Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 1063 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Holiram Bordoloi
RESPONDENT:
State of Assam
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/04/2005
BENCH:
K.G. Balakrishnan & B.N. Srikrishna
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.
The appellant was one of the accused in a case registered by
Boribazar Outpost in Assam. Originally, there were seventeen
accused. Three accused, including the appellant were absconding
and apprehended later. Fourteen accused persons were tried by
the Sessions Judge, Morigaon in Sessions Case No. 47/99 and
they were all found guilty of various offences. The case of the
present appellant was put up and numbered as 47A/99 and tried
separately. The appellant was found guilty of the offences
punishable under Sections 147, 148, 436, 326 and 302 read with
Section 149. For the main offence under Section 302 read with
Section 149, he was awarded the capital punishment by the
Sessions Judge. The appellant filed an appeal before the High
Court of Assam at Gauhati, and there was also a Reference against
the death penalty imposed on the appellant. The appeal and the
Reference were disposed of by a common judgment and the death
penalty imposed on the appellant was confirmed by the High Court.
The appellant challenges his conviction and sentence in this appeal.
The occurrence took place in the morning of 26.11.1996.
Deceased Narayan Bordoloi along with his wife and three children
were staying in a hut within the jurisdiction of Boribazar Outpost.
On the date of the incident, the appellant Holiram Bordoloi along
with seventeen others came near the house of Narayan Bordoloi.
Appellant Holiram and the other accused were armed with ‘lathi’,
‘dao’, ‘jathi’, ‘jong’ and various other weapons. On seeing
Holiram and others, Narayan Bordoloi and his brother Padam
Bordoloi went inside the house and remained there. Six year old
son Nayanmoni, eight year old Chitralekha, sixteen year old Nabid
and Budheshwari \026 wife of Narayan Bordoloi were also in the hut.
The accused persons started pelting stones on the bamboo wall of
the hut. Then they tied the door from outside and set the hut on
fire. PW-2 Padam Bordoloi pierced the bamboo wall of the hut and
escaped. Nabid also managed to escape from the hut, though he
sustained injuries. PW-1 Budheshwari, who had sustained serious
burn injuries but managed to come out from the house fainted.
Narayan Bordoloi and his six year old son Nayanmoni were trapped
inside. Nayanmoni somehow came out from the hut. But the
appellant Holiram and another accused person caught hold of him
and threw him into the fire. Narayan Bordoloi and Nayanmoni
were completely burnt and died on the spot. Nagarmol Bordoloi,
the elder brother of deceased Narayan Bordoloi was staying in
another house at some distance from the house of Narayan.
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Nagarmol Bordoloi was caught and dragged to the courtyard of
Holiram, where the appellant cut him into pieces.
PW-2 Padam Bordoloi went to the police post and gave the
first information to the police. The police took over the
investigation and PW-9 Prabodh Saikia conducted the investigation.
The remnants of the body of Narayan and Nayanmoni were found
near the Gatak’s house. The dead body of Nagarmol was found
near the house of Holiram, the appellant. The Investigating Officer
recovered the burnt portions of some materials and also a burnt
bicycle was found at the site. He held inquest over the dead
bodies and then the dead bodies were sent for post mortem
examination. On the side of the prosecution, ten witnesses were
examined. PW-1 Budhi Sen, PW-2 Padam Bordoloi, PW-3 Nayan
Bordoloi and PW-4 Chitralekha were examined by the prosecution.
They deposed that the house of Narayan Bordoloi was burnt and
as a result Narayan and his son died from burn injuries. Another
important witness examined is PW-5 Beenapani Bordoloi, the wife
of deceased Nagarmol Bordoloi. She gave the evidence regarding
the incident wherein her husband was assaulted and cut into
pieces by the appellant and the other accused. The Sessions
Judge relied on the evidence of some of these witnesses and found
the appellant guilty. The High Court confirmed the findings of the
Sessions Court.
We heard the appellant’s counsel and the counsel for the
State. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the witnesses
had given different versions as to the time of occurrence, which is
stated to be 9.30 a.m. by one witness and 11.00 a.m. by another
witness. The appellant’s counsel also pointed out certain
contradictions in the evidence of the eye-witnesses. We do not
think that the contradictions pointed out by the appellant would, in
any way, affect the credibility of these witnesses. PW-1
Budheshwari deposed that all the accused persons came to her
house and tied the door from outside and set the house on fire, but
these witnesses managed to come out from the house with serious
burn injuries. She had sustained burns on her right hand and also
on her right shoulder extending to the wrist joint. She stated that
her husband and son Nayanmoni could not come out and they were
inside the burnt house and on seeing this she fainted and was
taken to a nearby house where she remained for three days and
thereafter she was sent to Civil Hospital. PW-2 Padam Bordoloi
deposed that he could identify all the accused, including the
present appellant. He stated that when the fire started on the roof
of the house, he broke up a corner of the bamboo wall of the hut
and ran away to Boribazar. He later came to know that Narayan
and his son Nayanmoni died inside the house and his elder brother
Nagarmol Bordoloi was cut into pieces in the courtyard of the
house of Holiram. PW-3 Nabin Bordoloi deposed that he also
sustained serious burn injuries, but he came out of the house by
breaking a portion of the house and at that time, one of the
accused persons assaulted him and caused a punctured wound on
the left side of his chest. After half an hour, he was taken to
Nayagaon Hospital. PW-4 Chitralekha Bordoloi, the daughter of
deceased Narayan Bordoloi had also given a graphic description of
the incident. She further stated that when her younger brother
Nayanmoni Bordoloi managed to come out of the house, the
appellant and another accused caught hold of him and threw him
to the fire again. This witness also sustained serious burn injuries
on her right hand and right thigh.
The evidence of Beenapani Bordoloi, the wife of deceased
Nagarmol Bordoloi is important to prove the incident wherein
Nagarmol was attacked and killed. She deposed that on the
previous night also, somebody had pelted stones at her house.
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She had also deposed that on the day of the occurrence the mob
led by the appellant came to her house and her husband Nagarmol
Bordoloi was dragged from the house. He was given a lathi blow
and then taken to the house of the appellant Holiram, which was
at a distance of half a furlong, where he was cut into pieces by the
accused Holiram and when her deceased husband Nagarmol
requested for water, one of the accused, since dead, urinated on
the face of Nagarmol.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt the actual involvement of the appellant in this
incident. We find no reason to disagree with the findings entered
in by the Sessions Court as well as the High Court. The conviction
of the appellant is only to be upheld.
The next question that arises for consideration is whether the
present case falls in the category of rarest of the rare cases where
the death penalty is to be imposed on the appellant.
In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684,
this court after considering the validity of the provisions which
empower the court to award death sentence laid down the
following broad guidelines to be borne in mind by the courts while
considering the question of awarding a sentence in cases involving
murder:
"198. We will first notice some of the aggravating
circumstances which, in the absence of any mitigating
circumstances, have been regarded as an indication for
imposition of the extreme penalty.
199. Pre-planned, calculated, cold-blooded murder has
always been regarded as one of an aggravated kind. In
Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20,
it was reiterated by this Court that if a murder is
"diabolically conceived and cruelly executed", it would
justify the imposition of the death penalty on the
murderer. The same principle was substantially
reiterated by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the
bench in Ediga Anamma v. State of A.P., (1974) 4 SCC
443 in these terms:
"The weapons used and the manner of their
use, the horrendous features of the crime and
hapless, helpless state of the victim, and the
like, steel the heart of the law for a sterner
sentence\005"
201. ..., it is quite clear to us that for making the
choice of punishment or for ascertaining the existence
or absence of "special reasons" in that context, the
court must pay regard both to the crime and the
criminal. What is the relative weight to be given to the
aggravating and mitigating factors, depends on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. More
often than not, these two aspects are so intertwined
that it is difficult to give a separate treatment to each of
them. This is so because "style is the man". In many
cases, the extremely cruel or beastly manner of the
commission of murder is itself a demonstrated index of
the depraved character of the perpetrator. That is why,
it is not desirable to consider the circumstances of the
crime and the circumstances of the criminal in two
separate watertight compartments\005."
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Further, this Court also laid down circumstances, which
could be considered as aggravating circumstances. These
circumstances are as follows:
"202. \005 (a) if the murder has been committed after
previous planning and involves extreme brutality; or
(b) if the murder involves exceptional depravity; or
(c) if the murder is of a member of any of the armed
forces of the Union or of a member of any police force
or of any public servant and was committed \026
(i)which such member or public servant was on
duty; or
(ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted
to be done by such member or public servant in
the lawful discharge of his duty as such member
or public servant whether at the time of murder
he was such member or public servant, as the
case may be, or had ceased to be such member
or public servant; or
(d) if the murder is of a person who had acted in the
lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or who had rendered
assistance to a Magistrate or a police officer demanding
his aid or assistance under Section 37 and Section 129
of the said Code."
Similarly, it also considered the following circumstances as
mitigating circumstances:
"206 (1) That the offence was committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or
old, he shall not be sentenced to death.
(3) The probability that the accused would not commit
criminal acts of violence as would constitute a
continuing threat to society.
(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed
and rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence prove
that the accused does not satisfy the Conditions (3) and
(4) above.
(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the
accused believed that he was morally justified in
committing the offence.
(6) That the accused acted under the duress or
domination of another person.
(7) That the conditions of the accused showed that he
was mentally defective and that the said defect
impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct."
The counsel for the appellant referred to the case of Ashok
Kumar Pandey v. State of Delhi, (2002) 4 SCC 76, in which the
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extreme penalty of death was commuted to rigorous imprisonment
for life. This court while doing so held:
"11. \005. Reference in this connection may be made
to the Constitution Bench decision of this court in the
case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2
SCC 684, as well as, following the same, the three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Machhi Singh v.
State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470. wherein various
circumstances have been enumerated and it was laid
down that if the case squarely falls within its ambit,
only in that eventuality, death penalty can be awarded.
It was observed that in rarest of rare cases when
collective conscience of the community is so shocked
that it will expect the holders of the judicial power
centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their
personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise
retaining death penalty, such a penalty can be inflicted.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is
not possible to come to the conclusion that the present
case would fall within the category of rarest of rare one.
Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that in the
fitness of the things, extreme penalty of death was not
called for and the same is fit to be commuted to life
imprisonment."
In the above case the conviction was commuted solely taking
into consideration the mitigating circumstances and the peculiar
facts of that case and cannot be applied to the case on hand.
The counsel also referred to Ram Pal v. State of U.P.
(2003) 7 SCC 141, and contended that this court has commuted
the death penalty to that of life imprisonment in a case where the
accused have prematurely terminated the life of twenty-one people
including young children. In this case the court stated the factors
that have to be considered while awarding death penalty and held
that:
"8. Bearing in mind the above broad guidelines laid
down by this Court in the case of Bachan Singh if we
consider the facts of the case, we notice the fact that
the appellant was a party to an incident in which
twenty-one people including young children were
murdered by gunshot injuries or by burning them in
latched houses in itself could be considered as
aggravating circumstances to consider awarding of
death sentence. According to the judgment in Bachan
Singh case then we will have to weigh the same with
any mitigating circumstances that may be available on
the facts of this case. While doing the said exercise of
searching for mitigating circumstances in the present
case, we find that the incident in question was a sequel
to the murder of Bhagwati, a close relative of the
appellant and other principal accused, which was
suspected to have been committed by the members of
the victim’s family. Prior to that, the victims’ family was
accused of having committed the murder of two of the
close relatives of the appellant’s family for which some
of the members of the victims’ family were being
prosecuted. On facts and circumstances of this case, we
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think this circumstance can be treated as a
circumstance which amounts to a provocation from the
victims’ side. We also notice that the role played by the
appellant is somewhat similar to the role played by the
other accused persons who have been given lesser
sentence while the appellant has been awarded death
sentence, that too with the aid of Section 149 IPC;
therefore, a question arises why this appellant should
not be considered on a par with those accused for the
purpose of awarding the sentence. We also notice from
the argument of the learned counsel which is supported
by the material on record, that the specific overt act
attributed to the appellant that he climbed the house of
the informant and threatened to shoot the victims if
they came out of their houses, while the other accused
latched and set the houses on fire seem to be an
afterthought not having been told to the investigating
officer by the witnesses when their statements were
recorded by him. We also notice that the appellant was
not treated by the prosecution itself as the leader of the
gang but was considered to be one amongst other
accused who took part in the incident. The fact that the
accused has spent nearly 17 years in custody after the
incident in question can also be treated as a mitigating
circumstance while considering the question of
sentence.
9. The abovementioned circumstances which we
consider as mitigating circumstances, in our opinion,
outweigh the aggravating circumstances as found by
the courts below\005."
In the above stated case, the commutation of sentence was
ordered in the factual circumstances of that case and it is not
applicable to the present case. The accused therein was convicted
under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 IPC and there were
series of mitigating factors.
In the present case the aggravating circumstances against
the accused are : (a) this is a case of cold-blooded murder; (b)
the accused was leading the gang; (c) The victims did not provoke
or contribute to the incident; (d) two victims were burnt to death
by locking the house from outside; (e) one of the victims was a
young boy, aged about 6 years, who, somehow, managed to come
out of the burning house, but he was mercilessly thrown back to
the fire by the appellant; (f) the dragging of Nagarmol Bordoloi by
the appellant Holiram to his house and then cutting him into pieces
in broad daylight in the presence of bystanders; (g) the entire
incident took place in the broad daylight and the crime was
committed in the most barbaric manner to deter others from
challenging the supremacy of the appellant in the village; (h) the
entire incident was pre-planned by the accused-appellant Holiram.
On the other hand, neither the perusal of the evidence on
record nor the statement under Section 313 Criminal Procedure
Code, provided for any mitigating circumstance in favour of the
appellant. It is nowhere claimed that the deceased had provoked
the accused persons or there was any strong motive for the
commission of the heinous act.
The counsel for the appellant finally contended that the
appellant is not a menace to the society; he can be reformed and a
harsher punishment of death shall not be awarded. In support of
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his contention, reference was made to Ram Anup Singh and
Others v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 686 by the counsel.
This case was also decided in view of its peculiar facts.
There was a family dispute between the deceased on one hand and
his brother and nephews on the other and also the records show
that there was a chance for reformation and rehabilitation. But in
the case on hand, there is nothing to show that there was
repentance by the accused at any point of time or an explanation
for the occurrence. Even when questioned under Section 235 (2)
of Criminal Procedure Code, the accused stated that he had
nothing to say on the point of sentence. The fact that the
appellant remained silent would show that he has no repentance
for the ghastly act he committed. The appellant was in service
and he should have been a model to the society as very few people
from his community get opportunity to work in government
service. But the appellant, instead of setting an example to others,
organized a gang and instigated them to join his heinous activities.
There was no spark of any kindness or compassion and his mind
was brutal and the entire incident would have certainly shocked
the collective conscience of the community. We are unable to find
any mitigating circumstance to refrain from imposing the death
penalty on the appellant.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The interim stay of
execution of the sentence is vacated.