Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
VANKAMAMIDI VENKATA SUBBA RAO
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
CHATLAPALLI SEETHARAMARATHARANGANAYAKAMMA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/04/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh,
made on 23.3.1985 in Appeal No. 543 of 1977.
The admitted facts are that one V. Satyanarayana has
executed a will dated December 1, 1950 bequeathing 2.66
acres of wet land in favour of his wife Smt. Raghavamma and
also another gift deed bequeathing lands in favour of his
daughter Smt. Seetharamratna Ranganayakamma, the respondent
herein. He died on December 2, 1950 leaving behind him his
widow Raghavamma, his minor son, the appellant herein and
his daughter the respondent. Subsequently, this widow
Raghavamma filed OS No.182/53 in the Sub-Court, Tenali for
partition of all the properties into equal shares between
herself and the appellant. Therein a compromise was effected
and a decree in terms thereof under Ex.A-11 was passed on
July 13, 1955. Under the comprise decree, the property
bequeathed in favour of the respondent. Ranganayakamma was
affirmed. The properties sold by the appellant to the third
party also was affirmed. the balance property was
partitioned in equal shares 6.5 acres with a right of
reversion to the appellant on the demise of Raghavamma.
Subsequently, on April 25, 1959, the appellant has executed
another gift deed to an extent of 1.50 acres of land in
favour of third party jointly with his mother wherein she
acknowledged that the property has by Raghavamma under
compromise decree under Ex.A-11 was conferred with a limited
interest in terms thereof. Thereby, she had acknowledged
that she had a life interest in the properties and under the
compromise decree. Equally, the appellant has executed
another gift deed to an extent of 1.97 acres bequeathing
under Ex.A-4 in favour of his mother to enjoy the property
during her life time as limited owner. She accepted, acted
on and enjoyed for life. This was also pursuant to the
compromise decree under Ex.A-11. Therein also she had
acknowledged that she had life interest in the compromise
decree under Ex.A-11. After the estate was abolished under
the AP(AA) Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act 1948 (for short, the ‘Abolition Act’), the claim under
Section 15 of the Act was filed. Thereunder, the husband of
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the respondent laid the claim for Ryotwari patta. The
Settlement Officer negatived the claim of the appellant and
granted patta in favour of Krishnamurthy, namely, the
husband of the respondent. On appeal, in TAS No. 84/61 dated
December 3, 1962, the appellate authority set aside the
order and granted joint patta in favour of appellant No.1
and his mother Raghavamma. On her demise on April 7, 1973,
the appellant filed an application and patta to the entire
extent was granted exclusively in favour of the first
appellant.
Raghavamma had executed a will in favour of the
respondent bequeathing the property obtained under Ex.A-11.
In furtherance thereof, the respondent filed OS No. 94/73 of
possession of the properties under the will dated July 6,
1972. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, it was
decreed. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
The only question that arises for consideration is
whether Raghavamma, the mother of first respondent and the
appellant has a limited estate under the compromise decree
under Ex.A-11 attracting sub-section (2) of Section 14 or
the same was enlarged into an absolute estate by operation
of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 (for short, the ‘Act’). The High Court proceeded
on the premise that Raghavamma being a widow of
Satyanarayana had a right to partition under Hindu Women’s
Right to Property Act, 1937 and, therefore, when she has a
right to file a suit for partition of the property acquired
by her under Ex.A-11, compromise decree, is in recognition
of her pre-existing right to maintenance which was enlarged
into an absolute estate. Therefore, by operation of sub-
section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, the right was enlarged
into an absolute estate.
The question is: whether the view taken by the High
Court is correct in law? Shri C. Sitaramiah, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant contends that by virtue
of the settlement deeds, Ex.B-3 and A-4 dated April 25, 1959
executed by the first appellant jointly with his mother,
Raghavamma in favour of third party and Raghavamma being a
signatory to the document, had acknowledged that she has
only life interest in term of the compromise decree, Ex.A-11
which recites that she has life interest and on her demise
the property would revert back to the first appellant, the
will executed by her is neither valid nor binds the
appellant. In that view of the matter and in the light of
the patta granted by the Settlement Officer under Section 15
of the Act, the view taken by the High Court is not correct
and the suit itself is not maintainable. The right under
Section 14(2) will be only restricted right and, therefore,
she has no right to will away the property has by her under
Ex.A-11 in favour of the respondent.
Mr. A. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, on the other hand, contends that the compromise
decree is dated July 30, 1955, i.e., anterior to the coming
into force of the Succession Act. It is only in recognitions
of her pre-existing right, though her husband has executed a
will under which has bequeathed 2.66 acres for her life
towards maintenance which Will she did not accept. On the
other hand, in assertion of her right as a widow’s estate in
her husband’s property, she filed the suit for partition of
the property in two equal shares between herself and her
son, the appellant herein. Therein, the compromise decree
was effected under Ex.A-11. The compromise reiterates her
pre-existing right to maintenance. Therefore, this is not a
right acquired for the first time under Ex.A-11. It is only
in recognition of her properties given to her under Ex.A-11
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enlarged into an absolute right and operation of Section
14(1) of the Act. The gift deeds Ex.B-3 and A-4 executed on
April 25, 1959 between Raghavamma, the mother of the
respondent, and the first appellant must be understood in
the light of the mutual affection they has at that time.
Therefore, though there is a recital that she has only life
interest in the property has under the compromise decree,
that does not stand in her way to will away the properties
during her life time in favour of her daughter-the
respondent. Therefore, absolute right she had under Section
14(1) cannot be defeated by her accepting Exs.B-3 and A-4.
It is also contended that since her right under the will was
required to be established, the first respondent was not
required to approach the Settlement Authorities laying her
claim for patta.
Under these circumstances, the patta granted under
Section 15 of the Abolition Act does not stand in the way of
the Civil Court’s going into the question.
In view of the respective contentions, the question
that arises for consideration is: whether the compromise
decree, Ex.A-11, is only in recognition of pre-existing
right or whether Raghavamma has enlarged her limited right?
It is well settled legal position that if the right by
a Hindu woman under any instrument is in recognition of pre-
existing right, the limited right though prescribed under
the instrument, gets enlarged into an absolute right by
operation of Section 14(1) of the Act. On the other hand, if
a right is acquired for the first time under the document,
then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted and,
therefore, the right acquired under the instrument by
operation of sub-section (2) of Section 14 does not get
enlarged.
This controversy was considered by this Court in a
recent judgment rendered in C. Masilamani Mudaliar & Ors.
vs. Idol of Shri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil & Ors [(1996) 8
SCC 525]. In paragraph 27, this Court, after consideration
of the entire case law, has held as under:
"As held by this Court if the
acquisition of the property
attracts sub-section (1) of Section
14, sub-section (2) does not come
into play. If the acquisition is
for the first time, without any
vestige of pre-existing right under
the instrument, document or device
etc. then sub-section (2) of
Section 14 gets attracted. Sub-
section (2) being in the nature of
an exception, it does not engulf
and wipe out the operation of sub-
section (1). Sub-Section (2) of
Section 14 independently operates
in its own sphere. The right to
disposition of property by a Hindu
under Section 30 is required to be
understood in this perspective and
if any attempt is made to put
restriction female under an
instrument, document or device,
though executed after the Act has
come into force, it must be
interpreted in the light of the
facts and circumstance in each case
and to construe whether Hindu
female acquired or possessed the
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property in recognition of her pre-
existing right or she get the right
for the first time under the
instrument without any vestige of
pre-existing right. If the answer
is in the gets attracted. Thus
construed, both sub-section (1) and
(2) of Section 14 will be given
their full play without rendering
either as otiose or aids as menas
of avoidance."
Shri C. Sitaramiah, learned senior counsel, has placed
reliance on this paragraph and contends that since she has
acknowledged her limited right under compromise decree,
Ex.A-11, she acquired only limited right for the first time
under the compromise decree and, therefore, sub-section (1)
of Section 14 gets attracted. On the other hand, Mr. A.
Subba Rao, learned counsel contends that this ratio squarely
applies to the facts in this case. There also a compromise
decree was executed. Thereunder, the right was given
enlarging the limited estate of a widow into an absolute
estate attracting section 14(1) of the Act and, therefore,
the ratio is in hi favour.
In view of the respective contentions, the question is;
what right Raghavamma acquired under the document - Ex.A-11?
Ex.A-11 expressly mentions as under:
"The plaintiff gets the property
marked in blue pencil in the plan
attached hereto and on her death
the same shall devolve on the Ist
defendant (first appellant) and
that Ist defendant do get the
residuary properties shown in the
plan hereto. (more fully described
in the compromise petition)."
It is true, as rightly contended by Mr. Subba Rao, that
a compromise decree was passed in July, 1955; it was in
recognition of her pre-existing right. But how she has
understood her limited right gets reflected in subsequent
documents to which she was admittedly a partly and dealt
with after the Act came into force pursuant to the
compromise decree.
Raghavamma, the mother of the first respondent and the
first appellant has executed a sale deed, Ex.B-3, in favour
of the third party alienating 1.50 acres of land has under
the compromise decree. Therein she has specifically stated
that she has a life interest in terms of the compromise
decree, Ex.A-11. Similarly, a gift deed was executed in
favour of Raghavamma by the first appellant in respect of
1.90 acres of land. Thereunder also, she had acknowledged
not only the limited estate had under the compromise decree
but also her limited right under Ex.4 for enjoyment during
her life time and the possession given as per the compromise
decree. Thus, it could be seen that after the Act had come
into force, in 1959 she had acknowledged in Ex.A-3 and A-4
that what she obtained under the compromise decree, Ex.A-11,
was a limited right with the provision that the property
would revert to her son, the first appellant. Thus, it could
be seen that she had admitted that she had only limited
right acquired for the first time under the compromise
decree. Thereby, sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act
and not sub-section (1) of Section 14 stands attracted. That
apart, even the Settlement Officer has passed an order
granting ryotwari patta under Section 15 of the Abolition
Act which became final.
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This Court in Vatticherukuri Village Panchayat vs. Nori
Vnkatarama Deekshithulu & Ors. [(1991) Supp. 2 SCC 288],
after considering the entire case law, had held that the
civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness
of the patta granted by the Settlement Authorities. Under
Section 9, CPC, the Courts shall, subject to the provisions
contained therein, have jurisdiction to try all suits of
civil nature excepting suits cognizance of which is either
expressly or impliedly barred. When a legal right is
infringed, a suit would lie unless there is a bar against
entertainment of such civil suit and the civil Court would
take cognizance of its. Therefore, the normal rule of law is
that civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of
civil nature except those of which cognizance is either
expressly or by necessary implication excluded. The Rule of
construction being that every presumption would be made in
favour of the existence of a right and remedy in a
democratic set up governed by rule of law and jurisdiction
of the civil Court is assumed. The exclusion would,
therefore, normally be an exception. Court generally
construe the provisions strictly when jurisdiction of the
civil courts is claimed to be excluded. However, in the
development of civil adjudication of civil disputes, due to
pendency of adjudication and abnormal delay at hierarchical
stages, statutes intervene and provide alternative mode of
resolution of disputes with less expensive but expeditious
disposal. It is settled legal position that if a Tribunal
with limited jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction and
decide for itself the dispute conclusively, in such a
situation, it is the Court that is required to decide
whether the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction has correctly
assumed jurisdiction equally settled that when jurisdiction
is conferred on a Tribunal, the Court examine whether the
essential principle of jurisdiction have been followed and
decided by the Tribunal leaving the decision on merits t the
Tribunal. It is also equally settled legal position that
where a statute gives finality to the order of the special
Tribunal, the civil court’s jurisdiction must be held to be
excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what he civil
Court would normally do in a suit. Such a provision,
however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions
of the particular Act have not been complied with or the
statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the
fundamental principle of judicial procedure. Where there is
an express bar of jurisdiction of the Court, an examination
of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or
the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but
is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil
Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination
of the remedies and the scheme of the particular and the
result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case,
it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or
liability and provides procedure for the determination of
the right or liability and further lays down that all
questions about the said right or liability shall be
determined by the Tribunal so constituted and whether
remedies is normally associated with the action in civil
courts or prescribed by the statutes or not. Therefore, each
case requires examination whether the statute provides right
and remedies and whether the scheme of the Act is that the
procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes
the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect thereof.
After the advent of independence, the land reforms was one
of the policies of the Government abolishing fudal system of
land tenures and conforment of the Ryotwari patta on the
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tiller of the soil. Thereby, the land reform laws extinguish
pre-existing rights and create new rights under the Act. The
Act confers jurisdiction on the Tribunals in matter relating
thereto and hierarchy of appeals/revisions are provided
thereunder. Thereby, by necessary implication, the
jurisdiction of the civil Court to take cognizance of the
suits of civil nature covered under the land reform laws
stands excluded giving not only the finality to the decision
of the Tribunal but also ensuring expetitious, inexpensive
and simple procedure for disposal of the matters by the
Tribunal and make the Ryotwari patta granted to the tiller
of the soil conclusive. Under the normal course of civil
procedure, the jurisdiction of the trial of the civil suits
in relation to the matters covered under the Acts being time
consuming and tardy the lack of his financial support or
otherwise incapacity in defending or working the rights in
the civil courts and by hierarchy of appeals defeat justice.
Obviously, therefore, the civil suits by necessary
implication stand excluded unless the fundamental principle
of procedure are not followed by the Tribunals constituted
under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned
extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights
under the Act and requires Tribunals to enquire into the
rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against
the order of the primary authority. Thereby the right and
remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by
the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary
implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands
excluded.
Thus, it could be seen that the civil Court cannot
unsettle the patta which has become final in the decree now
passed pursuant to the declaration.
We are of the view that the Division Bench is not right
in granting the decree for the proprieties gifted to her
under the will dated 16.7.1972.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. But, in the
circumstance, without costs.