Full Judgment Text
KESHA V KUMAR SW AR UP
A
v.
FLOWMORE PRIV AT E LIMITED
JANUARY 1 8, 1994
B
[S. MOHAN AN D M.K. MUKHERJE E, JJ.]
De lhi Rent C ontrol Ac t, 1 958: s. 14 (l )( e)-R es identia l Premis e.s--
L ea se d ou t to Co m pan y-Clause of lea se d eed auth ori s ing le ssee to u se
a:
pr emises 'f or res idence d perso na l use of Dir ec to rs and/ or their re lacive s
and for th e pu rp ose of th e Compa ny ''- H eld, te nant aut hnri sed to use premis es
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only for r esidential purpo se.
ln te rpr e taiion of Docu men ts : Inte ntion of part ie s-To be ascert ained
from expres s ions u sed in do cume nt-Reading of enti re documc11 t-Looking
into attending circum st ances-{\Tee d for.
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TI1e appellant-landlo rd filed an applicatio n u nder s .1 4(1)(e) of the
Delhi Rent Control A ct , 1958, se king eviction of the re sp ondent from his
premises on the ground of bo na fi de requirement. The respondent-com-
pany, relying upon l aus e 5 of the leased eed to th e effect that the lessee
wo uld use the premises " fo r the residt •nce an d personal use of D irector s
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and/or their rela tives and for he pur p, >s e of the Compa ny ", cont nded that
the pr emises were let o ut both for re sid ential as also co mmer ci al purpose
and the composite purpose of the tenan cy took the pr emises o ut of the
purview of the re sidential accommodat ion. The R ent Controller rejected
te nant 's contentions and allowed the application. The High Co urt , in the
F revisional application filed by the tenant , acc ept ed its pl ea of composite
purpose of tanan cy and rejected the application of the landlord. Hence,
the appe al by special leave.
Di smi ss ing the appeal, setting as ide the order of the High Court and
restoring that of the Rent Controller , this Co urt
G
HELD : 1.1. On a plain reading of clause 5 of the lease-deed, it is
patentl y clear that the landlord authorised th ' tena nt to use the premi ses
only for residential purpose and for no o ther purpose. The words 'for the
purpose of the Compa ny ' ought to be read in conjunction with ' re sidence'
H and wh en so read there is no escape from lhe conclusion that w hat the
14 8
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K..K. SW1 lf UP FLOW MOR E (P ) LTD. f MUi G-iE RJE E,J_j l-\9
parties intended was t hat the premises we re to he used for residence of the
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Directors, the ir relatives and also others · who may have to be accom·
modated 'for the purpose of the Company'. This was established by the
otl er cl auses of the agreement as also by the other materials appearing
on recor d. From clause 11 of the lease deed it is cle ar that under the
agreement only installation of air conditioners and cooking ra nges we re
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permitted an d there is no mention of any kind of office eq uipment. Further ,
clause 13, when read in the context of the master and zonal plans clearly
indicates th at the residential user of the premi se was on ly contemplate d.
Th e High C ourt erred in law in reversing the decision of the Ren t Contr o! ·
Ic r all owing the eviction. [1 51-F-H, 152-G]
c
2. In interpreting a doeument the in tention of the parties has to be
ascertained, if possible from the exp re sions used therein. More often than
no t, this causes no difficulty, but i diillcutty is fo !t. owlng to inarticulate
dr afting or in a ve rte nc e or other causes, the in enlion may c gathered
reading the entire document and, if so u ce:s , ary. from nther attending
circumstances als o. throu gh such a process the intention uf the parties
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can be culled out consistently with t he rule of iaw, the Courts are requir ed
to take that co ur s e. [1 51-D-E]
C IVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3487 of
1988.
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From the Ju dgment and Orde r dat ed 25 .4.1988 of the Delhi High
Court in C.R. (R) No.869 of 1987.
Harish N. Salve, Am brish Kumar, H.K. Puri, M.V. Goswami a nd
Sharad Pur i for th_e Appe ll ant. F
G.L Sanghi, Mahesh Aggarwal and Anant V. Palli for the Respo n-
dent.
The Ju dgment of the Court was deliver ed by
L MUKHERJEE , J. The app ellant-landlord fil ed an application G
und er Section 14(1)(e) of the Del hi Rent Control Act, 1958 before the
Rent Controller seeking eviction of the respondent-tenant (Compan y) from
the pr emises in question on the ground of bona fide requirement. After
o bt ai ning leave to contest the application, the tenant contended, relying
upon clause 5 of the deed of lease which reads as under :- H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 1 S.C.R.
A "That the lessee shall use the pr,emises fol the residence
and personal use of Directors &/or their relatives and for
the purpose of the Company."
that the premises were let out both for residential as also commercial
purpose and the composite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out
of the purview of the residential accommodation. The other ground on
which the application was resisted was that the claim of the landlord that
the premises were required for his occupation was not. a bona fide
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one. The Controller rejected both the contentions of the tenant and passed
an orcier for eviction. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant filed a revisional
application in the Delhi High Court and reiterated both its contentions.
The High Court, while affirming the finding recorded by the Controller
about the bona fide requirement of the landlord upset the finding of the
Controller that clause 5 of the deed mistakably proved that the premises
were let out for residential purpose only. In interpreting clause 5, the High
Court first observed :
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"Clause 5 is not ambiguous. There is no confusion in the
word used in this clause. The words 'personal use of
Directors &/or their relatives and for the purpose of the
Company' were used after mentioning that the premises
can be used for residence meaning tereby that the other
users were also permissible besides residence and that the
user was for the purpose of the Company, i. e., for the
business of the Company and the Directors and their
relatives also could use does not mean that Directors and
their relatives are to use the premises for residence only.
The personal use could be of many nature. It could be
that Direct,.or or their relatives can have their office in
particular rooms for their personal work beyond the work
of the company."
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F
G And ultimately concluded by saying :
"The words 'for the purpose of the Company' are very
significant and cannot be given a go by. They do clearly
show that the premises can be used for the purpose of
Company which is obviously business of the Company.
H Hence it has to be held that the premises have been let ·
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K.K. SWARUP v. FLOWMORE (P) LID . (MUKHERJEE, J.) - 151
out not only for. residential purpose but also for commer- A
cial purpose. The interpretation of the Rent Controller
with regard to the particular clause does not appear to be
sound. So, I set aside the finding of the Rent Controller
in this regard."
2. On such conclusion, the High Court reversed the order of the
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Controller and rejected the application of the landlord. Hence, this appeal
by special leave.
In view of the concurrent fmding recorded by the Controller and the
High Court regarding bonafide requirement of the premises by the C
landlord, the only point that survives for consideration in this appeal is as
to the true meaning of clause 5 of the lease deed. In other words, we have
to find as answer to the question whether the premises were let out for
residential purpose only or for a composite purpose.
3. In interpreting a document the intention of the parties has to be D
ll.Scertained, if possible from the expressions used therein. More often than
not, this causes no difficulty, but if difficulty is felt owing to inarticulate
drafting or inadvertence or other causes, the intention may be gathered
reading the entire document and, if so necessary, from other attending
circumstances also. If through such a process the intention of the parties
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can be culled out consistently with the rule of law, the Courts are required
to take that course. Keeping these principles in mind, we may proceed to
consider the facts of the instant case.
4. On a plain reading of clause 5 it is patently clear to us that the
landlord authorised the tenant to use the premises in dispute . only for F
residential purpose and for no other purpose. The words 'for the purpose
of the Company' ought to be read in conjunction with 'residence' and when
so read there is no escape from the conclusion that what the parties
intended was that the premises were to be used for residence of the
Directors, their relatives and also others who may have to be accom-
modated 'for the purpose of the Company'. The interpretation given by the
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High Court to the above quoted words cannot be accepted for if the
landlord was to permit the tenant to use the premises for any other purpose
the whole exercise of prescribing the purpose and circumscribing the
category of persons who can use it for for that purpose would have been
futile. H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
( 19 94] l S.C.R.
A
5. Even if it is assumed, for arguments sake, that the words 'for the
purpose of the Company' in Clause 5 created some confusion about the
intention of the parties, it stood completely di spelled by the other clauses
of the agreement as also by the other materials appearing on record.
Reference in this connection may first be made to clauses 11 and 13 of the
agreement which read as under :
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"11. That the lessee shall not carry out any structural
addition or alterations to the said premises, lay-out, fit-
tings or fixtures but can instal air conditioners, cooking
range etc.
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xxx xxx xxx xxx
13 . That the lessee shall abide by all rules and regulations
of the Municipal Corporation, DOA and other authorities
and shall be responsible for any loss or damages suffered
by the lessor on account of lessee's failure to do so .
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Besides, the above clauses reference may be made to the certificate dated
10.2 . 1975 issued by the Managing Director of the tenant (Ext.AX) whereby
he confirmed that the premises had been let out to him for his residence
at a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- and the report dated 17 . 4.1975 prepared by
the officers of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Ext.A W3 / l), after
inspection of the premises for assessment of property tax wherein it has
been specifically mentioned that the user of the premises was residential.
Materials on record further show that under the master plan and the zonal
plan of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi the colony in which the
premises in question are situated is exclusively residential and that it cannot
be used for any purpose other than residential.
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6. From clause 11 quoted above, we find that under the agreement
only installation of air conditioners and cooking ranges were permitted and
G there is no mention of any kind of office equipment. Further, clause 13,
when read in the context of the master and zonal plans referred to earlier,
clearly indicates that the residential user of the premises was only con-
templated.
7. For the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the High
H Court erred in law in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller allowing
KK. SW AR UP v. FLOWMORE (P) LTD. [MUKHERJEE, J.] 153
the eviction. We, therefore, a ll ow this appeal, set aside the order of the
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High Court and restore that of the Controller. Howeve r, there will be no
order as to costs.
8. Before we part with th is judgment we may record that after the
hearing of this appeal was concluded we requested the learned counsel for
the parties to effect a settlement, if possible. Pursuant thereto the part ies
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negotiated but could not arrive at a settlement. The learned counsel for
the respondent, howe ve r, submitted before u s, on the basis of the negoti a-
tions that took place that the claim of the landlord regarding requirement
of the premises was not a bona fide one and therefore the appeal should
be dismissed on that score alone. Needless to say, the landlord agreed to C
negotiate for the settlement only in deference to our suggestion and without
prejudice to h is rights and contentions in the appea l. Th erefor e, no cog-
nizance could be, and should be , taken of the t er ms offered or exchanged
during negotiation s, far les s, relied up on to di spose of the appeal.
C MP No.16601/ 89 :- S in ce the appeal is disposed of, no orders are
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necessary on the C.M.P.
9. After the delivery of the judgment, a prayer on behalf of the
respondent-tenant has been made to seek some time to vacate the
premises. Accordingl y, we direct that the appellant shall not le vy execution
for a period of s ix month s. The respondent-tenant will fi l an undertaking E
within two weeks fr om today agreeing to the del ive ry of vacant possession
on the expiry of said six months, i.e. 31.7.J.994.
R.P.
Appeal Disposed of.