Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 577 OF 2022
Indrajeet Yadav .. Appellant
Versus
Santosh Singh and Anr. .. Respondents
With
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 578 OF 2022
Indrajeet Yadav ..Appellant
Versus
Avdhesh Singh @ Chhunnu Singh and Anr. ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Signature Not Verified
M. R. Shah, J.
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2022.04.19
17:48:52 IST
Reason:
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1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
common judgment and order dated 30.03.2019 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal
No.1083 of 2012 and Criminal Appeal No.1178 of 2012 by which
the High Court has allowed the said appeals preferred by the
original accused and has acquitted them for the offences
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’), the original complainant/informant
has preferred the present appeals.
2. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –
original complainant/informant and learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the State have drawn our attention to the fact that
in the present case the arguments in the appeals were concluded
on 30.03.2019 and the High Court allowed the said appeals on
the very day and pronounced the operative portion of the order
and set aside the judgment and order of conviction passed by
the learned Trial Court and directed the accused who was in jail
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to be released, but a reasoned judgment and order was
pronounced after a period of approximately five months.
3.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant –
original complainant/informant has heavily relied upon the
recent decision of this Court dated 29.10.2020 in Civil Appeal
in the case of
No.3564 of 2020 Balaji Baliram Mupade & Anr.
versus The State of Maharashtra, by which such a practice of
pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment has
been deprecated. It is submitted that in the aforesaid case this
Hon’ble Court considered another decision of this Court in the
case of
State of Punjab & Ors. versus Jagdev Singh Talwandi,
(1984) 1 SCC 596 as well as other decisions referred in para 4
of the said decision. It is submitted that this Court also
considered in detail another decision in the case of Anil Rai
versus State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 by which guidelines
have been issued by this Court regarding the pronouncement of
judgments and orders.
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4. Applying the law laid down in the case of Balaji Baliram
Mupade (supra) and the earlier decisions of this Court in the
case of to the facts of the case
Jagdev Singh Talwandi (supra)
on hand, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court is unsustainable.
4.1 In the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra) in
paragraphs 1 to 4 it is observed and held as under:
“1. Judicial discipline requires promptness in
delivery of judgments – an aspect repeatedly
emphasized by this Court. The problem is
compounded where the result is known but not
the reasons. This deprives any aggrieved party of
the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal
in the next tier of judicial scrutiny.
2. A Constitution Bench of this Court as far back
as in the year 1983 in the State of Punjab & Ors.
v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi 1984 (1) SCC 596 drew
the attention of the High Courts to the serious
difficulties which were caused on account of a
practice which was increasingly being adopted by
several High Courts, that of pronouncing the final
orders 2 without a reasoned judgment. The
relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:
“30. We would like to take this opportunity to
point out that serious difficulties arise on account
of the practice increasingly adopted by the High
Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a
reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final
order which the High Court intends to pass
should not be announced until a reasoned
judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose,
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for example, that a final order without a reasoned
judgment is announced by the High Court that a
house shall be demolished, or that the custody of
a child shall be handed over to one parent as
against the other, or that a person accused of a
serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is
unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a
detenu be released from detention. If the object of
passing such orders is to ensure speedy
compliance with them, that object is more often
defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special
Leave Petition in this Court against the order
passed by the High Court. That places this Court
in a predicament because, without the benefit of
the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for
this Court to allow the bare order to be
implemented. The result inevitably is that the
operation of the order passed by the High Court
has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned
judgment.”
3. Further, much later but still almost two
decades ago, this Court in Anil Rai v. State of
Bihar 2001 (7) SCC 318 deemed it appropriate to
provide some guidelines regarding the
pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to
be followed by all concerned under the mandate of
this Court. It is not necessary to reproduce the
directions except to state that normally the
judgment is expected within two months of the
conclusion of the arguments, and on expiry of
three months any of the parties can file an
application in the High Court with prayer for early
judgment. If, for any reason, no judgment is
pronounced for six months, any of the parties is
entitled to move an application before the then
Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to
reassign the case before another Bench for fresh
arguments.
4. The aforementioned principle has been
forcefully restated by this Court on several
occasions including in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh
& Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [AIR 2004 SC
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3467 paras 8082], Mangat Ram v. State of
Haryana (2008) 7 SCC 96 paras 510] and most
recently in Ajay Singh & Anr. Etc. v. State of
Chhattisgarh & Anr. AIR 2017 SC 310.”
4.2 Despite the strong observations made by this Court as far
as back in the year 1984 and thereafter repeatedly reiterated,
still the practice of pronouncing only the operative portion of the
judgment without a reasoned judgment and to pass a reasoned
judgment subsequently has been continued. Such a practice of
pronouncing the final orders without a reasoned judgment has
to be stopped and discouraged.
4.3 For immediate reference the order passed in the present
case speaks for itself. The High Court heard the arguments on
30.03.2019 and passed only the following order on that day:
"Heard Sri V. M. Zaidi, Senior Advocate
assisted by Sri M. J. Akhtar, learned counsel for
the appellant in the Criminal Appeal No. 1083 of
2012 and Sri Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant in connected Criminal Appeal No. 1178
of 2012, Sri J. K. Upadhyay, learned A.G.A. for the
State and Sri P. C. Srivastava, learned counsel for
the informant.
We are making the operative order here and
now. We will give reasons later.
Both the appeals are allowed. The impugned
judgement and order dated 24.02.2012 passed by
Additional District and ∙ Session Judge, T.E.C.P.,
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Court No. 1, Azamgarh in S.T. No. 151 of 2009 is
hereby setaside.
Appellant Santosh Singh in Criminal Appeal
No. 1083 of 2012 is on bail. He need not
surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled and his
sureties discharged.
Appellant Avdhesh Singh @ Chhunnu Singh
in connected Criminal Appeal No. 1178 of 2012 is
in jail. He shall be released forthwith unless he is
wanted in some other case.
Both the appellants shall comply with the
provisions of Section 437A Cr.P. C. within one
month from today.
There shall however, be no order as to costs."
4.4 From the record of proceedings it appears that the
reasoned judgment was pronounced and uploaded after a period
of almost five months. Therefore, applying the law laid down by
this Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove, we set aside
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
without further entering into the merits of the case nor
expressing anything on merits in favour of either party. We
remand the appeals to the High Court to decide the same afresh
in accordance with law and on its own merits. We request the
High Court to finally decide and dispose of the appeals at the
earliest and preferably within a period of six months from the
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date of the receipt of the present order. However, it is observed
that during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court
the accused need not surrender and they may be treated to have
been released on bail and continued to be released on bail,
however subject to the ultimate outcome of the appeals before
the High Court. If the conviction is sustained the accused shall
surrender within a period of two weeks from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment.
Present appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid
extent. Registry is directed to return the record of
proceedings of the case received to the High Court forthwith.
….…………………………….J.
[M. R. Shah]
…………………………………J
[B.V. Nagarathna]
New Delhi,
April 19, 2022