Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3179 of 2006
PETITIONER:
Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn.and Ors
RESPONDENT:
Mansaram Nainwal
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/07/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of SLP ( C ) No. 162 of 2006)
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Appellants call in question legality of the judgment
rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Uttaranchal High
Court. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge
set aside the order of termination passed by appellant No.2
and directed re-instatement of the respondent in service with
continuity of service, but without back wages.
Factual background needs to be noted in brief.
The respondent was appointed as Driver in appellant
No.1-U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the ’Corporation’). On 10.10.1990 while the
respondent was plying the bus No.UGA 938 on Mussoorie
road, all of a sudden the vehicle met with an accident and fell
into a ditch. Thereafter, a disciplinary enquiry was initiated
against the respondent in which the charges against the
respondent were found proved and the appellant vide its order
dated 31.3.1993 dismissed the respondent from service.
Thereafter, the respondent filed an appeal before appellant
No.2, which was rejected on 30.6.1993. Thereafter, the
respondent raised an industrial dispute under Section 4-K of
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ’Act’). The
industrial dispute decided by the award was referred in the
following terms:-
"Whether the termination of the services of
applicant/workman Sri Mansaram Nainwal
s/o Visheshware Dutt Nainwal, driver by the
employers from 31.3.1993 is unjustified
and/or illegal? If so, to which
benefit/compensation the applicant/workman
is entitled and to what extent?"
The Labour Court issued notice to the parties. The
appellants and the respondent filed their written
statement/objection. The stand of appellants before the
Labour Court was that the respondent was appointed as a
Driver. On 10.10.1990 when he was plying the bus No. UGA
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938 on Dehradun-Mussoorie Road, due to his rash and
negligent driving, the bus fell into the ditch in which 12
persons died and some other persons got seriously injured and
the bus was also got damaged as a result of which the
Corporation suffered a huge loss of Rs.2,50,000/-. It was also
pleaded that the respondent was charge sheeted and a
departmental enquiry was held against him in which full
opportunity of hearing was provided to the respondent. In the
enquiry, the charges against the respondent were found
proved and he was removed from the service.
On the other hand, the respondent in his written
statement accepted that he was served charge sheet and a
departmental enquiry was also held against him. But he
pleaded that the necessary documents were not being
produced though demand was made several times. The
Investigating Officer found him not guilty in the enquiry, even
though he was dismissed from service.
Labour Court found the respondent guilty and held that
the termination was not unjustified.
Challenging the order of Labour Court, the respondent
filed a Writ Petition which, as noted above, was allowed by the
impugned judgment. The foundation of the High Court’s
judgment was to the effect that in the criminal trial the
respondent was acquitted and placing reliance on a decision of
this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.
and Anr. (1999 (3) SCC 679) the order of termination was set
aside.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the ratio in Anthony’s case (supra)
has no application to the facts of the present case. It has not
even been indicated as to how the factual position is similar.
In any event, acquittal in a criminal case does not lead to an
automatic re-instatement and also does not render the
departmental proceedings invalid. It was, therefore, submitted
that the High Court was clearly wrong in its conclusion.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the departmental authorities in the enquiry
conducted against the respondent had clearly found that he
was not responsible for the accident and there was no
misconduct involved.
The position in law relating to acquittal in a criminal
case, its effect on departmental proceedings and re-
instatement in service has been dealt with by this Court in
Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (1997 (4) SCC
385). It was held in paragraph 5 as follows:
"5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted
by the criminal court but acquittal does not
automatically give him the right to be re-
instated into the service. It would still be open
to the competent authority to take decision
whether the delinquent government servant
can be taken into service or disciplinary action
should be taken under the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules.
Admittedly, the respondent had been working
as a temporary government servant before he
was kept under suspension. The termination
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order indicated the factum that he, by then,
was under suspension. It is only a way of
describing him as being under suspension
when the order came to be passed but that
does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal
of government employee does not
automatically entitle the government servant
to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be
open to the appropriate competent authority to
take a decision whether the enquiry into the
conduct is required to be done before directing
reinstatement or appropriate action should be
taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since
the respondent is only a temporary
government servant, the power being available
under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open
to the competent authority to invoke the said
power and terminate the services of the
employee instead of conducting the enquiry or
to continue in service a government servant
accused of defalcation of public money. Re-
instatement would be a charter for him to
indulge with impunity in misappropriation of
public money."
The ratio of Anthony’s case (supra) can be culled out
from paragraph 22 of the judgment which reads as follows:
"The conclusions which are deducible from
various decisions of this Court referred to
above are:
(i) Departmental proceedings and
proceedings in a criminal case can
proceed simultaneously as there is no bar
in their being conducted simultaneously,
though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the
criminal case are based on identical and
similar set of facts and the charge in the
criminal case against the delinquent
employee is of a grave nature which
involves complicated questions of law and
fact, it would be desirable to stay the
departmental proceedings till the
conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a
criminal case is grave and whether
complicated questions of fact and law are
involved in that case, will depend upon
the nature of offence, the nature of the
case launched against the employee on
the basis of evidence and material
collected against him during investigation
or as reflected in the charge sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii)
above cannot be considered in isolation to
stay the departmental proceedings but
due regard has to be given to the fact that
the departmental proceedings cannot be
unduly delayed.
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(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or
its disposal is being unduly delayed, the
departmental proceedings, even if they
were stayed on account of the pendency
of the criminal case, can be resumed and
proceeded with so as to conclude them at
an early date, so that if the employee is
found not guilty his honour may be
vindicated and in case he is found guilty,
the administration may get rid of him at
the earliest."
Though the High Court had not indicated as to how the
decision of this Court in Anthony’s case (supra) laid down as a
matter of law that whenever there is acquittal in a criminal
trial re-instatement is automatic, in all probabilities basis was
para 36 of Anthony’s case (supra) which reads as follows:
"36. For the reasons stated above, the appeal
is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court is set
aside and that of the learned Single Judge,
insofar as it purports to allow the writ petition,
is upheld. The learned Single Judge has also
given liberty to the respondents to initiate
fresh disciplinary proceedings. In the peculiar
circumstances of the case, specially having
regard to the fact that the appellant is
undergoing this agony since 1985 despite
having been acquitted by the criminal court in
1987, we would not direct any fresh
departmental enquiry to be instituted against
him on the same set of facts. The appellant
shall be reinstated forthwith on the post of
Security Officer and shall also be paid the
entire arrears of salary, together with all
allowances from the date of suspension till his
reinstatement, within three months. The
appellant would also be entitled to his cost
which is quantified at Rs.15,000/-."
(underlined for emphasis)
The High Court unfortunately did not discuss the factual
aspects and by merely placing reliance on earlier decision of
the Court held that reinstatement was mandated. Reliance on
the decision without looking into the factual background of the
case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a
precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own
features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving
judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a
Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which
the case is decided and for this reason it is important to
analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi.
According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every
decision contains three basic postulates \026 (i) findings of
material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of
facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct,
or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law
applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii)
judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A
decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is
of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every
observation found therein nor what logically flows from the
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various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation
of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court
has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State
of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC
647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors.
(1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what
it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges
in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an
Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.),
Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be
read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to
be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are
found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law
but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case
in which such expressions are found and a case is only an
authority for what it actually decides.
Unfortunately, the High Court has not discussed the
factual scenario as to how the Anthony’s case (supra) had any
application. As noted above, the position in law relating to
acquittal in a criminal case and question of re-instatement has
been dealt with in Sidhana’s case (supra). As the High Court
had not dealt with the factual scenario and as to how the
Anthony’s case (supra) helps the respondent, we think it
appropriate to remit the matter back to the High Court for
fresh consideration. Since the matter is pending for long, it
would be in the interest of the parties if the High Court is
requested to dispose of the writ petition within a period of 4
months from the date of receipt of this order.
The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no
order as to costs.