Full Judgment Text
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on:09.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 16 .04.2026
+ W.P.(C) 3989/2026 & CM APPL. 19590/2026
MS TEKRAM ENTERPRISES ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Deepak Mehra, Mr. Vikas
Kumar, Mr. Vikshit Kumar, Advs.
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ....Respondent
Through: Ms. Kritika Gupta
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
J U D G M E N T
1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has approached this Court to
challenge the disqualification of the petitioner from participation in the
tender process (“Impugned decision”) for all sports complexes where it
has participated.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The petitioner namely, M/s Tekram Enterprises is a sole proprietorship
concern of Ms. Arpana Tiwari, which is engaged in the business of
running and maintenance of swimming pools.
3. Ms. Arpana Tiwari, has been working since 2015 as a receptionist in the
Paschim Vihar Sports Complex hired on temporary outsource/private
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basis and at present is working for the contractor i.e., M/s Rajsheel
Enterprises.
4. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the term “petitioner” is used
interchangeably for M/s Tekram Enterprises (petitioner enterprise) and its
sole proprietor i.e., Ms. Arpana Tiwari.
5. The respondent namely, Delhi Development Authority (“DDA”) invited
11 tenders by issuing notice inviting tender (“NIT”) for hiring contractors
for maintenance and other ancillary functions of its swimming pools at
various sport centres in DDA complexes.
6. The petitioner participated in 10 tenders and was duly qualified for
participation for PDKP Sports Complex, Chilla Sports Complex, Yamuna
Sports Complex. However, the petitioner received an email dated
25.03.2026 disqualifying the petitioner just two days prior to the
scheduled draw of lots from the said tender process on the ground of
violation of Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT. The disqualification email
is reproduced as under:
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7. Hence, the present petition impugning the said disqualification action has
been filed by the petitioner.
8. This Court vide Order dated 27.03.2026, issued notice in the main petition
and after taking a prima facie view passed an interim Order staying the
effect and operation of the impugned decision i.e., disqualification email
dated 25.03.2026.
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9. Pursuant to the Order of this Court, the petitioner participated in the
scheduled draw of lots on 31.03.2026 and 01.04.2026 and has turned out
to be the successful bidder for Hari Nagar sports complex and Yamuna
sports complex. However, the petitioner has not been assigned the works
because this disqualification subsists against it.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
10. Mr. Mehra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned
decision is in teeth of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India
on the ground that the said action is arbitrary and unreasonably curtail the
petitioner’s right to carry on lawful business and profession.
11. The respondent in the present case where petitioner is only working as an
outsource staff has wrongly relied on Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT,
and illegally disqualified the petitioner from all tender processes.
12. He states that the Clause No. 47 could only have been invoked, if at all, to
disqualify the petitioner from only the concerned sports complex i.e.,
Paschim Vihar sports complex, where the proprietor is working and the
disqualification from participation for all other sports complex is arbitrary
and illegal.
13. Clause No. 77 finds no application to the case of the petitioner as the
petitioner is neither an employee of DDA/any government agency nor
under any contractual relationship with the DDA. The petitioner is only
engaged at the Paschim Vihar sports complex in outsourced/temporary
capacity under M/s Rajsheel Enterprises, who is a private contractor.
Thus, the petitioner cannot be characterised as an employee of DDA.
14. He further states that the impugned decision was taken in blatant violation
of principles of natural justice without any show cause notice or
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opportunity of hearing. Reliance is placed on Erusian Equipment &
1
Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal .
15. The petitioner also contends that the impugned decision is violative of the
doctrine of legitimate expectation as the petitioner qualified for
participation in all the tenders and is expecting the award of the same.
Reliance is placed on Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of
2
India .
SUBMISSIONS OF BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
16. Ms. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that it is
undisputed fact that Ms. Arpana Tiwari and Mr. Krishnanand Tiwari i.e.,
father of Ms. Tiwari, have been contractual employees of DDA for a
considerable period of time and have deep links within the sports centre
network. Hence, the petitioner was disqualified from participating in the
tender process vide email dated 25.03.2026.
17. Ms. Gupta, to buttress her submissions before this Court places reliance
on the Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of NIT and states that the said clauses
squarely applies to case the petitioner. Thus, the impugned decision is
taken in accordance with the law.
18. It is also submitted by Ms. Gupta, that the action of the respondent is in
accordance with law and it is the tender issuing authority which is the best
judge for its eligibility conditions. Thus, the contentions of the petitioner
should not be accepted. She also states that when the factual matrix is
clear and only one conclusion is possible, no show cause notice or
opportunity of being heard is required.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
1
(1975) 1 SCC 70.
2
(1992) 4 SCC 477.
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19. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
and documents placed on record.
Principles of Natural Justice
20. At the outset, it is imperative for this Court to examine the matter on the
issue of compliance of principles of natural justice by the respondent
before wielding the disqualification axe.
21. The disqualification email was addressed to the respondent merely two
days before the scheduled draw of lots, without affording any opportunity
of being heard or even a procedural show cause notice.
22. To my mind, harsh actions like debarment/disqualification carry profound
civil consequences and procedural fairness is the sine qua non for its
legitimacy and legality.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of UMC Technologies (P)
3
Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India , summarised the position of law with
respect to show cause notice/opportunity of hearing and stated the
principles of natural justice to be the first principles of civilised
jurisprudence. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:
“13. At the outset, it must be noted that it is the first
principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against
whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or
interests are being affected should be given a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. The basic principle of
natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the
authority concerned should give to the affected party a
notice of the case against him so that he can defend
himself. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds
3
(2021) 2 SCC 551.
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necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed
should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An
order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is
impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent. This
Court in Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee
Property [Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee
Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1] has held that it is essential for
the notice to specify the particular grounds on the basis of
which an action is proposed to be taken so as to enable the
noticee to answer the case against him. If these conditions
are not satisfied, the person cannot be said to have been
granted any reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
24. Applying the aforesaid settled position of law on the facts at hand, the
respondent’s ex-parte disqualification through an email constitute
violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned decision
conveyed by the email is ipso facto void.
25. Ms. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, states that in the present
case, show cause notice or grant of an opportunity of hearing was not
warranted as there existed no disputed questions of fact requiring any
response from the petitioner. Even if such an opportunity had been
afforded, the decision of the DDA or the outcome would not have
changed, since, in case of violation of aforesaid clauses and the
undisputed factual matrix, there is only one conclusion possible i.e.,
disqualification of the petitioner from the said tender processes.
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26. I am unable to agree with this contention of the respondent, as this
contention is based on the assumption that factual situation in the present
case is undisputed and admitted. However, this assumption does not hold
good in the present case. The impugned decision is based on both the
interpretation and applicability of Clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT on
facts of the case of the petitioner, which to my mind is a disputed factual
situation necessitating an opportunity of hearing. The respondent has
without even affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard,
already assumed and interpreted clause Nos. 47 and 77 of the NIT to the
detriment of the petitioner.
27. Even though the petition needs to be allowed on this ground alone, I am
inclined to consider the merits of the matter as well.
Scope of Judicial Interference
28. At this stage, the preliminary question before this Court is the confines of
its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court
under its writ jurisdiction is having limited scope of interference with
administrative decisions requiring technical expertise, especially in
matters of tender evaluation and award of contracts but at the same time
this court is to ensure that no such action of any administrative authority
suffers from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. The scope of
judicial review of administrative decision pertaining to tender process is
well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular v.
4
Union of India , which was relied upon and summarised by the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Vision Diagnostic India
4
(1994) 6 SCC 651.
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5
Private Limited v. All India Institute Of Medical Sciences & Anr. , the
relevant paragraphs of which read as under:
“58. Now the question is whether the respondents are
justified in prescribing the qualification criteria that no
criminal proceedings/FIRs should be pending against the
bidders. Suffice it to state, the Tender Inviting Authority is
entitled to prescribe Tender conditions it deems fit and
necessary to ensure sanctity of the Tendering process. The
court only examines the decision making process, and does
not sit in appeal to review the merits of such decision.
However, when the process or the decision is vitiated by
arbitrariness, unfairness, illegality, irrationality or the
principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness, the same can
be subjected to judicial review. The law in this regard is
well-settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata
Cellular (supra) wherein it has been observed as under:
“94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but
merely reviews the manner in which the decision was
made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to
correct the administrative decision. If a review of the
administrative decision is permitted it will be
substituting its own decision, without the necessary
expertise which itself may be fallible.
5
2026 SCC OnLine Del 545.
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(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be
open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to
tender is in the realm of contract.
Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender
or award the contract is reached by process of
negotiations through several tiers. More often than
not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In
other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body functioning in
an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative
sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested
by the application of Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out
above) but must be free from arbitrariness not
affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy
administrative burden on the administration and lead
to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.”
(emphasis supplied)
59. Further, in the judgment titled Erusian Equipment &
Chemicals Limited (supra), the Supreme Court has held
that the activities of the government, having a public
element, should be undertaken with great fairness and
equality. It observed that the State need not enter into any
contract with anyone, but if it does, it must do so in a fair
manner without any discrimination.”
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(Emphasis Supplied)
29. In another judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court titled
6
Ozar Homes LLP v. DDA , the settled position of law was summarised by
placing reliance on Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.)
7
Ltd. , in the following words:
“18…
a. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaipur Vidyut
Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.) Ltd.,(2024) 8 SCC
513, after referring to an earlier judgment in Air India
Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC
617 and Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
651, has held that unless the Court finds that decision
making process is vitiated by arbitrariness, malafides or
irrationality, it will not be permissible for the Court to
interfere with the same. Paragraphs 136 to 138 of
the Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (supra) are extracted
herein below:
“136. In any case, we find that the High Court was
not justified in issuing the mandamus in the nature
which it has issued. This Court in Air India
Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [Air India
Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2
SCC 617 : 2000 INSC 39] has observed thus : (SCC
pp. 623-24, para 7)
6
2025 SCC OnLine Del 6210.
7
(2024) 8 SCC 513.
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“7. The law relating to award of a contract by
the State, its corporations and bodies acting as
instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government has been settled by the decision of
this Court in Ramana Dayaram
Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India
[Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489],
Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union of
India [Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union v. Union
of India, (1981) 1 SCC 568], CCE v. Dunlop
India Ltd. [CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1
SCC 260], Tata Cellular v. Union of India [Tata
Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 :
1994 INSC 283], Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra [Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134] and Raunaq
International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd.
[Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction
Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 492] The award of a
contract, whether it is by a private party or by a
public body or the State, is essentially a
commercial transaction. In arriving at a
commercial decision considerations which are
paramount are commercial considerations. The
State can choose its own method to arrive at a
decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to
tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It
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can enter into negotiations before finally
deciding to accept one of the offers made to it.
Price need not always be the sole criterion for
awarding a contract. It is free to grant any
relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender
conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not
accept the offer even though it happens to be the
highest or the lowest. But the State, its
corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are
bound to adhere to the norms, standards and
procedures laid down by them and cannot depart
from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is
not amenable to judicial review, the court can
examine the decision-making process and
interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides,
unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State,
its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies
have the public duty to be fair to all concerned.
Even when some defect is found in the decision-
making process the court must exercise its
discretionary power under Article 226 with great
caution and should exercise it only in
furtherance of public interest and not merely on
the making out of a legal point. The court should
always keep the larger public interest in mind in
order to decide whether its intervention is called
for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion
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that overwhelming public interest requires
interference, the court should intervene.”
….
138. As has been held by this Court in Tata Cellular
[Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 :
1994 INSC 283], the Court is not only concerned with
the merits of the decision but also with the decision-
making process. Unless the Court finds that the
decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness,
mala fides, irrationality, it will not be permissible for
the Court to interfere with the same.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
30. From a conspectus of the aforementioned judgments it is clear that the
Court cannot interfere with administrative decisions in a routine manner
and should exercise its judicial wisdom to interfere with great
circumspection. While the administrative decisions involving technical
expertise are not amenable to scrutiny, the decision making process can
always be subjected to the same. The Court does not sit in appeal/review
over those decisions, and it is only the decision making process which
needs to be tested on the touchstones of irrationality, mala fides and
arbitrariness, while being subjected to judicial scrutiny.
31. With the above scope of interference in mind, I shall now deal with rival
contentions to decide, if at all, any interference by this Court is warranted.
Interpretation of Clause No. 47 of the NIT
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32. At this stage, it is relevant to see Clause No. 47 of the NIT, which reads as
under:
“There should be no relationship between the contractor and
officer/officials working in the concerned sports complex. In case of any
concealment of facts, necessary action will be initiated against the agency
as per terms & conditions of CRB, DDA.”
33. At the outset, the petitioner is neither a contractor nor an officer but an
outsourced employee of the contractor namely, M/s Rajsheel Enterprises,
even otherwise assuming that the said Clause No. 47 would be applicable,
to a person like the petitioner, a plain reading of the aforesaid Clause
makes it evident that it is not placing any general or omnibus embargo.
This prohibition Clause is undoubtedly and clearly directed against
existence of any relationship between the contractor and the officials
working in the “ concerned sports complex”.
34. The respondent by disqualifying the petitioner from participating in all of
the tender processes, has rendered the expression “concerned sports
complex” otiose. By this impugned decision, the respondent has enlarged
the scope of the said Clause beyond the reasonable and plain meaning.
35. I am of the view that Clause No. 47, is only intended to operate in relation
to the specific sports complex where the alleged specific relationship exist
between the contractor and the officer/officials working in the concerned
sports complex.
36. In the factual matrix of the present case, it is an admitted fact that the
petitioner, as of today, is a contractual employee of M/s Rajsheel
Enterprises Ltd. and is working as a receptionist in Paschim Vihar Sports
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Complex. It is also admitted that the petitioner has been a receptionist in
the said sports complex for the more than 10 years now.
37. In this view of the matter, not even an iota of doubt exists that the Clause
No. 47 could only be applicable to the case of the petitioner if the
petitioner was participating in the tender process of Paschim Vihar sports
complex. Once language of clause is clear, no external aid is required for
its interpretation.
38. It is also not the case of the respondent nor could it plausibly be, that by
being a receptionist at Paschim Vihar Sports Complex, the petitioner
would be privy to the tender details of other sports complexes or sensitive
details pertaining to other sports complexes such as tender quotations
given by the other participants to the tender, thereby gaining any sort of
unfair advantage therein.
39. Additionally, the NIT process envisages that where multiple bidders quote
identical rates, the successful bidder is determined through a computerised
draw of lots. Hence, it also cannot be said that the petitioner in its limited
capacity of being a receptionist at Paschim Vihar Sports Complex could
tamper with fair and free selection of the successful bidder in tender for
unrelated sports complexes.
40. Therefore, the impugned decision disqualifying the petitioner based on
Clause No. 47 is incorrect, based on erroneous and irrational interpretation
of the Clause No. 47.
Interpretation of Clause No. 77 of the NIT
41. The Clause No. 77 of the NIT reads as under:
“Any person who is in government service or an employee
of D.D.A. or on contract with D.D.A. should not be made a
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partner to the contract by the Contractor directly, or
indirectly in any manner whatsoever.”
42. The prohibitive ambit of the aforesaid Clause can be classified under three
distinct heads namely;
a. Persons in service of government.
b. Employees of DDA.
c. Persons on contract with DDA.
43. Individuals falling in these three prohibited categories cannot be made
partner to the awarded subject contract by the contractor, “directly or
indirectly” . This expression “directly or indirectly” is used to exclude the
aforesaid three prohibited categories of individuals from being directly or
indirectly made a party to the awarded contract through the tender process
for which the tender is invited by the NIT.
44. The respondent by invoking Clause No. 77 has erred in interpreting the
relation of the proprietor of the petitioner with the DDA and enlarged the
scope of the aforesaid Clause to include third party engagements through
independent private contractors within the ambit of the aforesaid three
prohibited categories. The proprietor of the petitioner is engaged by M/s
Rajsheel Enterprises (independent private contractor) in an
outsourced/private temporary capacity with no privity of contract
whatsoever with the DDA.
45. Therefore, the petitioner in the aforesaid factual background does not
qualify as falling in any of the three categories as stated above and the
impugned decision by the respondent can be categorised as irrational and
arbitrary.
46. Additionally during the course of hearing, Ms. Arpana Tiwari has handed
over an affidavit that in order to put the controversy to rest, she will resign
from the post within 2 months i.e., before June 2026.
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CONCLUSION
47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and interpretation of Clause Nos.
47 and 77, I am of the view that the even though the scope of judicial
interference with administrative decision is narrow but the same is not
barred when the decision making process is vitiated by reasons of
irrationality and arbitrariness. Having held the decision making process of
the respondent based on irrationality, arbitrariness and procedural
impropriety, the decision making process is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
48. Additionally the impugned decision undermines public interest by
suppressing fair play in competition. The blanket disqualification from the
process for all tenders, non-compliance with the principles of natural
justice and the disproportionate overreach beyond the plain meaning of the
Clauses of NIT collectively leads to this Conclusion that the impugned
decision is arbitrary and thus, deserves to be set aside.
49. In this view of the matter, the impugned decision is quashed and set aside
to the extent that the petitioner shall remain disqualified for participation
in the tender process for Paschim Vihar Sports Complex.
50. The petition is allowed and disposed of, in the aforesaid terms, along with
the pending applications, if any.
51. The affidavit furnished by Ms. Arpana Tiwari is taken on record.
JASMEET SINGH, J
APRIL 16, 2026/SS
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