Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 416
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1487 OF 2025
SATBIR SINGH ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
RAJESH KUMAR AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. This criminal appeal arises out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.
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10653 of 2024, which is at the instance of Satbir Singh . Under challenge
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therein is the judgment and order dated 7 March, 2024 passed by a
learned Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Vide
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the impugned order, while allowing a revisional application filed by Rajesh
Kumar, Sagar @ Bittoo, Niraj and Ankit (respondents in the said special
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leave petition), the High Court set aside an order dated 13 September,
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2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal . The Sessions Judge,
by the order impugned in the revisional application, had allowed an
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.04.01
15:41:04 IST
Reason:
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the appellant
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impugned order
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CRR-1357-2021 (O&M)
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Sessions Judge
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application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed
by the appellant, seeking to summon Rajesh Kumar, Sagar @ Bittoo, Niraj
and Ankit as additional accused for facing trial along with the principal
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accused , for commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324,
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307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 34 thereof
as well as Section 25 of the Arms Act.
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2. Notice on the said special leave petition was issued on 13 August, 2024,
limited to the respondents 1 and 3 (Rajesh Kumar and Neeraj, respectively).
For the reasons recorded in such order, the special leave petition against
the respondents 2 and 4 (Sagar @ Bittoo and Ankit, respectively) stood
dismissed.
3. The appellant has since obtained special leave to appeal. He questions the
legality and correctness of the impugned order.
4. Service of notice on Rajesh Kumar and Neeraj having been effected, they
entered appearance and are represented by Mr Gagan Gupta, senior learned
counsel. The appellant is represented by Mr. Neeraj Kumar Jain, learned
senior counsel. We have heard both of them and perused the materials on
record.
5. We have also heard learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 5-
State of Haryana and perused the counter affidavit filed on its behalf.
6. Briefly put, the facts of the case are that on 09.02.2020 an information was
received in P.S. Sadar, Karnal that accused Mukesh and the appellant,
residents of village Rasulpur Khurd, District Karnal, were admitted in Civil
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Cr. PC
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Mukesh
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IPC
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Hospital, Karnal and Ram Chander Memorial Hospital, Karnal, respectively,
due to injuries received in an assault. The police officials of P.S. Sadar,
Karnal made abortive attempts to record the statements of the injured on
09.02.2020 and 10.02.2020, since the injured were not in a position to give
statements. On 12.02.2020, Mukesh stood discharged, whereas the
appellant continued to be unfit. The Investigating Officer recorded the
statement of Mukesh. Based on Mukesh’s statement, a First Information
Report came to be registered. During the course of investigation, X-Ray
report relating to injuries of Mukesh was obtained, in which a fracture was
reported. Medical opinion was also obtained, which did not rule out the
possibility of such injuries being self-suffered. The Investigating Officer
reached a conclusion that the allegations of Mukesh against the appellant
were not substantiated and, ultimately, submitted a closure report.
7. The appellant having regained consciousness on 14.02.2020 and certified
by the attending doctor to be fit, his statement was recorded. The appellant
disclosed that he was serving in the Indian Army and had come to his village
on leave. On 09.02.2020 at about 2.30 p.m., while playing volleyball, an
altercation had taken place with Mukesh who was playing for the opposite
team. Mukesh started slapping the appellant. Team members pacified and
separated them. However, Mukesh left threatening that the appellant would
be taught a lesson. After 15 minutes, Mukesh came armed with a knife,
accompanied by Neeraj, Sagar @ Bittoo, and Ankit armed with lathi, danda,
etc. Neeraj caught hold of the appellant and Mukesh gave a knife blow in
the waist of the appellant followed by another knife blow near his heart,
which penetrated up to the lungs. Sagar and Ankit had beaten the appellant
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with lathi and danda. The appellant further alleged that he was threatened
by Rajesh who exhorted that although the appellant had been taught a
lesson, he would be killed if he came back to the village again. Further, in
his statement, the appellant alleged that due to bleeding, he became
unconscious and came to know that he was brought to the hospital by
Amarjeet and Jai Singh. As per MLR of the appellant, he had two injuries
caused with sharp weapons. The Investigating Officer obtained the
discharge summary of the appellant on 20.02.2020 as well as medical
opinion, vide which injury no.1 pertaining to chest was reported as
dangerous to life. As such, a cross-case under Section 323, 324, 307,
506/34 IPC was registered against Mukesh and Rajesh, Neeraj, Sagar @
Bittoo, and Ankit. On 28.02.2020, the knife used in the crime by Mukesh
was recovered in pursuance of his disclosure statement.
8. Further, during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer did not
find the involvement of Rajesh and Ankit and the same was verified by the
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Station House Officer, P.S. Sadar, Karnal . Subsequent separate enquiries
conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnal, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, HQ, Karnal, and Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Karnal-II led to filing of reports where, too, involvement of Rajesh, Neeraj,
Sagar @ Bittoo and Ankit was found lacking.
9. Mukesh was arrested in the present case on 28.02.2020 and after
completion of investigation, the SHO submitted report under section
173(2), Cr. PC under Sections 307, 323, 324, 506/34 IPC against Mukesh
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SHO
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before the Illaqa Magistrate. Thereafter, the case was committed to the
court of the Sessions Judge for trial.
10. Charges under Section 324, 307 and 506, IPC and Section 25 of the Arms
Act were framed against Mukesh vide order dated 04.03.2021, whereafter
trial commenced. It is proposed by the prosecution to examine 14
(fourteen) witnesses in support of its case, of whom the appellant as PW-1
was examined on 27.04.2021. He reiterated the allegations against Mukesh
as also against Rajesh, Neeraj, Sagar @ Bittoo, and Ankit in his
examination-in-chief. He also submitted an application under Section 319,
Cr. PC for summoning Rajesh, Neeraj, Sagar @ Bittoo, and Ankit to face
trial.
11. It is this application that succeeded before the Sessions Judge, whereupon
Rajesh, Sagar @ Bittoo, Neeraj and Ankit approached the High Court. The
impugned order dated 13.09.2021 of the Sessions Judge was thereafter set
aside on contest.
12. The High Court proceeded to record as follows:
“12. From a perusal of the aforementioned both injuries, it is apparent
that Satbir had suffered only two injuries in the present case and both
injuries were caused with a knife by Mukesh Kumar. The complainant in
his testimony (Annexure PW-4) stated that all the accused were carrying
dandas and handles of spade in their hands. Neeraj had caught hold of
him, whereas, Sagar @ Bittoo, petitioner No. 2 and Ankit, petitioner No.
4 gave blows with handles of spade on his back and on his legs. However,
the injuries caused by the petitioners No. 2 and 4 are clearly missing in
the medical reports. In fact, as per PW-1, Satbir Singh, all the petitioners
had come prepared and were duly armed to cause injuries to him, but
the injuries, which were allegedly caused by them were not corroborated
by medical evidence.
13. Apart from that, it is apparent from the record that repeated
applications were moved by both the sides to the local police and the
matter was investigated by 03 different DSPs of Karnal police and the
facts were finally verified by SP, Karnal at his own level. However, during
all the investigations, it was found that all the petitioners had not
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participated in the present case and their presence at the place of
occurrence could not be established. No doubt, the Court is obliged to
look into the evidence only, at this stage, however, the conclusions
recorded by the police and the supporting material collected during the
course of investigation also cannot be overlooked by the Court, while
deciding the application under Section 319 Cr. P.C, even though the
evidence led by the prosecution is the main basis for disposal of the
application. Still further, from the evidence led by the prosecution, it
appears that the fight in the present case had taken place at the spur of
the moment over a minor issue of counting the points in a Volley Ball
game. Even otherwise, admittedly, there was no enmity between the
parties and the petitioners had no reason to participate in the present
occurrence. Still further, it is also apparent that Mukesh Kumar and
Satbir Singh were members of opposite teams, while playing the Volley
Ball and the occurrence had taken place at the spur of the moment and
injuries were caused by both the sides. Apart from that, in the present
case, this Court has no hesitation to hold that there was not sufficient
material on record, which could serve as a ground for summoning the
petitioners to face trial along with Mukesh Kumar, who had already been
arrayed as an accused in the present case.”
13. The law on the point of summoning additional accused in exercise of power
conferred by Section 319, Cr. PC is well settled. One may profitably refer to
and rely on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Hardeep Singh
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v. State of Punjab , where law has been authoritatively declared. We
consider it proper to quote the conclusions reached by this Court qua the
questions arising for decision, hereunder:
“ 117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows:
Questions (i) and (iii)
— What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can
be exercised?
AND
— Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC has
been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence
collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited
to the evidence recorded during trial?
Answer
117.1. In Dharam Pal case [(2014) 3 SCC 306] , the Constitution Bench
has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be
taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom
materials are available from the papers filed by the police after
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(2014) 3 SCC 92
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completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under
Section 193 CrPC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till “evidence”
under Section 319 CrPC becomes available for summoning an additional
accused.
117.2. Section 319 CrPC, significantly, uses two expressions that have
to be taken note of i.e. ( 1 ) inquiry ( 2 ) trial. As a trial commences after
framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial
inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 CrPC, and under Section
398 CrPC are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 CrPC.
Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used
for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial
commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, and also
to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the
charge-sheet.
117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319
CrPC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence
brought during a trial.
Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section
319(1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross-
examination or the court can exercise the power under the said
provision even on the basis of the statement made in the
examination-in-chief of the witness concerned?
Answer
117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 CrPC a person
against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial
and in such an event under Section 319(4) CrPC the proceeding against
such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the
court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be
summoned to be tested by cross-examination.
Question (iv)—What is the nature of the satisfaction required to
invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused?
Whether the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised
only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in
all likelihood be convicted?
Answer
117.5. Though under Section 319(4)( b ) CrPC the accused subsequently
impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court
initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that
will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 CrPC would
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be the same as for framing a charge . The difference in the degree of
satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent
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In paragraph 106, the Court held “Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is
to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the
anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his
complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as
exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the
evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction,
the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC.”
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accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already
commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such
trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused.
Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore
the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and
subsequent) has to be different.
Question (v)—Does the power under Section 319 CrPC extend to
persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not
charge-sheeted or who have been discharged?
Answer
117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the
FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been
discharged can be summoned under Section 319 CrPC provided from
the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the
accused already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has
been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398
CrPC has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.”
14. Quite recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Jitendra Nath Mishra
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v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another , upon considering Hardeep
Singh (supra), had the occasion to observe as follows:
“ 10. Section 319 CrPC, which envisages a discretionary power,
empowers the court holding a trial to proceed against any person not
shown or mentioned as an accused if it appears from the evidence that
such person has committed a crime for which he ought to be tried
together with the accused who is facing trial. Such power can be
exercised by the court qua a person who is not named in the FIR, or
named in the FIR but not shown as an accused in the charge-sheet.
Therefore, what is essential for exercise of the power under Section 319
CrPC is that the evidence on record must show the involvement of a
person in the commission of a crime and that the said person, who has
not been arraigned as an accused, should face trial together with the
accused already arraigned. However, the court holding a trial, if it
intends to exercise power conferred by Section 319 CrPC, must not act
mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence has come on
record implicating the person sought to be summoned; its satisfaction
preceding the order thereunder must be more than prima facie as
formed at the stage of a charge being framed and short of satisfaction
to an extent that the evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction.”
15. It is in the light of such settled law that we need to examine the impugned
order of the High Court. However, we must exercise caution lest any
observation has the effect of influencing the trial.
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(2023) 7 SCC 344
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16. Neeraj happens to be the sibling of Mukesh. The initial statement of the
appellant referred to the fact that Neeraj had held him facilitating stabbing
by Mukesh, who gave a knife blow in the waist followed by another blow
near his heart which penetrated up to his lungs. Insofar as Rajesh is
concerned, it was alleged that he had threatened the appellant by saying
“Chaaku maar ke tassali kar di, agar dobaara zinda gaon me ayega to mai
goli se uda dunga”. Although, the Sessions Judge formed the requisite
satisfaction bearing in mind the decision in Hardeep Singh (supra) and
held that the tests laid down therein were squarely met, reading the
impugned order in its entirety, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court failed to consider the matter from the proper perspective and
arrived at an entirely wrong conclusion.
17. Mr. Gupta has assiduously attempted to impress upon us that involvement
of Rajesh and Neeraj were not found in the several reports of the Deputy
Superintendents of Police, attached to Karnal district, and such reports
should be given credence. We are, however, of the opinion that no
conclusive finding can be given that Rajesh and Neeraj were not involved
merely on the basis of such reports. Having regard to the version of the
appellant in course of examination-in-chief, the Sessions Judge formed a
satisfaction higher than a prima facie satisfaction of the alleged involvement
of Rajesh and Neeraj and that their complicity in the crime has to be
examined and tested on evidence being led at the trial. To ascertain whether
the Sessions Judge in allowing the application under Section 319, Cr. PC
had acted mechanically or in a manner not authorised by law or in
derogation of the law declared in Hardeep Singh (supra), the High Court
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was well within its competence to adopt an ‘eyes on’ approach, considering
the nature of power conferred on the High Court by the Cr. PC as the
revisional court, but regard being had to the facts and circumstances, a
‘hands off’ approach would have been advisable and the correct approach.
18. We have no hesitation to hold that the conclusion of the Sessions Judge was
a plausible conclusion and not an absurd one so as to warrant interference
by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order of the High Court stands set
aside and that of the Sessions Judge is restored. The appeal is, accordingly,
allowed.
20. We clarify, no observation made hereinbefore shall be construed as an
expression of opinion as regards the involvement of Rajesh and Neeraj in
the crime and whatever we have said is solely for the purpose of disposal
of this appeal.
21. The Sessions Judge is encouraged to take the trial to its logical conclusion,
in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
22. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
………….…………….. J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
……………….……….. J.
(MANMOHAN)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 01, 2025.
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