MANGATHAI AMMAL (DIED) THROUGH LRS vs. RAJESWARI .

CORRECTED       Reportable         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4805 OF 2019       (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.29642 OF 2016) Mangathai Ammal (Died) through LRs and Others                       ..Appellant(s)               Versus Rajeswari & Others                                              ..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras   dated   05.01.2016   passed   in   AS   No.785   of   1992 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by BALA PARVATHI Date: 2019.10.25 16:42:02 IST Reason: dismissing   the  same  and   affirming  the   Judgment  and   Decree dated 05.08.1992 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Arni 1 in O.S. No.124 of 1990 decreeing the suit for partition by original plaintiff, the original defendant nos. 1 to 3 have preferred the present appeal. 3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under : That,   one   Rajeswari   and   Others­original   plaintiffs instituted a suit bearing O.S.  No.124 of 1990 for partition of the suit properties and separate possession. It was the case on behalf of   the   plaintiffs   that   the   first   defendant   is   the   wife   of   one Narayanasamy Mudaliar. That, the said Narayanasamy Mudaliar and original defendant no.1 had one son and three daughters namely Elumalai (son), Ranganayaki (daughter), Nagabushanam (daughter) and Navaneetham (daughter). That, the son Elumalai and daughter Ranganayaki had died. The first plaintiff is the wife of Elumalai, the second plaintiff and plaintiff nos. 3 to 8 are the husband   and   children   of   the   deceased   Ranganayaki.   That, Elumalai and the first plaintiff did not have issue. According to the original plaintiffs, Narayanasamy Mudaliar sold the ancestral properties and purchased the suit property in the name of first defendant ­ Mangathai Ammal (wife of Narayanasamy Mudaliar). 2 Therefore,   it   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   plaintiffs   that Narayanasamy Mudaliar and his son Elumalai are entitled to half share of the ancestral properties. That, it was the case on behalf of the plaintiffs that the same Narayanasamy Mudaliar had died twenty  years   back   to   the   filing   of   the   suit.   His   share   in   the properties was inherited by Elumalai, defendant nos. 1 and 2 viz Nagabushanam   Ammal   and   Ranganayaki   Ammal.   That,   the Ranganayaki died about six years before filing of suit, therefore, her legal representatives viz original plaintiff nos.2 to 8 inherited her share in the properties. That, the Nagabushanam executed the   Release   Deed   dated   24.04.1990   in   favour   of   the   first defendant. According to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff is entitled to 5/8th share, plaintiff nos. 2 to 8 are entitled to 1/8th share and   the   defendants   are   entitled   to   1/4th   share   in   the   suit properties. According to the plaintiffs, since the defendant tried to claim the suit properties, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for partition. 3.1 The suit was resisted by the defendants. As per the case of the first defendant, except item nos. 1 and 3 of the suit properties, the other properties are self­acquired properties of the 3 first defendant. According to the first defendant, the first item of the suit property was purchased out of the money provided by her   in   her   name.   According   to   the   first   defendant,   the   suit properties   are   not   the   ancestral   properties   of   Narayanasamy Mudaliar. It was denied that the suit properties were purchased by selling the ancestral properties. It was the case on behalf of the defendant no.1 that except properties in item nos. 1 and 3 of Schedule II, the properties were purchased by the defendant no.1 out of the stridhana she received from her parents’ house and by selling   the   gold   jewellery.   It   was   also   the   case   on   behalf   of defendant   no.1   that   after   purchasing   the   property   from Thangavel Gounder and others; she constructed a house and is in possession and enjoyment of the said property. According to the defendant no.1, the deceased Narayanasamy Mudaliar was entitled to 47 cents in Survey No. 218/1 and 8 cents in Survey No. 218/3 and the deceased Ranganayaki Ammal is entitled to th 1/5  share in the suit properties. It was also the case on behalf of the first defendant  that, similarly, the first plaintiff’s husband th is also entitled to 1/5  share, in which, first defendant and first plaintiff are entitled to half share in the suit properties. According to   the   first   defendant,   the   first   defendant’s   daughter 4 Nagabhushanam executed a Release Deed in respect of her own share. It was also the case on behalf of the first defendant that she never acted as a manager of the joint family. According to her, she executed a Will dated 11.02.1987 in favour of plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 and Nagabhushanam Ammal. However, since the beneficiaries of the Will did not take care of the first defendant, she revoked the Will on 11.06.1990. 3.2 Defendant   nos.   2   and   3   supported   defendant   no.1. According to defendant nos. 2 and 3, defendant no.1 mortgaged the property with defendant no. 3 for a valuable consideration, which was also known to the plaintiffs. Defendant nos. 2 and 3 also adopted the written statement filed by defendant no.1. 3.3   That   the   learned   Trial   Court   framed   the   following issues: “1)   Whether   the   suit   schedule   properties   are st ancestral properties of husband of the 1  plaintiff namely   Elumalai   and   the   deceased Narayansamy? st 2) Whether it is true that the 1   defendant had managed the suit schedule properties being the Manager of the Family? 3)   Whether   it   is   true   that   the   Suit   Schedule properties are jointly enjoyed by all the family members as Joint Family Property? 5 4)   Whether   the   plaintiffs   are   entitled   to   claim partition   in   view   of   the   Release   Deed   dated 24.04.90 executed by Nagabooshanam Ammal? st 5) Whether it is true that the 1   defendant had executed a Will on 11.2.87 to and in favour of plaintiffs in respect of suit schedule property and revoked the said Will on 11.6.90? 6) Whether it is true that the plaintiffs are in joint possession of the suit schedule properties? th 7) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get 3/4 share over the suit schedule properties? 8)   Whether   the   present   suit   is   not   valued properly? 9) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled? 3.4   Before the Trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, four witnesses were examined and three documents Exh. A1 to A3 were marked. On the side of the defendants, two witnesses were examined and 19 documents Exh. B1 to B19 were marked. That, the learned Trial Court, after taking into consideration the oral   and   documentary   evidences   of   both   the   sides,   passed   a th preliminary decree finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to 3/4 share in the suit properties. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court, the original defendant nos. 1 to 3 preferred appeal before the High Court. That, by impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed the Judgment 6 and   Decree   passed   by   the   Trial   Court.   Feeling   aggrieved   and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the   High   Court   dismissing   the   appeal   and   confirming   the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court, original defendant nos.1 to 3 have preferred the present appeal. 4. Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel has appeared on behalf of the appellants­original defendants and Shri G. Balaji, learned   Counsel   has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   respondents­ original plaintiffs. 5. Shri   V.   Prabhakar,   learned   Counsel   appearing   on behalf   of   the   original   defendant   nos.1   to   3   has   vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, both, the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in decreeing the suit and holding that the original th plaintiffs have 3/4  share in the suit properties. 5.1 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that the suit properties were purchased by defendant no.1 out of the stridhana she received from her parents and by selling the gold jewellery. It is submitted that, admittedly, the suit 7 properties were purchased in the name of original defendant no.1 and   was   in   possession   of   defendant   no.1.   It   is   submitted therefore,   the   finding   that   the   properties   were   purchased   by Narayanasamy Mudaliar is erroneous. 5.2 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1   to   3   that   if   it   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   original plaintiffs that the properties purchased in the name of defendant no.1 were the benami transactions, in that case, the onus is/was upon the plaintiffs to prove by leading cogent evidence that the transactions were benami transactions. It is submitted that in the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus to prove that the transactions were benami transactions. It is submitted that, both, the Trial Court as well as the High Court had erroneously shifted the burden upon the defendants to prove that the  transactions/Sale   Deeds   in favour   of  defendant  no.1 were not benami transactions. It is submitted that the aforesaid is contrary to the settled proposition of law laid down by this Court. 8 5.3 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that in the present case, solely on considering two documents, namely, Exh. B3, Sale Deed in respect of one of the properties   and   Exh.   B4,   the   Sale   Deed   with   respect   of   two properties,   the   Courts   below   have   considered   the   entire   suit properties  as  ancestral  properties and/or  the  same  properties purchased   from   the   funds   raised   by   selling   the   ancestral properties. 5.4 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1   to   3   that   merely   because   some   consideration   or   part consideration was paid by the husband at the time of purchase of property at Exh. B3­Sale Deed and/or merely purchasing the stamp   papers   while   purchasing   the   property   at   Exh.   B4­Sale Deed, it cannot be said that the same properties as such were purchased   from   the   funds   raised   by   selling   the   ancestral properties and/or the same were purchased for and on behalf of joint family.  9 5.5 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that both the Courts below have materially erred in misinterpreting the Release Deed at Exh. A1. It  is submitted that both the Courts below have materially erred in holding the suit properties as joint family properties of Narayanasamy Mudaliar on the ground that execution of Release Deed at Exh. A1 by Nagabhushanam on payment of Rs.10,000/­ to Nagabhushanam and on such payment Nagabhushanam released her share in the property, was good to hold that the properties are the joint family properties of Narayanasamy Mudaliar. 5.6 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that even considering the documentary evidences on record, more particularly, Exh. B3 to B7, it can be seen that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 were purchased much prior to the sale of some of the ancestral properties   of   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar.   It   is   submitted   that, therefore,   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   plaintiffs   that   the   suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 out of 10 the   funds   raised   on   selling   the   ancestral   properties   of Narayanasamy   Mudaliar,   cannot   be   accepted.   Relying   upon paragraph 10 of the decision of this Court in the case of   Om Prakash Sharma v. Rajendra Prasad  Shewda, (2015) 15 SCC 556, it is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that as the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act and the amendments made thereto from time   to   time,   even   it   can   be   said   that   the   intention   of   the Narayanasamy Mudaliar to purchase the properties in the name of defendant no.1­his wife was in order to provide the wife with a secured life in the event of his death. 5.7 Shri   V.   Prabhakar,   learned   Counsel   appearing   on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 submitted that even otherwise, the plaintiffs have failed to prove by leading cogent   evidence   that   the   transactions   of   sale   in   favour   of defendant no.1 were benami transactions. It is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar that even in the plaint also there were no specific pleadings   that   the   sale   transactions   of   the   suit   properties   in favour   of   defendant   no.1   were   benami   transactions.   It   is 11 submitted that even the learned Trial Court also did not frame any   specific   issue   with   respect   to   benami   transactions.   It   is submitted that even otherwise on merits also and on considering the recent decision of this Court in the case of  P. Leelavathi v. V. Shankarnarayana   Rao   (2019)   6   SCALE   112,   in   which   after considering   the   earlier   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (Mst.)   (1974) 1 SCC 3;   Thakur Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh  (1980) 3 SCC 72;  Binapani Paul v.   Pratima   Ghosh   (2007)   6   SCC   100   and   Valliammal   v. Subramaniam  (2004) 7 SCC 233, it cannot be said that the Sale Deeds   executed   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   were   benami transactions. 5.8 Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   above decisions it is prayed to allow the present appeal. 6. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   G. Balaji, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­ original plaintiffs. 6.1 Shri G. Balaji, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs has vehemently submitted that on appreciation of entire evidence on record, both, learned Trial 12 Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court,   have   rightly   held   that   the transactions of sale in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions   as   the   said   properties   were   purchased   by Narayanasamy Mudaliar in the name of defendant no.1 out of the funds   received   from   selling   the   ancestral   properties.   It   is submitted that on considering the documentary evidences Exh. B3, B4 and even Exh. A1, the High Court has rightly observed and held that the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions and therefore the plaintiffs are th entitled   to   3/4   share   in   the   suit   properties   which   were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 but purchased out of the   funds   received   from   selling   the   ancestral   properties   by Narayanasamy Mudaliar. 6.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that   in   the   present   case,   all   the   conditions   to   prove   the transactions as benami transactions as laid down by this Court in the case of  P. Leelavathi  (Supra) have been satisfied. 6.3 It is vehemently submitted by Shri G. Balaji, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs 13 that in the present case, even from the intention and conduct of the parties it is proved that though the properties were in the name of defendant no.1, they were purchased and enjoyed as Joint   Family   Properties.   It   is   submitted   that   otherwise   the Nagabhushanam would not have released her share in favour of defendant no.1, if the daughter Nagabhushanam had no share. It is   submitted   that   execution   of   the   Release   Deed   by Nagabhushanam   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   suggests   that defendant   no.1   also   considered   the   share   of   the   daughter Nagabhushanam by treating the suit properties as Joint Family Properties. 6.4 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that the Will dated 11.02.1987, executed by defendant no.1, also included   even   the   properties   exclusively   belonging   to Narayanasamy Mudaliar. It is submitted, therefore, the intention can   be   gathered   from   Exh.   B8   and   Exh.   B9   that   the   suit properties  are Joint  Family Properties and  therefore liable for partition and not exclusive properties of defendant no.1. 14 6.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1   during   the   lifetime   of   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar.   It   is submitted   that   original   defendant   no.1   had   no   independent income.     It   is   submitted   that   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar   had ancestral   properties/agricultural   lands   which   were   generating income and he purchased all the properties in the name of his wife­defendant   no.1   from   the   income   generated   from   the ancestral   properties   and   by   selling   some   of   the   ancestral properties. 6.6 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that even the statutory presumption which was rebuttable under Section   3   (2)  of   the   Benami  Transaction   Act,   1988   has   been omitted by Benami Amendment Act of 2016. It is submitted that therefore as on date, there is no such statutory presumption that the purchase made in the name of wife or children is for their benefit. 15 6.7 Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   above decisions it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 7. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective   parties   at   length.   We   have   gone   through   and considered in detail the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court. We have also considered in detail the evidences on record both oral as well as documentary. 7.1 At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the original   plaintiffs   instituted   the   suit   before   the   learned   Trial th Court for partition of the suit properties and claiming 3/4  share with   the   pleadings   that   the   suit   properties   were   ancestral properties and that the Narayanasamy Mudaliar has purchased the suit properties in the name of his wife­defendant no.1 out of the   funds   derived   through   selling   his   share   of   the   property acquired through ancestral nucleus to some other person and that   the   suit   properties   were   in   absolute   possession   and enjoyment   of   the   Joint   Family   Property   since   the   date   of purchase.   From   the   pleadings,   it   appears   that   it   was   not specifically   pleaded   by   the   plaintiffs   that   the   Sale Deeds/transactions   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   were   benami 16 transactions. It was also not pleaded that the suit properties were purchased   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1   by   Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the income derived out of the ancestral properties. Even the learned Trial Court did not specifically frame the issue that whether the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 are benami transactions or not? Despite the above, learned Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   have   held   that   the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions. The aforesaid findings recorded by the Trial Court confirmed   by   the   High   Court   and   the   consequent   relief   of partition granted in favour of the plaintiffs is the subject matter of the present appeal. 8. While   considering   the   issue   involved   in   the   present appeal   viz.   whether   the   transactions/Sale   Deeds   in   favour   of defendant no.1 can be said to be benami transactions or not, the law on the benami transactions is required to be considered and few decisions of this Court on the aforesaid are required to be referred to. 8.1 In the case of  Jaydayal Poddar  (Supra) it is specifically observed and held by this Court that the burden of proving that a 17 particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be sold. It is further observed that this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly  prove  the   fact of   the   benami  transaction or   establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an interference of that fact. In paragraph 6 of the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under : “6.   “It is well­settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to   be   strictly   discharged   by   adducing   legal evidence   of   a   definite   character   which   would either   directly   prove   the   fact   of   benami   or establish   circumstances   unerringly   and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or   parties   concerned;   and   not   unoften,   such intention   is   shrouded   in   a   thick   veil   which cannot   be   easily   pierced   through.   But   such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction   to   be   benami   of   any   part   of   the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable   deliberation,   and   the   person expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question whether 18

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“(1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if  any,  for  giving  the  transaction a benami colour; (4)   the   position   of   the   parties   and   the relationship,   if   any,   between   the   claimant  and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and  20 (6)   the   conduct   of   the   parties   concerned   in dealing   with   the   property   after   the   sale. ( (supra), SCC p. 7, Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra  para6)” 8.3 After considering the aforesaid decision in the recent decision of this Court in the case of   P. Leelavathi   (Supra), this Court   has   again   reiterated   that   to   hold   that   a   particular transaction is benami in nature the aforesaid six circumstances can be taken as a guide. 8.4 Applying law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and the reasoning given by the Trial Court confirmed by the High Court, it appears that both, the learned Trial Court and the High Court have erred in shifting the burden on the defendants to prove that the sale transactions were not benami transactions. As held hereinabove in fact when the plaintiffs’ claim, though not specifically pleaded in the plaint, that the Sale Deeds in respect of suit properties, which   are   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1,   were   benami transactions,   the   plaintiffs   have   failed   to   prove,   by   adducing cogent evidence, the intention of the Narayanasamy Mudaliar to 21 purchase the suit properties in the name of defendant no.1 – his wife. 9. Even the reasoning and the findings recorded by the Trial Court confirmed by the High Court while holding the Sale Deeds/transactions   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   as   benami cannot be said to be germane and or fulfilling the circumstances as carved out by this Court in the aforesaid decisions. 9.1 The first reason which is given by the learned Trial Court while holding the suit properties as benami transactions is that part sale consideration was paid by Narayanasamy Mudaliar at the time of the purchase of the property vide Sale Deed Exh. B3.   As   held   by   this   Court   in   catena   of   decisions   referred   to hereinabove, the payment of part sale consideration cannot be the sole criteria to hold the sale/transaction as benami. While considering a particular transaction as benami, the intention of the person who contributed the purchase money is determinative of the nature of transaction. The intention of the person, who contributed the purchase money, has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances; the relationship of the parties; the   motives   governing   their   action   in   bringing   about   the 22 transaction and their subsequent conduct etc. It is required to be noted that Narayanasamy Mudaliar, who contributed part sale consideration by purchasing property at Exh. B3, might have contributed   being   the   husband   and   therefore   by   mere contributing the part sale consideration, it cannot be inferred that Sale Deed in favour of the defendant no.1­wife was benami transaction and for and at behalf of the joint family. Therefore, the Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error   in   holding   the   suit   properties   as   benami transactions/ancestral properties on the basis of the document at Exh. B3. 9.2 Similarly,   merely   because   of   the   stamp   duty   at  the time of the execution of the Sale Deed at Exh. B4 was purchased by Narayanasamy Mudaliar, by that itself it cannot be said that the Sale Deed at Exh. B4 in favour of defendant no.1 was benami transaction. It is required to be noted that except the aforesaid two   documentary   evidences   at   Exh.   B3   and   B4,   no   other documentary   evidence/transaction/Sale   Deed   in   favour   of defendant no.1 have been considered by the learned Trial Court and even by the High Court. 23 9.3 Now, so far as the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court on considering the Release Deed at Exh. A1 viz. the Release Deed executed by Nagabushanam in favour of defendant   no.   1   on   payment   of   Rs.10,000/­   and   therefore inference drawn by the learned Trial Court and the High Court that therefore even the defendant no.1 also considered the share of the daughter and considered the suit properties as joint family properties and therefore plaintiffs have also share in the suit properties is concerned, the said finding is just a mis­reading and mis­interpretation of the evidence on record. In her deposition, defendant   no.1   has   explained   the   payment   of   Rs.10,000/­   to Nagabushanam, daughter and the Release Deed executed by her. It is specifically stated by her that though she had no share in the suit properties, with a view to avoid any further litigation in future   and   to   be   on   safer   side,   Rs.10,000/­   is   paid   and   the Release Deed was got executed by Nagabushanam in favour of defendant no.1. Even in the Release Deed at Exh. A1, it is so specifically stated. Therefore, merely because to avoid any further litigation in future and though Nagabushanam had no share in the suit properties, Rs.10,000/­ was paid and the Release Deed was got executed in favour of defendant no.1, by that itself, it 24 cannot be said that defendant no.1 treated the suit properties as ancestral properties and/or Joint Family Properties. 9.4 Even considering the Will executed by defendant no.1 dated 11.02.1987 and the subsequent revocation of the Will is suggestive of the fact that defendant no.1 all throughout treated the suit property as her self­acquired property which according to her   were   purchased   from   the   Stridhana   and   selling   of   the jewellery.    10. It   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the   plaint   the plaintiffs   came   out   with   the   case   that   the   suit   properties purchased   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1   by   Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the funds raised by selling the ancestral properties received by him. It was never the case on behalf of the plaintiffs that   the   suit   properties   were   purchased   by   Narayanasamy Mudaliar   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1   out   of   the   income received from the ancestral properties. However, considering the date of transactions with respect to the suit properties and the ancestral properties sold by Narayanasamy Mudaliar, it can be seen   that   all   the   suit   properties   purchased   in   the   name   of defendant   no.1   were   much   prior   to   the   sale   of   the   ancestral 25 properties   by  Narayanasamy   Mudaliar.   The  ancestral  property was sold by the Narayanasamy Mudaliar (Exh. A3)  11.11.1951. However, the Sale Deeds at Exh. B3, B4, B5, B6 and B7 which are in favour of defendant no.1 were much prior to the sale of the property at Exh. A3. Therefore, also it cannot be said that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 by Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the funds received by selling of the ancestral properties. 11. Even considering the observations made by this Court in paragraph 10 in the case of Om Prakash Sharma (Supra) it can be said that Narayanasamy Mudaliar might have purchased the properties in the name of defendant no.1 in order to provide his wife with a secured life in the event of his death. It is required to   be   noted   that   it   was   the   specific   case   on   behalf   of   the defendant no.1 that the suit properties were purchased by her from the Stridhana and on selling of the jewellery. 12. It is required to be noted that the benami transaction came to be amended in the year 2016. As per Section 3 of the Benami   Transaction   (Prohibition)   Act   1988,   there   was   a presumption that the transaction made in the name of the wife 26 and children is for their benefit. By Benami Amendment Act, 2016, Section 3 (2) of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 the statutory presumption, which was rebuttable, has been omitted. It is the case on behalf of the respondents that therefore in view of omission of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transaction Act, the plea of statutory presumption that the purchase made in the name of wife or children is for their benefit would not be available in the present case. Aforesaid cannot be accepted. As held by this Court   in   the   case   of   Binapani   Paul   (Supra)   the   Benami Transaction   (Prohibition)   Act   would   not   be   applicable retrospectively. Even otherwise and as observed hereinabove, the plaintiff has miserably failed to discharge his onus to prove that the Sale Deeds executed in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions   and   the   same   properties   were   purchased   in   the name of  defendant  no.1   by  Narayanasamy   Mudaliar  from   the amount   received   by   him   from   the   sale   of   other   ancestral properties.  12.1 Once   it   is   held   that   the   Sale   Deeds   in   favour   of defendant no.1 were not benami transactions, in that case, suit properties, except property nos. 1 and 3, which were purchased 27 in her name and the same can be said to be her self­acquired properties   and   therefore   cannot   be   said   to   be   Joint   Family Properties, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have any share in the suit properties (except property nos. 1 and 3). At this stage, it is required   to   be   noted   that   the   learned   Counsel   appearing   on behalf of defendant no.1 has specifically stated and admitted that the   suit   property   Item   nos.   1   and   3   can   be   said   to   be   the ancestral properties and according to him even before the High Court also it was the case on behalf of the defendant no.1 that item nos. 1 and 3 of the suit properties are ancestral properties. 13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court as well as the Trial Court th holding that the plaintiffs have 3/4  share in the suit properties (Except  Item  Nos.  1  and   3  of   the  suit  properties)  are  hereby quashed and set aside. It is observed and held that except Item Nos. 1 and 3 of the suit properties, the plaintiffs have no share in other suit properties. Preliminary Decree directed to be drawn by the learned Trial Court, confirmed by the High Court, is hereby 28 directed to be modified accordingly. The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs. ……………………………….J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi; ……………………………….J. May 09, 2019.         [M.R. SHAH]    29       Reportable         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4805 OF 2019       (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.29642 OF 2016) Mangathai Ammal (Died) through LRs and Others                       ..Appellant(s)               Versus Rajeswari & Others                                              ..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras   dated   05.01.2016   passed   in   AS   No.785   of   1992 dismissing   the  same  and   affirming  the   Judgment  and   Decree dated 05.08.1992 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Arni 30 in O.S. No.124 of 1990 decreeing the suit for partition by original plaintiff, the original defendant nos. 1 to 3 have preferred the present appeal. 3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under : That,   one   Rajeswari   and   Others­original   plaintiffs instituted a suit bearing O.S.  No.124 of 1990 for partition of the suit properties and separate possession. It was the case on behalf of   the   plaintiffs   that   the   first   defendant   is   the   wife   of   one Narayanasamy Mudaliar. That, the said Narayanasamy Mudaliar and original defendant no.1 had one son and three daughters namely Elumalai (son), Ranganayaki (daughter), Nagabushanam (daughter) and Navaneetham (daughter). That, the son Elumalai and daughter Ranganayaki had died. The first plaintiff is the wife of Elumalai, the second plaintiff and plaintiff nos. 3 to 8 are the husband   and   children   of   the   deceased   Ranganayaki.   That, Elumalai and the first plaintiff did not have issue. According to the original plaintiffs, Narayanasamy Mudaliar sold the ancestral properties and purchased the suit property in the name of first defendant ­ Mangathai Ammal (wife of Narayanasamy Mudaliar). 31 Therefore,   it   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   plaintiffs   that Narayanasamy Mudaliar and his son Elumalai are entitled to half share of the ancestral properties. That, it was the case on behalf of the plaintiffs that the same Narayanasamy Mudaliar had died twenty  years   back   to   the   filing   of   the   suit.   His   share   in   the properties was inherited by Elumalai, defendant nos. 1 and 2 viz Nagabushanam   Ammal   and   Ranganayaki   Ammal.   That,   the Ranganayaki died about six years before filing of suit, therefore, her legal representatives viz original plaintiff nos.2 to 8 inherited her share in the properties. That, the Nagabushanam executed the   Release   Deed   dated   24.04.1990   in   favour   of   the   first defendant. According to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff is entitled to 5/8th share, plaintiff nos. 2 to 8 are entitled to 1/8th share and   the   defendants   are   entitled   to   1/4th   share   in   the   suit properties. According to the plaintiffs, since the defendant tried to claim the suit properties, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for partition. 3.1 The suit was resisted by the defendants. As per the case of the first defendant, except item nos. 1 and 3 of the suit properties, the other properties are self­acquired properties of the 32 first defendant. According to the first defendant, the first item of the suit property was purchased out of the money provided by her   in   her   name.   According   to   the   first   defendant,   the   suit properties   are   not   the   ancestral   properties   of   Narayanasamy Mudaliar. It was denied that the suit properties were purchased by selling the ancestral properties. It was the case on behalf of the defendant no.1 that except properties in item nos. 1 and 3 of Schedule II, the properties were purchased by the defendant no.1 out of the stridhana she received from her parents’ house and by selling   the   gold   jewellery.   It   was   also   the   case   on   behalf   of defendant   no.1   that   after   purchasing   the   property   from Thangavel Gounder and others; she constructed a house and is in possession and enjoyment of the said property. According to the defendant no.1, the deceased Narayanasamy Mudaliar was entitled to 47 cents in Survey No. 218/1 and 8 cents in Survey No. 218/3 and the deceased Ranganayaki Ammal is entitled to th 1/5  share in the suit properties. It was also the case on behalf of the first defendant  that, similarly, the first plaintiff’s husband th is also entitled to 1/5  share, in which, first defendant and first plaintiff are entitled to half share in the suit properties. According to   the   first   defendant,   the   first   defendant’s   daughter 33 Nagabhushanam executed a Release Deed in respect of her own share. It was also the case on behalf of the first defendant that she never acted as a manager of the joint family. According to her, she executed a Will dated 11.02.1987 in favour of plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 and Nagabhushanam Ammal. However, since the beneficiaries of the Will did not take care of the first defendant, she revoked the Will on 11.06.1990. 3.2 Defendant   nos.   2   and   3   supported   defendant   no.1. According to defendant nos. 2 and 3, defendant no.1 mortgaged the property with defendant no. 3 for a valuable consideration, which was also known to the plaintiffs. Defendant nos. 2 and 3 also adopted the written statement filed by defendant no.1. 3.3   That   the   learned   Trial   Court   framed   the   following issues: “1)   Whether   the   suit   schedule   properties   are st ancestral properties of husband of the 1  plaintiff namely   Elumalai   and   the   deceased Narayansamy? st 2) Whether it is true that the 1   defendant had managed the suit schedule properties being the Manager of the Family? 3)   Whether   it   is   true   that   the   Suit   Schedule properties are jointly enjoyed by all the family members as Joint Family Property? 34 4)   Whether   the   plaintiffs   are   entitled   to   claim partition   in   view   of   the   Release   Deed   dated 24.04.90 executed by Nagabooshanam Ammal? st 5) Whether it is true that the 1   defendant had executed a Will on 11.2.87 to and in favour of plaintiffs in respect of suit schedule property and revoked the said Will on 11.6.90? 6) Whether it is true that the plaintiffs are in joint possession of the suit schedule properties? th 7) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get 3/4 share over the suit schedule properties? 8)   Whether   the   present   suit   is   not   valued properly? 9) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled? 3.4   Before the Trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, four witnesses were examined and three documents Exh. A1 to A3 were marked. On the side of the defendants, two witnesses were examined and 19 documents Exh. B1 to B19 were marked. That, the learned Trial Court, after taking into consideration the oral   and   documentary   evidences   of   both   the   sides,   passed   a th preliminary decree finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to 3/4 share in the suit properties. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court, the original defendant nos. 1 to 3 preferred appeal before the High Court. That, by impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed the Judgment 35 and   Decree   passed   by   the   Trial   Court.   Feeling   aggrieved   and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the   High   Court   dismissing   the   appeal   and   confirming   the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court, original defendant nos.1 to 3 have preferred the present appeal. 4. Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel has appeared on behalf of the appellants­original defendants and Shri G. Balaji, learned   Counsel   has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   respondents­ original plaintiffs. 5. Shri   V.   Prabhakar,   learned   Counsel   appearing   on behalf   of   the   original   defendant   nos.1   to   3   has   vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, both, the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in decreeing the suit and holding that the original th plaintiffs have 3/4  share in the suit properties. 5.1 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that the suit properties were purchased by defendant no.1 out of the stridhana she received from her parents and by selling the gold jewellery. It is submitted that, admittedly, the suit 36 properties were purchased in the name of original defendant no.1 and   was   in   possession   of   defendant   no.1.   It   is   submitted therefore,   the   finding   that   the   properties   were   purchased   by Narayanasamy Mudaliar is erroneous. 5.2 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1   to   3   that   if   it   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   original plaintiffs that the properties purchased in the name of defendant no.1 were the benami transactions, in that case, the onus is/was upon the plaintiffs to prove by leading cogent evidence that the transactions were benami transactions. It is submitted that in the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus to prove that the transactions were benami transactions. It is submitted that, both, the Trial Court as well as the High Court had erroneously shifted the burden upon the defendants to prove that the  transactions/Sale   Deeds   in favour   of  defendant  no.1 were not benami transactions. It is submitted that the aforesaid is contrary to the settled proposition of law laid down by this Court. 37 5.3 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that in the present case, solely on considering two documents, namely, Exh. B3, Sale Deed in respect of one of the properties   and   Exh.   B4,   the   Sale   Deed   with   respect   of   two properties,   the   Courts   below   have   considered   the   entire   suit properties  as  ancestral  properties and/or  the  same  properties purchased   from   the   funds   raised   by   selling   the   ancestral properties. 5.4 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1   to   3   that   merely   because   some   consideration   or   part consideration was paid by the husband at the time of purchase of property at Exh. B3­Sale Deed and/or merely purchasing the stamp   papers   while   purchasing   the   property   at   Exh.   B4­Sale Deed, it cannot be said that the same properties as such were purchased   from   the   funds   raised   by   selling   the   ancestral properties and/or the same were purchased for and on behalf of joint family.  38 5.5 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that both the Courts below have materially erred in misinterpreting the Release Deed at Exh. A1. It  is submitted that both the Courts below have materially erred in holding the suit properties as joint family properties of Narayanasamy Mudaliar on the ground that execution of Release Deed at Exh. A1 by Nagabhushanam on payment of Rs.10,000/­ to Nagabhushanam and on such payment Nagabhushanam released her share in the property, was good to hold that the properties are the joint family properties of Narayanasamy Mudaliar. 5.6 It is further submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 that even considering the documentary evidences on record, more particularly, Exh. B3 to B7, it can be seen that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 were purchased much prior to the sale of some of the ancestral properties   of   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar.   It   is   submitted   that, therefore,   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   plaintiffs   that   the   suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 out of 39 the   funds   raised   on   selling   the   ancestral   properties   of Narayanasamy   Mudaliar,   cannot   be   accepted.   Relying   upon paragraph 10 of the decision of this Court in the case of   Om Prakash Sharma v. Rajendra Prasad  Shewda, (2015) 15 SCC 556, it is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that as the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act and the amendments made thereto from time   to   time,   even   it   can   be   said   that   the   intention   of   the Narayanasamy Mudaliar to purchase the properties in the name of defendant no.1­his wife was in order to provide the wife with a secured life in the event of his death. 5.7 Shri   V.   Prabhakar,   learned   Counsel   appearing   on behalf of the appellants­original defendant nos.1 to 3 submitted that even otherwise, the plaintiffs have failed to prove by leading cogent   evidence   that   the   transactions   of   sale   in   favour   of defendant no.1 were benami transactions. It is submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar that even in the plaint also there were no specific pleadings   that   the   sale   transactions   of   the   suit   properties   in favour   of   defendant   no.1   were   benami   transactions.   It   is 40 submitted that even the learned Trial Court also did not frame any   specific   issue   with   respect   to   benami   transactions.   It   is submitted that even otherwise on merits also and on considering the recent decision of this Court in the case of  P. Leelavathi v. V. Shankarnarayana   Rao   (2019)   6   SCALE   112,   in   which   after considering   the   earlier   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (Mst.)   (1974) 1 SCC 3;   Thakur Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh  (1980) 3 SCC 72;  Binapani Paul v.   Pratima   Ghosh   (2007)   6   SCC   100   and   Valliammal   v. Subramaniam  (2004) 7 SCC 233, it cannot be said that the Sale Deeds   executed   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   were   benami transactions. 5.8 Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   above decisions it is prayed to allow the present appeal. 6. Present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   Shri   G. Balaji, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­ original plaintiffs. 6.1 Shri G. Balaji, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs has vehemently submitted that on appreciation of entire evidence on record, both, learned Trial 41 Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court,   have   rightly   held   that   the transactions of sale in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions   as   the   said   properties   were   purchased   by Narayanasamy Mudaliar in the name of defendant no.1 out of the funds   received   from   selling   the   ancestral   properties.   It   is submitted that on considering the documentary evidences Exh. B3, B4 and even Exh. A1, the High Court has rightly observed and held that the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions and therefore the plaintiffs are th entitled   to   3/4   share   in   the   suit   properties   which   were purchased in the name of defendant no.1 but purchased out of the   funds   received   from   selling   the   ancestral   properties   by Narayanasamy Mudaliar. 6.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that   in   the   present   case,   all   the   conditions   to   prove   the transactions as benami transactions as laid down by this Court in the case of  P. Leelavathi  (Supra) have been satisfied. 6.3 It is vehemently submitted by Shri G. Balaji, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs 42 that in the present case, even from the intention and conduct of the parties it is proved that though the properties were in the name of defendant no.1, they were purchased and enjoyed as Joint   Family   Properties.   It   is   submitted   that   otherwise   the Nagabhushanam would not have released her share in favour of defendant no.1, if the daughter Nagabhushanam had no share. It is   submitted   that   execution   of   the   Release   Deed   by Nagabhushanam   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   suggests   that defendant   no.1   also   considered   the   share   of   the   daughter Nagabhushanam by treating the suit properties as Joint Family Properties. 6.4 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that the Will dated 11.02.1987, executed by defendant no.1, also included   even   the   properties   exclusively   belonging   to Narayanasamy Mudaliar. It is submitted, therefore, the intention can   be   gathered   from   Exh.   B8   and   Exh.   B9   that   the   suit properties  are Joint  Family Properties and  therefore liable for partition and not exclusive properties of defendant no.1. 43 6.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1   during   the   lifetime   of   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar.   It   is submitted   that   original   defendant   no.1   had   no   independent income.     It   is   submitted   that   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar   had ancestral   properties/agricultural   lands   which   were   generating income and he purchased all the properties in the name of his wife­defendant   no.1   from   the   income   generated   from   the ancestral   properties   and   by   selling   some   of   the   ancestral properties. 6.6 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   G.   Balaji,   learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents­original plaintiffs that even the statutory presumption which was rebuttable under Section   3   (2)  of   the   Benami  Transaction   Act,   1988   has   been omitted by Benami Amendment Act of 2016. It is submitted that therefore as on date, there is no such statutory presumption that the purchase made in the name of wife or children is for their benefit. 44 6.7 Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   above decisions it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 7. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective   parties   at   length.   We   have   gone   through   and considered in detail the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the High Court. We have also considered in detail the evidences on record both oral as well as documentary. 7.1 At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the original   plaintiffs   instituted   the   suit   before   the   learned   Trial th Court for partition of the suit properties and claiming 3/4  share with   the   pleadings   that   the   suit   properties   were   ancestral properties and that the Narayanasamy Mudaliar has purchased the suit properties in the name of his wife­defendant no.1 out of the   funds   derived   through   selling   his   share   of   the   property acquired through ancestral nucleus to some other person and that   the   suit   properties   were   in   absolute   possession   and enjoyment   of   the   Joint   Family   Property   since   the   date   of purchase.   From   the   pleadings,   it   appears   that   it   was   not specifically   pleaded   by   the   plaintiffs   that   the   Sale Deeds/transactions   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   were   benami 45 transactions. It was also not pleaded that the suit properties were purchased   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1   by   Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the income derived out of the ancestral properties. Even the learned Trial Court did not specifically frame the issue that whether the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 are benami transactions or not? Despite the above, learned Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   have   held   that   the transactions/Sale Deeds in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions. The aforesaid findings recorded by the Trial Court confirmed   by   the   High   Court   and   the   consequent   relief   of partition granted in favour of the plaintiffs is the subject matter of the present appeal. 8. While   considering   the   issue   involved   in   the   present appeal   viz.   whether   the   transactions/Sale   Deeds   in   favour   of defendant no.1 can be said to be benami transactions or not, the law on the benami transactions is required to be considered and few decisions of this Court on the aforesaid are required to be referred to. 8.1 In the case of  Jaydayal Poddar  (Supra) it is specifically observed and held by this Court that the burden of proving that a 46 particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be sold. It is further observed that this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly  prove  the   fact of   the   benami  transaction or   establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an interference of that fact. In paragraph 6 of the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under : “6.   “It is well­settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to   be   strictly   discharged   by   adducing   legal evidence   of   a   definite   character   which   would either   directly   prove   the   fact   of   benami   or establish   circumstances   unerringly   and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or   parties   concerned;   and   not   unoften,   such intention   is   shrouded   in   a   thick   veil   which cannot   be   easily   pierced   through.   But   such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction   to   be   benami   of   any   part   of   the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable   deliberation,   and   the   person expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question whether 47

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“(1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if  any,  for  giving  the  transaction a benami colour; (4)   the   position   of   the   parties   and   the relationship,   if   any,   between   the   claimant  and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and  49 (6)   the   conduct   of   the   parties   concerned   in dealing   with   the   property   after   the   sale. ( (supra), SCC p. 7, Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra  para6)” 8.3 After considering the aforesaid decision in the recent decision of this Court in the case of   P. Leelavathi   (Supra), this Court   has   again   reiterated   that   to   hold   that   a   particular transaction is benami in nature the aforesaid six circumstances can be taken as a guide. 8.4 Applying law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and the reasoning given by the Trial Court confirmed by the High Court, it appears that both, the learned Trial Court and the High Court have erred in shifting the burden on the defendants to prove that the sale transactions were not benami transactions. As held hereinabove in fact when the plaintiffs’ claim, though not specifically pleaded in the plaint, that the Sale Deeds in respect of suit properties, which   are   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1,   were   benami transactions,   the   plaintiffs   have   failed   to   prove,   by   adducing cogent evidence, the intention of the Narayanasamy Mudaliar to 50 purchase the suit properties in the name of defendant no.1 – his wife. 9. Even the reasoning and the findings recorded by the Trial Court confirmed by the High Court while holding the Sale Deeds/transactions   in   favour   of   defendant   no.1   as   benami cannot be said to be germane and or fulfilling the circumstances as carved out by this Court in the aforesaid decisions. 9.1 The first reason which is given by the learned Trial Court while holding the suit properties as benami transactions is that part sale consideration was paid by Narayanasamy Mudaliar at the time of the purchase of the property vide Sale Deed Exh. B3.   As   held   by   this   Court   in   catena   of   decisions   referred   to hereinabove, the payment of part sale consideration cannot be the sole criteria to hold the sale/transaction as benami. While considering a particular transaction as benami, the intention of the person who contributed the purchase money is determinative of the nature of transaction. The intention of the person, who contributed the purchase money, has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances; the relationship of the parties; the   motives   governing   their   action   in   bringing   about   the 51 transaction and their subsequent conduct etc. It is required to be noted that Narayanasamy Mudaliar, who contributed part sale consideration by purchasing property at Exh. B3, might have contributed   being   the   husband   and   therefore   by   mere contributing the part sale consideration, it cannot be inferred that Sale Deed in favour of the defendant no.1­wife was benami transaction and for and at behalf of the joint family. Therefore, the Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error   in   holding   the   suit   properties   as   benami transactions/ancestral properties on the basis of the document at Exh. B3. 9.2 Similarly,   merely   because   of   the   stamp   duty   at  the time of the execution of the Sale Deed at Exh. B4 was purchased by Narayanasamy Mudaliar, by that itself it cannot be said that the Sale Deed at Exh. B4 in favour of defendant no.1 was benami transaction. It is required to be noted that except the aforesaid two   documentary   evidences   at   Exh.   B3   and   B4,   no   other documentary   evidence/transaction/Sale   Deed   in   favour   of defendant no.1 have been considered by the learned Trial Court and even by the High Court. 52 9.3 Now, so far as the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court on considering the Release Deed at Exh. A1 viz. the Release Deed executed by Nagabushanam in favour of defendant   no.   1   on   payment   of   Rs.10,000/­   and   therefore inference drawn by the learned Trial Court and the High Court that therefore even the defendant no.1 also considered the share of the daughter and considered the suit properties as joint family properties and therefore plaintiffs have also share in the suit properties is concerned, the said finding is just a mis­reading and mis­interpretation of the evidence on record. In her deposition, defendant   no.1   has   explained   the   payment   of   Rs.10,000/­   to Nagabushanam, daughter and the Release Deed executed by her. It is specifically stated by her that though she had no share in the suit properties, with a view to avoid any further litigation in future   and   to   be   on   safer   side,   Rs.10,000/­   is   paid   and   the Release Deed was got executed by Nagabushanam in favour of defendant no.1. Even in the Release Deed at Exh. A1, it is so specifically stated. Therefore, merely because to avoid any further litigation in future and though Nagabushanam had no share in the suit properties, Rs.10,000/­ was paid and the Release Deed was got executed in favour of defendant no.1, by that itself, it 53 cannot be said that defendant no.1 treated the suit properties as ancestral properties and/or Joint Family Properties. 9.4 Even considering the Will executed by defendant no.1 dated 11.02.1987 and the subsequent revocation of the Will is suggestive of the fact that defendant no.1 all throughout treated the suit property as her self­acquired property which according to her   were   purchased   from   the   Stridhana   and   selling   of   the jewellery.    10. It   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the   plaint   the plaintiffs   came   out   with   the   case   that   the   suit   properties purchased   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1   by   Narayanasamy Mudaliar from the funds raised by selling the ancestral properties received by him. It was never the case on behalf of the plaintiffs that   the   suit   properties   were   purchased   by   Narayanasamy Mudaliar   in   the   name   of   defendant   no.1   out   of   the   income received from the ancestral properties. However, considering the date of transactions with respect to the suit properties and the ancestral properties sold by Narayanasamy Mudaliar, it can be seen   that   all   the   suit   properties   purchased   in   the   name   of defendant   no.1   were   much   prior   to   the   sale   of   the   ancestral 54 properties   by  Narayanasamy   Mudaliar.   The  ancestral  property was sold by the Narayanasamy Mudaliar (Exh. A3) was on dated 11.11.1951. However, the Sale Deeds at Exh. B3, B4, B5, B6 and B7 which are in favour of defendant no.1 were much prior to the sale of the property at Exh. A3. Therefore, also it cannot be said that the suit properties were purchased in the name of defendant no.1   by   Narayanasamy   Mudaliar   from   the   funds   received   by selling of the ancestral properties. 11. Even considering the observations made by this Court in paragraph 10 in the case of Om Prakash Sharma (Supra) it can be said that Narayanasamy Mudaliar might have purchased the properties in the name of defendant no.1 in order to provide his wife with a secured life in the event of his death. It is required to   be   noted   that   it   was   the   specific   case   on   behalf   of   the defendant no.1 that the suit properties were purchased by her from the Stridhana and on selling of the jewellery. 12. It is required to be noted that the benami transaction came to be amended in the year 2016. As per Section 3 of the Benami   Transaction   (Prohibition)   Act   1988,   there   was   a presumption that the transaction made in the name of the wife 55 and children is for their benefit. By Benami Amendment Act, 2016, Section 3 (2) of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 the statutory presumption, which was rebuttable, has been omitted. It is the case on behalf of the respondents that therefore in view of omission of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transaction Act, the plea of statutory transaction that the purchase made in the name of wife or children is for their benefit would not be available in the present case. Aforesaid cannot be accepted. As held by this Court   in   the   case   of   Binapani   Paul   (Supra)   the   Benami Transaction   (Prohibition)   Act   would   not   be   applicable retrospectively. Even otherwise and as observed hereinabove, the plaintiff has miserably failed to discharge his onus to prove that the Sale Deeds executed in favour of defendant no.1 were benami transactions   and   the   same   properties   were   purchased   in   the name of  defendant  no.1   by  Narayanasamy   Mudaliar  from   the amount   received   by   him   from   the   sale   of   other   ancestral properties.  12.1 Once   it   is   held   that   the   Sale   Deeds   in   favour   of defendant no.1 were not benami transactions, in that case, suit properties, except property nos. 1 and 3, which were purchased 56 in her name and the same can be said to be her self­acquired properties   and   therefore   cannot   be   said   to   be   Joint   Family Properties, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have any share in the suit properties (except property nos. 1 and 3). At this stage, it is required   to   be   noted   that   the   learned   Counsel   appearing   on behalf of defendant no.1 has specifically stated and admitted that the   suit   property   Item   nos.   1   and   3   can   be   said   to   be   the ancestral properties and according to him even before the High Court also it was the case on behalf of the defendant no.1 that item nos. 1 and 3 of the suit properties are ancestral properties. 13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court as well as the Trial Court th holding that the plaintiffs have 3/4  share in the suit properties (Except  Item  Nos.  1  and   3  of   the  suit  properties)  are  hereby quashed and set aside. It is observed and held that except Item Nos. 1 and 3 of the suit properties, the plaintiffs have no share in other suit properties. Preliminary Decree directed to be drawn by the learned Trial Court, confirmed by the High Court, is hereby 57 directed to be modified accordingly. The present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs. ……………………………….J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] New Delhi; ……………………………….J. May 09, 2019.         [M.R. SHAH]    58