Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HIMALAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT28/03/1980
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
KOSHAL, A.D.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 1118 1980 SCR (3) 235
1980 SCC (3) 223
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1980 SC1316 (7)
D 1988 SC2139 (3)
RF 1990 SC1321 (3)
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act 1894 (1 of 1894) Section 18(1) &
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1962 (31 of 19623 Section 7
Scope of.
Land acquisition proceeding ’person interested’ who is
Acquisition for company before July 20, 1962-Possession
not vesting in government-acquisition not complete-
Invalidity not cured by Section 7 of amending Act.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant a private company was carrying on the
business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and
tiles. In or about 1957 the company moved the Government for
acquiring additional land for purposes of the company and
the Government on January 7, 1958 issued a notification
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which was
followed by a separate notice by the Land Acquisition
officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by
another notification under section 6 of the Act which was
served on the respondent on January 25, 1960. The purpose of
the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as
"public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan
Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd." The acquisition proceedings
culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on
April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on
April 18, 1961. On December 11, 1961 a letter was written on
behalf of the Government informing the owner of the acquired
land that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of
January, 1962.
The first respondent in his writ petition to the High
Court, contended that the Government was not competent to
acquire the land for purposes of a private company which
could not be said to be a public purpose under section 4 of
the Act and prayed that the entire land acquisition
proceedings should be quashed. A Single Judge of the High
Court accepted the plea, allowed the writ petition and
quashed the land acquisition proceedings along with the
notifications.
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The appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent
Bench which confirmed the view of the Single Judge and
dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had no
locus standi to file the appeal, as it was not ’a person
interested’ within the meaning of section 18(1) of the Act.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf
of the appellant: (1) the Letters Patent Bench of the High
Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not ’a
person interested’ and therefore had no locus standi to file
an appeal, and (2) in view of the various amendments in the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 particularly in sections 40 and
41 it could not be said that the acquisition under section 4
was ultra vires of the Act.
236
Dismissing the appeal,
^
HELD: 1(i) The appellant was undoubtedly ’a person
interested’ as contemplated by section 18(1) of the Act. The
High Court committed an error in throwing out the appeal of
the appellant on the ground that it had no locus standi to
file an appeal before the Bench. [243F]
(ii) The ’definition of ’a person interested’ given in
Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally
construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly
or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or
in the quantum of compensation. [240D]
In the instant case, the lands were actually acquired
for the purpose of the Company and once the land vested in
the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to
the Company under the agreement entered into between the
Company and the Government. Thus it cannot be said that the
Company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly,
since under the agreement the Company had to pay the
compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing
that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the
Company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money.
For this purpose, the Company could undoubtedly appear and
adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of
compensation. [240E-F]
(iii) The preponderance of judicial opinion seems to
favour the view that the definition of person interested
must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local
authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is
acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the
compensation. This view accords with the principles of
equity, justice and good conscience. [243 B]
(iv) The view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by
the Calcutta High Court that a company, Local authority or a
person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an
interested person is not correct. Such a person is vitally
interested both in the title to the property as also in the
compensation to be paid thereof because both these factors
concern its future course of action and if decided against
him seriously prejudice his rights. [243E]
Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas [1968] 1 S.C.R. 362 referred
to; The Hindustan Sanitryware and Industries Ltd.
Bahadurgarh & Anr. v. The State of Haryana & Ors A.I.R.
[1972] Punjab & Haryana 59, M. Kurpuswami v. The Special
Tahsildar (L.A.) II Industrial Estate Ambathur at Saidapet,
Madras {1967] 1 M.L.J. 329 approved; Comilla Electric Supply
Ltd. v. East Bengal Bank Ltd. Comilla & ors. A.I.R. [1939]
Calcutta 669; State of orissa through the Land Acquisition
Collector, Sambalpur v. Amarandra Pratap Singh & Anr. A.I.R.
[1967] orissa, 180 over-ruled.
2(i) The properties not having vested in the Government
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the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could
not be cured by section 7 of the amendment Act. [246 G]
(ii) The basis of the decision in R. L. Arora v. State
of U. P. [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 149 was removed by the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1962. By virtue of Section 7 of
the amending Act, retrospective effect was given to the
amendment superseding any judgment, decree or order passed
before July 20, 1962. The validity of the amending Act was
upheld in R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1964] 6
S.C.R. 784. [239 A, E]
(iii) Even under section 7 of the amending Act, an
acquisition made by a company prior to July 20, 1962 must
fulfil the following conditions: (a) that
237
the land has been acquired and is vested in Government, (b)
that the acquisition has been made under Clauses (a) and (b)
or section 41, (c) that every such acquisition and any
proceeding, order etc. shall be deemed always as valid as if
the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended
by the amending Act, were in force at all material times;
and (d) that by virtue of section 7 validity to the
acquisition is given to all actions taken in connection
there with in spite of any judgment, decree or order of any
court to the contrary. [244F-H]
In the instant case the first condition that there must
be a complete acquisition before section 7 could validate
the same has not been fulfilled at all. [245A]
(iv) Until the possession of the entire land acquired
was taken by the Government, the acquisition could not be a
complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of
section 7 of the amending Act. [246H-247A]
In the instant case the appellant did not appear before
the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the.
respondents and the petition was contested only by the
State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as his
interests were fully safeguarded lay the Government, it was
not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High
Court. The pleas of both the parties taken together clearly
show that the entire possession of the property did not pass
to the Government and thus no title vested, in the
Government despite the notification acquiring the land.
[246F-G]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1098 of
1971 .
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 23-7-1970 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 13 of
1965. Y. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwal for the
Appellant.
V. S. Desai, Mrs. Urmila Sirur far the Respondent Nos.
2 & 3. Ex-parte for the RR 4 and 5.
The Judgment of the Court was Delivered by
FAZALALI, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed
against a judgment dated November 3, 1970 of the Bombay High
Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the
appellant Against a decision of a Single Judge allowing a
writ petition filed by the first respondent.
The facts of the case lie within a narrow Compass and
may briefly summarized as follows:
The appellant was a private company which was carrying
on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial
marbles and tiles and other accessories at village Majas
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Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay. The Company Was spread over
about 10 acres of land. Sometime in 1957 or 1958 the company
moved the Government for acquiring additional land for
purposes of the Company. Accordingly, on the 7th January,
1958, the Government issued a notification under section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to
238
as the ’Act’) which was followed by a separate notice by the
Land Acquisition officer acquiring the land in dispute. This
was followed by another notification under s. 6 of the Act
which was served on the respondent on the 25th January,
1960. In pursuance of these notifications the acquisition
proceedings went on which culminated in an award made under
s. 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in
the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December 11, 1961, a
letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the
owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on
or about the 12th of January 1962. The purpose of the
acquisition, as mentioned in the notification, was ’public
purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles &
Marbles (Pvt.) Ltd’. The first respondent in the writ
petition filed in the High Court before a Single Judge
prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings should
be quashed because the land was not acquired for any public
purpose as contemplated by s. 4 of the Act. It was contended
before the Single Judge that the Government was not
competent to acquire the land for purposes of a private
company which could not be said to be a public purpose under
s. 4 of the Act. The plea taken by the first respondent
found favour with the Single Judge who allowed the writ
petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings
alongwith the notifications mentioned above.
Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the
Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view taken by the
Single Judge and dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground
that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal
before the Bench inasmuch as it was not a person interested
within the meaning of s. 18(1) of the Act.
In support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the
appellant, Dr. Chitale, has argued two points before us. In
the first place, it was submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was
not a person interested and therefore had no locus to file
an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench. Secondly, it was
argued that in view of the various amendments in the Act,
particularly in ss. 40 and 41, it could not be said that the
acquisition under s. 4 was ultra vires of the Act. We might
mention here that in the case of R.L. Arora v. State of U.P.
majority of the Judges of this Court took the view that a
mere acquisition for the benefit of a company was not a
public purpose and therefore the notification made in that
case was struck down. Sarkar, J., however, took a contrary
view. In view of the decision Parliament amended certain
provisions of the Act particularly ss. 40, 41, 44A, 44B and
added a new sub-
239
section 5A after section 5. In other words, by virtue of the
amendments, the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court
in the first Arora case was removed. By virtue of s. 7 of
the amending Act, retrospective effect was given to the
amendment superseding any judgment, decree or order passed
before July 20, 1962. Section 7 of the amending Act may be
extracted thus:
Validation of certain acquisitions
"7. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or older
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of any Court, every acquisition of land for a Company
made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of
the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962,
shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of
the purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of
sub-section (I) of section 40 of the principal Act, be
deemed to have been made for the purpose mentioned in
clause (a) of the said sub-section, and accordingly
every such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed
always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of
sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by
this Act, were in force at all material times when such
acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order
was made or agreement was entered into or action I was
taken...."
This amending Act was also challenged in the case of
R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors., ’where this
Court upheld its constitutional validity subject to certain
corrosions. ’The Appellant contended before us that in view
of the later decision of the Supreme Court the previous
decision of this Court stood superseded and the land
acquisition proceedings taken even before the amendments
were validated. In support of this argument, Dr. Chitale
drew our attention to various provisions of the Act.
Before, however, deciding the question as to whether or
not the proceedings taken under s. 4 were cured by the
amending Act, we would first deal with the contention of Dr.
Chitale that the High Court w IS wrong in holding that the
company had no locus standi to file an appeal before the
Letters Patent Bench. Learned counsel submitted that the
definition of ’a person interested’ in s. 18 is an inclusive
one and is wide enough to include the appellant for whose
benefit the land was acquired and who had to pay the entire
compensation in accordance with the agreement entered into
by the Government with the appellant. He argued that it
could not be said that the appellant was not interested in
defending the acquisition or in the
240
quantum of compensation which was to be awarded by the Court
on a Reference made by the Collector. The High Court was of
the view that as the land was acquired by the Government,
the company had no interest in the same and was, therefore,
not entitled either to appear or to defend the proceedings
before the court. In order to decide this question it may be
necessary to extract the relevant part of s. 18(1) which
runs thus:-
"18(1). Any person interested who has not accepted
the award may, by written application to the Collector,
require that the matter be referred by the Collector
for the determination of the Court, whether his
objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount
of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable,
or the apportionment of the compensation among the
persons interested."
It seems to us that the definition of ’a person
interested’ given in s. 18 is an inclusive definition and
must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who
may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title
to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the
instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were
actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once
the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it
stood transferred the company under the agreement entered
into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot
be said that the company had no claim or title to the land
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at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had
to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in
seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so
that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of
money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly
appear and adduce IF evidence on the question of the quantum
of compensation.
So far as this aspect of matter is concerned, there
appears to be a general consensus of judicial opinion that
even though the company may not have any title to the
property yet it certainly has a right to appear and put
forward its case in the matter of determination of the
quantum of compensation. In the case of Sunder Lal v.
Paramsukh das(l) this Court observed as follows:
"It will be noticed that it is an inclusive
definition. It is not necessary that in order to fall
within the definition a person should claim an interest
in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a
person interested if he claims an interest in
compensation to be awarded. It seems
241
to us that Paramsukhdas is a "person interested" within
s. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an interest in
compensation.
..... ...... ...... ...... ....
It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a
person interested in the objections which were pending
before the Court in the references made to it and that
he was also a person whose interest would be affected
by the objections, within s.2l. He was accordingly
entitled to be made a party."
In the case of The Hindustan Sanitaryware and
Industries Ltd. Bhadurgarh & Anr. v. The State of Haryana &
Ors Pandit J. observed as follows:-
"From the facts stated above, it is apparent that
the compensation amount has to be paid by the two
companies. If the said amount is increased by the
learned Additional District Judge on a reference under
section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be the
two companies who would be prejudiced .... No authority
even was cited by him that under similar circumstances
any Court had ever held that the persons who had
actually to pay the compensation, could not be allowed
to lead evidence and say that the compensation amount
be not enhanced."
In the case of Comilla Electric Supple Ltd. v. East
Bengal Bank Ltd., Comila & Ors while the High Court took the
view that the company for whose benefit the land was
acquired may not strictly be an interested person yet it had
undoubtedly a right to appear and adduce evidence on the
quantum of compensation. In this connection, Mukherjea, J.
Observed thus:-
"Section 50, cl. (2) purports to remedy this
disability and it lays down that in any proceeding held
before a Collector or Court in such cases the local
authority or company concerned may appear and adduce
evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of
compensation. The reason is plain. It is the company or
the local authority who has got to pay the money in
such cases and it would be unjust to deny them the
right to appear and adduce
242
evidence which would have a bearing on the amount of
the compensation money."
Roxburgh, J. made the following observations:-
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"Thus the first question for decision is clearly
settled by the above decision and there can be no doubt
that in the circumstances at present being considered
the company is a person interested, as defined in the
Act, and is entitled to require a reference under s. 18
unless that right is restricted by the terms of the
proviso to s. 50(2)."
In the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar
(L.A.) II Industrial Estate, Anzbathur at Saidapet, Madras
Venkatadri, J. interpreting the definition of ’interested
person’ observed as follows:-
"The only question for consideration therefore is
whether the petitioner is a person interested, as
defined in section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.
The definition section says that the expression
’person interested’ includes all persons claiming an
interest in compensation to be made on account of the
acquisition of land under the Act. The expression
’person interested’ is Every comprehensive and it does
not profess to give an exhaustive definition. The
expression ’person interested’ has been interpreted by
various Courts, and the trend of the opinion seems to
be that I should give a liberal interpretation ...
On a review of the case-law on the subject, it
seems to me that the expression ’person interested’
does not require that a person must really have an
interest in the land sought to be acquired. It is
enough if he claims an interest in compensation, as
distinguished from an interest in the property sought
to be acquired. As long as a person claims a interest
in the compensation, he is a person interested within
the meaning of the definition of that expression."
The only case which appears to have taken a contrary
view is a Division Bench decision of the Orissa High Court
in the case of State of Orissa through the Land Acquisition
Collector, Sambalpur v. Amarandra Pratap Singh & Anr., (2)
where the High Court held that
243
the expression ’person interested’ did not include a local
authority or a company on whose behalf acquisition is made
by the State. At the same time, it was clearly held that it
was open to the company in any proceeding before the
Collector or court to appear and adduce evidence for the
purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to
favour the view that the definition of ’person interested’
must be liberally construed so as to’ include a body, local
authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is
acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the
compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the
principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can
it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is
acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person
interested even though its stake may be extremely vital ?
For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held
to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely
deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to
him. Similarly if such a person is not heard by the
Collector or a court, he may have to pay a very heavy
compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a
court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was
far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the
land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken
by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court
that a company, local authority or a person or whose benefit
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the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are
satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in
the title to the property as also in the compensation to be
paid therefor because both these factors concern its future
course of action and if decided against him, seriously
prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of
this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was
undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by s. 18(1)
of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in
throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that
it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench.
The next point that was argued before us was as to
whether the land acquisition proceedings are cured by s. 7
of the amending Act referred to above. Mr. V.S. Desai,
appearing for the respondents, submitted that in the second
Arora case (supra) while upholding the constitutional
validity of s. 4 and other amendments, this Court laid down
certain conditions which had to be fulfilled if an
acquisition made prior to July 20, 1962 was held to be
valid. In this connection, 11 reliance was placed by learned
counsel for the respondents on the following passage from
R.L. Arrora’s case (supra):
244
"Therefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition
made before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that
the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has
vested in Government. This means that the land acquired
has vested in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17(1)
of the Act. Thus s. 7 of the Amendment Act validates
such acquisitions in which property has vested
absolutely in Government either under s. 16 or s.
17(1). Secondly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that
where acquisition has been made for a company before
July 20, 1962 or purported to have been made under
cl.(a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and those clauses do not
apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R.L.
Arora’s case [1962 (2) Supp. S.C.R. 149], it shall be
deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose
mentioned in cl. (aa) as inserted in s.40(1) of the Act
by the Amendment Act. Thirdly s. 7 of the Amendment Act
provides that every such acquisition and any
proceeding, order, agreement, or action in connection
with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed
always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of
ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment
Act were in force at all material times when any action
was taken for such acquisition. Finally, this validity
is given to such acquisitions and to all actions taken
in connection therewith not with standing any judgment,
decree or order of any court."
A perusal of these observations would manifestly reveal
that even under s. 7 of the amending Act, an acquisition
made for a company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfil the
following conditions:-
(a) that the land has been acquired and is vested in
Government :
(b) that the acquisition has been made under clauses
(a) and (b) of s. 40(I)
(c) that every such acquisition and any proceeding,
order, etc., shall be deemed always as valid as if
the pro visions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as
amending by the amending Act, were in force at all
material times; and
(d) that by virtue of s. 7 validity to the acquisition
is given to all actions taken in connection
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therewith inspite of any judgment. decree or order
of any court to the contrary.
245
We are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the
first condition adumbrated by this Court, viz., that there
must be a complete acquisition before s. 7 could validate
the same, has not been fulfilled at all. In this view of the
matter we need not go into the other conditions indicated by
this Court.
It was contended by Mr. Desai that according to the
unchallenged pleadings of the respondents, including the
Government, which was a party before the District Court and
also before the Single Judge of the High Court, there is
nothing to show that after the issue of notification the
Government had taken possession of the land so that it could
be said that the land had vested in the Government in which
case alone the acquisition proceedings would have been
completed. In this connection, our attention was drawn to
para 1 of the petition filed by the respondents before the
High Court, which runs thus:
"The petitioners have. become the owners of the said
lands by inheritance, and the present lands records in
respect of the said lands stand in the name of the
petitioners. There is no dispute between the
petitioners and the respondents that the petitioners
are the owners of the said immovable property. The
petitioners were at all times and still are in
possession of the said immovable properties."
According to this averment, it is clearly pleaded that
inspite of the notifications, the possession had not been
given to the Government and the respondents (petitioners
before the High Court) were still in possession of the
properties in question. A similar averment has been made in
para 15 of the petition which may be extracted thus:-
"The petitioners say that they are still in possession
of the said lands and possession of the said lands has
not been taken away from them and the tenants of the
petitioners numbering about 53 at present are in
physical] occupation of the same."
It was also alleged that the Government had threatened
the petitioners in the High Court that possession would be
taken through police but despite such threats given by the
Government, the petitioners were still in possession of the
said lands and the structures were in possession of the
tenants. The Government in its reply-affidavit did not deny
these averments. On the other hand, they admitted the same.
Para 8 of the reply-affidavit may be extracted thus:
"with reference to paragraph 1 of the petition, I
believe the contents thereof to be substantially
correct though as stated above the petitioners’ names
do not appear as
246
occupants or owners in the record of rights relating to
the land in question."
Similarly, in para 21 of the reply, the contents of para 15
of the petition were admitted and further the fact that
possession was with the petitioners, was not denied but was
admitted to be correct. Para 21 of the reply-affidavit runs
thus:-
"21. With reference to paragraph 15 of the petition, I
believe the contents thereof to be substantially
correct."
Learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our
attention to a letter sent by the respondents and went on to
show that possession of only one acre of land has been taken
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by the Government. Even the High Court clearly found that
possession had not been fully delivered to the Government
after the notification. In this connection, the Division
Bench observed as follows:-
"on the question of possession being delivered to the
Government the petitioners specifically averred at the
end of paragraph 15 of the petition. "The Petitioners
further say that notwithstanding the said letter and
the threat therein contained the petitioners are still
in possession of the said lands and their tenants are
occupying the said structures standing thereon and
possession thereof has not been taken by the
respondents". They made similar averments at the end of
paragraph l of the petition, that "the petitioners were
at all times and still are in possession of the said
immovable properties"."
Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the
Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondents
and the petition was con tested only by the State. Perhaps
the appellant may have thought that as its interests were
fully safeguarded by the Government, it was not necessary
for it at that stage to appear before the High Court. Even
so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly
show that the entire possession of the property did not pass
to the Government and thus no title vested in the Government
despite the notification acquiring the land. In these
circumstances, therefore, it is unmistakably clear that the
properties not having vested in the Government, the
acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be
cured by s. 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this
Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone
the appellant must fail. Dr. Chitale, however, suggested
that out of 2.2 acres, possession of one acre may have been
taken by the Government. Assuming that to be so, until the
possession of the entire land acquired was taken
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by the Government, the acquisition could not be a complete
acquisition so as to attract the operation of s. 7 of the
amending Act. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied
that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the
essential conditions for application of s. 7 of the amending
Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the
acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilled. The
inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the land
acquisition proceedings were void and no benefit accrued to
the appellant from the amending Act. The result is that the
appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of
the case there will be no orders as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
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