Full Judgment Text
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: May 25, 2018
+ W.P.(C) 2511/1992
EX.LINK VISHAV PRIYA SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Ankita Patnaik, Adv.
versus
UOI ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Barkha Babbar, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
J U D G M E N T
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner with
the following prayers:-
― In view of the above and in the interest of justice,
it is, therefore, most humbly prayed that this
Hon‘ble Court may be pleased to issue
appropriate writ, direction or order in the nature
to :-
(a) DECLARE that the Summary Court Martial
held on 25.7.90 in respect of the petitioner is not
legally constituted and had no jurisdiction to
proceed in the matter;
(b) CERTIORARI quashing the entire
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 1 of 41
proceedings of the said Summary Court Martial;
(c) MANDAMUS directing the respondents to
reinstate the petitioner forthwith in the service
retrospectively with full pay and allowances and
all consequential benefits, as if he is continuously
in the service;
(d) Record be summoned;
(e) Any other or further, writ, direction or
orders that may be deemed appropriate under the
circumstances be also passed.‖
2. Some of the facts noted and as canvassed by the learned
counsel for the petitioner are that the petitioner was enrolled in
the Indian Army as a Sepoy on August 06, 1979. He was later
transferred to 19 Mahar Regiment on April 02, 1985. It is the
case of the petitioner, on September 25, 1987, he was promoted
to the rank of Lance Naik. On March 26, 1990, the petitioner
complained against the CO i.e the respondent No.5 to the
Commander of his brigade. It is the case of the petitioner that on
May 30, 1990, he was interviewed by the Commander where he
highlighted two major grievances of his i.e, he was being denied
leave by the CO and the CO was hell bent upon relinquishing the
rank of the petitioner. The petitioner was sent for 15 days casual
leave from June 01, 1990 to June 15, 1990. He was also
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 2 of 41
informed that his other grievances shall also be looked into and
the CO 17 Kumaon Regiment was detailed to conduct the
investigation on the basis of the complaints made by the
petitioner.
3. On July 15, 1990, the petitioner received a letter from the
Brigade informing him that his additional points are still under
investigation. On the same day, the Investigation Officer is
changed from CO 17 Kumaon Regiment to CO 18 Punjab
Regiment, who, according to the petitioner is the course mate of
respondent No.5. On July 16, 1990 at 9.20 am Subedar Adjudant
18 Punjab Regiment carries the letter dated July 16, 1990 and
directs the petitioner to report to the CO’s Office at 12 pm,
wearing the uniform of a Sepoy, despite the fact that the
complaint of the petitioner that the CO of his Unit was hell bent
upon relinquishing the petitioner’s rank, was the subject matter of
the investigation, to which the petitioner informed the Subedar
Adjudant that since he is a Lance Naik, he cannot wear the
uniform of a Sepoy and alternatively he may be allowed to appear
in civil clothes. It is the case of the petitioner that once again at
12.25 pm, he was asked by the Subedar Major to report to the
CO’s office at 12.30 pm in a Sepoy’s uniform and since it was
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 3 of 41
already 12.30 pm, the petitioner informed that he cannot reach
the office at 12.30 pm. At this, the petitioner was immediately
put under close arrest.
4. It is the case of the petitioner, on July 18, 1990, a
Summary of Evidence was initiated against the petitioner, on the
charge of disobeying the lawful command given by a superior
officer and subsequently the petitioner was tried through a
Summary Court Martial and vide sentence dated July 25, 1990 he
was awarded the sentence to undergo six months RI and was also
dismissed from service. On November 30, 1990, as the petitioner
had not been supplied with the copy of the Summary Court
Martial Proceedings, he asked for the same through Jail
Authorities but the same were not supplied to him. After he had
completed his sentence of six months, he again vide his
application dated February 14, 1991 sought the relevant
documents but the same were not supplied to him. Pursuant
thereto, multiple reminders were sent including a legal notice
dated May 13, 1991. It is only thereafter, the documents were
supplied to the petitioner i.e on July 10, 1991. It is the case of the
petitioner, on August 09, 1991, the petitioner submitted his
petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act, 1950 against his
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 4 of 41
wrongful dismissal but no reply was received for the same. He
accordingly, approached this Court by way of this petition. It is
the case of the petitioner that during the pendency of this writ
petition on May 14, 1993, the respondents vide their order dated
May 14, 1993 converted the sentence of the petitioner from
dismissal from service to discharge from service.
5. The case of the respondents, as set up in their pleadings is
that the petitioner was enrolled in Army as Sepoy in Rajput
Regiment. On March 08, 1990, the petitioner had at 1800 hrs
said to Hawaldar Kamble Udhav “ You are partial and do
favouritism. You have detailed me for commando practice.‖
According to them, the petitioner was charged under Section 63
of the Army Act i.e an act prejudicial to good order and military
discipline. It is their case that the petitioner was tried summarily
and was deprived of the appointment of Lance Naik on May 26,
1990 and reverted to the rank of Sepoy. It is their case that on
July 10, 1990 the petitioner was absent from physical training
parade and when he was called by the Company Commander, he
refused to come. On July 11, 1990 when the petitioner was asked
why he did not come for physical training parade, he replied that
―I have no problem but I have not been attending physical
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 5 of 41
training parade for some days.‖ On July 12, 1990, the petitioner
was asked to put up on uniform but he refused and had put on
civil clothes. It is their case that the Commander was apprised of
his behavior. On July 15, 1990, the petitioner had also directly
written a letter to GOC 15 Corps, therefore the Commander
ordered CO 18 Punjab to carry out an investigation and attached
the petitioner to 18 Punjab for all purposes. He reported to 18
Punjab on July 15, 1990 as Sepoy. On July 16, 1990, the
petitioner was called to the CO’s office in uniform by Naib
Subedar Gurcharan Singh who was doing the duty of Subedar
Adjutant. The petitioner disobeyed the lawful command given by
the superior officer and refused to wear uniform. That
subsequently when a letter was given to the petitioner to report to
CO 18, the petitioner refused to take the letter.
6. It is their case, on July 17, 1990 the Hearing of Charge
proceedings were held. On conclusion of Hearing of Charge
proceedings, the Commanding Officer 18 Punjab gave orders to
record the Summary of Evidence on July 17, 1990. The
Summary of Evidence was recorded on July 20, 1990. After
conclusion of the Summary of Evidence, orders were issued for
holding the Summary Court Martial. The petitioner was tried by
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 6 of 41
a Summary Court Martial for an offence under Section 41(2) of
the Army Act for refusing to accept official letter dated July 16,
1990. He was also proceeded for refusing to obey the verbal
orders given by the Sub. Adjutant to that effect. According to the
respondents, the petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge against
him and declined to make any statement. It is also their case that
provisions of Army Rule 115(2) were complied with. Pursuant to
the plea of guilt of the petitioner, recorded as the finding of the
Court, the petitioner was awarded punishment of dismissal from
service as well as six months RI. They also state that the
Statutory Petition was decided by the Central Government on
May 14, 1993 whereby it was decided that the punishment of
dismissal from service be converted into discharge with effect
from the date of dismissal.
SUBMISSIONS:-
7. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the Summary Court Martial Proceedings are liable
to be set aside as it has been proceeded on the alleged basis of
plea of guilt by the petitioner, which is totally false, as is evident
from the plea of guilt statement, which is unsigned. That apart,
she would state that the Leave Certificate dated May 31, 1990
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 7 of 41
issued to the petitioner mentions the rank of the petitioner as
Lance Naik and not Sepoy while the respondents in their counter
affidavit for the very first time stated that the petitioner was
demoted to the rank of Sepoy with effect from May 26, 1990.
However, no documents to substantiate the claim of the
respondents that the petitioner stood demoted have been supplied
by the respondents. According to her, the case of the respondents
that the petitioner was remitted to the rank of Sepoy vide order
dated May 26, 1990 because he refused to go for training but on
the other hand when the petitioner along with four other
personnel from his company reported for training, the instructor
told them he wants only volunteers and no nominated members
for the training and therefore the petitioner and the other four
personnel being nominated members were returned back but only
the petitioner was marched up to the CO, who was biased against
the petitioner. She would submit, the petitioner was never
supplied with the copy of the order dated May 26, 1990 remitting
him back to the rank of Sepoy nor the same has been produced by
the respondents at any point of time. She would also state that
even otherwise, the respondents who have taken the plea that a
Court of Enquiry was conducted to look into the complaints made
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 8 of 41
by the petitioner against the CO in which it was found that the
allegations raised by the petitioner were false but no documents
vis-à-vis the said Court of Enquiry have been produced by the
respondents, which shows that the same is an afterthought. That
apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
entire basis of awarding the sentence of dismissal from service to
the petitioner is his alleged past conduct, which has not been
substantiated by any document produced by the respondents.
According to her, on the other hand a perusal of the Summary of
Evidence will show that the respondents themselves recorded the
petitioner’s past record to be good. In the alternative, she has
also stated that the punishment of discharge from service is
totally disproportionate and is liable to be set aside. She states
that in the following batch of matters, which have been remitted
back to this Court by the Supreme Court, this Court had already
passed orders:-
a) W.P.(C) No. 17622/2004 Sep/Clk S.K. Nari v. Union of
India and Ors decided on September 22, 2017;
b) W.P.(C) No. 18185/2004 Sep/Clk Balwinder Singh v.
Union of India and Ors decided on September 22, 2017.
8. She would rely upon the following judgments of the
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 9 of 41
Supreme Court in support of her submissions:-
(i) Gayatri Sarkar v. Union of India W.P.(C) 3063/2014 decided
on January 22, 2016;
(ii) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors (1987) 4 SCC
611;
(iii) Dharambir Singh v. Union of India and Ors W.P.(C)
3585/2003 decided on August 26, 2015.
9. On the other hand, Ms. Barkha Babbar, learned counsel
for the respondents would state that after the coming into force of
the Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, this Court does not have
the jurisdiction to hear the matter. She would state, Section 3(o)
of the AFT Act deals with service matters in relation to persons
subject to the Army Act, and mentions all matters relating to the
conditions of their service which are included and which have to
be heard by the AFT. It also mention matters which shall not be
included in it and at (iv) it mentions that it shall not include
Summary Court Martial except where the punishment is of
dismissal or imprisonment for more than three months. She
states, in the present case, the SCM had awarded the punishment
of six months RI and dismissal from service. Therefore, the
present writ petition cannot be entertained by this Court and is
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 10 of 41
liable to be transferred to the AFT. She would state, the
conversion of the punishment of dismissal into discharge by the
Central Government is not illegal and is within the powers of the
Central Government. The petitioner had submitted a petition
under Section 164(2) of the Army Act 1950 against the findings
and sentence awarded by the SCM. The Government of India
after due consideration of the petition had directed that the
punishment of dismissal awarded to the petitioner be converted
into discharge with effect from the date of dismissal. She states,
the power conferred by Section 164(2) is very wide and no
limitations can be read into it to curtail the scope of the power.
According to her, Section 164(2) is a beneficial provision and is
totally independent and cannot be fettered with provisions of the
Army Rules, which is also clear from Army Headquarters letter
dated July 17, 1999. She would further state, on converting the
dismissal of the petitioner into discharge the petitioner is entitled
to terminal benefits i.e AFPP Fund, AGI Maturity Benefits, Final
Settlement of Accounts and DCRG which have already been paid
to him. In case the petitioner had 15 years qualifying service to
his credit, he would have been eligible for service pension also.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents takes a plea that the
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 11 of 41
petitioner was a habitual offender. On March 1, 1990, the
petitioner was detailed by the Officiating Company
Havaldar/Major Udhav Kamble to take part in commando
competition practice for the impending inter-battalion events,
which the petitioner refused, replying in an insubordinate manner
to his superior and alleging partiality on his part in detailing him
on commando training. The Company Commander reported the
matter to the then Commanding Officer for using insubordinate
language against Havaldar Udhav Kamble and the petitioner was
charged for an offence under Section 63 of the Army Act.
Instead of answering to the charge, the petitioner alleged
favouritism and discrimination. He also stated that he would not
accept the Commanding Officer’s punishment and that Ex.
Rajput Regiment personnel were being discriminated against in
the unit. He also wanted to see the Brigade Commander i.e
respondent No.3. The petitioner’s interview was arranged.
Inspite of that, he chose to write directly to the Brigade
Commander in contravention of instructions contained in para
522 of the ―Regulations for the Army‖ . However, respondent
No.3 finding the allegations baseless, directed that the
Commanding Officer could proceed with the disciplinary action
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 12 of 41
against the petitioner. She stated, on May 26, 1990 the petitioner
was remanded to the Commanding Officer for the same offence.
That a Summary Trial was held and on being found guilty, the
petitioner was awarded the punishment of deprivation of the
appointment of Lance Naik on May 26, 1990. According to her,
Lance Naik is an appointment and not a rank. In this regard, she
referred to Rule 29, Note 3. She would state, the petitioner was
granted 15 days casual leave with effect from June 01, 1990 to
June 15, 1990. The mention of the rank of Lance Naik in his
leave certificate is merely due to clerical error, and oversight.
The petitioner was not holding the appointment of Lance Naik on
that day as is evident from the Attachment Order dated July 15,
1990.
11. Insofar as the Summary Court Martial is concerned, it is
her submission, on July 16, 1990 the petitioner was called to the
Office of the Commanding Officer, 18 Punjab in uniform by
Subedar Gurcharan Singh who was then performing the duties of
Subedar Adjutant. She stated, the petitioner disobeyed the lawful
command given by the superior officer and refused to wear the
uniform. On July 17, 1990, the petitioner was brought before the
Commanding Officer in the Orderly Room in civil dress as he
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 13 of 41
refused to wear uniform. The Hearing of Charge proceedings
under Army Rule 22 were conducted. On conclusion of the
Hearing of Charge proceedings the Commanding Officer 18
Punjab gave orders for recording the Summary of Evidence on
July 17, 1990. On July 20, 1990, the Summary of Evidence was
recorded. On July 25, 1990, the petitioner was tried by the
Summary Court Martial for an offence under Section 41(2) Army
Act. She would state, the offence occurred while he was on
active service and the petitioner had on July 16, 1990 when he
was asked to accept an official letter dated July 16, 1990
requiring his presence in the CO’s Office for investigation in
uniform refused to do so. He also did not obey the verbal orders
given by the Sub Adjutant to this effect. The petitioner had
pleaded guilty to the charge against him and had declined to
make any statement. The procedure under Army Rule 115(2)
was complied with and the plea of guilty of the petitioner was
recorded as the finding of the Court. The petitioner was awarded
the punishment of six months RI and dismissal from service.
Though the signatures of the petitioner were not there on the plea
of guilty in the SCM proceedings there was no requirement for
the same in 1990 when the SCM was held. She would rely upon
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 14 of 41
the judgment in the cases of Ex. Ct. Kalu Ram v. Union of India
decided on August 16, 2012 and 110 (2004) DLT 268 D.B.
Chokha Ram v. Union of India & Anr.
12. According to her, the punishment awarded to the
petitioner is proportionate to the offence committed by him. It is
her submission that the petitioner was on active service when the
petitioner had committed an offence under Section 41(2) of the
Army Act, which provides that if such an offence is committed
while the person is on active service, he is liable to suffer
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or
such less punishment as mentioned in the Act and if the person
commits this offence while not on active service he is liable to
suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or
such less punishment as mentioned in the Act. The scale of
punishment awardable by Court Martial is given in Section 71 of
the Army Act. She would state, the petitioner was only awarded
the punishment of dismissal from service and RI for six months.
The Apex Court has held in several cases that the High Court
under Article 226 or 227 should not interfere with the punishment
so imposed merely on compassionate grounds such as it being
disproportionately harsh except in ex facie cases of perversity or
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 15 of 41
irrationality. She seeks the dismissal of the writ petition. She
would rely upon the following judgments in support of her
contention:-
(i) (2001) 9 SCC 592 Union of India & Ors v. R.K.
Sharma;
nd
(ii) (2011) 10 SCC 244 Commandant 22 Bn, CRPF v.
Surender Kumar.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the first
and the foremost issue that needs to be decided is whether the
present petition is not maintainable in this Court in view of
Section 3(o) of the AFT Act, as it is the submission of Ms.
Babbar that the issue herein relates to a service matter that too
concerning persons subject to Army Act where the punishment is
of dismissal or imprisonment for more than three months. In that
regard, the answer to the said issue lies in her own submission,
inasmuch as she had stated that the matters, which shall not have
the jurisdiction of AFT, are those relating to Summary Court
Martial except where punishment is of dismissal or imprisonment
for more than three months. In the case in hand, even though
initially it was a case of dismissal with imprisonment of six
months, the dismissal was reduced to discharge. Even otherwise,
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 16 of 41
initially the writ petition was disposed of by this court on an issue
whether the SCM need to be held by the CO of the unit or any
other unit on January 25, 2008. The said order was subject
matter of an Appeal before the Supreme Court, which decided the
issue vide order dated July 05, 2016 in favour of the respondents
but at the same time remanded the matter back to this Court for
consideration on merits. The Supreme court having remanded
the matter back to this court, this Court shall have the
competence to decide the matter on merits. Hence, this plea of
Ms. Babbar is rejected.
14. On the issue whether the Summary Court Martial
proceedings followed by the punishment of imprisonment of six
months and discharge from service of the petitioner is justified.
The issue needs to be seen from the perspective, what was the
charge, which was framed against the petitioner and whether the
procedure followed is in accordance with the Army Act/the Rules
and there is evidence, which has come on record to prove the
same. In this regard, it may be stated here that the summary of
evidence was recorded on July 20, 1990. Three witnesses were
produced by the respondents. Their statements read as under:-
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 17 of 41
“SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF
NO. 2976576/N SEPOY VISHAV PRIYA SINGH
OF 19 MAHAR, ATTACHED WITH 19 PUNJAB
ORDERED BY IC-19973L, LT. COL. H.S. NEGI,
COMMANDING OFFICER 18 PUNJAB,
RECORDED BY IC-31768W MAJOR ANIL
KUMAR, 18 PUNJAB ON 18 TO 20 JUL 90 AT
C/O 56 APO
Witness No.1
1. No. 2458411K Naib Subedar Parmodh
Singh having been duly warned states: -
2. I am performing the duties of NSA of the bn.
On 16 Jul 90 at about 0900 h, I was called by IC-
42062F Maj B.K. Pati, Adjt in his office. I reached
his office at 0905 hr where Adjt told me that
No.2976576N Sepoy Vishav Priya Singh, 19
MAHAR attached with 18 PUNJAB is required to be
present in CO‘s Office in uniform for investigation
at 161230h. Accordingly I went myself to Sep.
Vishav Priya Singh, 19 MAHAR personally and
conveyed to him the Adjt‘s orders at 160920 hr. AT
that time Sep Vishav Priya Singh was in his room
with No. 9507523 Hav. Kuldip Kumar (AEC), who is
also sharing room with him. On hearing the orders
given by Adjt. through me, Sep. Vishav Priya Singh
told me that he will not wear uniform of a Sepoy
since he is a L/Nk or he will come in civil dress to
CO‘s office. I tried to convince him but he did not
agree to wear Sepoy uniform. Accordingly, I went to
Adjt and informed him about it.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS
BY THE ACCUSED
3. The accused No.2976576N Sep. Vishav
Priya Singh declines to cross examine the witness.
4. The above statement has been read over to
the individual in the language he understands and
he signs it as correct.
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 18 of 41
Sd/- x-x-x-x-x-x-x
(No. 2458411 K Nb Sub)
Parmodh Singh
Witness No.2
5. NO. JC-167139Y Nb Sub Gurcharan Singh,
18 PUNJAB having been duly warned states:-
6. I am performing the duties of Sub Adjt. 18
PUNJAB. On 16 Jul 90 at about 1215 h I was
called by 42062F Maj B.K. Pati, who is doing the
duties of Adjt in this office. I was ordered by the
Adjt to deliver the letter No. 1304/2976576/AG dt
16 Jul 90 to No. 2976576N Sep. Vishav Priya Singh
of 19 MAHAR attached with 19 MAHAR attached
with 18 PUNJAB and to obtain the receipt duly
signed by him. Accordingly, I went to Sep. Vishav
Priya Singh at about 161225 h and found him sitting
on his bed in civil dress. No. 9507523X Hav. Kuldip
Kumar, AEC was also present there when I ordered
Sep. Vishav Priya Singh to accept the letter and sign
the receipt. However, Sep.
Vishav Priya Singh read the letter but refused to
accept the letter or sign the receipt. I tried to
convince him but he said, that he will not permitted
to wear L Nk rank, then he will remain in civil dress.
I once again told him that he is required to be
present in CO‘s office for investigation in uniform at
161230 h. However Sep. Vishav Priya Singh did not
change his stand. Therefore, I went to Adjt at 1235
h and informed him about it.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS BY
THE ACCUSED
7. The accused No.2976576N Sep. Vishav
Priya Singh declines to cross examine the witness.
8. The above statement has been read over to
the individual in the language he understands and
he signs it as correct.
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 19 of 41
Sd/- x-x-x-x-x-x-x
(JC-167139Y Nb Sub)
Gurcharan Singh
Witness No.3
9. IC—42062F Maj. B.K. Pati having been
duly cautioned states:
10. I am performing the duties of Adjt., 18
PUNJAB. On 15 Jul 90 at about 1630 hr, I received
the movement order of No. 2976576N Sep Vishav
Priya Singh, 19 MAHAR for attachment with 18
PUNJAB (Copy of movement order attached at
Exhibit ‗A‘). By 151640 H Sep Vishav Priya Singh
was attached with 18 PUNJAB after CO‘s
permission. He was asked to share room with
education Hav near unit library.
11. As per the CO‘s orders Sep Vishav Priya
Singh, 19 MAHAR was required to be present in
CO‘s office for investigations on 16 July at 1230
hrs. Therefore, I passed orders to Naib Subedar
Adjt 245811K Nb Sub Parmodh Singh to go
personally and convey the same. At about 1100 h
Naib Sub Parmodh Singh came back and told me
that Sep Vishav Priya Singh, 19 MAHAR attached
with 18 PUNJAB has refused to wear the uniform of
a Sepoy and was wearing civil dress. He also told
me that Sep Vishav Priya Singh says that he will not
wear uniform of a Sepoy since he is a L Nk, however
he will come for investigations in civil dress. I
therefore immediately informed CO who ordered me
to make out a written letter and take his receipt
stating that he is required at 1230 h in uniform for
investigation.
12. At 1215 h, I called JC-167139Y Nb Sub
Gurcharan Singh who is performing the duties of
Sub Adjt to deliver the 18 PUNJAB letter No.
1304/2976576/AG dt 16 Jul 90 and obtain receipt
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 20 of 41
from Sep Vishav Priya Singh. On 16 Jul at about
1240 h Nb Sub Gurcharan Singh came back to my
office and told me that No. 2976576N Sep Vishav
Priya Singh, 19 MAHAR has refused to obey his
orders. He also has refused to accept the letter No.
1304/2976576/AG dt 16 Jul 90, and sign the receipt.
(Letter No. 1304/2976576/AG dt 16 Jul 90 and
unsigned receipt of the letter are attached at Exhibit
‗B‘).
13. In view of the disobedience of orders as per
the CO‘s direction No. 29756576N Sep Vishav Priya
Singh was placed under close arrest. On 17 July 90
Sep Vishav Priya Singh was marched up to CO‘s
orderly room at 1205 h in civil dress (Offence
Report IAFD-901 attached as Exhibit C).
Accordingly, IC-19973L Lt. Col HS Negi, CO 18
PUNJAB ordered summary of evidence to be
recorded.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS BY
THE ACCUSED
14. The accused 29764576N Sep Vishav Priya
Singh declines to cross examine the witness.
15. The above statement has been read by the
individual and he signs it as correct.
16. The case for the prosecution is closed and
the accused No.2976576N Sep Vishav Priya Singh,
19 MAHAR attached with 18 PUNJAB has been
cautioned under AR 23(3) ―Do you wish to make a
statement? You are not obliged to say anything
unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say will
be taken down in writing and may be given in
evidence‖.
17. The accused 29764576N Sep Vishav Priya
Singh declines to make any statement.
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 21 of 41
18. The accused 29764576N Sep Vishav Priya
Singh also declines to call any witness.
19. The accused 29764576N Sep Vishav Priya
Singh remained in civil dress for recording of S of E.
20. The above statement has been read over to
the accused in the language he understand and he
refuses to signs it.
Sd/-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-
(2976576N Sep Vishav Priya Singh)
Sd/-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-
(RC-423N Lt Prithi Chand)
Independent Witness
21. The accused No. 2976576N Sep Vishav
Priya Singh, 19 MAHAR attached with 18 PUNJAB,
refused to sign the above statement and SOS on 20
July 90 at 1230 h.
22. The accused No. 2976576N Sep Vishav
Priya Singh having declined to add any evidence,
the S of E is concluded.
23. Certified that the provisions of AR 23(1),
(2), (3), (4) have been complied with.
24. Certified that S of E consisting (8) eight
manuscript pages alongwith Exhibit A, B, C have
been recorded by me in presence and hearing of the
accused and the Independent Witness.‖
15. Based on the summary of evidence, the following charge
was framed against the petitioner:-
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 22 of 41
“CHARGE SHEET
The accused No. 2976576N Sepoy Vishav Priya
Singh of 19 MAHAR, attached with 18 PUNJAB, is
charged with: -
Army Act “DISOBEYING A LAWFUL COMMAND GIVEN BY
Section 41 (2) SUPERIOR OFFICER”
In that he,
While on active service at 1230 hours on 16 Jul 90,
when Subedar Adjutant, JC-167139Y Naib Subedar
Gucharan Singh of 18 PUNJAB asked him to
accept official letter No. 1304/2976576/AG dated 16
Jul 90, requiring his presence in CO‘s officer for
investigation in uniform, refused to do so. Besides,
verbal orders given by the Subedar Adjutant to this
effect also NOT obeyed.‖
16. The Summary Court Martial proceedings were held on
July 25, 1990. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioner
had pleaded guilty of the charge framed against him. Much
reliance has been placed by the respondents on the plea of guilty
by the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner as contended by
his counsel that no signatures of the petitioner were taken on the
plea of guilty and hence the said statement could not have been
read against him. In this regard, it may be stated here that the
Rules governing the plea of guilty in the Army are Rules 115 and
116, which reads as under:-
115. General plea of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”.
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 23 of 41
(1) ―Guilty‖ or ―Not Guilty‖ (or if he refuses to plead, or does
not plead intelligible either one or the other, a plea of ―Not
Guilty‖)—shall be recorded on each charge.
(2) If an accused person pleads ―Guilty‖, that plea shall be
recorded as the finding of the court; but before it is recorded, the
court shall ascertain that the accused understands the nature of
the charge to which he has pleaded guilty and shall inform him of
the general effect of that plea, and in particular of the meaning of
the charge to which he has pleaded guilty and of the difference in
procedure which will be made by the plea of guilty, and shall
advise him to withdraw that plea if it appears from the summary
of evidence (if any) or otherwise that the accused ought to plead
not guilty.
(2A) Where an accused pleads ―Guilty‖, such plea and the
factum of compliance of sub-rule (2) of this rule, shall be
recorded by the court in the following manner: —
―Before recording the plea of ―Guilty‖ of the accused the court
explained to the accused the meaning of the charge (s) to which
he had pleaded ―Guilty‖ and ascertained that the accused had
understood the nature of the charge (s) to which he had pleaded
―Guilty‖. The court also informed the accused the general effect
of the plea and the difference in procedure, which will be
followed consequent to the said plea. The court having satisfied
itself that the accused understands the charge (s) and the effect of
his plea of ―Guilty‖, accepts and records the same. The
provisions of rule 115(2) are thus complied with.
(3) Where an accused person pleads guilty to the first of two or
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 24 of 41
more charges laid in the alternative, the court may, after sub-rule
(2) of this rule has been complied with and before the accused is
arraigned on the alternative charge or charges, withdraw such
alternative charge or charges without requiring the accused to
plead thereto, and a record to that effect shall be made upon the
proceedings of the court.‖
116. Procedure after plea of “Guilty”.
(1) Upon the record of the plea of ―Guilty‖,. if there are other
charges in the same charge-sheet to which the plea is ―Not
Guilty‖, the trial shall first proceed with respect to the latter
charges, and, after the finding of these charges, shall proceed
with the charges on which a plea of ―Guilty‖ has been entered;
but if they are alternative charges, the court may either proceed
with respect to all the charges as if the accused had not pleaded
―Guilty‖ to any charge, or may, instead of trying him, record a
finding upon any one of the alternative charges to which he has
pleaded ―Guilty‖ and a finding of ―Not Guilty‖ upon all the
other alternative charges.
(2) After the record of the plea of ―Guilty‖ on a charge (if the
trial does not proceed on any other charges), the court shall read
the summary of evidence, and annex it to the proceedings or if
there is no such summary, shall take and record sufficient
evidence to enable it to determine the sentence, and the reviewing
officer to know all the circumstances connected with the offence.
The evidence shall be taken in like manner as is directed by these
rules in case of a plea of ―Not Guilty‖.
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 25 of 41
(3) After such evidence has been taken, or the summary of
evidence has been read, as the case may be, the accused may
address the court in reference to the charge and in mitigation of
punishment and may call witnesses as to his character.
(4) If from the statement of the accused, or from the summary of
evidence, or otherwise, it appears to the court that the accused
did not understand the effect of his plea of ―Guilty‖, the court
shall alter the record and enter a plea of ―Not Guilty‖, and
proceed with the trial accordingly.
(5) If a plea of ―Guilty‖ is recorded and the trial proceeds with
respect to other charges in the same charge-sheet, the
proceedings under sub-rules (2) and (3) shall take place when the
findings on the other charges in the same charge-sheet are
recorded.
(6) When the accused states anything in mitigation of punishment
which in the opinion of the court requires to be proved, and
would, if proved, effect the amount of punishment, the court may
permit the accused to call witnesses to prove the same.
(7) In any case where the court is empowered by section 139 to
find the accused guilty of an offence other than that charged, or
guilty of committing an offence in circumstances involving a less
degree of punishment, or where it could, after hearing the
evidence, have made a special finding of guilty subject to
exceptions of variations in accordance with sub-rule (3) of rule
121, it may, if it is satisfied of the justice of such course accept
and record a plea of guilty of such other offence, or of the offence
as having been committed in circumstances involving such less
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 26 of 41
degree of punishment, or of the offence charged subject to such
exceptions or variations.
17. Having noted the Rules, the plea of guilty as recorded in
the case in hand during the proceedings dated July 25, 1990 reads
as under:-
―Proceedings of a Summary Court Martial held at Udhampur
th
(J&K) on Wednesday the 25 of July 1990 by IC-19973L Lt. Col.
th
H.S. Negi Commanding the 18 Battalion the Punjab Regiment
for the trial of all such accused persons as he may have brought
before him.
PRESENT
IC-19973L Lt. Col. H.S. Negi (Hindu-Rajput)
th
Commanding the 18 Battalion the Rajput Regiment.
ATTENDING THE TRIALS
th
IC-29959M Maj R.K. Bhola, 18 Bn the Punjab Regiment.
th
IC-111865F Sub Jagdish Chand, 18 Bn the Punjab Regiment.
FRIEND OF THE ACCUSED
th
IC-48655k 2/Lt. Sushil Kumar, 18 Bn the Punjab Regiment.
INTERPRETER
th
IC-19973L Lt. Col. H.S. Negi, 18 Bn the Punjab Regiment.
The officers and Junior Commissioner Officers assemble
at the 18 PUNJAB and the trial commences 1000 hrs.
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 27 of 41
The accused No. 2976576N Sepoy Vishav Priya Singh,
th th
19 Bn the Mahar Regt. attached with 18 Bn the Punjab
Regiment is brought (if a non-commissioned officer) into the
Court. IC-19973L Lt. Col. H.S. Negi is duly sworn as the Court.
Sd/- x-x-x-x-x
Lt. Col.
The Court
____________________________________________________
is duly sworn as the Court interpreter
Sd/- x-x-x-x-x
Lt. Col.
The Court
All witnesses are directed to withdraw from the Court.
Instructions :-
Enter rank and name of the officer holding the trial. Through out
these proceedings he is referred to the Court. See Army Rule
106.
If the Commanding Officer of the accused (i.e., the Court) acts as
interpreter he must take the Interpreter‘s oath in addition to the
oath prescribed for the Court.
The charge sheet is read (translated) and explained to the
accused marked ―B-2‖ by the Court and attached to
proceedings.
Instructions : - Transaction of superior authority for trial by
Summary Court Martial
should be entered with the date and signature of the officer at the
foot of the charge sheet, when sanction is necessary
(See AA Section 120(2).
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 28 of 41
18. The question and the answer, which was asked and which
was alleged to have been answered by the petitioner are as
under:-
―ARRAIGNMENT
Question By the Court – How say you 2976576N Sepoy
th
to Accused Vishav Priya Singh of 19 Bn the Mahar Regt. att
with 19 PUNJAB. You guilty or not guilty of the
charge preferred against you?
Answer - Guilty‖
19. It is a conceded position that the signatures of the
petitioner were not taken on the plea of guilty. Be that as it may,
the issue whether the signatures of the accused Officer having not
been taken would vitiate the proceedings. The position of law is
well settled and there are judgments, which have been rendered
by this Court on this aspect. One judgment where a Coordinate
Bench of this Court had summed up the law is Anil Kumar v.
Union of India and Ors W.P.(C) No. 2681/2000 decided on
August 06, 2012, wherein the Coordinate Bench dealing with the
provisions of the BSF Rules, which are para-materia to the Army
Rules, as referred above has in paras 22 and 23 held as under:-
―22. It is true that as per the BSF Rules 1969 which
were in force when the trial took place there is no
requirement of obtaining the signatures of the accused
upon the accused pleading guilty. But, prudence
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 29 of 41
demands that the signature of an accused, who pleads
guilty to a charge, should be obtained when the guilt is
admitted. However, we hasten to add that a procedural
default cannot be equated as a substantive default and
merely because a plea of guilt does not bear the
signatures of the accused is no ground to conclude in
favour of the accused. The correct approach has to be,
to apply the judicial mind and look at the surrounding
circumstances enwombing the arraignment.
23. What would the surrounding circumstances be?
The Record of Evidence would be a good measure of
the surrounding circumstances. If at the Record of
Evidence the accused has cross-examined the witnesses
and has projected a defence and in harmony with the
defence has made a statement, and with respect to the
defence has brought out material evidence, it would
not stand to logic or reason that such an accused
would plead guilty at a trial. But, where during Record
of Evidence, if it is a case akin to a person being
caught with his pants down i.e. it is an open and shut
case, and the accused does not cross examine the
witnesses and does not make a statement in defence,
but simply pleads for forgiveness, it would be an
instance where the accused, having no defence, would
be pleading guilty and simultaneously pleading for
mercy at the trial. We note that various decisions by
Division Benches of this Court have been taking
conflicting views with respect to absence of signatures
of an accused beneath the plea of guilt at a Summary
Security Force Court trial. In the decision reported as
2008 (152) DLT 611 Subhas Chander v. UOI the view
taken was that a plea of guilt which is not signed by the
accused would vitiate the punishment. The decision
reported as 2004 (110) DLT 268 Choka Ram v. UOI
holds to the converse.‖
20. From the above, it is clear that mere not taking signatures
of the Officer would not vitiate the proceedings. The Coordiante
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 30 of 41
Bench in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) has held, the
surrounding circumstances would become relevant. This include,
the record of evidence where evidence has come against the
petitioner. In the case in hand, during the summary of evidence,
three witnesses were produced by the respondents, who were not
cross examined by the petitioner. Rather, the petitioner has
signed the proceedings as correct. But whether on the basis of
that summary of evidence, assuming the statements of the
witnesses are correct, the charge framed against the petitioner
shall be sustainable. A reading of the charge, as noted above,
would reveal, the petitioner has disobeyed the lawful command
given by the Superior officer. The facts leading to the framing of
the charge are that while the petitioner was in active service at
1230 hrs on July 16, 1990 when Naib Subedar Gurcharan Singh
asked him to accept an official letter dated July 16, 1990
requiring his presence in the CO’s Office for investigation in
uniform, which he refused to do so. Even, verbal orders given by
the Subedar Adjutant to this effect were also not obeyed. The
statement of the witnesses have already been reproduced above.
From the statements, it is seen that Adjutant required the
petitioner to be present in the CO’s office for the investigation,
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 31 of 41
that too wearing a uniform of a Sepoy. The wearing of uniform
of a Sepoy was objected to by the petitioner as, according to him,
he was a Lance Naik. It is also revealed that the petitioner has
not refused to come for investigation but he said that he would
only come in civilian dress. No doubt, it has come on record that
the petitioner has refused to accept the letter dated July 16, 1990
and sign the receipt but the petitioner’s justification that he shall
not come in the investigation in the dress of a Sepoy, cannot be
faulted. The justification given by the respondents in this regard,
that the petitioner was awarded a punishment of deprivation of
the appointment of Lance Naik on May 26, 1990 is unfounded as
there is no evidence placed on record to show such an order of
deprivation was communicated to the petitioner. Further, the
justification of the respondents is, Lance Naik is an appointment
and not a Rank by placing reliance on Rule 29 Note 3 would not
hold good.
21. Even a deprivation of an appointment has to be by
following the principles of natural justice. It is not the case of the
respondents that the order of deprivation of appointment was
served on the petitioner and he did not challenge the same. In
other words, the petitioner continued to hold the appointment of
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 32 of 41
Lance Naik and not of a Sepoy. This justifies the insistence of
the petitioner that he will only wear the uniform of a Lance Naik
when the Officer had come to the petitioner on July 16, 1990 for
conveying the orders of the Adjudant for appearance before the
CO for investigation. But that can’t be a ground to refuse the
receipt of official letter dated July 16, 1990, which was tendered.
He after receiving the same could have justified his position of
not appearing before the CO. But at the same time, on that
charge, the petitioner could not have been imposed a penalty of
imprisonment of six months followed by dismissal. It appears
precisely for this reason, the respondents have converted the
penalty of dismissal to discharge. Whether the penalty of
discharge is proportionate to the charge framed against the
petitioner, that he refused to receive the letter dated July 16,
1990. The answer to the said question has to be in the negative,
more so, in view of the position of law as enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Thakur (supra) on which
reliance was placed by the counsel for the petitioner. The said
case also relates to Army wherein the appellant Ranjit Thakur
joined the Armed Services on September 7, 1972. He had not
commended himself well to respondent no.4, the Commanding
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 33 of 41
Officer. On March 29, 1985, appellant Ranjit Thakur was
serving out a sentence of 28 days’ rigorous imprisonment
imposed on him for violating the norms for presenting the
representations to higher officers. He had sent the representation
complaining ill treatment at the hands of the respondent no.4
directly to the higher officers. The appellant was punished for
that by respondent no.4. He was held in the Quarter-guard Cell
in handcuffs to serve the sentence of rigorous imprisonment.
While serving so, the appellant stated to have committed another
offence for which further punishment was imposed on him. The
charge in that case was of disobeying the lawful command given
by his superior Officer inasmuch as he did not eat his food
despite order to do that. A summary court-martial assembled the
very next day. Some witnesses were examined. The appellant
stated to have pleaded guilty. The sentence of RI for one year
was imposed in pursuance of which appellant was removed
immediately to civil prison at Tejpur to serve out the sentence.
The representation of the appellant to the confirming authority
under Section 164 of the Act was rejected by the General officer
Commanding. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The
Supreme Court while setting aside the impugned action of the
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 34 of 41
respondents has in Para 24 and 25 held as under:
“24. The submission that a disregard of an order to eat food
does not by itself amount to a disobedience to a lawful
command for purposes of section 41 has to be examined in
the context of the imperatives of the high and rigorous
discipline to be maintained in the Armed Forces. Every
aspect of life of a soldier is regulated by discipline.
Rejection of food might, under circumstances, amount to an
indirect expression of remonstrance and resentment against
the higher authority. To say that, a mere refusal to eat food
is an innocent, neutral act might be an over-simplification
of the matter. Mere in-action need not always necessarily be
neutral. Serious acts of calumny could be done in silence. A
disregard of a direction to accept food might assume the
complexion of disrespect to, and even defiance of authority.
But an unduly harsh and cruel reaction to the expression of
the injured feelings may be counter-productive and even by
itself be subversive of discipline. Appellant was perhaps
expressing his anguish at, what he considered, an unjust
and disproportionate punishment for airing his grievances
before his superior officers. However, it is not necessary in
this case to decide contention (c) in view of our finding on
the other contentions.
25 . Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed
against a decision, but is directed against the "decision
making process". The question of the choice and quantum of
punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It
should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock
the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence
of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the
concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an
aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of
the court-martial, if the decision of the Court even as to
sentence is an outrageous defiance of B logic, then the
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 35 of 41
sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality
and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review. In
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service, [1984] 3 Weekly Law Reports 1174 (HL) Lord
Deplock said:
"... Judicial Review has I think developed to a
stage today when without reiterating any analysis
of the steps by which the development has come
about, one can conveniently classify under three
heads the grounds upon which administrative
action is subject to control by judicial review. The
first ground l would call 'illegality'. the second
irrationality' and the third 'procedural
impropriety'. That is not to say that further
development on a case by case basis may not in
course of time add further grounds. I have in mind
particularly the possible adoption in the future of
the principle of 'proportionality' which is
recognized in the administrative law of several of
our fellow members of the European Economic
Community.‖
22. From the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, it is
clear that the Supreme Court held that judicial review generally
speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against
the decision making process. The question of the choice and
quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion
of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should
not be so disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 36 of 41
conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias.
23. In the case in hand, the charge against the petitioner is
that he has refused to receive the letter dated July 16, 1990. The
refusal of the petitioner, as referred above, was in a given
background, which was bonafide and not a serious act of
insubordination, at least in the given facts. No doubt, being an
armed forces personnel, discipline is expected from such
personnel but at the same time those exercising command need to
be sensitive to their needs to the extent service exigency permit.
The punishment of imprisonment of six months followed by
discharge from service would be unjust, unduly harsh and
disproportionate. Moreover, there is a plea of bias against CO of
his regiment. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that the CO
Punjab, the investigating officer was the course mate of his CO.
24. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
respondents on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Ex. Ct. Kalu Ram (supra) and Chokha Ram (supra) are
concerned, in Chokha Ram (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this
Court while considering the provisions of the Border Security
Force Rules, 1969, has inter-alia held that not obtaining the
signatures of the Charged Officer on the plea of guilt cannot be
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 37 of 41
held vitiated, when in that case, in the course of record of
evidence the petitioner therein had already made a statement
admitting his guilt. The said judgment would not have a bearing
insofar as the conclusion of this Court above as the same is a non-
issue.
25. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Ex. Ct. Kalu Ram
(supra) is concerned, in the said judgment also the Coordinate
Bench of this Court has held that it cannot be universally laid
down that the plea of guilt taken by the Charged Officer would
stand vitiated in every case where the document containing the
plea of guilty of the Charged Officer does not bear the signature
of the Charged Officer. It held, it depends upon the facts of each
case.
26. Insofar as the judgments referred to by Ms. Barkha
Babbar in the cases of R.K. Sharma (supra) and Surender
Kumar (supra) are concerned, in R.K. Sharma (supra) the
Supreme Court has held that the High Court under Article 226 or
227 and Supreme Court under Article 32 should not interfere
with the punishment so imposed merely on compassionate
grounds such as it being disproportionately harsh; except in ex
facie cases of perversity or irrationality. In the said case, the
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 38 of 41
charges against the respondent was that he disobeyed the
command received from Headquarters to visit the forward posts
immediately to check alertness and report OK, by instead sending
a JCO there and making false entries in drawing ration for
personal consumption of Rs.930.37 from Quartermaster without
paying for the same. The said judgment is distinguishable
inasmuch as the charges in the case of R.K. Sharma (supra) are
of very severe nature. It was in that background, the penalty of
dismissal imposed by the appellant therein was interfered with by
the High Court, which was held to be not justified and the matter
was remanded back to the respondent for awarding a lessor
punishment. In the said case, the judgment of Ranjit Thakur
(supra) was distinguished on the ground that the facts disclose a
bias on the part of the Commanding Officer, inasmuch as the
appellant therein had fallen out of favour of the Commanding
Officer because he had complained against the Commanding
Officer, which is the case herein also, as noted above. The said
judgment is distinguishable.
27. Similarly in the case of Surender Kumar (supra), the
charge against the respondent was that while working as
Constable in CRPF, he was detailed with vehicle no.25 to carry
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 39 of 41
patrolling party on Chandel Palel Road but he left the vehicle
unattended and absented himself without permission of his
superior officer and reported on his own after 20 minutes. It was
alleged in the complaint that while he was on duty, he consumed
illicit alcohol and in an inebriated state of mind misbehaved with
his superior officer H.N. Singh, snatched his AK-47 rifle and
pointed the barrel of the rifle to him and on the intervention of
Lachhi Ram, Assistant Commandant, the barrel of the rifle was
pointed upward and an untoward incident was avoided. It was in
that background, the Supreme Court has held that the scope of
judicial review is warranted not only when the punishment is
disproportionate but is shockingly disproportionate and in an
extreme case where on the face of it, there is perversity or
irrationality. The case in hand is distinguishable as the charges
framed against Surender Kumar are of very serious nature as
compared to the charge against the petitioner herein. Moreover,
there are allegations of bias against the Commanding Officer
made by the petitioner. The case of Ranjit Thakur (supra) is
applicable in all force.
28. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition
succeeds. Order of imprisonment and discharge are set aside and
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 40 of 41
the punishment is substituted by stoppage of two increments with
cumulative effect coinciding with the date of increments,
following the date when the punishment of discharge was
imposed. The petitioner shall be entitled to consequential
benefits as Lance Naik, including retiral benefits. The order shall
be complied within a period of three months from today.
29. The petition is disposed of. No costs.
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
G.S. SISTANI, J
MAY 25, 2018/ ak/jg
W.P.(C) No. 2511/1992 Page 41 of 41