Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1375
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No (s). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No(s)……………. of 2025)
(@ Diary No.60854 of 2024)
ROUSANARA BEGUM ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
S.K. SALAHUDDIN
@ SK SALAUDDIN & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL J,
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.12.02
18:33:02 IST
Reason:
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 1 of 10
2. These appeals are directed against judgment and order
th
dated 24 November 2022 passed in CRR No. 489 of 2019 and
st
Order dated 31 January 2024 passed in application for
modification bearing No. CRAN 9 of 2023 by the High Court at
Calcutta, at the instance of the Appellant herein, Rousanara
Begum, who is the former wife of the Respondent No.1 - S.K
1
Salahuddin .
3. The short question which arises for consideration in these
appeals are whether goods given to a daughter at the time of her
marriage by her father, or to the bridegroom, can be by
application of law, returned to the daughter, appellant herein,
given that their marriage had ended in divorce.
th
4. The parties to the lis were married on 28 August 2005.
Differences, however, arose shortly thereafter and the Appellant
th
departed from her matrimonial home on 7 May 2009.
Subsequently, she filed an application under Section 125 of the
2
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and initiated proceedings
3
under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 . The marriage
th
eventually ended in divorce on 13 December 2011. Thereafter,
4
she approached the Court under Section 3 of The Muslim
5
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 seeking the
1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Respondent’
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘CRPC’
3
Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
4
Misc. Case No. 149/2011 before Additional CJM, Bolpur District Birbhum
5
Hereinafter referred to as ‘1986 Act’
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 2 of 10
return of total of Rs. 17,67,980/-. This amount was arrived at in
the following terms:
“ 6. The petitioner is entitled to receive a total amont of
Rs.17,67,980/- from the opposite party, which includes
the dower amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-, dowry of
Rs.7,00,000/-, 30 (thirty) Bhori gold ornaments worth
Rs.9,00,000/-, the value of the fridge and stabilizer
Rs.10,700/-, Panasonic TV and other items worth
Rs.18,140/-, showcase Rs.3,000/-, box bed Rs. 19,000/-
, dressing table Rs.2,500/-, steel almirah Rs.5,500/-, steel
mirror Rs.2,100/-, sofa set Rs.2,000/-, dining table Rs.
1,720/-, and bedding Rs.3,320/ -, and she has claimed it.”
It is these proceedings that, after multiple rounds, have
travelled to this Court. Before proceeding to the merits of the
matter, we must take note of this history.
th
4.1. The Learned CJM vide order dated 26 June 2014
allowed the application and granted a total of Rs.8.3 lacs as
against the claim of Rs. 17.5 lacs.
4.2. Both parties preferred revision petitions before the
learned Session Judge who remanded the matter for afresh
consideration allowing the evidence of marriage registrar to
be entered.
4.3. On remand, the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate
rd
by order dated 23 February 2015 once again decreed the
matter in favour of the appellant granting a total of Rs.8 lacs
along with 30 bhories of gold ornaments.
4.4. Aggrieved thereby the respondent preferred the
revision petition and the learned Additional Sessions Judge
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 3 of 10
st
by order dated 21 July 2015 allowed the same and once
again remanded the matter for additional evidence and fresh
trial.
4.5. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur in
th
terms of judgment dated 27 April 2017 framed three issues
for consideration- issues 1 and 2 concerned the amount of
Rs.8 lacs along with 30 bhories as previously awarded and
issue 3 pertained to the articles that were given to the
bridegroom and whether any right to recover the same
existed. Issue no.1 which particularly dealt with Rs.1 lac as
mehr was disposed of observing that the amount already
stood paid by the respondent to the appellant and as such
nothing survived for consideration. For issue no.2, reference
was made to Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8-two qabilnamas or
entries in the marriage register. Exhibit 8 which is the
original entry records that the father of the bride gave Rs.7
lacs and 30 bhories of gold to the son-in-law. Exhibit 7 on
the other hand, records that the above said amounts were
given but it does not state that the same were particularly
given to the bridegroom. It has been noted that this
discrepancy has been admitted by the Marriage Registrar,
however, the Court, considering the overall circumstances
found it apposite not to grant too much weight to the same.
It was held that the proof of marriage, the original
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 4 of 10
qabilnama and the inability of the opposite party to disprove
the entry in question made the opposite party liable to return
the 7 lacs and 30 bhories gold to the appellants. Finally, for
issue no.3 it was observed that since there was no entry in
the concerned documents regarding the furniture, there was
no entitlement for the same to be returned.
4.6. The Respondent preferred Criminal Revision
th
No.21/2017 which was dismissed by judgment dated 15
December 2018 by the Court of Sessions observing that
there is no irregularity or impropriety in the order passed by
the ACJM.
4.7. The Respondent was aggrieved and dissatisfied by the
order of the Court of Sessions and as such went before the
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. The High Court found merit in the case made out by the
respondent and as such allowed the petition. The reasoning is as
follows:
5.1. The discrepancy between Exhibit 7 (marriage
certificate given to the respondent) & 8 (marriage certificate
given to appellant) as also the manner in which the learned
ACJM dealt with the same was noticed but the findings were
set aside given that the entry in Exhibit 8 tallied with the
statement of the father of the appellant made in the
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 5 of 10
proceedings under Section 498A IPC wherein he has
categorically stated to have given the amount and gold in
question to the respondent, that is Rs.7 lacs and 30 bhories .
5.2. Regarding the maintainability of a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitu
tion it was observed that the power of superintendence also
extends to judicial matters and it confers ample powers on
the Court to prevent abuse of process of law.
6. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the appellant is before
us.
7. At the outset, it is requisite to notice Section 3(1) of the
1986 Act, which reads as under:
“3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to
her at the time of divorce.—(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, a
divorced woman shall be entitled to—
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be
made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former
husband;
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before
or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and
maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for
a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such
children;
(c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be
paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter
according to Muslim law; and
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of
marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or
the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.”
(emphasis supplied)
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 6 of 10
The Section quoted above deals with mehr/dower and/or
other properties given to a woman at the time of her marriage-
clearing the way for the woman to set up a claim against her
husband in the above situations, or claim back from her husband
properties given, as the case may be. In Daniel Latifi v. Union of
6
India , the Constitution Bench of this Court discussed the object,
purpose and ambit of the Act and the Section reproduced supra
in the following terms:
“22. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are the principal
sections, which are under attack before us. Section 3
opens up with a non obstante clause overriding all other
laws …
23. Where such reasonable and fair provision and
maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not
been made and paid or the properties referred to in clause
(d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to a
divorced woman on her divorce, she or anyone duly
authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an
application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of
such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the
delivery of properties, as the case may be. Rest of the
provisions of Section 3 of the Act may not be of much
relevance, which are procedural in nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the High Court.
The primary basis for not giving the amount and gold in question
to the appellant, as it appears from the perusal of the judgment,
was the apparent contradiction between the statement of the Kazi
6
(2001) 7 SCC 740
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 7 of 10
i.e. marriage Registrar and the father of the appellant. The former
stated in evidence that the entry recording the amount and gold
being given to the husband was erroneously done so and it should
have been that the said amount(s) were only given without
specifying, to whom, the father of the appellant on the other hand
stated that he had given the amount(s) in question to the
respondent. The High Court observed that since the father was
directly responsible for giving the said amount(s), it would be
prudent to accept his version of events. What, apparently, the
High Court lost sight of is the end result of the proceedings in
which the said statement of the father was given. Those
proceedings were concerned with Section 498A-IPC and
Section(s) 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and despite
such a direct statement by the father of the appellant the learned
Trial Court seized of the matter acquitted the respondent, a
conclusion which appears to have attained finality. Then, it
cannot be said, in our view, that the evidentiary value of that
statement is either equal to or greater than the statement of the
marriage registrar. The High Court records that the latter
statement regarding writing and overwriting in the entry in the
marriage register is proved by him having produced the same
before the Court. When that is the case, we are at a loss to
understand why his statement in entirety should not be accepted.
Mere allegation as to his conduct being suspicious on account of
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 8 of 10
overwriting in the marriage register is not sufficient to discard his
testimony.
9. This case presents the possibility of two interpretations and
whereas it is a settled rule that this Court under its plenary, Article
136 jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of the High
Court simply because there are two views possible, this case, in
our considered view, does not fall under this exception for the
High Court missed the purposive construction goalpost and
instead proceeded to adjudicate the matter purely as a civil
dispute. The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all,
i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in
doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social
justice adjudication. To put it in context, the scope and object of
1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial
protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with
the rights of a women under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. The construction of this Act, therefore, must keep at the
forefront equality, dignity and autonomy and must be done in the
light of lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller
towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still
the order of the day.
10. The question framed above is answered accordingly. The
Appeals are allowed as aforesaid. The judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Calcutta with particulars as contained in
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 9 of 10
paragraph 2, is set aside. Learned Counsel for the Appellant
would supply the bank and other relevant details to the learned
counsel for the respondent within three working days from the
date of this judgment. The amount be directly remitted into the
bank account of the Appellant. The Respondent is directed to file
an affidavit of compliance with the Registry of this Court within
six weeks thereafter. The said compliance certificate shall be
placed on record. If the needful is not done, the respondent, would
be liable to pay interest @9% per annum.
Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.
………………………………..………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………………………………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
December 02, 2025.
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 10 of 10
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No (s). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No(s)……………. of 2025)
(@ Diary No.60854 of 2024)
ROUSANARA BEGUM ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
S.K. SALAHUDDIN
@ SK SALAUDDIN & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL J,
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.12.02
18:33:02 IST
Reason:
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 1 of 10
2. These appeals are directed against judgment and order
th
dated 24 November 2022 passed in CRR No. 489 of 2019 and
st
Order dated 31 January 2024 passed in application for
modification bearing No. CRAN 9 of 2023 by the High Court at
Calcutta, at the instance of the Appellant herein, Rousanara
Begum, who is the former wife of the Respondent No.1 - S.K
1
Salahuddin .
3. The short question which arises for consideration in these
appeals are whether goods given to a daughter at the time of her
marriage by her father, or to the bridegroom, can be by
application of law, returned to the daughter, appellant herein,
given that their marriage had ended in divorce.
th
4. The parties to the lis were married on 28 August 2005.
Differences, however, arose shortly thereafter and the Appellant
th
departed from her matrimonial home on 7 May 2009.
Subsequently, she filed an application under Section 125 of the
2
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and initiated proceedings
3
under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 . The marriage
th
eventually ended in divorce on 13 December 2011. Thereafter,
4
she approached the Court under Section 3 of The Muslim
5
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 seeking the
1
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Respondent’
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘CRPC’
3
Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
4
Misc. Case No. 149/2011 before Additional CJM, Bolpur District Birbhum
5
Hereinafter referred to as ‘1986 Act’
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 2 of 10
return of total of Rs. 17,67,980/-. This amount was arrived at in
the following terms:
“ 6. The petitioner is entitled to receive a total amont of
Rs.17,67,980/- from the opposite party, which includes
the dower amount of Rs. 1,50,000/-, dowry of
Rs.7,00,000/-, 30 (thirty) Bhori gold ornaments worth
Rs.9,00,000/-, the value of the fridge and stabilizer
Rs.10,700/-, Panasonic TV and other items worth
Rs.18,140/-, showcase Rs.3,000/-, box bed Rs. 19,000/-
, dressing table Rs.2,500/-, steel almirah Rs.5,500/-, steel
mirror Rs.2,100/-, sofa set Rs.2,000/-, dining table Rs.
1,720/-, and bedding Rs.3,320/ -, and she has claimed it.”
It is these proceedings that, after multiple rounds, have
travelled to this Court. Before proceeding to the merits of the
matter, we must take note of this history.
th
4.1. The Learned CJM vide order dated 26 June 2014
allowed the application and granted a total of Rs.8.3 lacs as
against the claim of Rs. 17.5 lacs.
4.2. Both parties preferred revision petitions before the
learned Session Judge who remanded the matter for afresh
consideration allowing the evidence of marriage registrar to
be entered.
4.3. On remand, the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate
rd
by order dated 23 February 2015 once again decreed the
matter in favour of the appellant granting a total of Rs.8 lacs
along with 30 bhories of gold ornaments.
4.4. Aggrieved thereby the respondent preferred the
revision petition and the learned Additional Sessions Judge
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 3 of 10
st
by order dated 21 July 2015 allowed the same and once
again remanded the matter for additional evidence and fresh
trial.
4.5. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bolpur in
th
terms of judgment dated 27 April 2017 framed three issues
for consideration- issues 1 and 2 concerned the amount of
Rs.8 lacs along with 30 bhories as previously awarded and
issue 3 pertained to the articles that were given to the
bridegroom and whether any right to recover the same
existed. Issue no.1 which particularly dealt with Rs.1 lac as
mehr was disposed of observing that the amount already
stood paid by the respondent to the appellant and as such
nothing survived for consideration. For issue no.2, reference
was made to Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8-two qabilnamas or
entries in the marriage register. Exhibit 8 which is the
original entry records that the father of the bride gave Rs.7
lacs and 30 bhories of gold to the son-in-law. Exhibit 7 on
the other hand, records that the above said amounts were
given but it does not state that the same were particularly
given to the bridegroom. It has been noted that this
discrepancy has been admitted by the Marriage Registrar,
however, the Court, considering the overall circumstances
found it apposite not to grant too much weight to the same.
It was held that the proof of marriage, the original
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 4 of 10
qabilnama and the inability of the opposite party to disprove
the entry in question made the opposite party liable to return
the 7 lacs and 30 bhories gold to the appellants. Finally, for
issue no.3 it was observed that since there was no entry in
the concerned documents regarding the furniture, there was
no entitlement for the same to be returned.
4.6. The Respondent preferred Criminal Revision
th
No.21/2017 which was dismissed by judgment dated 15
December 2018 by the Court of Sessions observing that
there is no irregularity or impropriety in the order passed by
the ACJM.
4.7. The Respondent was aggrieved and dissatisfied by the
order of the Court of Sessions and as such went before the
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. The High Court found merit in the case made out by the
respondent and as such allowed the petition. The reasoning is as
follows:
5.1. The discrepancy between Exhibit 7 (marriage
certificate given to the respondent) & 8 (marriage certificate
given to appellant) as also the manner in which the learned
ACJM dealt with the same was noticed but the findings were
set aside given that the entry in Exhibit 8 tallied with the
statement of the father of the appellant made in the
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 5 of 10
proceedings under Section 498A IPC wherein he has
categorically stated to have given the amount and gold in
question to the respondent, that is Rs.7 lacs and 30 bhories .
5.2. Regarding the maintainability of a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitu
tion it was observed that the power of superintendence also
extends to judicial matters and it confers ample powers on
the Court to prevent abuse of process of law.
6. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the appellant is before
us.
7. At the outset, it is requisite to notice Section 3(1) of the
1986 Act, which reads as under:
“3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to
her at the time of divorce.—(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, a
divorced woman shall be entitled to—
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be
made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former
husband;
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before
or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and
maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for
a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such
children;
(c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be
paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter
according to Muslim law; and
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of
marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or
the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.”
(emphasis supplied)
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 6 of 10
The Section quoted above deals with mehr/dower and/or
other properties given to a woman at the time of her marriage-
clearing the way for the woman to set up a claim against her
husband in the above situations, or claim back from her husband
properties given, as the case may be. In Daniel Latifi v. Union of
6
India , the Constitution Bench of this Court discussed the object,
purpose and ambit of the Act and the Section reproduced supra
in the following terms:
“22. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are the principal
sections, which are under attack before us. Section 3
opens up with a non obstante clause overriding all other
laws …
23. Where such reasonable and fair provision and
maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not
been made and paid or the properties referred to in clause
(d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to a
divorced woman on her divorce, she or anyone duly
authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an
application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of
such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the
delivery of properties, as the case may be. Rest of the
provisions of Section 3 of the Act may not be of much
relevance, which are procedural in nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the High Court.
The primary basis for not giving the amount and gold in question
to the appellant, as it appears from the perusal of the judgment,
was the apparent contradiction between the statement of the Kazi
6
(2001) 7 SCC 740
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 7 of 10
i.e. marriage Registrar and the father of the appellant. The former
stated in evidence that the entry recording the amount and gold
being given to the husband was erroneously done so and it should
have been that the said amount(s) were only given without
specifying, to whom, the father of the appellant on the other hand
stated that he had given the amount(s) in question to the
respondent. The High Court observed that since the father was
directly responsible for giving the said amount(s), it would be
prudent to accept his version of events. What, apparently, the
High Court lost sight of is the end result of the proceedings in
which the said statement of the father was given. Those
proceedings were concerned with Section 498A-IPC and
Section(s) 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and despite
such a direct statement by the father of the appellant the learned
Trial Court seized of the matter acquitted the respondent, a
conclusion which appears to have attained finality. Then, it
cannot be said, in our view, that the evidentiary value of that
statement is either equal to or greater than the statement of the
marriage registrar. The High Court records that the latter
statement regarding writing and overwriting in the entry in the
marriage register is proved by him having produced the same
before the Court. When that is the case, we are at a loss to
understand why his statement in entirety should not be accepted.
Mere allegation as to his conduct being suspicious on account of
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 8 of 10
overwriting in the marriage register is not sufficient to discard his
testimony.
9. This case presents the possibility of two interpretations and
whereas it is a settled rule that this Court under its plenary, Article
136 jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of the High
Court simply because there are two views possible, this case, in
our considered view, does not fall under this exception for the
High Court missed the purposive construction goalpost and
instead proceeded to adjudicate the matter purely as a civil
dispute. The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all,
i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in
doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social
justice adjudication. To put it in context, the scope and object of
1986 Act is concerned with securing the dignity and financial
protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with
the rights of a women under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. The construction of this Act, therefore, must keep at the
forefront equality, dignity and autonomy and must be done in the
light of lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller
towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still
the order of the day.
10. The question framed above is answered accordingly. The
Appeals are allowed as aforesaid. The judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Calcutta with particulars as contained in
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 9 of 10
paragraph 2, is set aside. Learned Counsel for the Appellant
would supply the bank and other relevant details to the learned
counsel for the respondent within three working days from the
date of this judgment. The amount be directly remitted into the
bank account of the Appellant. The Respondent is directed to file
an affidavit of compliance with the Registry of this Court within
six weeks thereafter. The said compliance certificate shall be
placed on record. If the needful is not done, the respondent, would
be liable to pay interest @9% per annum.
Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.
………………………………..………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………………………………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
December 02, 2025.
Crl. Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) D No.60854 of 2024 Page 10 of 10