Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
NOOKALA SETHARAMAIAH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
KOTAIAH NAIDU & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
31/03/1970
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
HEGDE, K.S.
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1354 1971 SCR (1) 153
1970 SCC (2) 13
CITATOR INFO :
R 1972 SC1324 (11)
ACT:
Mineral Concession Rules, 1949--Rules 28(1-A), 57(1)--Scope
of--Failure of the State Government to dispose of
applications for grant of mining lease within the time
prescribed by the rules--Whether the State Government is
deemed to have refused the applications.
Review--If Central Government court review under rule 57(1)
decision of State Government to grant leave pursuant to
mandamus issued by High Court.
HEADNOTE:
In September, 1953, the first respondent applied for a
mining lease for over 900 acres in the then Hyderabad State.
He was granted a lease of about 57 acres in January, 1954 by
an order of the State Government which was silent as regards
the other areas included in his application. While the
respondent kept pressing’ for a lease of the remaining
areas, the State Government began to grant, some of these
areas to other persons including the appellant. Meanwhile,,
on December 8, 1955, the respondent moved the Central
Government under Rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules,
1949, seeking a direction to the State to grant to him the
lease of the areas sought by him and to stop granting
further areas to other applicants. This review petition was
dismissed on the basis that the order of the State
Government granting only 57 acres by implication amounted to
a rejection of the respondent’s claim for the balance area.
On September 15, 1956, the Mineral Concession Rules were
amended and a new sub rule 28(1) (A) was introduced which
provided that every application under Rule 27 shall be
disposed of within 9 months from the date of its receipt.
The amended Rule 57 provided that the failure of the State
Government to dispose of an application within the
prescribed period would be deemed to be a refusal to grant a
lease and that the aggrieved person may, within two months,
apply to the Central Government for a review. A further
amendment of Rule 57(2) provided that any application
pending with the State Government an 14th September, 1956
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and remaining undisposed of on the 24th August, 1957, shall
be disposed of by the State Government within 6 months from
the latter date. Prior to this amendment the respondent had
filed another review petition before the Central Government
and on September 26, 1957, that petition was dismissed by
the Government as being premature; this was on the basis
that the respondent’s original application was pending on
31st August, 1957, and the period of 6 months from that
date, as prescribed by the amended Rule 57(2) had not yet
expired.
The respondent then moved the High Court by a petition under
Article 226. making the State Government alone party and
seeking a writ of mandamus to the Government to dispose of
his application of September, 1953, expeditiously. The High
Court allowed this petition and did not accept the
contention, on behalf of the State Government that in view
of section 57(2) the respondent’s application must be
L11Sup CI/11
154
deemed to have been rejected. it held that section 57(2) was
intended to be for the benefit of the applicant and did not
relieve the State Government from performing the statutory
function imposed on it under rule 17 of granting or refusing
the licence. During the pendency of the first petition, the
respondent had also filed a second petition seeking the same
relief and this was disposed of in August, 1959 on the basis
of a statement by the Government Advocate that the State
Government was prepared to dispose of the first respondent’s
application on the merits without relying on rule 57(2).
By an order on May 27, 1961, the State Government granted
on. mining lease to the, respondent all the areas for which
he had applied in September, 1953 excluding those areas
which had been earlier leased to others., However. the
Central Government allowed a review petition under Rule 57
filed by the appellant and set aside the order on the ground
that the application made by the appellant, the first
respondent, as well as others which were pending before the
State Government ’should be deemed to have been rejected on
1st March, 1958 in view of rule 57(2).
The 1st respondent then challenged this order by a writ
petition in the High Court which was allowed and the order
was quashed. The court held that rule 57(2) was enacted
only for the benefit of the applicants and did not take away
the power of the State Government to dispose of applications
even after expiry of the prescribed period; that in view of
the Government Advocate’s concession the State Government
Was stopped from contending that the respondent’s
application of September, 1953 must be deemed to have ’been
refused; and furthermore that in view of the writ of
mandamus issued in the first writ petition, the State
Government was bound to consider the application of the 1st
respondent and the decision of the State Government taken in
obedience to the order of the High Court could not have been
set aside by the Central Government.
HELD : (Per Hedge and Grover, JJ); The appeal must be
allowed (By the Court) (1) Reading rule 28 (1-A) and rule 57
(2) together, there is no doubt that after the period
prescribed, the State Government is incompetent to deal with
the applications’ pending before it. The High Court was,
therefore, wrong in holding that even if an application
stands rejected for failure to pass an order within the time
prescribed, the State Government has power to issue a
licence. [164 C]
Dey Gupta & Company vs. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1961 Pat.
487; referred to.
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(2) There can be no estoppel against a statute. Rule 28(1-
A) and rule 57(2) are statutory rules. They bind the
Government as much as they bind others. The requirement of
those rules cannot be waived by the State Governments.
Therefore the fact that the Government Advocate represented
to the Court that the 1st respondent’s application was still
pending could not change the legal position nor could it
confer on the State Government any power to act in
contravention of those rules. [165 A-B]
(3)Per Hegde and Grover JJ.); As far as the State Government
was concerned the writ issued was binding whether the
decision rendered by the Court was correct in law or not;
but that decision could not bind the appellant or the
Central Government who were not parties to that writ
petition.. It was not a judgment in rem. In obedience to
the writ issued by the court, the State Government did
consider the
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application of the 1st respondent and granted him the lease
asked for by him. The Central Government had been
constituted as the revisional authority under rule 57. That
authority is a quasi-judicial body created by statutory
rules. It is bound by law to discharge the duties imposed
on it by rule 57. Therefore it had to obey the mandate of
rule 57. In so doing it cannot be said that it had
infringed the mandamus issued by the High Court. [165 D-F]
(Per Shah J, dissenting) : The appeal must be dismissed,
Granting that the High Court erroneously issued a writ of
mandamus directing the State Government to perform its
functions it was, not open to the Central Government in
effect to exercise appellate authority over the judgment of
the High Court. To accede to the contention that the
executive has the power, when exercising quasi-judicial
functions, to sit in appeal over the decision of the High
Court is to destroy the scheme of division of powers under
our Constitution. There was no distinction between the
effect of an order made by the High Court and carried out by
the State, and an order made by the High Court and confirmed
in appeal by this Court and carried out by the State.
Article 141 of the Constitution has no bearing on that
question. If this Court decided a question of law or of
fact or a mixed question of law and fact arising in an
appeal against an order passed by the High Court in a writ
petition against the action of the State Government granting
or refusing to grant a licence, it would not be open to the
Central Government, hearing a review petition against the
order of the State Government in compliance with the order
of this Court, to set aside the order so as to upset the
order of this Court. [156 H]
It is well settled that a person who has not been made a
party to a proceeding may still appeal with leave of the
Appellate Court provided he might have properly been made ’a
party to the proceeding. The appellant could undoubtedly
have been made a party to the petition before the High
Court. He could, therefore, challenge the correctness of
the order and no objection could be raised against the
granting of leave to him to appeal on the ground that he was
not a party to the writ petition. [157 F, 158 C]
Re. "B" an Infant [1958] 1 Q.B. 12 C.A., The Province of
Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association I.L.R. [1949]
Bom. 591; Ponnalagu v. State of Madras I.L.R. [1953] Mad.
808; Pullayya v. Nagbhushanain I.L.R. 1962 A.P. 127 F.B.;
referred to.
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2 1 21 and
2122 of 1969.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated July 18, 1969 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. P. Nos. 464 and 602 of
1965.
D. Narasaraju, A. Subba Rao and K. R. Sharma, for the appel-
lant (in both the appeals)
M. C. Setalvad P. Parameswara Rao, V. Rajagopal Reddy, S, L.
Setia and K. C. Dua, for respondent No. 1 (in both the
appeals).
V. A. seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2
(in both the appeals).
156
P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4
(in C.A. No. 2121 of 1969) and respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No.
2122 of 1969).
The Judgment of HEGDE and GROVER, JJ. was delivered by
HEGDE, J. SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion :
Shah, J. I agree that Appeal No. 2122 of 1969 must be
dismissed. I also agree that if the states to dispose of
the application for grant of a mining lease within the time
prescribed by the rules, the failure,results in refusal to
grant the lease. The High Court was in error in holding
that in the absence of a provision enacting, that even if
the application stands rejected for failure to pass an order
within the time prescribed, the State Government has power
to issue a licence. The High Court was again in error in
holding that because of the representations made by the
State before Bhimasankaran, J., in Writ Petition No. 1237 to
1957 the State Government were estopped from contending that
the application was by the first respondent must be deemed
to have been refused.
But I am unable to agree that the Central Government was
competent in exercise of its power of review, against the
order of the State Government made in compliance with the
order of Basi Reddy, J. in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957, to
set aside the order so as in effect to overrule the,
judgment of the High Court.
The relevant facts may be recalled. The Central Government
made an order on September 25, 1957, in the review
application filed by the first respondent holding that his
application was premature and that it was for the State
Government to dispose of the application within six months
of August 31, 1957. The first respondent then moved
Petition No. 888 of 1957 for a mandamus directing the State
Government to dispose of his application. By order dated
November 4, 1958, Basi Reddy, J., observed that r. 57(2) as
amended by S.R.O. No. 2753 "is intended for the benefit of
the applicant, and does not relieve the State from per-
forming the statutory functions imposed on it under rule
17(1) and 17(2) viz. of granting or refusing the licence".
The State Government then heard the application and granted
the mining lease for which the first respondent had applied
on September 15, 1953. Against that order the appellant
moved a review petition. The Central Government by order
dated February 15, 1965, allowed the review petition and set
aside the grant in favour of the first respondent.
Granting that the High Court erroneously issued a writ of
mandamus directing the State Government to perform its func-
tions it was, in my judgment, not open to the Central
Government
157
in effect to exercise appellate authority over the judgment
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of the High Court. If the order was erroneous it could be
set aside by an appropriate proceeding before a Division
Bench- of the High Court or before this Court. But the
Central Government had no power to set aside the order on
the view that the High Court had reached an erroneous
conclusion. To accede to the contention that the executive
has the power, when exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
sit in appeal over the decision of the High Court is to
destroy-the scheme of division of powers under our
Constitution. I see no reason for making a distinction be-
tween the effect of an order made by the High Court and
carried out by the State, and an order made by the High
Court and confirmed in appeal by this Court and carried out
by the State. In my view Art. 141 of the Constitution has
no bearing on that question. If this Court decided a
question of law or of fact or a mixed question of law and
fact arising in an appeal against an order passed by the
High Court in a writ petition against the action of the
State Government granting or refusing to grant a licence, it
would not, in my judgment, be open to the Central
Government, hearing a review petition against the order of
the State Government in compliance with the order of this
Court, to set aside the order so as to upset the order of
this Court. That is so,; not because of Art. 14 1, but I
because neither the Legislature nor the executive is
invested with powers to supersede judgments of Courts. The
Legislature may if competent in that behalf change the law
but cannot supersede a judgment of the Court. The executive
has no power to change the law, and no power to supersede
the judgment of the Court.
It was, however, said that the appellant was not impleaded
as a party to Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957, and he could
not seek redress in a superior court against the order of
Basi Reddy, J. But it is settled by a long course of
authorities that a person who has not been made a party to a
proceeding may still appeal with leave of the appellate
Court, provided he might have properly been made a party to
the proceeding : see Re. "B " an Infant.(1). In In re.
Securitie Insurance Company(2) Lindley, L.J., observed at p.
413 :
"I understand the practice to ’ be perfectly
well settled that a person who is a party can
appeal (of course within the proper time)
without any leave, and that a person who
without being a party is either bound by the
order or is aggrieved by it, or is
prejudicially affected by it, cannot appeal
without leave. It does not require. much to
obtain leave. If a person alleging him-
(1) [1958] 1 Q.B. 12 C.A.
(2) [1894] 2 Ch. 410.
158
self to be aggrieved by an order can make out
even a prima facie case why he should have
leave he will get it; but without leave he is
not entitled to appeal."
The rule has been accepted by the High Courts in India : see
The Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Associa-
tion;(1) Ponnalagu v. State of Madras;(2) and Pullayya v.
Nagbhushanam. (3)
The appellant could undoubtedly have been made a party to a
petition before the High Court. lie could, therefore,
challenge the correctness of the order made by Basi Reddy,
J. No objection could be raised against the grant of leave
to him to appeal ,on the ground that he was not a party to
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the Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957. In my judgment,
therefore, Appeal No. 2121 of 1967 must also fail.
Hegde, J. These appeals by certificate arise from the common
judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh
in Writ Petitions Nos. 464 and 602 of 1965. The appellant
herein was the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 602 of 1965
and the 5th respondent in Writ Petition No. 464 of 1965. In
this case, it will be convenient to formulate the issues
arising for’ decision after setting out the relevant facts.
Amrutham Kotaiah Naidu, the 1st respondent in these appeals
applied for the grant of a mining lease in respect of 915
acres and 18 cents of lands in Appalanarasinmhapuram hamlet
of Cheruvumadhavaram in Khammameth Teluqa of Warangal
District of the then Hyderbad State, on September 15, 1953.
After production of agreement with the pattedars lease in
respect of lands comprising 57 acres 25 Gunthas was granted
to him as per the order of the Director of Mines and Geology
dated January 9, 1954. That order is silent as regards the
other areas included in his application. Thereafter the
respondent was pressing the State Government to ,-rant him
on lease the remaining areas included in his application.
Meanwhile on November 21, 1955, the appellant applied for
the grant of a mining lease of a portion of the area for
which the respondent had earlier submitted his application.
The State Government granted on mining lease to various
persons some of the areas in respect of which the respondent
had asked for a mining lease. Obviously aggrieved by those
grants the respondent moved
(1) I.L.R. [1949] Bom. 591. (2) I.L.R. [1953] Mad. 808.
(3) I.LR. [1962] A.P. 127 F.B.
159
the Central Government under rule 57 of the Mineral
Concession Rules, 1949 (to be hereinafter referred to as
’rules on December 8, 1955, seeking a directicon to the
State Government to grant to him the lease asked for by him
by his application of September 15, 1953. He further
requested the Central Government to direct the State
Government to stop granting further areas to other appli-
cants in Appalanarasimhapuram village pending investigation
of the matter and pending decision of the Central
Goverrunent. Meanwhile on December 27, 1955, the State
Government granted on mining lease 1 acre and 20 cents of
land to the appellant from out of the area included in the
1st respondents application. On July 18, 1956, the Central
Government dismissed the review petition made by the 1st
respondent on December 8, 1955 with these observations
"Sir,
I am directed to refer to your application
dated the 8th December, 1955, on the subject
and to say that after careful consideration of
the facts stated therein, the Central
Government have come to the conclusion that
there is no valid ground for interfering with
the decision of the Government of Hyderabad,
rejecting your application-for grant of mining
lease for iron ore in Appanarasimhapuram and
Raigudam villages, Khammameth district. Your
application for revision is, therefore,
rejected.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- G. C. Jerath,
Under Secretary to the Government of India."
Evidently the Central, Government proceeded on the basis
that the order of the State Government dated January 9, 1954
granting 57 acres and 20 cents of land to the 1/st
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respondent, by implication amounted to a rejection of his
claim in respect of the other areas.
Meanwhile on September 15, 1956, some of the rules were
amended. After rule 28(1) anewsub-rule 28(1-A)was inserted.
That sub-rule reads :
"Every application under rule 27 shall be
disposed of by the State Government within 9
months from the date of receipt of the
application."
At the same time rule 57 was also amended. Amended rule 57
reads thus :
(1) "Application for review.-(1) Where a State
Government passes as under.-
(i) refusing to grant a certificate of
approval, prospecting license or mining lease;
160
(ii)refusing to renew a certificate of
approval, prospecting license or mining lease;
(iii) cancelling a prospecting license or
mining lease;
(iv) refusing to permit transfer of a
prospecting license or any right, title or
interest therein under clause (iv) of sub-rule
(1) of rule 23 or a niping lease or any right,
title or interest therein under rule 37,
it shall communicate in writing the reasons
for such order to the person against
whom the
order is passed and any person aggrieved by
such order may, within two months of the date
of receipt of such order, apply to the Central
Government for reviewing the same.
(2) Where a State Government has failed to
dispose of an application for the grant or
renewal of a certificate of approval or
prospecting license or a mining lease within
the period prescribed therefore in these
Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of
these rules, be deemed to be a refusal to
grant or renew such certificate, license or
lease, as the case may be, and any person
aggrieved by such failure may, within two
months of the expiry of the period aforesaid
apply to the Central Government for reviewing
the case.
(3) An application for review under this rule
may be admitted after the period of limitation
prescribed under this rule, if the applicant
satisfies the Central Government that he had
sufficient cause for not making the
application within the said period."
A further amendment to that rule 57(2) was made on August
31, 1957. The concerned notification No. S.R.O. 2753 reads
"In exercise of the powers’ conferred by
section 5 of the Mines and Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1948, the
Central Government hereby makes the following
further amendment in the Mineral Concession
Rules, 1949, namely-
Provided that any such application pending
with the State Government on the 14th
September, 1956, and remaining undisposed of
on the 24th August, 1957, shall be disposed of
by the State Government within six months from
the latter date."
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On April 16, 1957, the 1st respondent filed another review
petition before the Central Government. On September 26,
1957,
161
that petition was dismissed by the Central Government as
being premature. The relevant portion of that order reads
"With reference to your application dated 16th
April, 1957, on the above subject, I am
directed to invite your attention to this
Ministry’s notification No., MII-152(26)/57
dated the 21-8-57 (copy enclosed) amending the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1949. It will be
noticed therefrom that the application for
concessions received by the State Govt. prior
to the 4th September, 1956 and remaining
undisposed of on the 31st August 1957 shall
be disposed of by them within six months from
the latter date. Your application fo
r review
is therefore premature at this stage and in
case your application for Mining Lease is not
disposed of by the State Government within the
prescribed period you may apply to the Central
Government at the appropriate time."
While making this order, evidently the Central Government
had overlooked its earlier order dated July 18, 1956.
After the aforementioned order of the Central Government,
the 1st respondent moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
under Art. 226 of the Constitution in Writ Petition No. 888
of 1957 seeking a writ of mandamus to the State Government
of Andhra Pradesh to dispose of his application for lease
made on September 15, 1953, expeditiously. To that petition
he made only the State of Andhra Pradesh as the respondent.
Neither the Central Government nor the appellant herein were
parties to that petition. That petition came tip for
hearing before Basi Reddy J. on November 4, 1958. At the
hearing the learned Government Pleader who appeared for, the
State Government conceded that the application of the
petitioner for mining lease on September 15, 1953 had not
been disposed of by the State Government in the manner
prescribed by rule 17 of the ’Rules’ but he contended that
that application must be deemed to have been rejected in
view of rule 57(2). The learned judge rejected that,
contention with the following observations:
"In my opinion this deeming provision is
intended for the benefit of the applicant add
does not relieve the State Government from
performing the statutory functions imposed on
it by rules 17(1) and 17(2) viz., of granting
or refusing the licence, and in case of
refusal of recording in writing the reasons
for the refusal and of refunding the
application fee."
He accepted the petition and issued the mandamus prayed for.
162
During the pendency of the writ petition No. 888 of 1957,
,the 1st respondent filed another writ petition on December
16, 1957 seeking the very relief that he had sought in his
earlier writ ,petition. That petition was disposed of by
Bhimasankaram J. ,on August 20, 1959, with these
observations :
"It is stated by the learned 3rd Government
Pleader that the Government is prepared to
dispose of the application of the petitioner
on the merits without relying upon rule 57(2)
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of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949. in the
circumstances the petitioner does not want to
press his petition. The writ petition is
accordingly dismissed. There will be no order
as to costs."
The State Government by its order dated May 27, 1961,
:granted on mining lease to the respondent all the areas for
which he had applied an September 15, 1953 less those areas
which had been earlier leased out to others.
Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant moved the
Central Government under rule 57 on July 7, 1961 for review-
ing the said order. Even before that he had moved the
Andhra Pradesh High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution
on June 13, 1961 to issue a writ of mandamus to the State
Government .to consider his application for mining lease in
preference to that of the 1st respondent as according to him
the 1st respondent’s application should be deemed to have
been rejected under rule 57(2). The High Court rejected
that application observing that the appropriate course for
him was to move the Central Government under rule 57 against
the order of the State Government. Thereafter on 15-2-1965,
the Central Government allowed the review petition filed by
the appellant and set aside the grant made in favour of the
1st respondent on May 27, 1961. It came to the conclusion
that the applications made by the appellant, the 1st
respondent as well as others which were pending before the
Andhra Pradesh Government should be deemed to have been
rejected on the 1st March 1958, in view of rule 57(2).
Aggrieved by that order the 1st respondent filed Writ
Petition No. 464 of 1965 praying that the High Court may be
pleased to call for ’the relevant records from the Central
Government by issuing a writ of certiorari and quash the
order of the Central Government and issue a further writ to
the Central Government and to the :State Government to grant
the lease asked for by him. During ,the pendency of that
petition the appellant filed Writ Petition ’No. 602 of 1965
seeking a writ of mandamus against the Central ’Government
and the State Government to grant him the mining lease for
which he had applied. The High Court has allowed ’the writ
petition filed by the 1st respondent and dismissed that of
the appellant. Hence these appeals.
163
So far as Civil Appeal No. 2122 of 1969 is concerned there
is no merit in the same. No ground in support of that
appeal was urged before us. Hence it fails and it is
dismissed.
In Writ Petition No.. 464 of 1965 from which Civil Appeal’
No. 2121 of 1969 arises, the High Court set aside the order
of the Central Government on various grounds and upheld the
grant made by the State Government in favour of the 1st res-
pondent. We shall now proceed to consider the correctness
of the reasons given by the High Court in support of its
order.
The High Court was of the opinion that rule 57(2) was
enacted only for the benefit of the applicants for lease,
license etc. so that they may have an early opportunity to
move the Central Government for appropriate orders. In the
view of the High Court that rule does not take away the,
power of the State Government to dispose of the applications
made for mining lease etc. even after the period prescribed
expires. In support of this conclusion, it relied on the
decision of the Patna High Court in Dey Gupta and Co. v.
State of Bihar and Anr.(1) as well as on the decision of
Basi Reddy J. in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957 to which
reference has already been made. Neither the Patna decision
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nor the judgment of Basi Reddy J. nor the decision under
appeal gives any cogent reason An support of the conclusion
that the deemed dismissal under rule’57(2) does not take
away the right of the State Government to grant the lease
asked for. The Patina High Court in support of its
conclusion observed
"No doubt, reading rule 27(1-A) with rule
57(2) of the Rules, it is clear that, if the
State Government fails to dispose of an
application for the grant of a mining lease
within nine months, it must be deemed to have
been refused by it.
But this provision is made, in my opinion only
for the purpose of filing a review application
before the Central Government, so that an
applicant desirous to have a mining lease may
not have to wait unnecessarily for a long
period without any order being passed on his
application. That however, does not mean that
after the lapse of nine months from the date
of receipt of the application, the State Govt.
ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter so
as not to pass any order on any application
after the lapse of nine months from the date
of its receipt.
The expression "deemed to be a refusal" in
rule 57(2) is only for the purpose of a review
application to
(1) A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 487.
164
be filed before the Central Government, and
it-is not a part of rule 28(1-A). In this
view of the matter the legality of the order
passed by the State Government granting a
mining lease to respondent No. 2 cannot be
Challenged on the above ground."
We think that these observations are not correct. If it is
otherwise, even when a review petition is pending before the
Central Government under rule 57, the State Government can
make an order on the application made and thus compel the
parties to file another review petition. Further, if the
Central Government gives one direction ins the review
petition and the State Government passes an inconsistent
order in the original petition, there is bound to be
confusion. If we read rule 27(1A). and rule 57(2) together,
there is hardly any doubt that after the period prescribed,
the State Government is incompetent to deal with the
applications pending before it. According to rule 57(2),
where a State Government has failed to dispose of an
application. for the grant of a mining lease within the
period prescribed therefor in the rules, such failure shall,
for the purpose of the rules be deemed: to be refusal to
grant the lease. The rules referred therein include rule 28
as well. This deemed refusal, if read with the mandate
given to the State Government under rule 28(1-A) requiring
it to dispose of the applications within 9 months of the
receipt of those applications, there can be hardly any doubt
that if the State Government does not dispose of the
applications within the time prescribed, it is deemed to
have refused those applications, for the purpose of rule 28
as well as rule 57. The High Court was wrong in thinking
that in the absence of a provision providing for deemed
rejection in rule 28(1-A), the contravention of that rule
does not take away the jurisdiction of the State Government.
That conclusion ignores the words in rule 57(2) that deemed
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rejection is ’for the purpose of these rules’. In view of
those words in rule 57(2), it was unnecessary for the rule
making authority to prescribe in rule 28(1A) the
consequences of the failure on the part of the State Gov-
ernment to implement the mandate of rule 28(1-A). Hence, in
our opinion, the Central Government’s decision that the
applications made by the appellant, the 1st respondent and
others for mining lease should be deemed to have been
refused on March 1, 1958 is correct. Therefore the High
Court was wrong in quashing the order of the Central
Government on that ground.
The High Court was also wrong in opining that in view of the
representations made by the learned Government Pleader
before Bhimasankaran J. on August 25, 1959, in Writ Petition
No. 1237 of 1957, the State Government is estopped from con-
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tending that the application made by the 1st respondent on
September 15, 1953 must be deemed to have been refused.
There can be no estoppel against a statute. Rule 28(1-A)
and rule 57 (2) are statutory rules. They bind the
Government as much as they bind others. The requirement of
those rules cannot be waived by the State Governments.
Therefore the fact that the learned Government Pleader
represented to the Court that the petition filed by the 1st
respondent on September 15, 1953 was still pending disposal
cannot change the legal position nor could it confer on the
State Government any power to act in contravention of those
rules.
Yet another ground relied on by the High Court is that in
view of the writ issued by Basi Reddy J. in Writ Petition
No. 888 of 1957, the State Government was bound to consider
the application of the 1st respondent and therefore the
decision of the State Government taken in obedience to the
order of the High Court could not have been set aside the
Central Government. It is true that as far as the State
Government is, concerned the writ issued was binding whether
the decision rendered by the court was correct in law or
not; but then that decision will not bind either the
appellant herein or the Central Government who were not
parties to that writ petition. It is not a judgment in rem.
In obedience to the writ issued by the court, of the State
Government did consider the application of the 1st
respondent. It granted him the lease asked for by him.
Therefore the State Government has complied with the
direction issued to it by the High Court. The Central
Government had been constituted as the revisional authority
under rule 57. That authority is a quasi-judicial body
created by statutory rules. It is bound by law to discharge
the duties imposed on it by rule 57. Therefore it had to
obey the mandate of rule 57. In so doing, it cannot be said
that it had infringed the mandamus issued by the High Court
in writ petition No. 888 of 1957 to which, as pointed out
before, the appellant was not a party and the order made in
which could not be ’binding either on the Central Government
or the appellant.
For the reasons mentioned above, we allow Civil Appeal No.
2121 of 1969 and set aside the order of the High Court and
dismiss the writ petition No. 464 of 1965 but in the circum-
stances of the case, we make no order as to costs in these
appeals.
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion of the majority Civil Appeal
No. 2121 of 1969 is allowed and Civil Appeal No. 2122 of
1969 is dismissed. No order as to costs in these appeals.
R.K.P.S.
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