Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HARNATH SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
27/09/1968
BENCH:
MITTER, G.K.
BENCH:
MITTER, G.K.
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
HEGDE, K.S.
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1619 1969 SCR (2) 289
ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 164--Test identification
parade held by Magistrate of the Third Class--Record of such
identification whether inadmissible in evidence as
contravening s. 164 of the Code.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant who was suspected of having taken part in
a dacoity was put .up ’for identification by the witnesses
in a test identification parade which was conducted by a
Magistrate of the Third Class. The Magistrate noted in
Co1. 5 of the prescribed form the fact of identification by
a witness, in Co1. 7 he recorded further statements made by
the witness after he had purported to identify the accused.
Later the appellant was tried for the offence under s. 395
at the Indian Penal Code, and convicted. His appeal to the
High Court failed. In this Court it was urged on behalf of
the appellant that the record of the test identification
parade was inadmissible in evidence as the statements
the rein were recorded by a Magistrate of the Third Class
who was not empowered under s. 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to record such statements.
HELD: A Magistrate when called upon to conduct
verification proceedings should confine his attention only
to the steps to he taken to ensure that the witnesses were
able to identify certain persons alleged to have been
concerned in the commission at the crime or to identify
certain things which were said to be the subject matter
thereof. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not sanction
his transgression of this limit and recording at other
statements which may have a bearing in establishing the
guilt of the accused except in accordance with s. 164 of the
Code. [296 C-D]
In the present case the Magistrate was called upon only
to conduct the’ identification proceedings. He was not
required to record any confession or to interrogate
witnesses to elicit any other facts or call upon them to
make any statement beyond mere identification. The
statements in Co1. 7 would therefore be inadmissible in
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evidence. This would however not be applicable to the
record under Col. 5 [296 G]
As the High Court had not taken into consideration the
statements in Col. 7 its judgment could not be said to
suffer ’from the infirmity of having relied on
inadmissible evidence. [296 H]
Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 662,
applied.
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 and
Ramkrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State o/Bombay, [1955] 1
S.C.R. 903, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 130
of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated April 24, 1985 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
Gwalior Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1964.
290
R.L. Kohli, for the appellant.
I. N. Shroff for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J. This is an appeal by Special Leave from the
judgment and order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior
Bench on April 24, 1965 in Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1964.
The said appeal was heard and disposed of along with two
other appeals Nos. 44 and 45 of 1964. The appellant
before us, Harnath Singh, was the appellant in Appeal No.
55 of 1964 while Narayan Singh and Chhotelal were the
appellants in the other two appeals. Narayan Singh and
Harnath Singh were, convicted by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Morena, under s. 395 of the Indian Penal Code while
Chhotelal was convicted in the same trial under s. 395 read
with s. 75 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution case was as follows. There was a
dacoity at the house of one Dhudilal in village Chhota Kheda
on the night of December 10, 1962 in which the inmates of
the house were beaten and property, to wit, Rs. 350 in
currency notes, some silver ornaments etc., belonging to one
Raghunath were taken away by the dacoits from the said
house. Ramkumar (P.W. 1 ) raised an alarm which brought the
neighbours on the scene and one of the dacoits, Chhotelal,
was caught on the spot and handed over to the police. The
first information report was lodged by Dhudilal at about 9
a.m. on the following morning. During investigation Rs.
335 in currency notes besides some silver articles and small
change were found on the person of Chhotelal.Some articles
were also produced by Narayan Singh on December 12, 1962. On
the same day, on a personal search of the appellant Harnath
Singh, four George V silver rupee coins, one Victoria silver
rupee coin, one silver half-rupee coin and one old square
coin with vermillion on them were found and seized. On
December 25, 1962 there were test identification parades of
the accused and all the appellants were identified by some
of the eye witnesses The appellant, Harnath Singh, was
identified by Ramkumar (P.W. 1), Panabai (P.W. 13) and
Hari Shankar (P.W. 15). The articles seized from the accused
were also identified. Chhotelal admitted his presence in the
village of the night of the incident and the seizure of Rs.
335 from his person but claimed them as his own. He denied
the seizure of the other articles from his possession.
Narayan Singh denied the recovery of any articles from his
house while the appellant Harnath Singh, admitted the
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seizure of the five rupee coins and the square coin from his
person but claimed them as his own.
The Sessions Judge found all the accused guilty and
sentenced them as stated.
291
So far as the appellant Harnath Singh is concerned, the
High Court held that he had been "identified as one of the
dacoits by Ramkumar (P.W. 1), Panabai (P.W. 13) and Hari
Shankar (P.W. 15)" and they had also "identified him earlier
in a test identification parade." Discussing the question
as to whether the evidence with regard to the test
identification parade was admissible in view of the fact
that it was conducted by a Magistrate of the Third Class who
was not empowered to record statements under s. 164 of the
Criminal procedure Code, the High Court was of the view that
"the test identification parade .... cannot
be disregarded as of no value under the
circumstances of the case."
The High Court then went on to consider the evidence against
the appellant as to his being concerned in the dacoity. It
relied the testimony of Ramkumar, P.W. 1, that the appellant
was standing near his sister, Tulsabai and had a Gajkundi
and was firing crackers. Ramkumar had also given a
description of the appellant to the police and stated in his
evidence that he was able to identify him from his facial
features. Panabai, another of the identifying witnesses,
had stated that the appellant was wearing a black coat and
was flashing a torch. The third identifying witness, Hari
Shankar, could give no special reason for identifying the
appellant but stated that he was standing near his aunt,
Tulsabai. All these witnesses stated that they had
identified the appellant in the identification parade.
Tulsabai did not identify the appellant but had stated that
the person standing near her had a black coat on. The High
Court held on the evidence that there was no sufficient
reason to discard the testimony of these persons on the
point of their identifying the appellant as one of the
dacoits although there were some minor discrepancies in
their statements. The High Court also found that the
evidence of the witnesses was amply corroborated from other
evidence on record.
One of the circumstances which corroborated the
testimony of the witnesses, according to the High Court, was
the unexplained possession of the appellant of some of the
articles taken away by the dacoits from the scene after the
incident. In the first information report there had been
specific mention of the loss of four George V rupee coins,
one Victoria rupee coin and a gilt half rupee piece. These
correspond with the recovery from the appellant along with
one square coin probably of brass all bearing marks of
vermillion. This mark was explained by Raghunath, the
claimant of the coins as having been used in the Diwali
pooja. The High Court did not accept the appellants version
of his having carried them on his person because they used
to be worshipped by his father and grand-father. The High
Court held that the
292
presence of the square piece in his possession showed his
complicity in the offence. According to Raghunath this coin
was kept separately from the other coins but all bore
vermillion mark because of their use in the pooja.
The second circumstance incriminating the appellant as
found by the High Court was his unexplained absence from
duty in the Chambal Canal Project from December 9, 1962.
While the appellant admitted his absence from duty he tried
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to account for it by saying that he was ill but offered no
independent witness to establish his statement. Accordingly,
the High Court found itself unable to disturb the conviction
of the appellant under s. 395 and dismissed the appeal.
Before us learned counsel for the appellant contended
that the conviction of the appellant could not stand in view
of the reliance of the High Court on the record of the test
identification parade. In our opinion, the learned Judges of
the High Court did not affirm the conviction relying merely
or mainly on the said report. The elaborate discussion on
this point appears to have been prompted by the two
judgments in Appeal No. 218/1963 and Appeal No. 35/1964 of
the same High Court on which reliance was placed by counsel
for the accused. As noted already, the view of the High
Court was that the test identification parade could not be
discarded as of no value in the circumstances of the case.
It was only after recording the said view that the High
Court proceeded to consider the evidence of the witnesses
and the circumstances which corroborated their testimony.
These were only two as discussed above. It appears
therefore that although the High Court did not reject the
testimony of the Naib Tehsildar, Dinkar Rao who presided at
the parade, it really upheld the conviction of the appellant
on other evidence on the record.
Relying principally on the judgment of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King
Emperor(1) and to certain observations of this Court in
Ramkrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay(2)
counsel for the appellant attacked the identification
proceedings as being without jurisdiction and as such
inadmissible in evidence. It was further argued that if the
High Court had rejected the said evidence, it would not have
maintained the conviction of the appellant. In order to
appreciate the foundation for this argument, it is necessary
to take a brief note of the reason for holding
identification proceedings and the scope thereof. During
the investigation of a crime the police has to hold
identification parades for the purpose of enabling witnesses
to identify the properties which are the subject matter of
the offence or to identify the persons who are concerned
therein. They have thus a two-fold object: first, to satisfy
the investigating
(1) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253. (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 903.
293
authorities that a certain person not previously known to
the witnesses was involved in the commission of the crime or
a particular property was the subject of the Crime. It is
also designed to furnish evidence to corroborate the
testimony which the witness concerned tenders before the
court. The process of identification proceedings and the
legal basis of evidence adduced thereat were considered’ by
this Court in Ramkrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of
Bombay(1). It was there said (at p. 920):
"...it is clear that the process of identification by the
identifying witnesses involves the statement by the
identifying witnesses that the particular properties
identified were the subject matter of the offence or the
persons identified were concerned in the offence. This
statement may be express or implied. The identifier may
point out by his finger or touch the property or the person
identified, may either nod his head or give his assent in
’answer to a question address to him in that behalf or may
make signs or gestures which are tantamount to saying that
the particular property identified. was the subject matter
of the offence or the person identified was concerned in
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the offence. All these statements express or implied
including the signs and gestures would amount to a
communication of the fact of identification by the
identifier to another person.....The distinction....
between the mental act of identification and the
communication thereof by the identifier to another person is
quite logical and such communications are tantamount to
statements made by the identifiers.......The physical fact
of identification has thus no separate existence apart from
the statement involved in the very process of
identification ......."
On the above logic the Court pointed out that
identifications by a police officer would be hit by s. 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It being hardly practicable to have identification
proceedings conducted by private citizens they are as a rule
held by Magistrates at the request of the investigating
police ’authorities. Usually the record of the proceedings
is made on certain forms and one such, Ex. P-1, was used in
this case. This form contains 9 columns, the first being
for the serial number, the second for the names of the
witnesses who identified the accused, the third for names of
the accused who are to be identified,’ the fourth for the
number of persons who were mixed in the identification
parade, the fifth being headed "correctly identified"; the
sixth reading "wrongly identified", the seventh for
"statement of the witnesses
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 903.
294
about identification", the eighth for the signature of the
identifying witnesses and the ninth and last being for
remarks. The note at the end of the form shows how the
parade was conducted, where it was held, how many persons
were mixed up with the accused in the case, what precautions
were taken so that the witnesses could not see the steps
being taken for mixing the accused persons etc. The last
sentence of the form reads:
"From their gestures it appeared that
the witnesses had correctly identified the
accused persons."
In Nazir Ahmad’s case(1), the appellant .was convicted
mainly, if not entirely, on the strength of a corffession
said to have been made by the appellant to a Magistrate who
was examined at the trial. The Magistrate however did not
record the confession under s. 164 of the Criminal
Procedure Code which provides that a Magistrate of the class
therein mentioned may record any statement or confession
made to him in the course of an investigation in the manner
prescribed and after complying with the formalities therein
laid down. The Judicial Committee found that though the
Magistrate was manifestly acting under Part V of the
Criminal Procedure Code, he neither purported ’to follow nor
in fact followed the procedure of ss. 164 and 364 of the
Code. To quote the words of the judgment to show absence of
non’compliance with secs. 164 and 364 of the. Criminal
Procedure Code:
"....there was no record in existence at
the material time (at the time the alleged
confession was made), there was nothing to be
shown or to be read to the accused, and
nothing he could sign or refuse to sign."
The Magistrate gave no explanation as to why he adopted this
procedure. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that
by necessary implication in the Code of Criminal Procedure
the Magistrate must either proceed under s. 164 of the Code
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or not at all. Considering the position of the accused
persons and the position of the magistracy, the Judicial
Committee observed that it was most undesirable that
Magistrates and Judges should be in the position of witness
insofar it could be avoided. According to the Judicial
Committee:
"....it would be particularly unfortunate
if Magistrate were asked at all generally to
act rather as police officers than as judicial
persons; to be by reason of their position
freed from the disability that attaches to
police officers under s. 162 of the Code; and
to be ’at the same time freed, notwithstanding
their position as Magistrates, from any
obligation to make records under s. 164. In
the result they would indeed be relegated to
the ,position of ordinary citizens as
witnesses and then would be.
(1) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253.
295
required to depose to matters transacted by
them in their official capacity unregulated by
any statutory rules of procedure or conduct
whatever,"
In the result it was held that the Code of Criminal
procedure did not sanction any departure from the mode in
which the confeSsions were to be dealt with by. the
Magistrates when made during an investigation.
This decision of the Judicial Committee was considered
by this Court in Deep Chand v. The State of Rajasthan(1) and
the’ above observations were adopted-In this case, one Suraj
Bhan had been abducted by certain persons and according to
the prosecution case he was taken first to the house of Deep
Chand and kept blind folded and confined in a small room
for 17 days.During this period after temporary removal of
the bandage over his eyes he was made to write letters to
his father asking for moneys to be paid for releasing him.
He was thereafter removed to the house of one Lachman. As
regards the identification of Deep Chand’s house, the High
Court accepted the evidence of Suraj Bhan that he had been
able to note certain features of it through a chink in the
wall of his room. Suraj Bhan’s evidence was corroborated by
the evidence of one Devi Singh, a Magistrate who had taken
Suraj Bhan along with him to the house of Deep Chand. The
Magistrate had inspected the house and got a plan prepared
under his supervision and recorded a memorandum in which
his observations and the statements made by Suraj Bhan were
noted down. The Magistrate gave evidence at the trial
describing the building of Deep Chand and proved the
memorandum prepared by him. Objection was taken by the
appellant to the verification proceedings conducted by the
Magistrate on the strength of Nazir Ahmad’s case(9) and it
was argued that the High Court had gone wrong in acting
upon the memorandum are the Magistrate. It was pointed
out by this Court prep by ....that the decision in Nazir
Ahmad’s case(a) did not preclude a Magistrate from
deposing to relevant facts if no statute precluded him from
doing so either expressly or impliedly. It was also said
that neither the evidence Act nor the code of Criminal
procedure prohibited a Magistrate from deposing to relevant
facts within the meaning of s. 9 of the. Evidence Act.
Reference was made by this Court to the observation in
Amiruddin Ahmad v. Emperor(a) in relation to identification
proceedings that "the main concern of the Court would seem
to be to ensure that evidence not strictly admissible is not
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admitted." In that case, the High Court had further
observed that the verifying Magistrate should not be
permitted to speak to statements said to have been made to.
him in the course of the proceedings. The High Court
observed that
(1) (1962) 1 S.C.R.662
(2) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253.
(3) I.L.R. 45 Calcutta 557.
296
"additional statements being statements made
in the course of an investigation, when not
recorded in the manner provided in section 164
of the Code of Criminal Procedure......are
inadmissible."
According to this Court, the above decision was "an
authority for the position that the evidence given by a
Magistrate on the basis of the verification proceedings
conducted by him is relevant evidence, though he could not
speak to statements made by the accused or a witness
recorded by him in contravention of s. 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure."
Deep Chand’s case(1) goes to show that a Magistrate
when called upon in a case like this to conduct verification
proceedings should confine his attention only to the steps
to be taken to ensure that the witnesses were able to
identify certain persons alleged to have been concerned in
the commission of the crime or to identify certain things
which were said to be the subject matter thereof. The Code
of Criminal Procedure does not sanction his transgression of
this limit and recording of other statements which may have
a bearing in establishing the guilt of the accused except in
accordance with s. 164 of the Code.
In this case the Magistrate gave evidence to the effect
that he was a Naib Tehsildar at Sirpur on 26th December 1962
on which date he had executed the proceedings of
identification parade of the three accused including the
appellant. He also stated that he had the power of a Third
Class Magistrate. After stating how the parade was
conducted he recorded statements in support of the
identification of the three accused by different persons.
He also surported to give evidence of what the witnesses
had said after identifying a particular accused. Learned
counsel for the appellant contended that as he had purported
to record statements made in the course of investigation,
the entire evidence of the Magistrate including the record
of the identification proceedings became inadmissible
because he was a Third Class Magistrate not empowered to
proceed under s. 164 Cr.P.C. We find ourselves unable to
accept this argument. The Magistrate was called upon only
to conduct the identification proceedings. He was not
required to record any confession or to interrogate
witnesses to elicit any other facts or call upon them to
make any statement beyond mere identification. The
statements in column 7 would therefore be inadmissible in
evidence. This would not however be applicable to the
record under column 5. The High Court did not refer to the
statements in column 7 at all. It would therefore be clear
that the judgment-does not suffer from the infirmity
complained of and the appeal must fail. It is therefore
dismissed.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 662.
297
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