Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
POPPATLAL SHAH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MADRAS.UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS-Interveners.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/03/1953
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BENCH:
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ)
BOSE, VIVIAN
HASAN, GHULAM
CITATION:
1953 AIR 274 1953 SCR 677
CITATOR INFO :
R 1955 SC 661 (93,147)
RF 1958 SC 452 (14,26)
RF 1958 SC 468 (6,14,17)
R 1958 SC 560 (14,32)
R 1959 SC 887 (16)
RF 1961 SC 347 (20)
RF 1961 SC1065 (4)
R 1963 SC1207 (42,50)
R 1965 SC 161 (8)
RF 1966 SC 376 (5)
F 1985 SC1034 (15)
R 1988 SC2031 (9)
ACT:
Madras Sales Tax Act (IX of 1939), Ss. 2, 8 (before
amendment of 1947)-" Sale within the province", meaning of-
Levy of tax on sales where property in the goods passed
outside the province-Legality-Provincial Legislature-
Territorial jurisdiction.
HEADNOTE:
Under the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, as it stood before
it was amended by the Madras Act XXV of 1947,the mere fact
that the contract of sale was entered into within the
Province of
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Madras did not make a transaction which was completed in
another province where the property in the goods passed, a
sale within the Province of Madras and no tax could be
legally levied upon such a transaction under the provisions
of the Act.
Though a Provincial Legislature could not pass a taxation
statute which would be binding on any other part of India it
was quite competent for a province to enact a legislation
imposing taxes on transactions concluded outside the
province provided there was a sufficient and real
territorial nexus between such transactions and the taxing
province.
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The title and preamble, whatever their value might be as
aids to the construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw
light on the intention and design of the Legislature and
indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself.
It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the
legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute
are to be taken together and each word phrase or sentence is
to be considered in the light of the general purpose and
object of the statute.
Judgment of the Madras High court reversed.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 92 of
1952.
Appeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1) (c) of the
Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the
29th August, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature At Madras
(Rajamannar C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar J.) in Criminal
Appeal No. 129 of 1952 arising out of the-order dated the
25th February, 1952, of the Court of the VII Presidency
Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, in C. T. No. 1358 of the
Calendar for 1950.
B. Somayya (C. B. Pattabhi Baman, with him) for
theappellant.
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate- General of Madras (V. V.
Rahavan and Alladi Kuppuswami with him) for the respondent.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G. N. Joshi
and P. A. Mehta, with him) for the Union of India.
B. K. P. Sinha for the State of Bihar.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab (M. L,
Sethi, with him) for the State of Punjab.
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A. R. Somanatha Iyer, Advocate-General of Mysore (R. Ganapathy
lyer, with him) for the State of, Mysore.
K. B. Asthana for the State of Uttar Pradesh.
T. N. Subramanya Iyer, Advocate-General of Travancore-
Cochin (M. B. Krishna Pillai and Balakrishna Iyer, with
him) for the State of Travancore Cochin.
V. N. Sethi for the State of Madhya Pradesh.
Hajarnavis for Husain Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. (Intervener
No. 8).
1953. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
MUKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on a
certificate granted by the Madras High Court under articles
134(1) (e) and 132(1) of the Constitution, is directed
against an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the
High Court of Madras, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 129 of
1952, by which the learned Judges affirmed an order of the
Seventh Presidency Magistrate, Madras, dated February 25,
1952, convicting the appellant of an offence punishable
under section 15 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and
sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000; in default to
suffer imprisonment for a period of 3 months.
The appellant is a partner of a firm of merchants called
Indo-Malayan Trading Company" which has its head office in
the city of Madras and carries on the business of selling
and purchasing groundnut oil, sago and kirana articles. For
the period-April 1, 1947, to December 31, 1947-the company
was assessed to sales tax under the Madras Act IX of 1939
for an amount of Rs. 37,771 annas odd on a total turnover of
Rs. 37,75,257 and for failure to pay the same were
instituted against him under the provision of section 15 of
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the Act which resulted in his conviction as mentioned above.
The course of business, which is usually followed by the
company
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and which was actually followed during the period for which
assessment is made, is as follows: The company receives
orders-in its Madras office from’ Calcutta merchants for
supply of certain articles. These articles are purchased in
the local markets and they are despatched to Calcutta by
rail or steamer. The railway receipts and bills of lading
are taken in the name of the vendor company and so also are
the insurance policies, and they are sent to the company’s
bankers in Calcutta who deliver the same to the consignees
on payment of prices and other charges. The sole point that
requires consideration is, whether in these circumstances
the sale transactions were liable to be taxed under the
General Sales Tax Act of Madras?
Before the High Court both the parties seem to have
accepted the position that if on the facts stated above,
which were not disputed by either side, the sales could be
hold to have taken place within the Province of Madras, the
tax could legitimately be levied on them but not otherwise.
The parties differed, however? as regards the test to. be
applied, in determining whether the sales did take place
within the Province of Madras or not. On behalf of the
appellant the contention raised was that the place of sale
in regard to all the transactions was Calcutta, as the
property in the goods sold admittedly passed to the
purchasers in that city. The contention of the respondent
State on the other hand was that the true test for
determining the locality of the sale was not where the
property in the goods sold passed, but where the actual
transaction was put through. As the company had its head
office in the city of Madras, its accounts were maintained
there and the goods were delivered to the common carrier in
that city, the sale, according to the respondent, must be
deemed to have taken place in Madras even though the
property in the goods sold passed outside the province.
The High Court accepted this contention of the respondent
State. In the opinion of the learned
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Judges, the word "sale" has both a legal and a popular
meaning. In the legal sense, it imports passing of property
in the goods and it is in this sense that the word is used
in the Sale of Goods Act. ’In the popular sense, however,
it signifies the transaction itself which results in the
passing of property. As the object of the Legislature in
the Sales Tax Act is to impose a tax on the occasion of the
sale, it is immaterial that the sale has been completed
outside the province. The place where the property passes
is, it is said, a matter of no concern to the taxing author-
ity and in such context the popular meaning of the word is
more appropriate and should be adopted. The further
contention raised on behalf of the appellant, that if this
view was accepted, the sales tax would have to be regarded
as being extra-territorial, in its operation and as such
ultra vires the Provincial Legislature, was repelled by the
High Court on the authority of the well known decision of
the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers etc., & Company
v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay(1).
It is the propriety of this decision that has been
challenged before us and the contentions raised by Mr.
Somayya, who appeared in support of the appeal, are of a
two-fold character : The learned counsel has argued in the
first place that the Provincial Legislature functioning
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under the Government of India Act, 1935, was
constitutionally incompetent to enact a legislation of this
character which according to the interpretation put upon it
by the High Court is capable of operating on sale
transactions concluded outside the province. The other
contention is that on a proper construction of the relevant
provisions of the Madras Sales Tax Act the High Court ought
to have held that they do not authorise the imposition of
sale tax in respect of a transaction of sale where property
in the goods sold passes outside the province.
The first contention appears to us to be unsustainable.
Section 100 (3) of the Government of India
(1) (1948] F.C.R. I (P.C.).
682
Act, 1935, upon which Mr.Somayya relied and which
corresponds to article246(3) of the Constitution runs as
follows :
‘‘Subject to the two preceding sub-sections, the
Provincial Legislature has and the Federal Legislature has
not, power to make laws for a province or any part thereof
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in
the Second Schedule."
The entry in the Provincial List that is relevant for our
purpose is Entry No. 48 and that speaks of " taxes on the
sale of goods and on advertisements." The entry does not
suggest that a legislation imposing tax on sale of goods can
be made only in respect of sales taking place within the
boundaries of the province ; and all that section 100(3)
provides is that a law could be passed by a Provincial
Legislature for purposes of the province itself. It admits
of no dispute that a Provincial Legislature could not pass a
taxation statute which would be binding on any other part of
India outside the limits of the province, but it would be
quite competent to enact a legislation imposing taxes on
transactions concluded outside the province, provided that
there was sufficient and a real territorial nexus between
such transactions and the taxing province. This principle,
which is based upon the decision of the Judicial Committee
in Wallace Brothers etc. & Company v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay(1) has been - held by this court to be
applicable to sale tax legislation, in its recent decision
in the Bombay Sales Tax Act case (2) and its propriety is
beyond question. As a matter of fact, the legislative
practice in regard to sale tax laws adopted by the
Provincial Legislatures prior to the coming into force of
the Constitution has been to authorise imposition of taxes
on sales and purchases which were related in some manner
with the taxing province by reason of some of the
ingredients of the transaction having taken place within the
province or by
(1) [1948] F.C.R. I (P.C.).
(2) The State of Bombay d Another v. United Motors (India)
Ltd. & Others-Civil Appeal NO. 204 Of 1952.
683
reason of the production or location of goods within it at
the time when the transaction took place. If in the Madras
Sales Tax Act the basis adopted for taxation is the location
of the place of business or of the goods sold, within the
Province of Madras, undoubtedly it would be a valid piece of
legislation to which no objection on constitutional grounds
could be taken. The controversy, therefore, narrows down to
the short point as to what exactly has been adopted as the
basis of the levy of sale tax by the Madras Legislature.
This leads us to the question of interpretation of the
statute which is involved in the second point raised by Mr.
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Somayya.
It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the
legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute
are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence
is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and
object of the Act itself. The title of the Madras Sales Tax
Act describes it to be an Act, the object of which is to
provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods
in the Province of Madras and the very same words are
repeated in the preamble which follows. The title and
preamble, whatever their value might be as aids to the
construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw light on the
intent and design of the Legislature and indicate the scope
and purpose of the legislation itself. The title and
preamble of the Madras Sales Tax Act clearly show that its
object is to impose taxes on sales that take place within
the province, though these words do not necessarily mean
that the property in the goods sold must pass within the
province. The expression "sale of goods " is a composite
expression consisting of various ingredients or elements.
Thus, there are the elements of a bargain or contract of
sale, the payment or promise of payment of price, the
delivery of goods and the actual passing of title, and each
one of them is essential to a transaction of sale though the
sale is not completed or concluded unless the purchaser
becomes the owner of the property. The question is-what
element or elements have been accepted
684
by the Madras Legislature as constituting a sale in the
province upon which it is the object of the statute to levy
tax. Section 2(h) gives the definition ’of "sale" and it is
defined as meaning, every, transfer of the property in goods
by one person to another in the course of trade or business
for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, but does not include a mortgage,
hypothecation, charge or pledge."
Unmistakably the stress is laid in this definition on the
element of transfer of property in a sale and no other. The
language gives no indication of the popular meaning of sale
in which according to the High Court, the word was used. It
is to be noticed that there was no provision by way of
explanation of this definition, in operation, at the
material time to indicate in what cases a sale would be
regarded as taking place within the Province of Madras,
although the property in the goods sold did pass outside the
boundaries of the province. Such explanations were added by
the Madras Act XXV of 1947 and one of these explanations,
namely explanation 2, provides as follows :
" Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian
Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale or purchase of any goods
shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have taken
place in this Province, wherever the contract of sale or
purchase might have been made-
(a) if the goods were actually in this Province, at
the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect
thereof was made, or
(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase
of future goods by description, then, if the goods are
actually produced in this Province at any time after the
contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made."
It would be clear from this that these transactions were
not considered by the Legislature to constitute sales within
the Province of Madras under the definition itself, but by
resort to a legal fiction they were
685
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declared to be so, notwithstanding any provision in the
Sale of Goods Act to the contrary which it was assumed,
would otherwise be applicable,. The explanation further
shows that in defining "sale" in section 2(h), the
Legislature had in mind a sale in the Province of Madras and
as these words occur in the title and preamble of the Act it
was not deemed necessary to repeat them in the definition or
the charging sections. Section 3 is the charging section in
the Act and it provides for the levy of a tax on the total
turnover of a dealer for a particular year. A "turnover" is
defined to be the aggregate amount for which goods are
either bought or sold. The charging section purports to
levy a tax on the sale of goods and the tax is on the sale
of goods in the Province of Madras as defined in section
2(h) of the Act read in the light of its title and preamble.
In our opinion, the mere fact that the contract for sale
was entered into within the Province of Madras does not make
the transaction, which was completed admittedly within
another province, where the property in the goods passed, a
sale within the Province of Madras according to the
provisions of the Madras Sales Tax Act and no tax could be
levied upon such a transaction under the provisions of the
Act. A contract of sale becomes a sale under the Sale of
Goods Act only when the property in the goods is transferred
to the buyer under the terms of the contract itself. The
presence of the goods within the province at the time of the
contract would undoubtedly make the sale, if subsequently
completed, a sale within the province by reason of the
explanation added by Act XXV of 1947 ; but as this
explanation was not in operation during the relevant period
with which we are concerned, the assessment of sale tax, in
our opinion, on the transactions during this period is
illegal and not warranted by the provisions of the Act. It
is worthwhile to mention in this connection that except for
the period in question no tax was attempted to be levied on
similar transactions of the appellant by the taxing
authorities in any of the
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686
previous years,though the Act came into operation as early
as the year 1939. It is not disputed also that the company
is paying sale tax on its transactions with the Calcutta
merchants since the explanation added by Act XXV of 1947
came into force. ’In our opinion, the appeal should be
allowed and the conviction and sentence passed by the courts
below should be set aside. The fine and sale tax, if
actually paid, should be refunded to the appellant.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: M. S. K. Aiyangar.
Agent for the respondent (the State of Madras), the Union of
India, and the States of Punjab,
Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Travancore Cochin (Interveners):
G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
Agent for the State of Bihar: B. C. Prasad.
Agent for the State of U. P. C. P. Lal.
Agent for Intervener No. 8: Bajinder Narain.