VASTSALABAI VISHNU JADHAV AND ANOTHER vs. MARATHWADA MEDICAL RESEARCH AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTION LTD.(SNDH) CHIKALTHANA

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kps
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 5634 OF 2014
1 Smt. Chandrakala W/o Lalaji Misal
Age : 40 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
Chikalthana MIDC Area, 
Aurangabad.
2 Smt. Surekha W/o Madhukar Waghmare
Age : 35 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Prakashnagar, Mukundwadi,
Aurangabad.
3 Smt. Kanta Baban Sable
Age : 32 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
Chikalthana MIDC Area,
 Aurangabad.
4 Manda W/o Vasant Bankar
Age : 35 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Sanjaynagar, Mukundwadi,
Aurangabad.
5 Prakash S/o Rambhau Mhaske
Age : 35 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
Aurangabad.
6 Mrs. Sangeeta Sanjay Nikalje
Age : 34 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
Aurangabad.
7 Smt. Gayabai Gautam Shinde
Age : 33 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
 Aurangabad.
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8 Dhondabai W/o Ram Pendharkar
Age : 42 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
Aurangabad.
9 Vimalbai W/o Sambhaji Shinde
Age : 45 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
 Aurangabad.
10 Smt. Lilabai W/o Fakirrao Dhotre
Age : 40 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Ashok Nagar, Masnatpur,
Aurangabad. ...Petitioners.
­Versus­
Marathwada Medical Research and
Rural Development Institution Ltd,
(Seth Nandlal Dhoot Hospital,) 
Plot No. A­1, Chikalthana,
MIDC Area, Aurangabad. ...Respondent.
                WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 5635 OF 2014
1 Laxmibai Dilip Hiwarale
Age : 32 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Sanjay Nagar, Mukundwadi,
Aurangabad.
2 Mrs. Ujwala Ravindra Gomate
Age : 35 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Jaibhavani Nagar,
Aurangabad.
3 Vikas S/o Suresh Misal
Age : 27 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Sindiban, Masnatpur,
Chikalthana MIDC Area,
Aurangabad.
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4 Sandip S/o Dajiba Bodhak
Age : 30 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Sindiban, Masnatpur, 
MIDC, Chikalthana,
Aurangabad.
5 Sangita Baban Dabhade
Age : 33 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Chikalthana, Aurangabad.
6 Radha Tanaji Rupekar
Age : 33 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Mukundwadi, Aurangabad.
7 Shaikh Rajiya Kalim
Age : 39 years, Occu : unemployed,
  R/o Murtijapur, Mhada Colony,
Aurangabad.
8 Sunil S/o Gangadhar Narwade
Age : 30 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Sanjay Nagar, Mukundwadi,
Aurangabad.
9 Chandrakala Sudhakar Ingale
Age : 35 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Sindiban, MIDC, Chikalthana,
Aurangabad.
10 Sheshrao Ramdhan Rathod
Age : 35 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Girija Mata Colony, Mukundwadi,
Aurangabad.
11 Seema Chandanshive
Age : 30 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o J­Sector, Mukundwadi,
Aurangabad. ...Petitioners.
­Versus­
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Marathwada Medical Research and
Rural Development Institution Ltd,
(Seth Nandlal Dhoot Hosptial,) 
Plot No. A­1, Chikalthana,
MIDC Area, Aurangabad. ...Respondent.
                          WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 5640 OF 2014
1 Smt. Vastsalabai W/o Vishnu Jadhav
Age : 32 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o Kamgar Chowk, Chikalthana,
Aurangabad.
2 Smt. Sindubai W/o Raju Sonawane
Age : 33 years, Occu : unemployed,
R/o C/o Rameshwar Kirana Stores,
Garkheda Parisar, Aurangabad. ...Petitioners.
­Versus­
Marathwada Medical Research and
Rural Development Institution Ltd,
(Seth Nandlal Dhoot Hosptial,) 
Plot No. A­1, Chikalthana,
MIDC Area, Aurangabad. ...Respondent.
............. 
Shri   T.K.Prabhakaran   a/w   Shri   Telangre   G.S.,   Advocates   for   the
Petitioners.  
Shri   Ashok   Patil   a/w   Shri   Joshi   Arvind   Ramakant,   Advocates   for
Respondents 
............
CORAM :  RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
     
rd
Reserved on : 23  October, 2015.
th
Pronounced on : 30  October, 2015.
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Judgment : 
1 Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by
the consent of the parties.
2 On 25.08.2015, this Court has passed the following order:­
“ 1 The learned Advocates submit on instructions from
their respective clients present in the Court that they
have no objection if this Court hears these matters.
2 These matters have been heard for almost two hours.
3 Stand  over to 07.09.2015 at  02:30 pm as PART­
HEARD, at the request of the learned Advocates.”
3 The Petitioners in the first petition challenge the judgment
and order dated 11.12.2013 passed by the Industrial Court at Aurangabad
by   which   Complaint   (ULP)   No.47/2008   filed   by   the   Petitioners   was
dismissed. 
4 The Petitioners in the second petition are aggrieved by the
judgment and order dated 11.12.2013 passed by the Industrial Court,
Aurangabad   by   which   Complaint   (ULP)   No.97/2008   filed   by   these
Petitioners has been dismissed.
5 The Petitioners in the third petition are aggrieved by the
judgment and order dated 11.12.2013 passed by the Industrial Court,
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Aurangabad   by   which   Complaint   (ULP)   No.50/2008   filed   by   these
Petitioners has been dismissed.
6 The Petitioners in these petitions are identically placed. They
have preferred the above referred three identical complaints against the
same Respondent as in these petitions and which have been dismissed by
the Industrial Court vide it's common judgment dated 11.12.2013. 
7 The   extensive   submissions   of   Shri   Prabhakaran,   learned
Advocate for the Petitioners, can be summarized in brief as follows:­
(a) All the lady Petitioners were working as “Aaya” and all the
male Petitioners were working as “Ward Boys”.
(b) None of them were deployed through any contractor. 
(c) No prayer is made by the Petitioners seeking repudiation of
contract/ contractor.
(d) The Respondent through it's Written Statement has claimed
that all these Petitioners were working as contract labourers.
(e) At   no   point   in   time,   had   any   contractor   deployed   these
Petitioners as contract labourers.
(f) The contention of the Respondent that the Petitioners were
engaged   through   two   contractors,   namely,   Shri   Subhash
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Dhoot and Shri Premchand Kokate, is a false plea.
(g) The contention of the Respondent that the Petitioners were
working   in   the   cleaning   /   sweeping   activity   under   the
Housekeeping Contract, is a false plea.
(h) The contention of the Petitioners through their evidence that
they were working as Aaya and Ward Boys has not been
denied.
(i) The original identity cards signed by responsible officer of the
Respondent were issued to the Petitioners.
(j) Though   it   was   admitted   by   the   Petitioners   in   cross­
examination that they are not in employment since 2008,
their claim in the complaints could not be negated on this
count. 
(k) Though it is admitted that an appointment order as an Aaya
or Ward Boy was not issued to the Petitioners, their claim of
having actually so worked cannot be negated. 
(l) Though the attendance record produced at Exhibit U/38 does
not   bear   the   signature   of   any   responsible   officer   of   the
Respondent, it would indicate that they were working on the
same   nature   of   activity   as   was   being   performed   by   the
regular employees.
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(m) Experience certificates were issued by the Respondent to the
Petitioners.
(n) Separate   list   for   making   the   payment   of   wages   to   the
Petitioners was not maintained.
(o) The Management Witness admitted in his cross­examination
that the contract labourers were doing similar work as was
being done by the permanent employees. 
(p) The   Industrial   Court   has   erroneously   dismissed   the
complaints on the ground that it has no jurisdiction merely
because the Respondent has taken a stand of 'no employer­
employee relationship'.
(q) The work of Aaya/ Ward Boy was never contracted by the
Respondent and the defence taken in the Written Statement
was only intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Court. 
(r) There is no dispute about the nature of work done by the
Petitioners which was similar to the work done by the regular
employees. 
(s) There is no cross­examination on the nature of work done by
the Petitioners.
(t) When original identity cards were produced, the same could
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not have been disbelieved.
(u) The   inspection   carried   out   by   the   various   officers   of   the
Labour Department would indicate that the Petitioners were
working on the main activity. 
(v) The   PF   contribution   deposited   by   the   Respondent   would
indicate the names of the Petitioners. 
(w) The   Industrial   Court   has   lost   sight   of   the   fact   that   the
Petitioners   were   doing   the   same   work   as   like   regular
employees, I­Cards were issued identically to all and the PF
contributions were deposited by the Respondent.
(x) The remarks of the Government Labour Officer were ignored
by the Industrial Court.
(y) The Complaints deserve to be remitted back to the Industrial
Court only for the reason that the Industrial Court needs to
adjudicate   upon   the   aspect   that   the   work   done   by   the
Petitioners was never outsourced to a contractor.
(z) It   has   become   a   fashion   for   the   employers   to   cite   the
judgments of the Apex Court delivered in the case of  Vividh
Kamgar Sabha v/s Kalyani Steels Limited ,  2001 (1) CLR 532
and   Cipla Limited v/s Maharashtra General Kamgar Union ,
2001 LLR 305  so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Industrial
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Court.
(za) The   complaints   filed   by   the   genuine   workers   like   the
Petitioners have suffered dismissal orders at the hands of the
Labour Courts or the Industrial Courts merely on the basis of
the judgments of the Apex Court in  Kalyani Steels  (supra)
and Cipla Limited (supra).
8 Shri A.V.Patil with Shri A.R.Joshi, learned Advocates have
opposed these petitions. Their submissions can be summarized as under:­
(a) The judgments of the Apex Court in  Kalyani Steels Limited
and Cipla Limited  cases (supra) are squarely applicable to
this case.
(b) The   work   of   an   Aaya   and   a   Ward   Boy,   falls   under   the
category of housekeeping.
(c) The   fact   that   the   Petitioners   were   deployed   through
contractors has been brought on record.
(d) When there are disputed questions as regards the employer­
employee relationship, the Industrial Court cannot resort to
investigation in the matter. 
(e) The Petitioners were not on the rolls of the Respondent right
from the day they were deployed by the Contractors in the
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housekeeping activity.
(f) The dates of joining of the Petitioners as stated in Annexure A
to the complaints is different from the dates mentioned in the
certificate   purportedly   issued   by   the   Respondent   below
Exhibit U/37.
(g) The signatures on the purported experience certificates are
not in original.
(h) The Experience Certificates are forged documents.
(i) The   report   of   the   handwriting   expert   reflects   a   different
picture as regards the signatures appearing on the experience
certificates.
(j) Some   of   the   officers   whose   signatures   appear   on   the
experience   certificates,   had   resigned   prior   to   the   dates
mentioned on such certificates. 
(k) When   none   of   the   Petitioners   had   filed   any   application
seeking experience certificate, there was no reason for any
officer of the Respondent to issue such certificate. 
(l) The Respondent produced agreements with the Contractors,
payment registers and attendance registers. 
(m) Sample bills of the contractors and ledger statements were
also produced.
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(n) Attendance registers of Class III and Class IV workers on the
rolls of the Respondent were produced and which did not
reflect the names of the Petitioners. 
(o) In a limited enquiry conducted by the Industrial Court, it has
been   sufficiently   established   that   the   Petitioners   were
deployed through contract labourers.
(p) False  attendance  sheets   were   produced  by  the  Petitioners
which   do   not   bear   any   stamp   or   signature   or   any
identification mark of the Respondent.
(q) The attendance record is fabricated.
(r) The   Petitioners   are   not   remedy­less   as   they   can   raise   an
industrial dispute under Section 2A or Section 2(k) of the
Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947   for   the   redressal   of   their
grievance.
(s) An industrial dispute in this backdrop can be considered by
the appropriate Government and the true employer of the
Petitioners can be identified.
(t) The law as is crystallized would not permit the Industrial
Court to enter into a roving enquiry so as to locate the actual
employer of the Petitioners.
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9 The learned Advocate for the Petitioners has relied upon the
following judgments:­
(a) Hindustan   Coca   Cola   Bottling   S/W   Private   Limited   v/s
Bhartiya Kamgar Sena, 2001 (3) CLR 1025.
(b) Bhojraj  Tulsiram Gajbhiye  v/s All India Reporter Limited,
2009 (4) Bom. C.R. 91.
(c) Akhil   Bhartiya   Shramik   Kamgar   Union   v/s   Buildtech
Constructions, 2004 (Supp.2) Bom.C.R. 857.
10 The learned Advocate for the Respondent has relied upon the
following judgments:­
(a) Regional   Manager,   Central   Bank   of   India   v/s   Madhulika
Guruprasad Dahir, 2008 (9) AD (SC) 311 : 2008 (5) AIR
Bom R (SC) 796.
(b) Sanket   Food   Products   Pvt.   Ltd.   v/s   Prabhakar   Asaram
Bhalerao, 2014 MCR 661.
(c) Indian Express Limited v/s P.P.Kothari, 2015 (4) AIR Bom R
672.
(d) Managing Director, Epitome Components Ltd. v/s Swarajya
Kamgar Sanghatana, 2015 MCR 614 : 2015(2) AIR BOM R
76.
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(e) Cipla Limited v/s Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, 2001
LLR 305.
(f) Vividh Kamgar Sabha v/s Kalyani Steels Limited, 2001 (I)
CLR 532.
(g) Sarva   Shramik   Sangh   v/s   Indian   Smelting   and   Refining
Company Limited, 2004 (101) FLR 635.
(h) Maharashtra Engineering Plastic and General Kamgar Union
v/s Little Kids and others, 2005 (I) CLR 658.
(i) Hydroflex (India) v/s A.D.Shelar and others, 2005 (I) CLR
48.
(j) Maharashtra   State   Cooperative   Cotton   Growers   Marketing
Federation Limited v/s Asha Joseph D'Mello, 2008 (116) FLR
183.
(k) Nashik Workers Union, Nashik v/s Mahindra & Mahindra
Limited, Nashik, 2008 (I) LLJ 132.
(l) Sarva Shramik Sangh v/s Janprabha Offset Works, 2008 (I)
LLJ 271.
(m) Bharatiya Kamgar Sena v/s Udhe India Ltd., 2008 (I) LLJ 371
(Bom.) : 2008 (116) FLR 457.
(n) Petroleum Workers Union, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd.,   Chennai   v/s   Hindustan   Petroleum   Corporation   Ltd.,
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2004 (2) LLN 451.
(o) V.I.P.   Industries   Limited,   Nagpur   v/s   Athar   Jameel   and
others, 2010 (II) LLJ 83 (Bom.).
(p) International Airport Authority of India v/s International Air
Cargo Workers' Union, 2009 (123) FLR 321.
(q) General   Manager   (OSD),   Bengal   Nagpur   Cotton   Mills,
Rajnandgaon v/s Bharat Lal and another, 2011 (I) CLR 1.
11 The issue, therefore, is as to whether, the Industrial Court can
consider disputed questions in the light of the claim of the Petitioners that
they are employed directly by the Respondent/ Management, vis­a­vis the
contention of the Respondent that the Petitioners were deployed through
two Contractors, who were allotted the work of housekeeping. 
12 In the Kalyani Steels case (supra) decided by the Apex Court
on 19.01.2001, it has been observed in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 as
under:­
“2. Briefly stated the facts  are  as follows: 
The Appellants claim to be a Union representing the
workmen of a Canteen run by the Respondents.  The
Appellant   Union   claimed   that   even   though   the
Appellants     are   actually     the   employees   of   the
Respondents,  the  Respondents are not treating them
at   par   with   other   employees   and   have   notionally
engaged  contractors   to     run   the   canteen.     As  the
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Respondents   were   not     accepting   the     Appellants'
claim to treat them as their employees, the Appellant
filed  a  Complaint under Section  28(1)  of   the
Maharashtra     Recognition     of     Trade   Unions   &
Prevention  of Unfair Labour Practices   Act,
1971 (hereinafter called   the MRTU   & PULP Act)
alleging that the Respondents had  engaged in  unfair
labour practices under Item Nos.  1, 1(a),  1(b), 4,
4(a)  of Schedule II and Items 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and  10  of
Schedule     IV   of   the   MRTU   &   PULP   Act.   This
Complaint came to be   dismissed by the impugned
Order dated 20th August, 1996. 
3. The  Appellant Union has filed an SLP directly in this
Court   against   this   Order   as   the   High   Court   of
Bombay, in the case of  Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak
Sangathana v.  S. V. Naik reported  in  (1993) 1 CLR
Page 1002, has already held that the Industrial Court
cannot   in   a   complaint   under   MRTU   &   PULP   Act
abolish contract labour and treat employees as  direct
employees  of  the  company.   
4. At  this stage it  must  be mentioned  that this Court
has also in the case of  Central Labour Union   (Red
Flag) Bombay v.  Ahmedabad Mfg.  & Calico Printing
Co.  Ltd.  and Ors.  reported in (1995) 2 LLJ 765 :
1995   Supp.(1)   SCC   175,   held     that     where   the
workmen have not been accepted by the Company to
be its employees, then no complaint would lie under
the MRTU & PULP Act. We are in full agreement with
the above mentioned view.  
5. The provisions of MRTU & PULP Act can only be
enforced by persons who admittedly are workmen. If
there  is  dispute as  to whether the   employees   are
employees  of  the Company, then that dispute must
first  be got  resolved  by raising a dispute before  the
appropriate forum. It  is  only  after  the status  as  a
workmen  is established in an appropriate Forum that
a complaint  could be made under the provisions of
MRTU & PULP Act.
6. Faced with this  situation it was submitted that the
Respondent   Company   had   always   recognised   the
members   of   the   Appellant   Union   to   be   their   own
workmen. It is submitted that a formal denial was
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taken only to defeat the claim. We see no substance in
this   submission.   In the written statement   it   has
been categorically denied that the members of the
Appellant Union were   employees of the Respondent
Company.  The question has been  agitated before the
Industrial Court. The   Industrial Court has given a
finding, on facts, that the members of the Appellant
Union  were not   employees   of     the     Respondent
Company.  This is  a disputed  fact and  thus  till  the
Appellants  or their members, get the question decided
in  a proper   forum,   this     complaint   was   not
maintainable. 
7. Accordingly,   we dismiss this Appeal on the ground
that the complaint  was not maintainable.  We clarify
that it is open for  the Appellant or their members to
raise dispute in this behalf before an   appropriate
forum provided  they are entitled  to do so.  If they
get a declaration to the effect that  they are employees
of the Respondent Company, then  it may  be  open to
them to file such a complaint. It is also clarified  that
if   a   dispute   as   to   their   status   is   raised   in   an
appropriate forum then the same will be decided on
merits   without   taking   into   consideration   any
observations made  or finding given by the Industrial

Court in the impugned Order.”
13 The   Apex   Court,   in  Kalyani   Steel's  Case   (supra)   has
considered the ratio laid down in the  Krantikari Suraksha Case  (supra)
and the Red Flag case (supra) and held that when the workmen have not
been accepted by the Company to be it's employees, a complaint under
the ULP Act would not be maintainable before the Labour or Industrial
Court. In the Kalyani Steels Case (supra), the Apex Court concluded that
the Industrial Court had given a finding on facts that the members of the
Union were not employees of the Respondent Company. If this question
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was to be decided, the Industrial Court was not the proper forum.
14 In   the  Cipla   Limited  case   (supra),   the   Apex   Court   has
observed in paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 as under:­
“3. The Labour Court on the basis of these pleadings
framed the following issues:­
1. Does the complainant prove that the company
indulged in unfair labour practices as alleged ?
2. ­­­­­deleted­­­­
3. Does  he  prove that he is entitled the  relief  as
prayed for?
4.  What order ?
Additional Issues:­
     3A. Whether  the complaint   is maintainable?
3B. Whether the complainant prove that the names
in Annexure A are the workmen of the Respondent
No.1?  
3C.   Whether   this   Court   has   jurisdiction   to
entertain the complaint?
4. …....
5. After   further  examination,  it was   held   that the
arrangement  between the appellant and the second
respondent can  only  be  termed as legal and bona
fide and  hence the matter of  abolition of contract
labour   in   the   process   of   house­keeping   and
maintenance of the premises of the factory can be
agitated only under the provisions of Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.  Therefore, the
Labour Court dismissed  the complaint   filed  by the
first respondent­Union. When the matter was carried
by   revision under   the   Act the Industrial Court
dismissed the  revision application by reiterating the
views of the Labour Court.
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6. In the writ  petition the Division Bench of  the High
Court     took     a   different   view   of   the   matter   and
allowed the complaint. Before  the High Court several
decisions were referred   to including the decision of
this   Court   in   General   Labour   Union   (Red   Flag),
Bombay v.  Ahmedabad Mfg.  & Calico Printing  Co.
Ltd & Ors., 1995 Supp.  (1) SCC 175.  In that case
the complaint of the Union was that 21 workmen
who were working   in   one of the canteens of   the
respondent­company   were   not   given   the   service
conditions as were available  to the other workmen of
the   company   and   there   was   also   a   threat   of
termination of their services.   This Court proceeded
to consider the case on the basis that their complaint
was that the  workmen  were  the employees   of  the
company and, therefore, the  breach  committed   and
the threats of   retrenchment   were cognizable by
the Industrial Court or the Labour Court under the
Act.  Even in the complaint no case was  made out
that   the   workmen   had   ever  been  accepted   by   the
company as its employees.   On the other hand, the
complaint proceeded  on the basis as if the workmen
were a part of the work  force  of the company.  This
Court noticed  that   the   workmen   were   never
recognised by the company as its workmen and   it
was the consistent contention of the company  that
they  were  not its employees. In those circumstances,
the Industrial Court having dismissed the complaint
and the High Court having upheld the same, this
Court stated that it was not   established   that the
workmen in   question   were the workmen of   the
company  and in  those  circumstances,  no complaint
could   lie under the Act as was held by   the two
courts. In that case it was the admitted position that
the workmen were   employed by a contractor, who
was     given     a   contract     to     run   the   canteen   in
question.  Thereafter, the High Court adverted to the
decision of this Court in Gujarat Electricity   Board,
Thermal   Power   Station,   Ukai,   Gujarat     v.   Hind
Mazdoor Sabha & Ors., 1995 (5) SCC 27, wherein it
was noticed  that  the  first question to be  decided
would  be whether an   industrial   dispute   could   be
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raised for abolition of  the contract labour system in
view of the provisions  of the  Act  and, if so, who can
do so.  The High Court was  of the  view  that
the decision in General Labour Union (Red Flag),
Bombay v.  Ahmedabad Mfg.  & Calico Printing Co.
Ltd & Ors. (supra) would make it clear that such a
question can be  gone into and that the observations
would not mean that the  workmen  had  to establish
by  some  other  proceedings before the complaint is
filed or that if the complaint  is filed, the  moment
the employer repudiates or denies  the relationship  of
employer and employees the court will  not have  any
jurisdiction.  The observation of this Court that it is
open   to   the   workmen   to   raise   an   appropriate
industrial dispute in that behalf if they are entitled
to do so has to be understood in the light of the
observations of this Court made earlier.   The High
Court further held that the judgment in   General
Labour Union (Red Flag), Bombay  v.   Ahmedabad
Mfg.   &  Calico  Printing  Co.  Ltd  & Ors. (supra)
was confined  to the facts of that case.  On that basis
the High Court   proceeded to further consider the
matter and reversed the  findings recorded by the two
courts and gave a   finding that   the   workmen   in
question  are  the  workmen  of   the   appellant­
company.
7. In this Court it was submitted that the High Court
had proceeded  entirely on wrong lines.  In Gujarat
Electricity Board, Thermal Power Station, Gujarat v.
Hind   Mazdoor   Sabha   (1995(5)   SCC   27)   the
question   raised   was   whether   the   workers     whose
services   were engaged by the contractors but who
were working in  the  thermal  power station of the
Gujarat Electricity  Board  at Ukai can legally claim
 to  be the employees  of the Gujarat Electricity
Board.  The industrial tribunal  had  adjudicated  the
matter and  held  that the workmen concerned in the
reference   could   not   be   the   workmen   of   the
contractors and, therefore, all the workmen employed
by     the   contractor   should   be   deemed   to   be   the
workmen of the Board. The  industrial  tribunal also
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gave   consequential   directions     to   the     Board   for
payment of wages,  etc.   The   award     of     the
industrial tribunal was upheld by  the High
Court in appeal.  The contention put forth before this
Court was  that after coming into force of the Act it is
only the appropriate Government, which can abolish
the   contact   labour   system   after     consulting     the
Central Board  or  the  State Board, as   the   case
may   be,   and   no   other   authority   including   the
industrial tribunal has jurisdiction either to entertain
such   dispute or to direct abolition of the contract
labour   system   and     neither     the     appropriate
Government   nor   the   industrial   tribunal   has
the   power   to   direct   that   the   workmen   of     the
erstwhile   contractor should be deemed to   be the
workmen of  the  Board. The Central Government  or
the industrial tribunal, as the case may be, can only
direct the abolition  of  the  contract  labour   system
as   per the provisions   of the Act but it does not
permit   either   of   them   to     declare   the   erstwhile
workmen of the contractor to be the employees   of
the  principal employer. As  to what  would happen
to an employee engaged by the contractor if contract
employment   is abolished is another moot question
yet to  be decided by this Court.   But   that   is   not   a
point on which we are called upon to decide in this
matter.
8. But one thing is clear – if  the employees are working
under  a  contract covered by the  Contract Labour
(Regulation  & Abolition)  Act then it is  clear  that
the labour court   or   the industrial   adjudicating
authorities cannot have any jurisdiction to deal with
the matter as   it falls   within   the province of an
appropriate Government  to abolish the same.  If the
case put forth by the workmen  is that  they  have
been directly employed by   the   appellant­company
but   the   contract   itself   is a   camouflage and,
therefore,  needs to be adjudicated is a matter which
can be gone  into  by appropriate industrial tribunal
or  labour court. Such question cannot be examined
by   the   labour   court   or     the   industrial     court
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constituted   under   the     Act.   The   object   of   the
enactment   is,   amongst   other   aspects,   enforcing
provisions  relating to unfair labour practices.  If that
is so, unless it is undisputed or indisputable that
there  is employer­employee relationship between the
parties, the question   of unfair practice cannot be
inquired into at all. The  respondent union came  to
the Labour Court with a complaint that the workmen
are engaged by the  appellant through  the contractor
and though that is ostensible relationship the true
relationship is one of master and servant between the
appellant and the workmen in   question. By this
process, workmen repudiate their relationship with
the  contractor under whom  they are employed   but
claim   relationship   of   an   employee   under   the
appellant. That   exercise   of   repudiation   of   the
contract  with  one   and establishment   of   a legal
relationship with another can   be done only in a
regular industrial tribunal/court under  the I.D.Act.
9. Shri   K.K. Singhvi,  the learned  senior   Advocate
appearing  for the respondent, submitted that under
Section 32  of the Act the labour court has the power
to decide all matters arising out of any application or
complaint referred to  it for the decision under any
of the provisions of   the Act. Section 32 would not
enlarge the jurisdiction of the court beyond what is
conferred upon it by other  provisions of  the  Act. If
under other provisions of   the   Act the industrial
tribunal or the labour court has no jurisdiction to
deal with a particular aspect of the matter, Section
32 does not give such power to it. In the cases at
hand before us, whether a workmen can be stated to
be the workman of the appellant  establishment  or
not, it must be held  that the   contract   between   the
appellant and the second respondent is a camouflage
or bogus and upon such a decision it can be held that
the   workman   in   question   is   an   employee   of   the
appellant   establishment.     That   exercise, we are
afraid, would   not   fall   within the scope of either
Section  28  or Section 7  of the Act. In cases of this
nature  where the provisions of the Act are summary
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in nature and give drastic remedies to the parties
concerned elaborate consideration of the question as
to relationship of employer­employee cannot be gone
into. If at any time the employee   concerned was
indisputably   an   employee  of   the establishment
and subsequently  it  is  so  disputed, such a  question
is  an incidental  question  arising under Section 32
of  theAct. Even the case pleaded by the respondent­
Union itself is that the appellant establishment had
never recognised the workmen mentioned  in  Exhibit
A as its employees  and throughout treated   these
persons as  the  employees  of the  second respondent.
If that dispute existed throughout, we   think, the
labour  court or the industrial court under the Act  is
not  the appropriate court to decide such question, as
held by   this Court in General Labour Union (Red
Flag), Bombay v. Ahmedabad  Mfg. & Calico Printing
Co. Ltd & Ors.  (1995 Supp (1) SCC 175), which
view  was reiterated by us in Vividh Kamgar Sabha
v. Kalyani Steels Ltd.  & Anr., (2001) 2 SCC 381.”
15 It has, therefore, been held by the Apex Court that in such
cases where the Employees contend that the Employer has taken a false or
bogus stand of denying employer­employee relationship, the issue will
have to be adjudicated upon by an appropriate forum which is not the
Labour or Industrial Court under the ULP Act.
16 In the  Indian Smelting Case  (supra), the Apex Court once
again considered a similar controversy and has observed in paragraphs 7,
8, 9 and 10 as under:­
“7. On the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of
the   appellants   while   reiterating   the   plea   that   the
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principles   laid   down   in   CIPLA's   case   (supra)   are
unexceptionable and well merited having regard to
the   scheme,   purpose   and   object   of   the   legislations
under consideration and legislative intent as expressed
in the language of the  various provisions therein and
do not call for any reconsideration, merely because
there was no reference to a particular provision or
other,   wherein   according   to   the   respondents   all
relevant   principles   and   criteria   necessary   for   the
purpose   have   been   found   effectively   kept   into
consideration.  According to the respondents the scope
for  the  Maharashtra  Act is   limited  in  nature  and
confined to consideration of claims and grievances of
unfair labour practices of certain kind by prohibiting
employer or union and employees from engaging in
any unfair labour practice and the existence of an
undisputed or indisputable relationship of employer­
employee is an essential pre­requisite for the labour or
Industrial   Court   under   the   Maharashtra   Act   to
entertain any proceedings in respect of any grievance
under the said Act.  Section 32  of the Maharashtra
Act, it is urged is to be considered in the context  of
Sections 26 and 27 read with the relevant entries in
the Schedules in  these cases, particularly items 5, 6,
9 & 10 and in the absence of accepted or existing
relationship  of employer­employee duly declared in
competent proceedings, neither Section 5 nor Section
7   or   even   Section   28   enabled   a   complaint   to   be
entertained for consideration of such grievances as are
sought   or   permitted   to   be   agitated   under   the
Maharashtra Act.
8. The further plea on behalf of the respondents was that
the scope of adjudication under the ID Act is much
wider   in   which   all   or   any   types   and   nature   of
industrial disputes including claims for declaration of
status   or   relationship   of   "Master   and   Servant   or
Employer and Employee" can also be agitated and
determined   and   not   under   the   Maharashtra   Act.
Consequently,   it   is   claimed   that   questions   as   to
whether   the   contract   under   which   contract   labour
was engaged was a sham and nominal or a mere
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camouflage and if so whether by piercing the veil they
should be declared to be really the employees of the
principal employer are matters which could be got
referred to for adjudication by seeking a reference
under   ID   Act   only   and   are   totally   outside   the
jurisdiction   of   the   Courts   constituted   under   the
Maharashtra Act.
9. The   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench   in   Steel
Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. v. National Union
Waterfront Workers and Ors. (2001 (7) SCC 1) in
several paragraphs particularly paras 65, 108, 112,
113, 117, 125 makes the position clear that a dispute
of the nature previously projected has perforce to be
adjudicated on the issue as to whether a person was a
workman under the employer. 
10. The relevant paragraphs so far as relevant read as
follows:­
"65. The contentions of the learned counsel for the
parties, exhaustively set out above, can conveniently
be dealt with under the following two issues : 
A.  Whether   the   concept   of   automatic
absorption of contract labour in the establishment of
the principal employer on issuance of the abolition
notification, is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA Act;
and 
B.  Whether   on   a   contractor   engaging
contract labour in connection with the work entrusted
to him by a principal employer, the relationship of
master   and   servant   between   him   (the   Principal
employer) and the contract labour, emerges. 
108. The next issue that remains to be dealt
with is : 
B.  Whether   on   a   contractor   engaging
contract labour in connection with the work entrusted
to him by a principal employer, the relationship of
master   and   servant   between   him   (the   principal
employer) and the contract labour emerges. 
112. The decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Basti Sugar Mill's case (supra), was
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given   in   the   context   of   reference   of   an   industrial
dispute under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. The appellant­Sugar Mills entrusted the
work of removal of press­mud to a contractor who
engaged the respondents therein (contract labour) in
connection   with   that   work.   The   services   of   the
respondents were terminated by the contractor and
they claimed that they should be reinstated in the
service of the appellant. The Constitution Bench held
(AIR p. 357, para 7 : 
"The  words  of  the  definition  of  workmen  in
Section   2(z)   to   mean   "any   person   (including   an
apprentice)   employed   in   any   industry   to   do   any
skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or
clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of
employment be express or implied" are by themselves
sufficiently wide to bring in persons doing work in an
industry   whether   the   employment   was   by   the
management or by the contractor of the management.
Unless however the definition of the word "employer"
included the management of the industry even when
the employment was by the contractor the workmen
employed by the contractor could not get the benefit
of   the   Act   since   a   dispute   between   them   and   the
management   would   not   be   an   industrial   dispute
between "employer" and workmen. It was with a view
to   remove   this   difficulty   in   the   way   of   workmen
employed   by   contractors   that   the   definition   of
employer   has   been   extended   by   sub­clause   (iv)   of
Section   2(i).   The   position   thus   is   :   (a)   that   the
respondents   are   workmen   within   the   meaning   of
Section 2(z), being persons employed in the industry
to do manual work for reward, and (b) they were
employed by a contractor with whom the appellant
company had contracted in the course of conducting
the industry for the execution by the said contractor
of   the   work   of   removal   of   press­mud   which   is
ordinarily a part of the industry. It follows therefore
from Section 2(z) read with sub­clause (iv) of Section
2(i) of the Act that they are workmen of the appellant
company   and   the   appellant   company   is   their
employer." 
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113. It is evident that the decision in that case
also   turned   on   the   wide   language   of   statutory
definitions of the terms "workmen" and "employer". So
it does not advance the case pleaded by the learned
counsel. 
117. We   find   no   substance   in   the   next
submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that a combined
reading of the definition of the terms contract labour,
establishment and workman would show that a legal
relationship   between   a   person   employed   in   an
industry and the owner of the industry is created
irrespective of the fact as to who has brought about
such relationship. 
125(5).  On issuance of prohibition notification
under   Section   10(1)   of   the   CLRA   Act   prohibiting
employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an
industrial dispute brought before it by any contract
labour   in   regard   to   conditions   of   service,   the
industrial   adjudicator   will   have   to   consider   the
question whether the contractor has been interposed
either on the ground of having undertaken to produce
any given result for the establishment or for supply of
contract labour for work of the establishment under a
genuine  contract   or is  a  mere  ruse  camouflage  to
evade compliance of various beneficial legislations so
as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If
the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere
camouflage, the so­called contract  labour will have to
be treated as employees of the principal employer who
shall   be   directed   to   regularise   the   services   of   the
contract labour in the concerned establishment subject
to the conditions as may be specified by it for that
purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.”  
17 This Court has considered the law as laid down by the Apex
Court in the above referred cases and has concluded in paragraphs 5 and
6 of it's judgment in the case of  Maharashtra Engineering Plastic and
General Kamgar Union (supra) as under:­
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“5.  At   the   hearing   of   this   petition,   on   behalf   of   the
Petitioners, their learned counsel points out that the
judgment   in   Kalyani   (supra)   and   Cipla   Ltd.   V.
Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and ors. 2001 1
CLR 754 would not be attracted to the facts of the
present case. It is pointed out that in both the cases
admittedly   relationship   of   employer   and   employee
was with another employer. In the case of Kalyani
(supra)  the   Canteen   workers   claimed   to   be   direct
workmen though they were employed in the canteen
by the contractor. Similarly in Cipla, admittedly the
complaint was filed contending that the contract was
sham and bogus and that the employees were direct
employees  of  Cipla.  It is  therefore,  submitted  that
these judgments would not apply on the fact of the
present case where the complainants had contested
that respondents are their workmen. Merely denial
would   not   be   sufficient.   It   was   open   to   the
complainant to produce evidence and in fact there
was prima facie evidence to establish relationship of
employer and employee and in these circumstances,
the order of the Labour Court ought to be set aside. It
is secondly submitted that the  workman who was
examined by the complainant union was one of those
who admittedly was admitted by the respondent to be
their workman though his name was not listed in
ESIS records. The workman had deposed that he was
working along with other 16 workmen whose names
were listed in the complaint. Prima facie there was
therefore, sufficient material and in the light of that,
the   learned   Labour   Court   ought   not   to   have
proceeded to dispose of the issues without recording
further evidence. It is submitted that petitioners did
not have a fair opportunity of leading evidence. 
On   the   other   hand,   on   behalf   of   the
Respondents, their learned counsel submits that the
complainants are not sure as to who is their employer
considering   the   pleadings   of   the   respondents
themselves   in   the   complaint   and   thereafter   in   the
affidavit in rejoinder filed on behalf of the Respondent
Nos. 1 and 2. It is pointed out that no material had
been   brought   on   record   whatsoever   to   show   any
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relationship   between   Respondent   no.   1   and   M/s.
Dinesh Fashions or for that matter with M/s. Teenage
Fashions.   Considering   the   contention   of   the
complainant   themselves   that   the   workmen   were
working for both the units, it is contended that it
cannot   be   said   that   the   findings   recorded   by   the
learned Labour Court suffers from any error. 
6. With the above, we may first consider whether on the
plea by the employer that the persons claimed to be
workmen are not his workmen the complaint under
the   provisions   of   the   MRTU   &   PULP   Act   is   not
maintainable and the remedy of such persons is to
approach Industrial Tribunal on a reference by the
appropriate Government. We may firstly consider the
judgment in Kalyani and another. The learned Apex
Court has been pleased to observe that the provisions
of MRTU & PULP Act can only be enforced by persons
who admittedly are workman. If there is dispute as to
whether employees are  employees of the company,
then  that must  be got resolved by raising  dispute
before the appropriate forum. It is only after a proper
forum   decides   the   status   will   an   application   be
maintainable   under   the   provisions   of   M.R.T.U.&
P.U.L.P. Act. The Judgment came to be delivered on
19.1.2001. 
The matter once came up before the Apex Court
in Cipla Ltd. V. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union
and   Ors,   2001   1   CLR   754.   That   was   the   case
admittedly   of   Contractor   and   employees.   The
contention of the Union was that the contract was
sham and consequently they were direct employees of
the appellant before the Apex Court. This view found
favour with the Division Bench of this Court. The
Apex Court observed that the case put forth by the
workman is that they have been directly employed by
the   appellant   company.   That   the   contract   itself   is
sham and therefore, needs to be adjudicated. It is a
matter which can be gone into by Industrial Court or
the   Labour   Court.   The   said   question   cannot   be
examined by the Labour Court constituted under the
Act. The Apex Court then observed that the object of
the enactment is, amongst other aspects, enforcing
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provisions relating to unfair labour practice. If that is
so, unless it is undisputed or indisputable that there is
employer­employee relationship between the parties,
the question of unfair practice cannot be inquired
into at all. The court then noted that the Respondent
Union came to the Labour Court with a complaint
that   the   workmen   are   engaged   by   the   appellant
through the contractor and though that is ostensible
relationship the true relationship is one of master and
servant between the appellant and the workmen in
question. The court held that exercise of repudiation
of the contract with one and establishment of a legal
relationship   with   another   can   be   done,   only   in   a
regular   Industrial   Tribunal/Court   under   the
Industrial Disputes Act. 
Subsequent   to   these   judgments   several
judgments of the learned Single Judges of this Court
came   to   be   considered   in   Hindustan   Coca   Cola
Bottling S/W pvt. Ltd. and anr. V. Narayan Rawal
and   Ors.   2001   II   CLR   380.   By   considering   the
judgment   in   Kalyan   Steel   (supra)   and   in   Cipla
(supra) the learned Division Bench of this court held
that if the relationship of employer and employee is
established before the Industrial Tribunal or Labour
Court   under   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act   or   the
employee/employer   relationship   is   undisputed   or
indisputable, then the complaint under M.R.T.U. &
P.U.L.P.   Act   would   be   maintainable.   The   court
hastened to add that if any time the employee was
recognised   by   the   employer   and   subsequently
repudiated   such   question   would   be   incidental
question arising under Section 32 of the Act and the
Labour Court and the Industrial Court as the case
may be is bound to decide the said question. However,
in   the   case   where   the   complaint   is   filed   that
employees of the contractors are direct employees of
the Employer the court constituted under Section 28
of the MRTU Act will have no jurisdiction to entertain
the   complaint   unless   status   of   relationship   gets
determined in the proceedings under the Industrial
Disputes Act. 
From the above it will therefore, be clear that
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there   must   be   at   the   time   of   entertaining   the
complaint,   where   relationship   is   disputed,   strong
material in the form of at least documentary evidence
to   show  existence  of   relationship   of  employer  and
workman. If such relationship does not exist or is
disputed,   it   will   not   be   open   to   the   court   under
M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act to examine the matter. In a
case where the employee claims that though he is
employed by the contractor, the contract is sham,
then the complaint would not be maintainable. In
cases other than contract workers where the employee
disputes the relationship, there must be strong prima
facie evidence available before the court to entertain
the complaint in order to determine the issue as to
existence of relationship. If there is no documentary
prima facie material, then it will not be open to the
Labour Court to decide the issue.”
18 Similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of
Hydroflex   India  (supra),  Asha   Joseph   D'Mello  (supra),    Mahindra   &
Mahindra Limited  (supra),  Janprabha Offset  (supra) and  VIP Industries
Limited (supra).
19 The Petitioners have placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court   (Division   Bench)   in   the   case   of  Hindustan   Coca   Cola  (supra).
Paragraph 8 of the judgment which is pointed out, reads as under:­
“8 .  Mr.Cama also drew our attention to an unreported
decision   of   the   learned   single   Judge   of   this   Court
(Khandeparkar, J.) in Indian Seamless Metal Tubes
Limited v. Sunil Iwale and Ors., Writ Petition No.
1433 of 2000 decided on 5th July, 2001. In that case
the learned Judge has not agreed with the view taken
by Kochar, J. in the present case and held that in view
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of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Cipla Ltd.
and Kalyani Steels Ltd. that only precondition to seek
remedy under the MRTU & PULP Act is necessity of
existence of employer­employee relationship between
the   parties   and   when   its   existence   is   not   already
established or is disputable, the party has to first seek
relief under the Central Act i.e. the Industrial Disputes
Act or the Bombay Act i.e. the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, and if successful therein to seek remedy
under the said Act thereafter. We are in agreement
with the observations of the learned Single Judge but
with   a   rider   that   in   cases   where   the   employer­
employee relationship was recognised at some stage
and thereafter it was disputed, the Industrial Court
has jurisdiction to decide this issue as an incidental
issue under Section 32 of the MRTU & PULP Act. 
In his judgment Khandeparkar, J. has referred
to a judgment of another single Judge Rebello, J. in
Writ   Petition   No.1365   of   2001,   Raigad   Mazdoor
Sangh v. Vikram Bapat. Rebello, J. has, inter alia,
held   that   while   deciding   the   question   of
maintainability   of   the   complaint   under   MRTU   &
PULP Act, the Industrial Court is bound to frame an
issue as a preliminary issue on that count and after
framing   the   preliminary   issue   decide   the   point   of
jurisdiction.   Khandeparkar,   J.   has,   however,
disagreed with this view and held that the question of
framing such issue does not arise if on a perusal of the
complaint under the MRTU & PULP Act it is found
that there is no jurisdiction to try the complaint. He
observed : 
"20. It was also sought to be contended that
mere denial of status of the complainant as that of
employee   by   the   opponent,   cannot   non­suit   the
employees   and   such   denial   would   not   oust   the
jurisdiction to the Industrial Court to ascertain the
fact situation by framing issues and asking the parties
to lead evidence in that regard, and to decide the
same, possibly by summary manner. In fact, similar
was   the   contention   sought   to   be   raised   in   Vividh
Kamgar Sabha's case by saying that such denials can
be raised in each and every case to defeat the claim of
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the employee, the contention was rejected by the Apex
Court.   Indeed,   a   question   of   framing   of   issue   or
holding of summary inquiry does not arise at all.
Once, it is clear that the Industrial Court under the
said Act has no jurisdiction to decide the issue relating
to employer­employee relationship, the occasion for
framing of issue on the point which is beyond its
jurisdiction cannot arise. Once it is clear that the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court depends upon the
fact of existence of employer­employees relationship
between   the   parties   which   is   a   jurisdictional   fact,
which should exist to enable the Industrial Court to
assume jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under
the said Act, in the absence of the same, any attempt
on the part of the Industrial Court to adjudicate upon
the   issue   of   such   relationship   would   amount   to
mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction." 
We are in respectful agreement with the above
view   expressed   by  Khandeparkar,   J.  If,  on   a  bare
reading of the complaint, the Industrial Court or the
Labour Court as the case may be, is satisfied that it
has no jurisdiction to decide the complaint as there is
no   undisputed   or   indisputable   employer­employee
relationship, the occasion for framing an issue on that
count would not arise. If the Industrial Court or the
Labour Court is satisfied that there is no undisputed
or indisputable the employer/employee relationship,
it   cannot   assume   jurisdiction   to   entertain   the
complaint and the complaint will have to be dismissed
as not maintainable. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have
no   hesitation   in   holding   that   in   the   instant   case
complaints filed by the Union and the employees are
not maintainable and the Industrial Court has no
(Emphasis is mine).
jurisdiction to try these complaints.”
20 It   is   quite   obvious   that   the   consistent   view   in   such
circumstances has been that unless employer­employee relationship was
recognized at some stage in between the litigating sides and it has then
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been disputed only to oust the jurisdiction of the Court, there cannot be
an ouster of jurisdiction. 
21. The contention of the Petitioners in the case on hand is that the
work   of   Aaya   and   Ward  Boy   was   never   performed   through   contract
labourers.   However,   the   Petitioners   have   not   produced   any   evidence
which would indicate that, at some point in time, there was a direct
relationship and which was recognized in between the Petitioners and the
Respondent. Identity Cards cannot be indicative of such a relationship
since an identity card is not the decisive/ determinative piece of evidence
of an employer­employee relationship. It is an admit card on the strength
of which regular employees as well as contract labourers are permitted to
enter the premises of the Respondent. So also, the identity cards could not
be proved by the Petitioners before the Industrial Court to be genuine
documents.
22 It cannot be overlooked that the Respondent has brought
voluminous record before the Industrial Court which has considered the
oral and documentary evidence after framing preliminary issues. It may
eventually appear that the housekeeping activity may not include the
work of an Aaya or Ward Boy or it may also turn out that there was no
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valid licence and registration for deploying Aaya and Ward Boys in the
housekeeping area, under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970 (herein after referred to as “the CLRA Act”). However, this
investigative exercise cannot be undertaken by the Industrial Court. 
23 The Petitioner has relied upon the following observations of
this Court in the case of Bhojraj Tulsiram Gajbhiye (supra):­
“He also makes a reference to Hindustan Coca
Cola Bottling Vs, Bhartiya Kamgar Sena reported in
2002   (3)   Bom.   C.R.   129   (O.S.)   :   2001(III)   CLR
1025. Next Division Bench decision to which reference
is   made   is   reported   in   2005   (1)   Bom.C.R.   759
(O.S.) : 2004 LIC 3789 (M/s Quadricon Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Maxi   D'Souza   and   Others).   Dharmadhikari   J.   in
M.I.D.C. case finally observes after taking stock of
these decisions as follows: 
"Both   the   above   Division   Bench   rulings
therefore hold that the Labour or Industrial Court
functioning under the U. L. P. Act has to first find out
whether  the relationship  which is being  denied  by
employer   is   indisputable   or   unquestionable   on
account of its past acceptance by the employer and
such past acceptance is to be found out on the basis of
pleadings of parties and the available material. If it
has any doubt about existence of such relationship,
inquiry   to   clear   it   is   not   possible   and   the
employee/complainant will be required to approach
regular forum under either B. I. R. Act or ID Act. The
judgments of Hon. Apex Court in this respect use two
words i.e. "undisputed" or "indisputable". No problem
arises when the relationship is undisputed. However,
when employer denies and disputes the relationship
which is beyond dispute, the question whether it is
indisputable will arise. The complaint as filed may
disclose   necessary   facts   to   show   existence   of   such
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relationship and those facts may be corroborated by
certain documents filed either with the complaint or
later on. The employer even in this position can come
up with plea of denial of relationship in his written
statement. In fact, contingency of this nature will not
arise till employer takes a stand in his reply or written
statement.   In   that   event   apart   from   pleadings   of
parties, material produced may also be required to be
gone into. If complainant/employee has such material
with   him,   he   will   definitely   produce   it   for
consideration. However, if he does not possess such
material and the same is available with his employer,
he can requisition it to show that relationship exists
and is being denied malafidely. Labour or Industrial
Court   will   not   be   acting   without   jurisdiction   in
summoning   documents   like   registers   in   which
attendance of such employee is marked or vouchers
through which payment has been made to him or
production record containing his name. The Division
Bench judgments do not prohibit such inquiry only to
find out previous acceptance of such relationship. The
judgments   coupled   with   the   other   judgments
mentioned   above   permit   scrutiny   by   Industrial   or
Labour Court to find out genuineness in the defence of
denial of relationship by employer. The inquiry by
Labour or Industrial Court will be only to find out
whether   relationship   of   employer   and   employee   is
indisputable.   It   cannot   be   forgotten   that   the
jurisdictional fact to be decided in this matter is also
the fact about which no decision can be taken by
Labour or Industrial Court under U. L. P. Act if there
is   genuine   dispute.   While   deciding   whether   the
employer   employees   relationship   is   indisputable,   it
cannot record a finding that such relationship exists
and   therefore   it   is   indisputable.   Tests   and   factors
determinative for aforesaid purpose as laid down by
Hon. Apex Court from time to time cannot be applied
to such material to create a relationship. These tests
crystallised in recent judgments of Hon. Apex Court
reported at AIR 2004 SC 1639 between Workmen of
Nilgiri   Cooperative   Marketing   Society   Vs.   State   of
Tamil Nadu and 2004(1) SCC 126 : AIR 2004 SC
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969 between Ramsingh Vs. Union of India may be
mentioned here. Briefly  stated, in  case of disputed
relationship,   several   factors   which   would   have   a
bearing on the result and the Court is required to
consider are : (a) who is appointing authority; (b)
who is the paymaster; (c) who can dismiss; (d) how
long alternative service lasts; (e) the extent of control
and   supervisions;   (f)   the   nature   of   the   job   e.   g.
whether, it is professional or skilled work; (g) nature
of   establishment;   (h)   the   right   to   reject.   The
distinction in this respect while answering the issue of
"indisputable relation" is very fine but will have to be
maintained. The tests at (a), (b) and (c) above alone
can be applied only to once accepted material and
documents   which   Court   finds   employer   is   not   in
position to deny. Application of other tests i. e. tests at
(d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and "integration test"even to
admitted material will not be possible because it will
be holding enquiry into a disputes province. The only
purpose of such inquiry is to examine bona fides of
employer who comes up with denial of relationship. If
after perusal of pleadings and records, it finds that
employer can possibly demonstrate that there is no
such relationship, it will have to give up the exercise.
The   jurisdiction   can   be   exercised   to   hold   limited
inquiry   and   at   the   end   thereof,   the   Labour   or
Industrial Court has to be in position to draw only
one   inference   that   such   relationship   was   and   is
accepted by employer earlier, and to deliver verdict
that stand in defence raised by employer is totally
false and malafide. Even if two views of the matter
appear probable, it will have to direct employee to file
proceedings under B. I. R. Act or Industrial Disputes
(Emphasis is mine).
Act.” 
24 Even going by the ratio laid down in the above stated case, I
do not find that the Petitioners appear to sustain the test of who is the
appointing authority, who is the pay master, who can dismiss, etc..
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25 So also, there was nothing before the Industrial Court to
indicate that the Respondent had earlier accepted employer­employee
relationship with the Petitioners so as to be construed that the defence of
the Respondent in the Written Statement is a malafide and a vexatious
defence. 
26 The ratio laid down by this Court in Buildtech Constructions
case (supra) is of no assistance to the Petitioners since in the instant case
and unlike in the Buildtech Case, the Respondent has produced evidence
to indicate that the Petitioners were neither appointed by the Respondent
nor are the Petitioners directly paid wages by the Establishment. 
27 For the sake of clarity, it needs to be noted that the CLRA Act,
1970 and the Rules thereunder are aimed at regulating the deployment of
contract labourers. If the contract labourers are performing work similar
to the work performed by the regular employees, their wage structure has
to be similar. The contractor has to pay wages directly to the contract
labourer,   but   in   the   presence   of   a   representative   of   the   Principal
Employer. The contractor has to raise a bill for service charges and the
wages   of   the   labourers   are   paid   from   such   payments   made   by   the
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Principal Employer to the contractor. If the contractor does not deposit
the PF contributions, the Principal Employer is mandated to pay the same.
Issuance of identity cards/ admit cards would not mean that a direct
relationship   is   established   between   the   labourers   and   the   Principal
Employer. Abolition of contract labour system by the competent authority
does not lead to the automatic absorption of the contract labourers in the
service of the Principal Employer. 
28 The Apex Court, in the case of International Airport Authority
of India case (supra), has concluded in paragraph 27 as under :­
“ 27.  The last finding is that there were three indicators to
show that contract labour for loading/unloading were
direct employees of IAAI : direct payment of wages,
direct   penal   action   by   IAAI   against   the   contract
labour, and direct control and supervision of contract
labour by IAAI. Therefore, the contracts for supply of
contract   labour   were   `paper'   contracts   and   a
camouflage to deny benefits of labour laws to the
members of first respondent Union.
We will first examine whether there was any
material at all to hold that the wages were being
directly   paid   by   IAAI   to   the   contract   labour.   The
contracts between IAAI and the society make it crystal
clear that a lump sum consideration was to be paid by
the IAAI to the society and the society was responsible
for   payment   to   its   members   who   were   send   as
contract labour. The workers did not produce any
document to show that the payment was made by
IAAI   directly   to   the   workers.   But   The   Tribunal
wrongly held that Ex. W­1 to W­6 showed that the
payment   was   directly   made.   Ex.   W­1   is   an
appointment   letter   dated   31.1.1978   issued   to   one
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Godaraman by Airfreight. Ex.W­2 dated 31.10.1983
is a pay­slip of one D. Natarajan issued by Airfreight.
Both these documents relate to the period prior to
31.10.1985 when the workers were the permanent
employees   of   Airfreight,   and   had   absolutely   no
connection with IAAI. Ex.W­3 dated 18.4.1988 is a
cash receipt for payment of ex­gratia amount paid to
cargo loaders for the period 22.3.1986 to 9.5.1986
and 17.5.1986 to 23.5.1986. It shows that a sum of
Rs.7,267.20 was paid as ex gratia amount. Though
the said receipt is dated 18.4.1988, it clearly shows
that the payment related to the work done between
22.3.1986 to 9.5.1986 and 17.5.1986 to 23.5.1986
when, admittedly, these workers were direct casual
daily   wage   employees   under   IAAI   and   when   the
contract between IAAI and the society had not even
come into existence. The contract labour arrangement
admittedly came into existence only from 1.7.1986.
This document has, therefore, no relevance to show
that any payment was made to the contract labour
directly. Ex.W­4 is a Circular dated 18.2.1986 of IAAI
notifying that wages of 82 loaders mentioned therein
had been drawn from 1.1.1986 to 31.1.1986 and
directed the said daily wage labourers to receive their
wages immediately. This again is of no relevance as it
related   to   the   period   prior   to   the   contract   labour
agreement when the workers were working as casual
daily wage employees directly under the IAAI. Ex.W­5
is the pay­slip of one S.C. Yadav for May, 1990 who
was working in the Bombay Airport and Ex. W­6 is a
pay­slip of one Aseem Das, Cargo Loader for June,
1990 who was working in the Calcutta Airport. These
two documents were produced only to show that the
IAAI had employed some persons as direct labour in
its   cargo   department   in   Calcutta   and   Bombay
Airports and had nothing to do with the workers who
were   working   at   Madras.   On   the   basis   of   these
documents, the Tribunal has held that payments were
being   directly   made   to   workers   when   they   were
contract labours. This is a finding based on absolutely
no evidence and shockingly perverse and is liable to be
rejected accordingly.
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The Tribunal held that IAAI was taking penal
and disciplinary action by suspending and punishing
the   contract   labour   and   that   was   proof   of   direct
employment.   This   finding   is   also   based   on   no
evidence. Not even a single document was produced to
show that any notice of suspension or show cause
notice   for   disciplinary   action   or   order   imposing
punishment was passed by IAAI in regard to any of
the contract labour. Reliance was placed on Ex.W10,
M­15 to M­17, M­21, M­23 as also M2, 24 to 31 and
34 to 40 to prove that IAAI was directly taking action
against the contract labour. None of them is relevant.
Ex.W­10 is a letter dated 7.3.1990 from IAAI to the
society, stating that one Ram Chander, loader­cum­
packer   had   given   an   assurance   to   work   in   a
disciplined manner and therefore it was decided to
allow   him   to   work.   This   is   not   a   communication
addressed to the contract labour but to the society
informing   the   society   that   Ram   Chander   may   be
permitted to work in view of his assurance to behalf
properly. M­15 to M­17 are 3 letters dated 9.3.1987,
16.6.1988 and 11.6.1990 addressed by IAAI to the
society regarding the allotment of contract labour and
their   identification.   Ex.M­21   is   a   letter   dated
20/22.2.1991 from IAAI to the society for supply of
contract labour. Ex.M­23 is a letter dated 14.5.1991
from   IAAI   to   the   society   regarding   duty   roster.
Ex.M24 is a letter dated 2.12.1987 from IAAI to the
society informing that there is no improvement in the
attendance of the contract labour, and requesting the
society   to   take   necessary   action   to   improve   their
attendance. Ex.M25 to 31 and 34 to 40 are letters
complaining about pilferage and other irregularities
committed by the contract labour noticed by security
personnel. These  letters give the particulars of  the
irregularities committed and inform the society not to
send them to work pending investigation. None of
them relates to imposition of punishment by IAAI as
employer   against   any   employee.   These   are   merely
communications informing the contractor society that
some of the contract labour provided by it were guilty
of   some   illegal   acts   and   therefore   directing   the
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contractor   not   to   send   those   employees.   This   was
expressly provided for in clauses 20 and 25 of the
Contract   Labour   Agreement.   Thus,   none   of   these
documents is evidence of any penal or disciplinary
action by IAAI against the contract labour.
The next ground referred is that the contract
labour were working under the direct supervision and
control of officers of IAAI. This is not in fact disputed.
The contract labour were engaged in handling cargo,
that is loading, unloading and movement of cargo in
the Cargo Complex of IAAI. Naturally, the work had
to be done under the supervision of the officers of
IAAI.  Merely   because   the   contract   labour   work   is
under the supervision of the officers of the principal
employer, it cannot be taken as evidence of direct
employment under the principal employer. Clause 17
of the Contract Agreement required a supervisor to be
employed by the society also. Exercise of some control
over   the   activities   of   contract   labour   while   they
discharge their duties as labourers, is inevitable and
such exercise is not sufficient to hold that the contract
labour   will   become   the   direct   employees   of   the
principle employer.
It   is   thus   seen   that   all   the   three   grounds
mentioned by the Tribunal  and which have found
favour with the Division Bench as indicators of direct
employment   by   IAAI   and   the   contract   labour
agreement with the society being a camouflage, are
wholly baseless.”  (Emphasis is mine).
29 As   such,   merely   because   there   was   supervision   by   the
representative of the Principal Employer on the work activities of the
contract   labourers   would   not   tantamount   to   the   labourers   being   the
employees of the Principal Employer.
30 The   Apex   Court   in   the   case   of  General   Manager   (OSD),
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Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills case (supra) has held in paragraphs 8 and 9
as under:­
“ 8.     In this case, the Industrial adjudicator has granted
relief to the first respondent in view of its finding that
he should be deemed to be a direct employee of the
appellant. The question for consideration is whether
the said finding was justified. It is now well­settled
that if the industrial adjudicator finds that contract
between the principal employer and contractor to be
sham,   nominal   or   merely   a   camouflage   to   deny
employment benefits to the employee and that there
was in fact a direct employment, it can grant relief to
the employee by holding that the workman is the
direct employee of the principal employer. Two of the
well­recognized tests to find out whether the contract
labour   are   the   direct   employees   of   the   principal
employer are (i) whether the principal employer pays
the salary instead of the contractor; and (ii) whether
the   principal   employer   controls  and   supervises   the
work of the  employee.  In this case, the  Industrial
Court answered both questions in the affirmative and
as a consequence held that first respondent is a direct
employee of the appellant.
9.     On a careful consideration, we are of the view that
the   Industrial   Court   committed   a   serious   error   in
arriving at those findings. In regard to the first test as
to who pays the salary, it placed the onus wrongly
upon the appellant. It is for the employee to aver and
prove that he was paid salary directly by the principal
employer and not the contractor. The first respondent
did not discharge this onus. Even in regard to second
test,   the   employee   did   not   establish   that   he   was
working under the direct control and supervision of
the   principal   employer.   The   Industrial   Court
misconstrued the meaning of the terms `control and
supervision' and held that as the officers of appellant
were giving some instructions to the first respondent
working as a guard, he was deemed to be working
under the control and supervision of the appellant.
The   expression   `control   and   supervision'   in   the
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context of contract labour was explained by this court
in   International   Airport   Authority   of   India   v.
International Air Cargo Workers Union [2009 (13)
SCC 374] thus:
"If   the   contract   is   for   supply   of   labour,
necessarily, the labour supplied by  the contractor will
work under the directions, supervision and control of
the principal employer but that would not make the
worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if
the   salary   is   paid   by   contractor,   if   the   right   to
regulate employment is with the contractor, and the
ultimate   supervision   and   control   lies   with   the
contractor. 
The   principal   employer   only   controls   and
directs the work to be done by a   contract labour,
when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him.
But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses
whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the
principal   employer   or   used   otherwise.   In   short,
worker   being   the   employee   of   the   contractor,   the
ultimate   supervision   and   control   lies   with   the
contractor as he decides where the employee will work
and   how   long   he   will   work   and   subject   to   what
conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends
the worker to work under the principal  employer, the
worker works under the supervision and control of
the principal employer but that is secondary control.
The primary control is with the contractor."
Therefore we are of the view that the Industrial
Court ought to have held that first respondent was
not a direct employee of the appellant, and rejected
(Emphasis is mine).
the application of the first respondent.”
31 Insofar   as   the   visit   of   the   Government   Labour   Officer   is
concerned, it is noteworthy that the visit was under the CLRA Act. His
conclusion as regards payment of wages is also under the CLRA Act. If the
Petitioners were the direct employees of the Principal Employer and were
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not contract labourers deployed by the contractor, I find no reason for
these Petitioners to have approached the Labour Officer for making a
statement to be recorded under the CLRA Act. 
32 I have no reason to accept the contention of the Petitioners
that the attendance record is a genuine document which is compilation of
sheets   of   papers   without   any   stamp   or   letter   head   or   name   of   the
establishment and without any signature of the officer concerned. 
33 Considering the totality of the evidence before the Industrial
Court, I find that the Respondent has taken a stand that the Petitioners
were deployed as Aaya / Ward Boy under the housekeeping activity and
the same was outsourced through a contractor. The submission of the
Petitioner that the work of Aaya / Ward Boy is not outsourced and was
never performed by any contractor, is in itself a contention aimed at
repudiating/ disputing the existence of a contractor who is said to have
deployed the Petitioners in the Respondent Establishment. 
34 In the light of the above, I do not find that the impugned
judgment of the Industrial Court in the Complaints filed by the Petitioners
could be termed as being perverse or erroneous. In view of the ratio laid
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down by the Apex Court regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of this
Court, in the case of  Syed Yakoob v/s K.S.Radhakrishnan  reported in  AIR
1964 SC 477   and   Surya Dev Rai v/s Ram Chander Rai   reported in   AIR
2003 SC 3044 , I am of the view that grave injustice is not caused to the
Petitioners by the impugned judgment. They are not rendered remedy­less
as the Apex Court in Kalyani Steels Limited and Cipla Limited judgments
(supra)   has   laid   down   the   law   that   the   contract   labourers   like   the
Petitioners   can   raise   an   industrial   dispute   for   the   redressal   of   their
grievance and for obtaining a declaration that the Principal Employer is
the real employer. The Petitions are, therefore, dismissed.
35 In the event, the Petitioners raise an industrial dispute before
the   appropriate   Government   under   the   Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947
within   a   period   of   SIX   WEEKS   from   today,   the   time   spent   by   the
Petitioners before the Industrial Court and this Court shall be a ground for
condonation of delay, if any. All contentions of the litigating sides are,
therefore, kept open. In the event, the appropriate Government refers the
dispute to the appropriate Court/ Tribunal, the said reference shall be
decided   on   it's   own   merits   and   the   concerned  Tribunal   shall   not   be
influenced by the observations of the Industrial Court in the impugned
judgment as well as the observations of this Court.
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36 Rule is, therefore, discharged. 
37 No order as to costs.
(RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
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