Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 54
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 1544-1545 of 2026)
KANCHANA RAI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GEETA SHARMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1737 of 2026)
UMA DEVI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GEETA SHARMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2026.01.13
15:35:09 IST
Reason:
1. Leave granted.
1
2. Heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Shri V. Giri, senior
counsel appearing for the respective appellants in the two
appeals and Shri Vikas Singh, senior counsel for the
contesting respondents, in both the appeals.
3. The controversy is inter se the heirs/family members of late
Dr. Mahendra Prasad who died on 27.12.2021. He had three
sons, namely, Ranjit Sharma, who passed away on
02.03.2023, Devinder Rai, husband of the appellant-
Kanchana Rai and Rajeev Sharma. It is alleged that late Dr.
Mahendra Prasad executed a registered Will on 18.07.2011,
appointing the appellant, the wife of his pre-deceased son
Devinder Rai, as the executor while bequeathing his
properties in favour of her two sons, completely ignoring his
own two sons namely Ranjit Sharma and Rajeev Sharma.
4. Smt. Geeta Sharma, Respondent No. 1, wife of one of the
sons, Ranjit Sharma, who died after the death of Dr.
Mahendra Prasad, applied for maintenance from the estate
of her father-in-law, before the Family Court under the Hindu
2
1
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 . The petition was
dismissed by the Family Court as not maintainable as
Respondent no.1 was not a widow on the date of death of Dr.
Mahindra Prasad, since her husband, Ranjit Sharma was
alive at the time of his father’s demise. The High Court, in
appeal, set aside the order of the Family Court recording a
categorical finding that the petition was maintainable as
Respondent no.1 was the widow of one of the sons of late Dr.
Mahindra Prasad and as such was a dependant.
Accordingly, the High Court directed the Family Court to
consider the matter on merit and to decide about the
quantum of maintenance.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the High
Court dated 20.08.2025, the appellant-Smt. Kanchana Rai,
the wife of late Devinder Rai, the pre-deceased son of late Dr.
Mahindra Prasad, has preferred one of these appeals on the
issue of maintainability of the maintenance petition filed by
the Respondent No.1
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”
3
6. The other appeal has been preferred by one Smt. Uma Devi,
the alleged partner of late Dr. Mahindra Prasad, contending
that she was in a live-in relationship with him over the last
forty years and that Respondent No. 1 had no legal right for
seeking maintenance from the estate of late Dr. Mahendra
Prasad.
7. In these facts and circumstances, a short and simple
question, which has been made intricate by legal engineering
of the legal minds, arising in these appeals is: whether a
daughter-in-law, who becomes a widow after the death of her
father-in-law, is a dependant upon the estate of the father-
in-law, and entitled to claim maintenance from his estate.
8. Since the issue which is falling for our consideration is purely
legal in nature, we intend to proceed and decide it on our own
thinking and reasoning on the simple interpretation of the
provisions of the Act, independent of the view taken by either
of the courts below i.e. the Family Court and the High Court
or on the basis of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which is
completely alien for the purposes of any interpretation of the
provisions of the present Act.
4
9. The law on the grant of maintenance of Hindus has been
codified by enacting the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act,
1956. The aforesaid Act provides for the adoption as well for
the maintenance. The adoption part is dealt under Chapter
II of the Act, whereas Chapter III of the Act provides for
maintenance to the dependants of a Hindu under Sections
18 to 28.
10. The “dependants” have been defined under Section 21 of the
Act inter alia to include the following relatives of the
deceased.
“…
2 (vii). any widow of his son or of a
son of his predeceased son, so long as
she does not remarry: provided and to
the extent that she is unable to obtain
maintenance from her husband’s estate.
or from her son or daughter, if any, or his
or her estate; or in the case of a
grandson’s widow, also from her father-
in-law’s estate;
…”
11. A plain reading of the above definition of the dependants
makes it crystal clear that the relatives of the deceased,
5
namely, “any widow of his son” would be a dependant
provided she is unable to maintain herself from her
husband’s estate or from her son or her daughter’s estate
and in the case of grandson’s widow, from her father-in-law’s
estate.
12. Section 22 of the Act provides for the maintenance of
dependants and casts an obligation upon all the heirs of the
deceased Hindu to maintain the dependants of the deceased
out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. In
simpler words, all the heirs of the deceased Hindu are
obliged to maintain the dependants of the deceased from the
funds inherited out of the estate of the deceased.
13. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 further provides that where a
dependant of the deceased Hindu has not obtained share in
the estate of the Hindu either by testamentary or intestate-
succession, such a dependant shall be entitled to
maintenance from those who take the estate. Therefore,
anyone succeeding to the estate of the deceased Hindu is
under an obligation to maintain the dependant of the
deceased.
6
14. Section 23 of the Act provides for the manner and the factors
on the basis of which maintenance to a dependant has to be
determined.
15.
Section 21 of the Act, as stated earlier, is only a defining
section which defines the “dependants” of the deceased
Hindu. One of the relatives of the deceased Hindu who has
been defined as a dependant is clearly “any widow of his son”
meaning thereby a widow of the deceased son of the Hindu
is a dependant irrespective of the time she becomes a widow.
16. The above definition is quite clear and unambiguous. It is
not open for any other meaning except that a “widow of the
son” of the deceased is a dependant. In view of such a clear
definition, it is not open for anyone to infer and assign any
other meaning to the said definition so as to say that only a
widow of the predeceased son of a Hindu would be covered
by the said definition. The aforesaid definition nowhere uses
the word “widow of a predeceased son”. It simply uses the
words “any widow of a son”. The legislature in its wisdom
has deliberately avoided to use the word “predeceased”
before the “son” so as to include any widow of the son. The
7
time of her becoming a widow or the death of the son is
immaterial.
17. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of law that where
the provision is clear and unambiguous, it has to be
interpreted literally provided the literal interpretation is not
in conflict with the purpose of the Act or is otherwise not
impractical.
18. This foundational principle of literal interpretation finds
unequivocal support in a consistent line of judicial
precedents.
2
19. In Crawford v. Spooner the Privy Council observed that
the construction of an Act must be taken from its bare
words, and it is not for the courts “to add, and mend, and,
by construction, make up deficiencies” left by the legislature,
nor to “fish out what possibly may have been the intention”
if not clearly expressed. Judges must take the words as they
are and give them their natural meaning, unless controlled
or altered by the context or the preamble.
2
(1846) 4 Moo IA 179
8
3
20. In B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal this Court emphasized
that departure from the literal rule should be an exception
in very rare cases, as once courts depart from the literal rule
where the language is clear, the result would be destructive
of judicial discipline and contrary to the constitutional
scheme as the exclusive domain to legislate is upon the
legislature. The Court aptly noted that “the literal rule of
interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and
we say what we mean.” The Court further cautioned that
even if a literal interpretation results in hardship or
inconvenience, the same cannot be a ground to depart from
the plain meaning of the statutory text.
4
21. More recently, in Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau this Court
reaffirmed that the literal rule is the first and foremost
principle of statutory interpretation. Where the words are
absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had
to any other principle. The Court explicitly held that “the
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
3
(2011) 4 SCC 266
4
(2023) 19 SCC 126
9
the legislative intent” and that judges cannot correct or make
up a perceived deficiency in the words used by the
legislature. The Court held that courts cannot correct or
supply an assumed omission in the statute, as the
legislature is presumed to have intended what it has
expressly stated.
22. In view of the language so used in Section 21 (vii) of the Act
and guided by the settled principles reiterated above, there
is hardly any scope to interpret that the words “any widow
of his son” used therein would mean “widow of his
predeceased son” only. The courts cannot add or subtract
any word from the text of the statute. The provisions of the
statute cannot be re-written by the courts by assuming or
inferring something which is not implicit from the plain
language of the statute.
23. Even otherwise, any such restrictive interpretation would
fail the test of constitutional validity under Article 14 of the
Constitution. The classification sought to be made between
widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of the
husband’s death, namely, (a) those whose husbands died
10
during the lifetime of the father-in-law, and (b) those whose
husbands died after him; is manifestly unreasonable and
arbitrary. Such a classification bears no rational nexus with
the object and purpose of the Act, which is to secure
maintenance to dependants who are unable to maintain
themselves. In both situations, the women are similarly
situated in so far as the object of the Act is concerned, having
suffered widowhood, being without spousal support, and
facing comparable financial vulnerability. Denial of
maintenance to one category based on a fortuitous
circumstance beyond their control is manifestly arbitrary
and violative of the guarantee of equality before law under
Article 14 of the Constitution.
24. Any interpretation contrary to one opined above, would also
infringe upon Article 21 of the Constitution, which
guarantees the right to life with dignity. The right to life has
been judicially expanded to include the right to livelihood
and basic sustenance. Denying maintenance to a widowed
daughter-in-law from the estate of her deceased father-in-
law on a narrow or technical construction of the statute
11
would expose her to destitution and social marginalization,
thereby offending her fundamental right to live with dignity.
The provisions of the Act must, therefore, be read
purposively and in conformity with constitutional values, so
as to advance social justice and protect the dignity of
vulnerable dependants rather than defeat it.
25. Section 4 of the Act has an overriding effect but it does not
erase away fundamental principles of Hindu law particularly
where some doubt is raised about the codified provisions.
The Hindu law specially Manu Smriti vide Chapter 8, verse
389 says:
“
न माता न पिता न स्त्री न िुरस्त््यागमर्हतत।
”
्यजन्नितततानेतान राज्ञा दण्ड्यः शतातन षट ।।
No mother, no father, no wife, and no son deserves to be
forsaken. A person who abandons these blameless (relatives)
should be fined six hundred (units) by the king. This verse
emphasizes duty of the family head to support female family
members.
12
26. A son or the legal heirs are bound to maintain all the
dependant persons out of estate inherited i.e. all persons
whom the deceased was legally and morally bound to
maintain. Therefore, on the death of son, it is the pious
obligation of the father-in-law to maintain widowed
daughter-in-law, if she is unable to maintain herself either
on her own or through the property left behind by the
deceased son. The Act does not envisage to rule out the
above obligation of the father-in-law to maintain his
widowed daughter-in-law, irrespective of the fact when she
became a widow whether prior or after his death.
27. Though, it may not be very much in context to refer to
Section 19 of the Act but we consider it proper to refer to it
as the Courts below have considered and dealt with it and
some arguments on its basis have been advanced before us.
28. Section 19 of the Act provides for the maintenance of
“widowed daughter-in-law” of the deceased Hindu. It simply
contemplates that a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained
after the death of her husband by her father-in-law. Thus, it
13
casts an obligation upon the father-in-law to maintain his
daughter-in-law. The said obligation subsists only during
the lifetime of the father-in-law as the aforesaid provision
nowhere contemplates that the daughter-in-law would be
entitled to maintenance from the estate of the father-in-law.
In other words, Section 19 contemplates for the
maintenance of the daughter-in-law during the lifetime of
father-in-law, whereas, Section 22 contemplates
“maintenance of dependants” including “widowed daughter-
in-law” from the estate of her father-in-law meaning thereby
that a claim under Section 22 can be raised only after the
death of the father-in-law.
29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are
clearly of the opinion that “any widow of the son” of a
deceased Hindu is a dependant within the meaning of
Section 21 (vii) of the Act and is entitled to claim
maintenance under Section 22 of the Act. Therefore, no
illegality has been committed by the High Court in passing
the impugned order holding the petition of Respondent no.1,
who is a widow of the son of the deceased, to be maintainable
14
and in directing the Family Court to consider it on merits in
accordance with law.
30. The appeals as such lack merits and are dismissed with no
order as to costs.
…..………………………..J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
…..………………………..J.
(S.V.N. BHATTI)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 13, 2026
15
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 1544-1545 of 2026)
KANCHANA RAI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GEETA SHARMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1737 of 2026)
UMA DEVI …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
GEETA SHARMA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2026.01.13
15:35:09 IST
Reason:
1. Leave granted.
1
2. Heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Shri V. Giri, senior
counsel appearing for the respective appellants in the two
appeals and Shri Vikas Singh, senior counsel for the
contesting respondents, in both the appeals.
3. The controversy is inter se the heirs/family members of late
Dr. Mahendra Prasad who died on 27.12.2021. He had three
sons, namely, Ranjit Sharma, who passed away on
02.03.2023, Devinder Rai, husband of the appellant-
Kanchana Rai and Rajeev Sharma. It is alleged that late Dr.
Mahendra Prasad executed a registered Will on 18.07.2011,
appointing the appellant, the wife of his pre-deceased son
Devinder Rai, as the executor while bequeathing his
properties in favour of her two sons, completely ignoring his
own two sons namely Ranjit Sharma and Rajeev Sharma.
4. Smt. Geeta Sharma, Respondent No. 1, wife of one of the
sons, Ranjit Sharma, who died after the death of Dr.
Mahendra Prasad, applied for maintenance from the estate
of her father-in-law, before the Family Court under the Hindu
2
1
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 . The petition was
dismissed by the Family Court as not maintainable as
Respondent no.1 was not a widow on the date of death of Dr.
Mahindra Prasad, since her husband, Ranjit Sharma was
alive at the time of his father’s demise. The High Court, in
appeal, set aside the order of the Family Court recording a
categorical finding that the petition was maintainable as
Respondent no.1 was the widow of one of the sons of late Dr.
Mahindra Prasad and as such was a dependant.
Accordingly, the High Court directed the Family Court to
consider the matter on merit and to decide about the
quantum of maintenance.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the High
Court dated 20.08.2025, the appellant-Smt. Kanchana Rai,
the wife of late Devinder Rai, the pre-deceased son of late Dr.
Mahindra Prasad, has preferred one of these appeals on the
issue of maintainability of the maintenance petition filed by
the Respondent No.1
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”
3
6. The other appeal has been preferred by one Smt. Uma Devi,
the alleged partner of late Dr. Mahindra Prasad, contending
that she was in a live-in relationship with him over the last
forty years and that Respondent No. 1 had no legal right for
seeking maintenance from the estate of late Dr. Mahendra
Prasad.
7. In these facts and circumstances, a short and simple
question, which has been made intricate by legal engineering
of the legal minds, arising in these appeals is: whether a
daughter-in-law, who becomes a widow after the death of her
father-in-law, is a dependant upon the estate of the father-
in-law, and entitled to claim maintenance from his estate.
8. Since the issue which is falling for our consideration is purely
legal in nature, we intend to proceed and decide it on our own
thinking and reasoning on the simple interpretation of the
provisions of the Act, independent of the view taken by either
of the courts below i.e. the Family Court and the High Court
or on the basis of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which is
completely alien for the purposes of any interpretation of the
provisions of the present Act.
4
9. The law on the grant of maintenance of Hindus has been
codified by enacting the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act,
1956. The aforesaid Act provides for the adoption as well for
the maintenance. The adoption part is dealt under Chapter
II of the Act, whereas Chapter III of the Act provides for
maintenance to the dependants of a Hindu under Sections
18 to 28.
10. The “dependants” have been defined under Section 21 of the
Act inter alia to include the following relatives of the
deceased.
“…
2 (vii). any widow of his son or of a
son of his predeceased son, so long as
she does not remarry: provided and to
the extent that she is unable to obtain
maintenance from her husband’s estate.
or from her son or daughter, if any, or his
or her estate; or in the case of a
grandson’s widow, also from her father-
in-law’s estate;
…”
11. A plain reading of the above definition of the dependants
makes it crystal clear that the relatives of the deceased,
5
namely, “any widow of his son” would be a dependant
provided she is unable to maintain herself from her
husband’s estate or from her son or her daughter’s estate
and in the case of grandson’s widow, from her father-in-law’s
estate.
12. Section 22 of the Act provides for the maintenance of
dependants and casts an obligation upon all the heirs of the
deceased Hindu to maintain the dependants of the deceased
out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. In
simpler words, all the heirs of the deceased Hindu are
obliged to maintain the dependants of the deceased from the
funds inherited out of the estate of the deceased.
13. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 further provides that where a
dependant of the deceased Hindu has not obtained share in
the estate of the Hindu either by testamentary or intestate-
succession, such a dependant shall be entitled to
maintenance from those who take the estate. Therefore,
anyone succeeding to the estate of the deceased Hindu is
under an obligation to maintain the dependant of the
deceased.
6
14. Section 23 of the Act provides for the manner and the factors
on the basis of which maintenance to a dependant has to be
determined.
15.
Section 21 of the Act, as stated earlier, is only a defining
section which defines the “dependants” of the deceased
Hindu. One of the relatives of the deceased Hindu who has
been defined as a dependant is clearly “any widow of his son”
meaning thereby a widow of the deceased son of the Hindu
is a dependant irrespective of the time she becomes a widow.
16. The above definition is quite clear and unambiguous. It is
not open for any other meaning except that a “widow of the
son” of the deceased is a dependant. In view of such a clear
definition, it is not open for anyone to infer and assign any
other meaning to the said definition so as to say that only a
widow of the predeceased son of a Hindu would be covered
by the said definition. The aforesaid definition nowhere uses
the word “widow of a predeceased son”. It simply uses the
words “any widow of a son”. The legislature in its wisdom
has deliberately avoided to use the word “predeceased”
before the “son” so as to include any widow of the son. The
7
time of her becoming a widow or the death of the son is
immaterial.
17. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of law that where
the provision is clear and unambiguous, it has to be
interpreted literally provided the literal interpretation is not
in conflict with the purpose of the Act or is otherwise not
impractical.
18. This foundational principle of literal interpretation finds
unequivocal support in a consistent line of judicial
precedents.
2
19. In Crawford v. Spooner the Privy Council observed that
the construction of an Act must be taken from its bare
words, and it is not for the courts “to add, and mend, and,
by construction, make up deficiencies” left by the legislature,
nor to “fish out what possibly may have been the intention”
if not clearly expressed. Judges must take the words as they
are and give them their natural meaning, unless controlled
or altered by the context or the preamble.
2
(1846) 4 Moo IA 179
8
3
20. In B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal this Court emphasized
that departure from the literal rule should be an exception
in very rare cases, as once courts depart from the literal rule
where the language is clear, the result would be destructive
of judicial discipline and contrary to the constitutional
scheme as the exclusive domain to legislate is upon the
legislature. The Court aptly noted that “the literal rule of
interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and
we say what we mean.” The Court further cautioned that
even if a literal interpretation results in hardship or
inconvenience, the same cannot be a ground to depart from
the plain meaning of the statutory text.
4
21. More recently, in Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau this Court
reaffirmed that the literal rule is the first and foremost
principle of statutory interpretation. Where the words are
absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had
to any other principle. The Court explicitly held that “the
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
3
(2011) 4 SCC 266
4
(2023) 19 SCC 126
9
the legislative intent” and that judges cannot correct or make
up a perceived deficiency in the words used by the
legislature. The Court held that courts cannot correct or
supply an assumed omission in the statute, as the
legislature is presumed to have intended what it has
expressly stated.
22. In view of the language so used in Section 21 (vii) of the Act
and guided by the settled principles reiterated above, there
is hardly any scope to interpret that the words “any widow
of his son” used therein would mean “widow of his
predeceased son” only. The courts cannot add or subtract
any word from the text of the statute. The provisions of the
statute cannot be re-written by the courts by assuming or
inferring something which is not implicit from the plain
language of the statute.
23. Even otherwise, any such restrictive interpretation would
fail the test of constitutional validity under Article 14 of the
Constitution. The classification sought to be made between
widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of the
husband’s death, namely, (a) those whose husbands died
10
during the lifetime of the father-in-law, and (b) those whose
husbands died after him; is manifestly unreasonable and
arbitrary. Such a classification bears no rational nexus with
the object and purpose of the Act, which is to secure
maintenance to dependants who are unable to maintain
themselves. In both situations, the women are similarly
situated in so far as the object of the Act is concerned, having
suffered widowhood, being without spousal support, and
facing comparable financial vulnerability. Denial of
maintenance to one category based on a fortuitous
circumstance beyond their control is manifestly arbitrary
and violative of the guarantee of equality before law under
Article 14 of the Constitution.
24. Any interpretation contrary to one opined above, would also
infringe upon Article 21 of the Constitution, which
guarantees the right to life with dignity. The right to life has
been judicially expanded to include the right to livelihood
and basic sustenance. Denying maintenance to a widowed
daughter-in-law from the estate of her deceased father-in-
law on a narrow or technical construction of the statute
11
would expose her to destitution and social marginalization,
thereby offending her fundamental right to live with dignity.
The provisions of the Act must, therefore, be read
purposively and in conformity with constitutional values, so
as to advance social justice and protect the dignity of
vulnerable dependants rather than defeat it.
25. Section 4 of the Act has an overriding effect but it does not
erase away fundamental principles of Hindu law particularly
where some doubt is raised about the codified provisions.
The Hindu law specially Manu Smriti vide Chapter 8, verse
389 says:
“
न माता न पिता न स्त्री न िुरस्त््यागमर्हतत।
”
्यजन्नितततानेतान राज्ञा दण्ड्यः शतातन षट ।।
No mother, no father, no wife, and no son deserves to be
forsaken. A person who abandons these blameless (relatives)
should be fined six hundred (units) by the king. This verse
emphasizes duty of the family head to support female family
members.
12
26. A son or the legal heirs are bound to maintain all the
dependant persons out of estate inherited i.e. all persons
whom the deceased was legally and morally bound to
maintain. Therefore, on the death of son, it is the pious
obligation of the father-in-law to maintain widowed
daughter-in-law, if she is unable to maintain herself either
on her own or through the property left behind by the
deceased son. The Act does not envisage to rule out the
above obligation of the father-in-law to maintain his
widowed daughter-in-law, irrespective of the fact when she
became a widow whether prior or after his death.
27. Though, it may not be very much in context to refer to
Section 19 of the Act but we consider it proper to refer to it
as the Courts below have considered and dealt with it and
some arguments on its basis have been advanced before us.
28. Section 19 of the Act provides for the maintenance of
“widowed daughter-in-law” of the deceased Hindu. It simply
contemplates that a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained
after the death of her husband by her father-in-law. Thus, it
13
casts an obligation upon the father-in-law to maintain his
daughter-in-law. The said obligation subsists only during
the lifetime of the father-in-law as the aforesaid provision
nowhere contemplates that the daughter-in-law would be
entitled to maintenance from the estate of the father-in-law.
In other words, Section 19 contemplates for the
maintenance of the daughter-in-law during the lifetime of
father-in-law, whereas, Section 22 contemplates
“maintenance of dependants” including “widowed daughter-
in-law” from the estate of her father-in-law meaning thereby
that a claim under Section 22 can be raised only after the
death of the father-in-law.
29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are
clearly of the opinion that “any widow of the son” of a
deceased Hindu is a dependant within the meaning of
Section 21 (vii) of the Act and is entitled to claim
maintenance under Section 22 of the Act. Therefore, no
illegality has been committed by the High Court in passing
the impugned order holding the petition of Respondent no.1,
who is a widow of the son of the deceased, to be maintainable
14
and in directing the Family Court to consider it on merits in
accordance with law.
30. The appeals as such lack merits and are dismissed with no
order as to costs.
…..………………………..J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
…..………………………..J.
(S.V.N. BHATTI)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 13, 2026
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