition filed for the enforcement
of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a
violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order
under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the
statute is under challenge.
16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some
exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the
proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes
[AIR 1964 SC 1419] and other similar judgments that the High
Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Page 24 of 35

Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the
aggrieved person or the statute under which the action
complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for
redressal of grievance still holds the field. ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
In
34. Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
,
and Others reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771, this Court has held
as under:
“ 25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to
dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition.
In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool
Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] , a two-Judge
Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point,
noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15)
“14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226
of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited
by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can
be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the
Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court,
having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to
entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High
Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of
which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is
available, the High Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at
least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of
the principle of natural justice or where the order or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of
an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this
point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we
would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of
the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”
( e mphasis s upplied)
Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool [Whirlpool
26.
Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1],
in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal
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Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] , this Court
noted that : (Harbanslal Sahnia case [Harbanslal
Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] , SCC p. 110,
para 7)
“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the
remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was
available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition
filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is
concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of
writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is
a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an
appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative
remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ
jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the
writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural
justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
(See Whirlpool Corpn.v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool
Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The
present case attracts applicability of the first two
contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants'
dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be
terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In
such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should
have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of
driving them to the need of initiating arbitration
proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue
writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High
Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the
aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a)
the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b)
there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c)
the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High
Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an
appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be
entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by
law.
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27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes
the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort
must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking
the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.
This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion.
In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the
27.6.
High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition.
However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the
nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.
28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court
in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad,
(2003) 5 SCC 399] , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal
Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas
Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of
India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among
other decisions. ”
(Emphasis
Supplied)
35. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in PHR Invent
Educational Society vs. UCO Bank and Others , reported in
(2024) 6 SCC 579 , has held as under:
“ 37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out
certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an
alternative remedy. Some of them are thus:
(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance
with the provisions of the enactment in question;
(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure;
(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed;
and
(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the
principles of natural justice.
It has however been clarified that the High Court will not
38.
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person
or the statute under which the action complained of has been
taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. ”
Page 27 of 35

( E mphasis S upplied)
36. A careful perusal of the aforesaid judgments leads us to the
conclusion that where an efficacious alternate remedy is
available, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters falling
squarely within the domain of the Tribunals.
37. Nevertheless, a writ petition under Article 226 may still be
maintainable notwithstanding the existence of such an
alternative remedy in exceptional circumstances, including the
enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of
the Constitution; instances of ultra vires or illegal exercise of
power by a statutory authority; violation of the principles of
natural justice; or where the vires of the parent legislation itself is
under challenge. While these exceptions have been carved out
and reiterated by this Court in a catena of decisions, the facts of
the present case do not fall within any of these exceptions so as
to warrant the maintainability of the writ petitions before the
High Court.
The Act of 1985 empowers the Tribunals to deal exclusively with
38.
service matters with the intention to reduce the burden on
Courts, who were otherwise dealing with service matters along
with the other cases. The idea behind establishing the Tribunals
Page 28 of 35

was to provide speedy reliefs to the aggrieved persons in respect
of their grievances in relation to service matters.
39. The Act of 1985 came into force in the State of Karnataka w.e.f.
01.01.1985 vide G.S.R. 956(E), dated 31.12.1985. In the Act of
1985, a complete mechanism is provided for disposal of any
service matter expeditiously and, therefore, it cannot be said that
the statutory remedy before the Tribunal is not an effective
remedy.
40. Section 15 of the Act of 1985 which outlines the exclusive
jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal and Section 22
bestows upon the Tribunals the power to regulate its own
provisions. The said provisions read as under:
“15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State
Administrative Tribunals .—(1) Save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall
exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction,
powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by
all courts (except the Supreme Court []) in relation to—*
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any
civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State;
(b) all service matters concerning a person [not being a person
referred to in clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person
or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section
14] appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post
under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in
connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other
authority under the control of the State Government or of any
corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the State
Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with
the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any
service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose
services have been placed by any such local or other authority
or corporation [or society] or other body as is controlled or
Page 29 of 35

owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State
Government for such appointment.
(2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect
from such date as may be specified in the notification the
provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and
corporations [or societies] controlled or owned by the State
Government:
Provided that if the State Government considers it expedient
so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as
envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under
this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different
categories under any class of, local or other authorities or
corporations [or societies].
(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
Administrative Tribunal for a State shall also exercise, on and
from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-
section apply to any local or other authority or corporation [or
society], all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable
immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme
Court []) in relation to—*
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any
service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or
other authority or corporation [or society]; and
(b) all service matters concerning a person [other than a person
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section or a
member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-
section (1) of section 14] appointed to any service or post in
connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or
corporation [or society] and pertaining to the service of such
person in connection with such affairs.
(4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the
jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Administrative Tribunal
for a State shall not extend to, or be exercisable in relation to, any
matter in relation to which the jurisdiction, powers and authority
of the Central Administrative Tribunal extends or is exercisable.

- xxx -
22. Procedure and powers of Tribunals. —(1) A Tribunal shall
not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles
of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act
and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal
shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the
fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to
sit in public or in private.
(2) A Tribunal shall decide every application made to it as
expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every application shall
be decided on a perusal of documents and written
Page 30 of 35

representations and [after hearing such oral arguments as may
be advanced].
(3) A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of [discharging its
functions under this Act], the same powers as are vested in a civil
court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while
trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person
and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) receiving evidence of affidavits;
(d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), requisitioning any
public record or document or copy of such record or document
from any office;
(e) issuing commissions for the examination of witness or
documents;
(f) reviewing its decisions;
(g) dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex
parte;
(h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation
for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and
(i) any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central
Government.”
41. Moreover, Section 24 of the Act of 1985 enables the Tribunals to
pass interim orders subject to fulfillment of certain conditions,
however, in circumstances where an urgent relief is necessitated,
the Tribunal can pass such an interim order bypassing the
conditions specified so as to prevent any travesty of justice.
Section 24 reads as follows:
“24. Conditions as to making of interim orders. —
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of
this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no interim
order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other
manner) shall be made on, or in any proceedings relating to, an
application unless—
(a) copies of such application and of all documents in support
of the plea for such interim order are furnished to the party
against whom such application is made or proposed to be
made; and
(b) opportunity is given to such party to be heard in the matter:
Page 31 of 35

Provided that a Tribunal may dispense with the requirements of
clauses (a) and (b) and make an interim order as an exceptional
measure if it is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
that it is necessary so to do for preventing any loss being caused
to the applicant which cannot be adequately compensated in
money but any such interim order shall, if it is not sooner
vacated, cease to have effect on the expiry of a period of fourteen
days from the date on which it is made unless the said
requirements have been complied with before the expiry of that
period and the Tribunal has continued the operation of the
interim order.”
42. Section 27 of the Act of 1985 also provides the mechanism for
execution of orders passed by the Tribunal. Furthermore, Section
35 and 36 also empowers the appropriate government to make
rules for efficient functioning of the Tribunals.
43. In exercise of the powers under Sections 35 and 36 of the Act of
1985, the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1986 have been framed and Rule 15 of the said rules provides a
timeline of 6 months to the KSAT for deciding the applications.
Additionally, Rule 17 envisages the ex-parte hearing of an
application.
44. Further, Section 17 of the Act of 1985, gives the power to the
Tribunals to the Tribunal to punish for contempt. In exercise of
the same, the KSAT has framed the Karnataka Administrative
Tribunal (Contempt of Tribunal Proceedings) Rules, 1987 to deal
with contempt.
Page 32 of 35

45. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 22 of the Act of
1985, the KSAT framed the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal
(Review Applications) Regulation, 1994 which provides for the
powers and procedure of the KSAT to deal with applications for
the review of any order passed by the Tribunal.
46. What emerges from the foregoing exposition of law is that the
KSAT is equipped with all the powers to effectively and
holistically deal with a matter presented before it and do
complete justice to the same.
47. Thus, we are of the considered view that the Division Bench of
the High Court has rightly set aside the judgment passed by the
Single Judge and had not committed any illegality in partly
allowing the appeals by the first set of appellants (A) and
relegating the matter to the KSAT for adjudication. The Division
Bench of the High Court had rightly held that their writ petitions
before the High Court are not maintainable.
48. So far as the contention of the appellants of the first set of
appeals (A), that the Division Bench has erred in not reviving the
provisional select list dated 18.11.2022, we are of the view that
the same has no merit since, the appellants of the first set of the
appeals (A) were figured in only the provisional select list issued
Page 33 of 35

on 18.11.2022 and, therefore, no right has been accrued to them.
Any direction issued by the High Court to act on, the provisional
select list dated 18.11.2022 would result in confusion and a
complex situation and, therefore, we do not find any error in the
impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court,
wherein it has not revived the provisional select list dated
18.11.2022.
49. As a result, this batch of appeals is dismissed. The interim
directions passed by this Court on 03.01.2024, 22.01.2024 and
04.10.2024 are made absolute with a clarification that the 500
posts which were kept reserved pursuant to the Order dated
04.10.2024 shall be filled as per the final judgment passed by the
KSAT.
50. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is expected that the
KSAT shall make every endeavour to decide any application
preferred on behalf of the appellants of the second set of appeals
(B) pursuant to liberty granted by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Karnataka vide impugned judgment, expeditiously,
preferably within six months from the date of filing of such
application/applications. Further, it is made clear herein that we
have only dealt with the maintainability of the writ petitions
Page 34 of 35

before the High Court and not gone into the merits of the instant
case.
51. With these observations, the present appeals and all
pending/interim applications stand disposed of.
………………………. J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)



………………………. J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
NEW DELHI,
th
Dated: 16 October, 2025
Page 35 of 35