C. P. Francis vs. C.P.Joseph

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 1071
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SLP (C) NO. 13348 OF 2025]

C.P. FRANCIS … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

C.P. JOSEPH AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
S.V.N. BHATTI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. CR Pius and Philomina Pius possessed, as absolute owners, an extent
of 7.875 cents of property in survey no. 60/6 of Elamkulam village and 3.233
cents in survey no. 60/6 of Elamkulam village, Kanyanoor Taluk, Ernakulam
District, as described in plaint A and B schedules. On 24.11.2004, CR Pius
died. On 27.11.2008, Philomina Pius died. The children/grandchildren of
Pius and Philomina are the parties to the present litigation, and their
genealogy is illustrated as follows:

C.P Joseph
C.P.Sebastia
Desty
Thomas -
C.P.Raphel -
C.P.George -
Clara Jacob
Mariya
(Deceased)
C.P.Francis
R1/P1
( DW-3 -
n - R4/P4
R2/P2
R3/P3
- R6
-
Appellant/
(PW-1)
(R5/P5)
Scribe)
Defendant
No.1(DW-1)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.09.03
16:27:38 IST
Reason:
Kavitha
Antony -
R7/Defenda
Savitha
Sachin - R8/
Defendant
nt no.3
no.4

1


3. On 15.12.1999, Philomina Pius executed a registered settlement deed
in favour of CP Sebastian/Fourth Plaintiff, whereunder, she has settled an
extent of 4 cents out of 7 cents in favour of the fourth plaintiff and retained
3.235 cents (Plaint B Schedule). Pius, admittedly, has been the absolute
owner and possessor of Plaint A schedule property. On 27.01.2003, CR Pius
and Philomina Pius executed the registered joint will in favour of CP
Francis/Appellant for the Plaint A and B schedule properties. Antony (DW6),
husband of Kavitha Antony/Defendant No. 3, and Ponsy (DW5), wife of
Appellant, have subscribed their signatures as attestors. The salient features
of the will dated 27.01.2003 are noted as follows:
3.1 All three daughters have been given their share and married off. The
fourth plaintiff was given 4 cents of the land as per the settlement deed
dated 15.12.1999. Hence, they are not entitled to any right in the plaint
schedule.
3.2 The properties in the plaint schedule A will be bequeathed to D1 after
the death of one of the testators, and after the death of the second
testator, properties in the plaint schedule B will be bequeathed to the
Appellant.
3.3 That Appellant has to pay Rs.1,00,000/- to Maria, Rs. 50,000/- to
daughter Thresia, Rs. 50,000/- to daughter Clara, Rs. 1,00,000/- to
Son Joseph, Rs. 1,00,000/- to son Raphael, and Rs. 1,00,000/- to son
George, within 5 years of death of both the parents. Reportedly, if the
said amount is not paid to the respective children, they can have a
charge on the schedule properties to recover the amounts.
4. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in the Civil Appeal filed OS No. 722/2009 before
the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, against the Appellant and three others for the
2


reliefs of partition of the plaint schedule properties into eight equal shares by
th
meets and bounds and allotment of 1/8 share to each one of the children of
Pius and Philomina. The plaint prays for the perpetual injunction restraining
the Appellant from alienating the property or creating third-party interests.

5. OS No. 722/2009 was dismissed on 03.09.2011. Respondent Nos. 1 to
5 filed AS No. 6 of 2012, and the learned Additional District Judge vide the
decree and judgment dated 26.08.2013 dismissed the appeal. Respondent
Nos. 1 to 5 filed RSA No. 94/2014 before the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam. Through the impugned judgment, the second appeal was allowed,
st
and hence, the Civil Appeal was filed at the instance of the 1 defendant. The
impugned judgment placed reliance on Section 67 of the Indian Succession
Act, 1925 (‘the Act’). It allowed the appeal by recording a finding that one of
the attesting witnesses/Ponsy (DW5) is the wife of the Appellant, and
consequently, by operation of Section 67 of the Act, the testamentary
succession in favour of Appellant, being void, fails as a testamentary
succession.

6. We have heard Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. V. Chitambaresh and Mr.
Mathai M. Paikaday, and the Learned Counsel Mr. Akshay Sahay for the
Appellant and Respondents.
7. It is argued for the Appellant that the impugned judgment exceeded the
jurisdictional limitation of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘the
CPC’).
7.1 The second appeal was admitted on the substantial questions of law
raised in the memorandum of appeal. However, the second appeal has
been allowed on an additional question of law framed by the Court,
which reads as follows:
3


“Whether Ext. A4/B3 Will is void under Section 67 of the Indian
Succession Act in view of the attestation of the same, who is
the first defendant, and, DW6, who is the husband of the third
defendant, since benefits are reserved in the said Will in favour
of those defendants?”
7.2 The impugned judgment refers to an opportunity of further hearing
given to the counsel on the additional question of law framed by the
Court. According to him, the same should not have been at the first
instance framed or answered. To be precise, the additional question of
law was framed without any basis in the pleadings or evidence, and was
not even put as a suggestion to the witnesses. The parties to the
litigation are brothers and sisters. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have chosen
to regulate the succession to Plaint A and B schedule properties from
testamentary to intestate succession. The emphasis was on the capacity
of late Pius and Philomina in executing a valid and binding will
regulating the succession to the scheduled properties. Therefore, the
Appellant was invited to join issue on the proof of Exhibits B-2 and B-
3. The Appellant discharged the burden to claim testamentary
succession to the suit properties. The findings of fact on valid execution
and sound disposing state of testators are concurrent findings of fact
by all three courts. The High Court relied on Section 67 of the Act and
declared Exhibit B-3 as a void bequest in favour of the Appellant. The
High Court's findings grant a new prayer based on an entirely new
reasoning. In this light, it is contended that Respondent Nos. 1 to 5
have chosen a plea, namely, that the testators were not having a sound
disposing state of mind, and that the registered will dated 27.01.2003
4


is not out of their free will. The impugned judgment, adverting to a new
case, ought not to have ignored the validly executed and proved will. An
argument has been advanced on the interpretation of Section 67, and
also that the grounds available to challenge Section 67 of the Act as
violative of equality of law and equal protection of law under Article 14
of the Constitution of India. The courts are under an obligation to give
effect to the disposition contemplated by the testator once the execution
of the will dated 27.01.2003 is proved in accordance with law. He prays
for the setting aside of the impugned judgment.
8. Mr. Mathai M. Paikaday, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 5,
contends that though the impugned judgment refers to an additional question
of law, it is, in fact, a substantial question of law framed by the High Court
under Section 100(5) of the CPC. The impugned judgment records that further
opportunity was afforded to the parties to address the Court on the additional
question of law framed by the Court. There is substantial compliance with
Section 100 of the CPC. He further argues, to sustain the findings recorded
on the additional question of law, that the finding is not based on an incorrect
plea or fact. There is no gainsaying that DW5 is the wife of the Appellant, and
pleadings and issues are absent on the applicability of Section 67 of the Act.
A plain reading of Section 67 makes the bequest in favour of the Appellant
void. Section 67 has been on the statute book for 100 years, and the effect of
being void once the circumstances are satisfied has stood the test of time. The
learned senior counsel argues that the points urged by the Appellant do not
fall within the ambit of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, much as the
succession to the suit schedule is guided by intestate succession and all the
th
children of Pius and Philomina would be entitled to a 1/8 share. Advocate
5


Akshay Sahay, appearing for Respondents, adopts the argument of the
Appellant and contends that the other attesting witness is also the son-in-law
of the executants of the will. The wish and desire of the testators must be
respected, and the opening of intestate succession would defeat the last wish
of late Pius and late Philomina.
9. We have taken note of the submissions and perused the record. Before
we take up the submissions of the learned counsel, we preface the journey of
the parties in the present litigation by setting out the pleadings and the
resulting issues between the parties.
10. The plaint in OS No. 722 of 2009 is summarised by retaining the cause
pleaded by Respondent Nos. 1 to 6:
10.1 The plaintiffs sought partition of the properties into eight equal shares,
along with a permanent prohibitory injunction against alienation. The
plaintiffs contend that, though the deed dated 15.12.1999 was styled
as a settlement deed, it was expanded for the marriage of two sisters.
The plaintiffs assert that their father, C.R. Pius, suffered from physical
and mental ailments, including cerebral palsy, senile changes, and
Parkinson's disease, from 1998 until his death, rendering him mentally
incapable of making rational decisions. They, hence, state that the said
will carries no legal validity, as the first defendant, his wife and the third
defendant’s husband misrepresented the mother.
10.2 They note that the joint will was falsely created and forged by the first
defendant, his wife (DW5), and the husband of the third defendant
(DW6) through misrepresentation and undue influence over their
incapacitated father and elderly mother. They claimed the mother was
too old to understand the document properly.
6


10.3 The plaintiffs asserted that their parents died intestate, and therefore,
all children held joint ownership and possession of the plaint schedule
properties. The defendants are trying to alienate the property on the
th
basis of the alleged will, ignoring the plaintiffs’ 1/8 share each in the
plaint schedule properties. Furthermore, the plaintiffs are not
interested in continuing with joint possession and therefore seek
partition.
10.4 The plaintiffs alleged that the cause of action arose on 24.11.2004
(father’s death) and 27.11.2008 (mother’s death).
11. The first defendant, to resist the claim of intestate succession, has set
up Exhibit B-2, a registered settlement deed. The pleadings in the written
statement are summarised as follows:
11.1 The defendants refuted the claims of the plaintiffs and asserted that the
plaintiffs have never obtained any ownership, co-ownership or are in
joint possession of the plaint schedule property. The defendants
asserted that the plaintiffs are only entitled to get the monetary claims
as stipulated in the registered will. If the claims are unfulfilled within
the 5-year period after the will comes into force, the defendants can
create a charge over the properties.
11.2 They state that the plaintiffs have admitted the execution of the
st
settlement deed dated 15.12.1999, in which late Pius and the 1
defendant are the witnesses, and the executant is late Philomina.
Hence, it is admitted that they were capable of executing the
documents. The settlement deed was executed after Pius and
Philomena decided to execute a joint will in respect of the remaining
properties. Thus, their mental capacity to execute the joint will is
7


admitted. They further contend that the plaintiffs cannot blow hot and
cold at the same time, and are estopped in fact and law.
st
11.3 It is asserted that the 1 defendant took over the possession of the
plaint schedule after the death of Pius on 24.11.2004, and Philomina
did not have any objection regarding this possession. The only right
created in favour of the plaintiffs is the monetary claims (mentioned in
the will), and a substantial amount was also paid as the plaintiff’s share
during their marriage.
11.4 The defendants claim that the settlement deed was executed in favour
of the fourth plaintiff for the construction of a residential building for
the fourth plaintiff and not for the marriage of two sisters of the fourth
plaintiff . The defendants further asserted that he looked after his father
and mother until his death.
11.5 The defendants contend that after the execution of the will on
27.01.2003, the father was still alive for a period of one year and some
months in good health. During this period after execution of the will,
there was no objection by the plaintiffs or the testators.
12. The Trial Court framed the following issues:
“1) Whether the will bearing No. 22/2003 of S.R.O Ernakulam
is valid and genuine?
2) Whether the plaint schedule property is partable? If so what
is the share of each party?
3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of permanent
prohibitory injunction as prayed for?
4) Relief and cost.”
13. The categorical findings of the Trial Court are that:
8


13.1 The execution of the will was valid and genuine, and it also concluded
that C.R. Pius was capable of making rational decisions at the time of
the will’s execution. He was not suffering from any mental disease. This
was supported by the evidence of DW7 (Neurologist), who deposed that
Pius was not suffering from any ailment or from any kind of mental
disease. In fact, Pius had witnessed the settlement deed executed in
1999, thereby proving his sound mental capacity.
13.2 No evidence was present that the execution of the will by Philomina Pius
was vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation. It considered the evidence
of DW1 to DW4 and concluded that the execution of Exhibit B-3 is not
vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation.
13.3 DW5 (Appellant’s wife) complied with Section 63(c) of the Act, testifying
that she witnessed the testators' signatures and signed in their
presence. Despite DW6’s (Antony) non-compliance with Section 63(c) of
the Act ( animo attestandi ), the combined evidence of DW3 (scribe), DW4
(Sub-Registrar), and DW5 sufficiently proved attestation of Exhibit B-3.

13.4 It held that the presence or active participation of the Appellant or his
wife (DW5) as a witness did not raise doubt on the genuineness of the
will or the testamentary capacity of the testators.
13.5 Based on the valid will, the plaint schedule properties were deemed not
partible, and other legal heirs were only entitled to the specified
monetary amounts.
13.6 Hence, it dismissed the suit for partition.
14. In AS No. 6 of 2012, the Appellate Court, on the competence, capacity,
and the execution of Exhibit B-3 in a free and sound disposing state of mind,
affirmed the findings of the Trial Court.
9


14.1 The Appellate Court affirmed that Pius was mentally and physically
capable of making rational decisions, considering that no record of
treatment between 14.09.2002 and 06.11.2004 for any ailment was
placed. Thus, the plaintiffs' contention that he was in poor health is
unfounded. The court stated that the argument that he was in a
vegetative state was not established.
14.2 The court accepted DW5’s (Appellant's wife) testimony regarding the
will's execution and DW4’s (Sub Registrar) testimony that the
executants signed before attesting witnesses, substantiating proper
attestation under Section 63 of the Act. DW6’s testimony was not relied
upon as he did not witness the executant's signature.
14.3 The fact that the will remained un-cancelled by the parents until their
deaths (Pius died 1 year 10 months after execution, mother much later)
was deemed to probabilise its voluntary execution without coercion. The
th
court upheld the reason for excluding the 4 plaintiff (Sebastian) due
to his prior receipt of land via the settlement deed. It noted that specific
monetary provisions for other children indicated the parents’ due
deliberation.
14.4 The first appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court that the will
was genuine and free from suspicious circumstances.
15. The contentions canvassed by the respective counsel would present the
following points for consideration.
Point 1: Whether the High Court, while invoking the Proviso to Section 100(5)
of the CPC, was correct in referring to and applying Section 67 of the Act?
Point 2: Whether Section 67 of the Act is attracted to determine the
succession to the suit schedule property or not?
10


16. The points for consideration are independent. The need and necessity
to take up point no. 2 arises from the consideration and conclusion recorded
on point no. 1.
P OINT 1
17. The impugned judgment records that an additional substantial
question of law ( sic ) was framed and opportunity was provided to the counsel
to address the Court on the said question of law. Section 100 of the CPC reads
as follows:
100. Second appeal.--(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided
in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being
in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree
passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court,
if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate
decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal
shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in
the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial
question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that
question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated
and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be
allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be
deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court
to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any
11


other substantial question of law, not formulated by it,
if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.
(Emphasis supplied)
18. In the above background, before we examine the procedure followed by
the High Court, a few precedents on the point are noted. The principles
emanating from precedents on Section 100(5) of the CPC can be summed up
as follows:
18.1 A substantial question of law must be grounded in the parties’
pleadings and the findings of lower courts. Thus, it must be exercised
1
if it is so fundamental that it goes to the very root of the matter.
18.2 The jurisdiction to frame a new question of law is exceptional and
should not be exercised routinely unless there is a strong and
2
convincing reason to do so.
18.3 The proviso allows the court to hear an appeal on
“any other substantial question of law,” which implies that at least one
substantial question of law must have been formulated at the
admission stage. The power to reformulate or add a question arises only
3
if a substantial question of law has already been framed.
18.4 The High Court must be “satisfied” that the new question is
4
a substantial question of law and not a mere legal plea.
18.5 The court is mandatorily required to record its reasons for framing an
5
additional substantial question of law.

1
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179.
2
Mehboob-Ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani, (2019) 19 SCC 415.
3
Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat, (2006) 6 SCC 271; Kirpa Ram v. Surendra Deo Gaur, (2021)
13 SCC 57.
4
Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438.
5
R. Nagraj (Dead) through LRs. and Anr. v. Rajmani and Ors, (2025) INSC 478.
12


18.6 The opposite party (the respondent) must be given a fair and proper
opportunity to contest the new question. Parties must be put on notice
and be allowed to present their arguments on the newly framed
question. Framing a question while dictating the judgment without
6
hearing the parties would be improper.
19. The ratio of the precedents is that the High Court is competent and
endowed with discretionary jurisdiction to formulate a substantial question
of law not stated when the second appeal was admitted. The High Court is
entitled to formulate an additional substantial question of law for reasons to
be recorded if the High Court is of the view that the case involves such a
question of law. The proviso to sub-section 5 of Section 100 of the CPC comes
into operation in exceptional cases, albeit for strong and convincing reasons
to be specifically recorded by the High Court. Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have
pleaded a lack of a sound disposing state of mind to late Pius. The pleadings
refer to the line of treatment given to the late Pius. The plea needed for
invoking Section 67 of the Act, either by choice or inadvertence, is not pleaded
by Respondent Nos. 1 to 5. Issue No. 1 deals with whether Exhibit B-3-will is
valid and genuine. Mr Mathai does not dispute that the issue ought to have
been different, and from the expressions used in the issue, consideration falls
under Section 100(5) of the CPC.
20. We have perused the plaint, and the plaint refers to the will and the
allegation that “[s]ince the will executed by fraud and misrepresentation upon
the ailed mother and forced upon the ailed father, it carries no legal validity,
and it is to be neglected.” The plea under Section 67 of the Act can be an
additional or alternative plea, which would have resulted into an additional

6
Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar, (2023) 17 SCC 624.
13


issue, and an establishment of a relationship, where one of the attestors to
the legatee of the will would have fallen for consideration. Introducing Section
67 at the stage of Second Appeal does not merely raise a new legal argument;
rather, it creates an entirely new case for the plaintiffs. The original case
required the defendant to prove the testators’ mental capacity and also the
absence of suspicious circumstances in bringing into existence Exhibit B-3.
A case under Section 67 of the Act would require the Appellant to meet a
completely different legal challenge, one which is based on the identity of an

attesting witness and the legal consequences arising from the said identity.
21. Section 141 of the Evidence Act, 1872 defines a ‘leading question as
any question that “suggests” the answer which the person questioning expects
to receive.’ We have perused the evidence of DW1 and DW5, and the
suggestion which is otherwise available is not put to the witnesses. The
importance of a suggestion in oral evidence of a party can crisply be
summarised as follows:
7

21.1 In Browne v. Dunn , the English House of Lords established a rule of
practice which dictates that if a cross-examiner intends to later adduce
evidence or make submissions that contradict the testimony of a
witness, they must first put the substance of the contradiction to the
witness during cross-examination. The purpose is to afford the witness
a fair opportunity and is rooted in the principle of Audi Alteram Partem .
8
This principle has also been upheld in Indian decisions.

7
(1893) 6 R 67.
8
See , Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, AIR 2013 SC1204
14


9
21.2 In a 1954 decision of the Bombay High Court, it was noted that failing
to suggest contrary points during cross-examination can weaken a
party’s position and can be interpreted as an implicit acceptance of the
witness’s testimony. While the case pertained to criminal defamation,
this principle has also been applied in civil litigation. For instance, in
10
Radha Kishan Aggarwal v. Network Ltd , the Delhi High Court held
that since no suggestion was given to the plaintiffs’ willingness to
dispute the market rent, the witness’s testimony on rent was accepted
as true.
21.3 Absence of a suggestion to a witness may not be the deciding factor in
determining the outcome of a plea. However, in the wheel of
consideration of all facts in issue and their legal implication, the
absence of suggestion constitutes an important cog in the wheel of
consideration. We hasten to add that the timing, absence of suggestion,
relevance and its impact are left to the experience, wisdom and
discretion of the Judge appreciating a case.

22. We have perused the evidence of DW1, the propounder of Exhibit B-3,
and DW5, an attesting witness to Exhibit B-3. The evidence is bereft of at least
a suggestion that would be expected in a matter as serious as the present.
The Court has power and jurisdiction to suit or non-suit a party on the
adduced pleadings, issues and evidence, but not on a totally new and
unexpected case, more particularly at the stage of Section 100. The root of the
matter is not an abstract legal issue floating freely, but it is fundamentally
anchored to the specific cause of action and the factual matrix pleaded by the

9
Yeshpal Jashbhai Parikh (Original Accused) v. Rasiklal Umedchand Parikh (Original
Complainant, Opponent, 1955 AIR BOM 318.
10
2011 SCC OnLine DEL 3896; See also, JS Bhalla v. GJ Bhawnani, 23 (1983) DLT 125.
15


parties. From the beginning, the plaintiffs’ case was built on a factual
challenge; wherein, they contend that (i) the testators lacked a sound
disposing state of mind, and (ii) the will was a product of forgery,
misrepresentation, and undue influence. These two aspects have been
successfully established by the Appellant, and the findings favour the
Appellant
23. Therefore, in fine, we record that in the circumstances of this case, the
High Court fell in error by not recording reasons for framing the additional
substantial question of law. The additional substantial question of law may
be an abstract application of Section 67 without verifying the foundational
facts and circumstances. The admission of a party must be in the manner
known to law. An admission in pleading and evidence is certainly an
admission. By appreciating an admission, the Court is entitled to apply the
consequence of law. In the analysis, we notice that the relationship of DW5
with DW1 is either assumed by the Court or not contested by the parties on
any of the grounds available, namely, want of pleadings, etc., before the High
Court. The above consideration leads to the irrefutable conclusion that an
additional substantial question of law is framed without pleadings, issues and
reasons and a finding is recorded. The Court is now confronted with a will
duly executed and proved, and not given effect to by applying Section 67 of
11
the Act. It is axiomatic, but still referred to in often quoted decisions, that
the wish of a testator as expressed through a duly proved will is upheld by
the Court, but not open up succession contrary to the arrangement made by
the testator. Thus, the point is answered in favour of the Appellant and

11
Gnanambal Ammal v. T. Raju Ayyar , 1950 SCC 978; 2. K.S. Palanisami v. Hindu
Community in General & Citizens of Gobichettipalayam , (2017) 13 SCC 15.
16


consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside. For the above reasons,
point no. 2 is not, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
examined and answered.
24. The conclusion to the above points does not give quietus to the
obligations fastened on the Appellant by late Pius and late Philomina. Exhibit
B-3 stipulated a few obligations for discharge by the Appellant. The parties
have been agitating over whether testamentary or intestate succession is
applicable to the plaint schedule. With the findings recorded by the present
judgment, testamentary succession is again opened. The Appellant has
neither deposited nor paid the amount directed in Exhibit B-3 to any of the
other beneficiaries. The parents made a contemporaneous arrangement in
bequeathing the suit schedule to the Appellant. The testamentary succession
finally opens through the present adjudication, and therefore, it is incumbent
upon the Appellant to compensate the other legatees within three months
from today as summarised in the following table:

17

25. In default of payment, the amount determined by this Court will carry
an interest of 6% per annum, and also charge for realising the same will be
on the plaint schedule.
26. We hasten to add that extraordinary care and caution have to be
observed in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India. It does not confer a right of appeal, but it vests with this Court a vast
discretion, which is only to be exercised by considerations of justice, call of
duty and the eradication of injustice. This overriding power is exercised only
in exceptional cases where special circumstances exist.
27. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and there is no order as to
costs.

………..……….…………………J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]





…..…....…………………………J.
[S.V.N. BHATTI]

New Delhi;
September 03, 2025.
18