VINUBHAI RANCHHODBHAI PATEL vs. RAJIVBHAI DUDABHAI PATEL .

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1525 OF 2009 Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel … Appellant Versus Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel & Others …     Respondents WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1526­1527 OF 2009  J U D G M E N T  Chelameswar, J. 1. On 11.07.1992, at about 10.10 pm, an incident occurred in the village of Nana Ankadia leaving 3 persons dead and 5 persons injured. It appears from the judgment of the High Court: “…information   about   the   incident   was   conveyed   by   wireless message by PSO of Amreli (Rural) Police Station to PSI, Mr. NG Rajput. On the basis of the said information, PSI, Rajput had gone to village Nana Ankadia and found three dead bodies lying near   the   shop   of   Bhikabhai   and   after   getting   some   further information,   he   had   gone   to   Amreli   Hospital   and   recorded complaint from Vinu Ranchhod, which was registered at about 1.30 a.m. on 12.07.1992. On the basis of the said complaint, PSI,   Rajput   started   investigation   by   recording   statements, drawing   panchnamas   and   sending   the   dead   bodies   for   post mortem etc.” Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date: 2018.05.16 14:24:02 IST Reason: 1 2. On completion of investigation, a charge­sheet came to be filed against 15 accused because the remaining two accused A­16 and   A­17   were   absconding   for   some   time.   The   matter   was committed   to   the   Sessions   Court   of   Amreli   as   offences   were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. In Sessions Case No. 118/1992,   trial   was   conducted   against   15   accused.   The   trial insofar as the two absconding accused was segregated from the trial of the remaining even after they were apprehended and they were put to trial separately in Sessions Case No. 58/98 before the Special Judge of the Fast Track Court, Amreli.  3. In Sessions Case No.118/1992, the Sessions Court by its judgment dated 17.01.1996 recorded the conviction of A­1, A­5, A­10 and A­12 as follows: “Prosecution has proved the criminal offence punishable under section 302 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 135(1)   of   the   B.P.   Act,   against   the   accused   No.   10   and   [12] respectively Nanjibhai Khodabhai and Ratilal Nagji, and therefore the accused No. 10 and 12 are convicted under sections 302, 148 IPC and section 135(1) of the B.P. Act. The accused No. 1 Ravji Duda   is   convicted   for   the   criminal   offence   punishable   under section   326   and   148   of   IPC   and   section   135(1)   of   B.P.   Act. Whereas the accused No. 5 Manubhai Makanbhia is convicted for the criminal offence punishable under section 326, 323 and 148 of   the   IPC   and   section   135(1)   of   the   B.P.   Act.   Whereas   the accused other than these accused, the prosecution has not been able to prove their case beyond doubt therefore the accused No. 2,3,4,6,7,8,9,11,13,14 and 15 are given the benefit of doubt and are acquitted, and if they are not required in any other matter, then   the   accused   Nos.   2,3,4,6,7,8,11,13,14   be   released   from 2 judicial custody. The accused No. 2,4,9 and 15 are enlarged on bail, their bail bonds are ordered to be cancelled.” And by separate order dated 17.01.1996, A­10 and A­12 were sentenced   to   imprisonment   for   life   for   an   offence   punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code [hereinafter referred to as “IPC”]; one year rigorous imprisonment for an offence punishable under Section 148 IPC; and six months rigorous imprisonment for an offence punishable under Section 135(1) of the Bombay Police Act [hereinafter referred to as “BP Act”]. 4. A­1 was sentenced to suffer six years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1000/­ for an offence under Section 326 IPC and one year rigorous imprisonment for an offence punishable under Section 148 IPC and six months rigorous imprisonment for an offence under Section 135(1) of the BP Act. 5. A­5 was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment and fine for an offence punishable under Section 326 IPC and one year   rigorous   imprisonment   for   an   offence   punishable   under Section   148   IPC,   six   months   rigorous   imprisonment   for   an offence   under   Section   323   IPC   and   six   months   rigorous imprisonment for an offence under Section 135(1) of the BP Act. 3 6. All the convicted accused preferred appeal No. 166/1996 before   the   High   Court   of   Gujarat   challenging   conviction   and sentence.   The   State   of   Gujarat   filed   Criminal   Appeal No.167/1996 challenging the acquittal of the remaining thirteen accused. It must be mentioned here that the original complainant also filed a Criminal Revision Petition No.138/1996 challenging the   decision   of   the   Sessions   Court   acquitting   eleven   of   the accused.  7. The   two   absconding   accused   nos.16   and   17   “ were   tried separately for the offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 120B, 302 and 307 read with section 149 of IPC and under Section 25(1)(A) of the Arms Act   and   under   Section   135   of   Bombay   Police   Act   in   Sessions   Case 1 No.58/98.”   They were found not guilty by the Fast Track Court, Amreli by judgment dated 19.07.2003. The State of Gujarat filed Criminal Appeal No.1226/2003 against the acquittal of accused nos.16 and 17. 8. All the appeals and the revision were clubbed together and disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment dated 1 2.2, Judgment of the High Court. 4 5.10.2004, which is the subject matter of the various appeals before us. 9. The appeal of A­10 and A­12 was dismissed by the High Court. The appeal of accused nos.1 and 5 was partly allowed. The State   appeals   challenging   acquittals   of   various   accused   were dismissed   along   with   the   revision   filed   by   the   de   facto complainant. Hence, these appeals, by the State and the  de facto complainant. 10. Admittedly all the convicts have by now served out their sentences. Some of the accused have even died. 11. An examination of the record in these appeals left us in distress. The judgments of the Sessions Courts as well as the High Court leave too much to be desired.  12. We notice the following striking features from the judgment of the Sessions Court that:  (i) Charges   have   not   been   framed   in   accordance with the requirements of the CrPC; (ii) There appears to be a charge (however defectively framed), conviction and sentencing of 4 accused for an offence under Section 148 IPC; (iii)  There is an omnibus accusation that the accused committed   offences   falling   under   Sections   143, 5 147,   148   and   vicariously   liable   by   virtue   of Section 149 IPC for the offence of Section 302 IPC;  (iv) The judgment does not contain any clear finding: (a)  regarding   the   existence   of   an   ‘unlawful assembly’ i.e. regarding the accusation of an offence punishable under Section 143 IPC; (b) number of persons (identified or not) who participated in the attack on the deceased and the injured; or  (c)  the identity of such participants.  (v) The judgment is singularly silent regarding the post mortem examination report of one of the 3 deceased   and   the   evidence   of   the   doctor   who conducted the post mortem examination. It only discusses   the   evidence   of   the   doctor   who conducted the post mortem on the dead bodies of two of the deceased; (vi) The   judgment   does   not   specify   whether   the accused   10   and   12   are   guilty   of   causing   the death of all the 3 deceased or one of them;  (vii) The legal analysis and appreciation of evidence in the context of the question of vicarious liability is wholly unsubstantial and not in accordance with the settled principles of law; and (viii) There is material on record to indicate that even some   of   the   accused   received   injuries   in   the transaction   but   no   material   is   on   record indicating whether any crime is registered and investigated   or   anybody   is   prosecuted   in   that regard.   6 13. The judgment in Sessions Case No.118/1992 commences with an omnibus statement: “In this case against the present accused, there are charges of offences under sections 302, 307, 324, 147, 148, 149, 120B of IPC and section 25(1)(aa) of the Arms Act and section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, for these offences the charge sheet is filed.” Later in the same paragraph it is stated: “Fifteen accused in the case have remained present before the court, my learned predecessor has on 21/3/1994 below Exh. 1 on charges of offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 148, 302 read with 149, 120­b, 307 read with 147, 114, 120­b of the Indian Penal Code and against the accused Nos. 7, 8 and 11 charges under section 27 of the Arms Act, and against all the accused the offence punishable under section 25 of the Indian Telegraphs Act, and for carrying weapons the charges of violation of the Notification by the District Magistrate Amreli, for which against the accused Nos. 2,4,9,15,10,12,13, 1, 3, 6, 7 and 8 the charges of offence punishable under section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, charges were pronounced against the accused.” It appears from the above that no clear charges appear to have been framed.  At any rate, no document is brought to our notice showing the charges framed by the Court in spite of repeated enquiry.   It must be remembered that it is a case where three persons died and five persons were injured allegedly in an attack by all the  accused.     Causing death  to each one   of  the  three persons or causing injury to each one of the five persons is a distinct   offence.   Similarly,   an   offence   under   Section   307   is  a distinct offence specific to a particular victim. The offences under 7 Sections 147 and 148 are distinct offences.  Section 149 IPC does not   create   a   separate   offence   but   only   declares   the   vicarious liability of all the members of an unlawful assembly in certain circumstances.  14. It   was   held   by   a   three­judge   bench   of   this   Court   in 2 Shambhu Nath Singh & Others v. State of Bihar :  “ Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is declaratory of the vicarious liability of the members of an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or for such offences as the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object”    [emphasis supplied] 3 However, there are benches of a lesser smaller strength   which have observed that Section 149 creates a specific and distinct offence. In view of the fact that decision in   Shambu Nath Singh was decided by a larger bench, the law declared therein must be taken to be declaring the correct legal position.   With utmost respect, we may also add that the same is in accord with the settled   principles   of   the   interpretation   of   the   statutes   having regard to the language of Section 149 and its context.  2 AIR 1960 SC 725 3 Sheo Mahadeo Singh v. State of Bihar, (1970) 3 SCC 46 paragraph 9; Lalji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1989 (1) SCC 437 paragraph 9 8 15. Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”] deals with “charges” in a criminal case. Sections 211 to 213 deal with the particulars which are required to be contained in a charge in a criminal trial.  These provisions are made to ensure a fair procedure by which a person accused of an offence should be tried – a procedure in compliance with the requirement of the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.   The accused are entitled in law to know with precision what is the charge on which they are put to trial. It was held by 4 this Court in  Esher Singh  v.  State of Andhra Pradesh : “It is the precise formulation of the specific accusation made against   a   person   who   is   entitled   to   know   its   nature   at   the earliest   stage.   A   charge   is   not   an   accusation   made   or information given in the abstract,   but an accusation made against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted in violation of penal law forbidding or commanding it. In other words, it is an accusation made against a person in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him. A charge is formulated   after   inquiry   as   distinguished   from   the   popular meaning of the word as implying inculpation of a person for an alleged offence as used in Section 224 of the IPC.” [emphasis supplied] 16. In the case on hand where three persons died, the charge under   Section   302   must   have   been   framed   on   three   counts against specifically named accused with respect to each of the deceased. Assuming for the sake of argument, that all the 17 4 (2004) 11 SCC 585, para 20 9 persons are accused of causing the death of each one of the three deceased, distinct charges should have been framed with respect to each of the deceased. It is also necessary that the court should record a specific finding as to the guilt of the accused under Section 302 IPC  qua  the death of a named deceased. If different accused   are   prosecuted   for   causing   the   death   of   the   three different   deceased,   then   distinct   charges   should   have   been framed   specifying   which   of   the   accused   are   charged   for   the offence of causing the death of which one of the three different deceased.   Charges   should   also   have   been   proved   clearly indicating which of the accused is charged for the offence under Section 302 simpliciter or which of the accused are vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for causing the death of one or more of   the   three   deceased.   Of   course,   none   of   the   accused   is eventually found vicariously guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 17. By definition of the offences covered under Sections 147 and 5 148 , a person cannot be charged simultaneously with both the offences by the very nature of theses offences.  A person can only 5 Section 146 IPC defines the offence of rioting. Section 147, IPC prescribes punishment for offence of rioting. Section 148, IPC prescribes punishment for offence of rioting armed with deadly weapons. 10 be held guilty of an offence punishable either under Section 147 or Section 148. 18. The   legal   consequences   of   framing   defective   charges   or omission in charges was considered by this Court in  Dalbir Singh 6 v.  State of U.P.   and this Court held as follows: 

It is obvious from the above that an erroneous or irregular or even absence of a specific charge shall not render the conviction recorded by a court invalid unless the appellate court comes to a conclusion that failure of  justice has  in fact  been occasioned thereby.   19. In cases where a large number of accused constituting an ‘unlawful assembly’ are alleged to have attacked and killed one or more persons, it is not necessary that each of the accused should inflict fatal injuries or any injury at all.  Invocation of Section 149 is essential in such cases for punishing the members of such 6 (2004) 5 SCC 334 11 unlawful   assemblies   on   the   ground   of   vicarious   liability   even though they are not accused of having inflicted fatal injuries in appropriate cases if the evidence on record justifies.   The mere presence   of   an   accused   in   such   an   ‘unlawful   assembly’   is sufficient to render him vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for causing the death of the victim of the attack provided that the accused are told that they have to face a charge rendering them vicariously   liable   under   Section   149   IPC   for   the   offence punishable   under   Section   302   IPC.     Failure   to   appropriately invoke and apply Section 149 enables large number of offenders to get away with the crime.  7 20. This Court in  Bala Seetharamaiah  v.  Perike S. Rao   held: “8.   Unfortunately,   the   Sessions   Judge   did   not   frame   charge against   the   accused   persons   for   offence   punishable   under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. It is also important to note that the relevant prosecution allegations so as to bring in the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC also were not incorporated in the charge framed by the Sessions Judge. The accused were not told  that   they   had  to  face   charges  of   being  members   of  an unlawful assembly and the common object of such assembly was to commit murder of the deceased and in furtherance of that common object murder was committed and thereby they had a constructive liability and thus they committed the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. Of course the mere omission to mention Section 149 may be considered as an irregularity, but failure to mention the nature of the offence committed by them cannot be said to be a mere 7 (2004) 4 SCC 557, para 8. 12 irregularity. Had this mistake been noticed at the trial stage, the Sessions Judge could have corrected the charge at any time before the delivery of the judgment. In the instant case, the accused were told to face a charge punishable under Section 302 simpliciter and there was no charge under Section 302 IPC read   with   Section   149   IPC.   Therefore,   it   is   not   possible   to reverse the conviction of the accused under Section 326 IPC and substitute the conviction for the offence punishable under Sections 302/149 IPC as there was no charge framed against them for such offence.” 21. When a large number of people gather together (assemble) and   commit   an   offence,   it   is   possible   that   only   some   of   the members of the assembly commit the crucial act which renders the transaction an offence and the remaining members do not take part in that ‘crucial act’ ­ for example in a case of murder, the infliction of the fatal injury. It is in those situations, the legislature thought it fit as a matter of legislative policy to press 8 into   service   the   concept   of   vicarious   liability   for   the   crime. Section 149 IPC is one such provision.  It is a provision conceived in the larger public interest to maintain the tranquility of the society   and   prevent   wrong   doers   (who   actively   collaborate   or assist   the   commission   of   offences)   claiming   impunity   on   the 8 Ram Gope v. State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 689 paragraph 5: “… When a concerted attack is made on the victim by a large number of persons it is often difficult to determine the actual part played by each offender. But on that account for an offence committed by a member of the unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the common object or for an offence which was known to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, persons proved to be members cannot escape the consequences arising from the doing of that act which amounts to an offence.” 13 ground that their activity as members of the unlawful assembly is limited.    The responsibility of the prosecution and/or of the Court (in a case like the one at hand where large numbers of people (5 or more) are collectively accused to have committed various offences and   subjected   to   trial)   ­   in   examining   whether   some   of   the members of such group are vicariously liable for some offence committed   by   some   of   the   other   members   of   such   group   ­ requires an analysis.  Such analysis has two components – (i) the amplitude and the vicarious liability created under Section 149; and (ii) the facts which are required to be proved to hold an accused vicariously liable for an offence.  22. To understand the true scope and amplitude of Section 149 IPC   it   is   necessary   to   examine   the   scheme   of   Chapter   VIII (Sections 141 to 160) of the IPC which is titled “Of the offences against the public tranquility”. Sections 141 to 158 deal with offences   committed   collectively   by   a   group   of   5   or   more individuals.  23. Section   141   IPC   declares   an   assembly   of   five   or   more persons to be an ‘unlawful assembly’ if the common object of 14 such   assembly   is   to   achieve   any   one   of   the   five   objects 9 enumerated in the said section.   One of the enumerated objects 10 is to commit any offence.    “The words falling under section 141, clause third “or other offence” cannot be restricted to mean only minor offences of trespass or mischief. These words cover all offences falling under any of the 11 provisions   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   or   any   other   law.”   The   mere assembly of 5 or more persons with such legally impermissible object   itself   constitutes   the   offence   of   unlawful   assembly punishable under Section 143 of the IPC. It is not necessary that any overt act is required to be committed by such an assembly to 12 be punished under Section 143. 24. If force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly or any member thereof in prosecution of the common objective of such assembly,   every   member   of   such   assembly   is   declared   under Section 146 to be guilty of the offence of rioting punishable with two years imprisonment under Section 147.   To constitute the offence of rioting under Section 146, the use of force or violence need not necessarily result in the achievement of the common 9 See Yeshwant & Others v. State of Maharashtra , (1972) 3 SCC 639 10 Section 40 “offence”.- Except in the Chapters and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the word “offence” denotes a thing made punishable by this Code. 11Manga alias Man Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 7 SCC 629 12 See Dalip Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab , AIR 1953 SC 364. 15 13 object.  In other words, the employment of force or violence need not result in the commission of a crime or the achievement of any one of the five enumerated common objects under Section 141. 25. Section   148   declares   that   rioting   armed   with   deadly weapons is a distinct offence punishable with the longer period of imprisonment (three years).   There is a distinction between the offences under 146 and 148.   To constitute an offence under Section 146, the members of the ‘unlawful assembly’ need not carry weapons.   But to constitute an offence under Section 148, a   person   must   be   a   member   of   an   unlawful   assembly,   such assembly is also guilty of the offence of rioting under Section 146 and the person charged with an offence under Section 148 must 14 also be armed with a deadly weapon. 15 26. Section   149   propounds   a   vicarious   liability   in   two contingencies by declaring that   (i)   if a member of an unlawful assembly  commits an offence in prosecution of the common then every member of such unlawful object of that assembly,   assembly is guilty of the offence committed by the other members 13 See Sundar Singh Vs. State, AIR 1955 All 232 (FB) 14 See Sabir v . Queen Empress, (1894) ILR 22 Cal 276; In re Choitano Ranto and Others, AIR 1916 Mad 788 15 See Shambu Nath Singh Vs. State of Bihar , AIR 1960 SC 725. 16 of the unlawful assembly and (ii) even in cases where all the members   of   the   unlawful   assembly   do   not   share   the   same common object to commit a particular offence,  if they had the knowledge of the   fact that some of the other members of the assembly   are   likely   to   commit   that   particular   offence   in prosecution of the common object. The scope of Section 149 IPC 16 was enunciated by this Court in  Masalti : “ The crucial question to determine in such a case is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects as specified by section 141. While determining this question, it becomes relevant to consider whether the assembly consisted of some   persons   who   were   merely   passive   witnesses   and   had joined   the   assembly   as   a   matter   of   idle   curiosity   without intending to entertain the common object of the assembly. It is in that context that the observations made by this court in the case of  Baladin   assume significance; otherwise, in law, it would not   be   correct   to   say   that   before   a   person   is   held   to   be   a member of an unlawful assembly, it must be shown that he had committed some illegal overt act or had been guilty of some illegal   omission   in   pursuance   of   the   common   object   of   the assembly. In fact, section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is committed   by   any   member   of   an   unlawful   assembly   in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the   members   of   that   assembly     knew   to   be   likely   to   be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence, and that emphatically brings   out   the   principle   that   the   punishment   prescribed   by section 149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually committed by every member of the unlawful assembly. ” 27. It can be seen from the above, Sections 141, 146 and 148 create distinct offences.   Section 149 only creates a vicarious 16 Masalti  v.  State of U.P. ,  AIR 1965 SC 202. 17 liability.     However, Sections 146, 148 and 149 contain certain legislative declarations based on the doctrine of vicarious liability. The doctrine is well known in civil law especially in the branch of torts, but is applied very sparingly in criminal law only when there   is   a   clear   legislative   command.     To   be   liable   for punishment   under   any   one   of   the   provisions,   the fundamental   requirement   is   the   existence   of   an   unlawful assembly   as   defined   under   Section   141   made   punishable under Section 143 IPC.    28. The concept of an unlawful assembly as can be seen from Section 141 has two elements; (i) The   assembly   should   consist   of   at   least   five persons; and (ii) They should have a common object to commit an offence   or   achieve   any   one   of   the   objects enumerated therein. 29. For recording a conclusion, that a person is  (i)  guilty of any one   of   the   offences   under   Sections   143,   146   or   148   or   (ii) vicariously liable under Section 149 for some other offence, it must   first   be   proved   that   such   person   is   a   member   of   an ‘unlawful   assembly’   consisting   of   not   less   than   five   persons 18 irrespective of the fact whether the identity of each one of the 5 persons is proved or not. If that fact is proved, the next step of inquiry is whether the common object of the unlawful assembly is one of the 5 enumerated objects specified under Section 141 IPC. 30. The common object of assembly is normally to be gathered from the circumstances of each case such as the time and place of the gathering of the assembly, the conduct of the gathering as distinguished from the conduct of the individual members are indicative of the common object of the gathering. Assessing the common object of an assembly only on the basis of the overt acts committed by such individual members of the assembly, in our opinion is impermissible. For example, if more than five people gather together and attack another person with deadly weapons eventually resulting in the death of the victim, it is wrong to conclude that one or some of the members of such assembly did not share the common object with those who had inflicted the fatal injuries  (as  proved  by  medical evidence);   merely   on  the ground that the injuries inflicted by such members are relatively less serious and non fatal. 19 31. For   mulcting   liability   on   the   members   of   an   unlawful assembly   under   Section   149,   it   is   not   necessary   that   every member of the unlawful assembly should commit the offence in prosecution   of   the   common   object   of   the   assembly.   Mere knowledge of the likelihood of commission of such an offence  by  is sufficient. For example, if five the members of the assembly or more members carrying AK 47 rifles collectively attack a victim and cause his death by gunshot injuries, the fact that one or two of the members of the assembly did not in fact fire their weapons does not mean that they did not have the knowledge of the fact that the offence of murder is likely to be committed.  32. The identification of the common object essentially requires an   assessment   of   the   state   of   mind   of   the   members   of   the unlawful assembly. Proof of such mental condition is normally established   by   inferential   logic.     If   a   large   number   of   people gather at a public place at the dead of night armed with deadly weapons like axes and fire arms and attack another person or group of persons, any member of the attacking group would have to be a moron in intelligence if he did not know murder would be a likely consequence. 20 33. The Sessions Court purported to frame ‘issues’ – a practice statutorily mandated under the Code of Civil Procedure as one of the   ingredients   of   the   adjudication   of   a   suit.     But,   we   are informed that in the  State  of  Gujarat the  practice of  framing “issues” is prevalent even in the trial of a criminal case.  Be that as it may, obviously ‘issues’ are not the same as “charges”.  They are not framed prior to the commencement of trial.  They are only ‘identified’ at the time of writing the judgment.  34. Issue Nos.2 and 4 framed by the Sessions Judge are with respect to offence of unlawful assembly, rioting and the vicarious liability under the IPC.  Issue Nos. 2 and 4 read as follows:­ “(2)   Whether the prosecution has proved that, the accused and the persons of the complainant party are the Kadva and Leuva Patels of teh Nana Ankadiya, Taluka Amreli, and due to the enemity between them on 11/7/92 at about 22­15 at night near the   Nana   Ankadiya   village   Bus   stand,   near   the   shop   of Bhikhabhai in the public place  all the accused in this matter and   the   absconding   accused   Chandubhai   Vallabhbhai   and Vallabhbhai Khodabhai,  thus all of these had constituted an  and with the common intention of killing the illegal assembly Leuva Patels of the Nana Ankadiya village, attempted to murder, and at that above time and place, all these accused and the absconding   accused   with   the   intentions   of   achieving   their common object, caused rioted and committed criminal offence punishable under section 143, 147? (4)  Whether the prosecution is able to prove that, the accused had for achieving the common object of their illegal assembly, made use of the weapons carried by them and had assaulted Chhaganbhai   Premjibhai   Patel,   Madhubhai   Mohanbhai   Patel and Pragjihai Parbatbhai Patel and fired at them and by such act they were well aware that they would certainly be killed and 21 inspite of this intentionally and with the intentions of killing, caused   grievous   injuries,   and   all   the   three   persons   were assaulted and murdered, the said act was committed by the accused No. 2,4,5 and 9 using stick, and accused No. 10, 12 using sword, and accused No. 1, 3 and 6 using their dhariya, all three deceased were caused injuries and murdered, and thus the accused have committed criminal offence punishable under section 302, 149 and 114 of the IPC” [emphasis supplied] 35. Issue No. 2 makes a reference   to all the accused   put to trial along with absconding accused (put to trial subsequently in Sessions   Case   No.   58)   in   the   context   of   the   offences   of   the unlawful assembly  and  rioting.  Issue  No. 4  does  not  make  a reference to  “all the accused” , in the context of the offences under Sections 302 read with Section 149 IPC.   But in view of the reference   to   the   illegal   (obviously   the   learned   Judge   meant unlawful) assembly we assume that the Sessions Court intended to examine the vicarious liability under Section 149 of all the accused in the context of the death of the three victims.  Since the prosecution invoked Section 149, charges should have been framed   specifying   which   of   the   accused   are   sought   to   be punished for which offence with the aid of Section 149. 36. From the judgment of the Sessions Court, we do not see any clear   findings   recorded   (i)  as   to   the   existence   of   an   unlawful assembly, (ii) if it existed, how many (number of the members) 22 were present in the unlawful assembly.  It must be remembered that the accusation is that all the 17 accused were members of the unlawful assembly.  There appears to be an accusation of the commission of the offence under Section 143 IPC.   There is no finding whether the assembly consisted of 17 members or less (number) and which of the 17 accused were present (the identity) in the assembly. Nor is there any clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly.   Consequentially, there is no finding recorded by the Sessions Court whether an offence of unlawful assembly punishable under Section 143 was committed by   all   or   some   of   the   accused.   The   Trial   Court   recorded   the conviction under Section 148 IPC against 4 accused.  Logically it should follow that the trial court was of the opinion that there was   an   unlawful   assembly.   That   means   more   than   5   people participated in the attack. In such a case even assuming for the sake of argument the identity of the accused (other than the 4 convicts) is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, A­1 and A­5 who were found to have been guilty of the offence under Section 148 should normally have been found vicariously guilty of the offence of murder along with A­10 and A­12 (provided of course that they are not prejudiced by the improper framing of charges). 23 The record is not very clear whether the accused were told they were to face a charge of being members of the unlawful assembly, whose   common   object   was   to   commit   murder   of   the   three deceased. 37. Coming   to   the   conviction   of   A­10   and   A­12,   the   mere statement   in   the   Sessions   Court’s   judgment   that   two   of   the accused were found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC falls short of the requirement of law in a case where more than one person died in the transaction. Equally the other two accused who are convicted of other offences mentioned earlier are entitled to know the details of the offence for which they are convicted.  38. We shall now examine the judgment of the High Court. The High Court completely failed to take note of the defects in framing of the charges.    The High Court recorded a finding at paragraph 19, that the prosecution witnesses are trustworthy and they had witnessed 17 the incident. However, in paragraph 20 , the High Court records 17 “20.… However, all the PWs have not specifically involve all the accused. Likewise, there are certain discrepancies in their evidence regarding the part played by them, the weapons carried by them etc., that in our opinion is natural as all the accused, 17 in number came all of a sudden and started assaulting and that too during night hours when visibility was also low. Because of the same, the learned trial judge acquitted A-2, A-3, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-8, A-9, A-11, A-13, A-14 and A-15 by giving benefit of doubt. In other words, the learned 24 that there are discrepancies in the evidences of PWs regarding the part played by each of the accused, the weapons carried by them,   etc..   The   High   Court   takes   note   of   the   fact   that   the Sessions   Court  acquitted   11   accused   by   giving   the   benefit  of doubt. To us, it is not very clear whether the Sessions Court doubted the very presence of the 11 accused in the unlawful assembly or the Sessions Court doubted the very existence of an ‘unlawful assembly’ for the lack of proof of either the requisite number of the accused to constitute the unlawful assembly or for the   lack   of   proof   of   the   common   object   which   renders   the assembly to be an unlawful assembly (even if the court concluded that more than 5 people participated in the transaction). The High Court readily drew an inference that the Sessions Court disbelieved the case of the prosecution regarding the existence of an unlawful assembly, in our opinion, a very unsatisfactory way of analyzing the case of the prosecution vis­à­vis the vicarious liability of the accused under Section 149.  trial judge disbelieved the case of the prosecution of unlawful assembly and convicted the accused of their individual act. After carefully examining the evidence on record, we are of the view that the presence of A-2, A-4, A-9 and A-15 who were alleged to have carried sticks, is not established. The complainant involved them in his further statement. Likewise other PWs are also contradicted about the presence of these accused with their previous statement. Apart from that in the post mortem reports of the deceased as well as in the injury certificates of the injured, the injuries do not reveal any injury possible with sticks.” 25 The   High   Court   recorded   a   finding   with   reference   to   4 accused   (A­2,   A­4,   A­9   and   A­15)   who   according   to   the prosecution were alleged to have carried sticks, that there is no evidence on record to prove the same on three grounds: (i) that their names were not to be found in the FIR (ii) that there were improvements   in   the   evidence   of   the   PWs   at   various   stages regarding   the   presence   of   the   four   accused   and   (iii)   that   the medical evidence does not disclose any injury which could have been attributed to the beatings by sticks. In our opinion, the first two reasons given by the High Court are legally tenable, however, the third reason, i.e. the absence of injuries attributable to a stick,   need   not   necessarily   result   in   a   conclusion   that   the accused   were   not   present   in   the   unlawful   assembly.   But   the absence   of   such   injuries   cannot   said   to   be   an   irrelevant consideration   in   arriving   at   a   conclusion   whether   the   four accused participated in the unlawful assembly in the background of the other two factors mentioned above. But a similar analysis with respect to the seven of the other accused who were given the benefit of doubt by the Sessions Court is lacking in the judgment of the High Court. 26 Another important aspect of the matter is that at least one of   the   accused   (A­7)   appears   to   have   been   injured   in   the transaction and it appears from the judgment of the High Court that an FIR in that regard was lodged.  A submission was made 18 that there was tampering with the record to screen the offence. This aspect of the matter has not been considered either by the trial Court or by the High Court.  In fact, the judgment of the trial Court contains further details regarding this aspect of the matter but without recording any conclusive finding.   39. The question is whether this court would  be justified in reversing the finding of acquittal in the case on hand on the grounds that (i) the framing of charges is egregiously erroneous and not in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC; or (ii) the courts below failed to record appropriate findings with respect to the   various   offences   which   the   accused   are   said   to   have st committed; or (iii) the 1  appellate court’s reasoning in declining to reverse a finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court is 18 Impugned Judgment Para 6. “ … Finally, Mr. Shethna submitted that investigation in the instant case is also not free from doubt. According to him, the manner in which the FIR given by A-7, being the first in point of time, was treated and the manner in which the investigating officer expresses his ignorance in the hospital of the erasure made in the station diary etc. would go to show that a deliberate attempt is made to falsely involve the accused.” 27 defective?  The answer to the question, in our opinion, should be in the negative. 40.   In   Sessions   Case   No.58/98   against   A­16   and   A­17,   no evidence was recorded independently. On the other hand, the evidence recorded in Sessions Case No.118/1992 was marked as evidence in Sessions Case No.58/1998. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not permit such a mode of proof of any fact barring in 19 exceptional situations contemplated in Section 33  of the Indian Evidence Act. 41.  There is no material on record to warrant the procedure adopted by the Sessions Court. On that single ground, the entire trial   of   Sessions   Case   No.58/98   is   vitiated   and   is   not   in accordance with procedures established by law. It is a different matter   that   both   the   accused   put   to   trial   in   Sessions   Case No.58/98 were acquitted by the Fast Track Court and the High “ 33. Relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent proceeding, the truth of facts therein stated. –– 19 Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding , or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving , in a subsequent judicial proceeding , or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable: Provided –– that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine ; that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding. Explanation.–– A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this section.” 28 Court did not interfere with the conclusions recorded by the Fast Track Court. 42. It is the grievance of the appellant that in spite of the gravity of the offence and the evidence of the 5 injured witnesses, most of the accused went scot free without any punishment and, hence, this appeal. We   do   understand   the   grievance   of   the   appellant.   The 20 following prophetic words of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer   deserve to be etched on the walls of every criminal court in this country:

20 In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra , (1973) 2 SCC 793, para 6 29 The prophecy came true when Section 21 of TADA Act, 1987 burdened   the   accused   to   prove   his   innocence,   and   when   the Parliament responded to the public outcry to impose more and more harsher punishments to persons found guilty of the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC etc. 43.  For   all   the   abovementioned   reasons,   we   should   have recorded a conclusion that there is a failure of justice in the case on hand looked at from the point of view of either the victims or even from the point of view of the convicted accused.  The most normal consequence thereafter should have been to order a fresh trial, but such a course of action after a lapse of 26 years of the occurrence of the crime, in our opinion, would not serve any useful purpose because as already indicated some of the accused have died in the interregnum. We are not sure of the availability of the witnesses at this point of time. Even if all the witnesses are available, how safe it would be to record their evidence after a quarter century and place reliance on the same for coming to a gist conclusion regarding the culpability of the accused?   44. We   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   only   course   of   action available to this court is that the victims of the crime in this case 30 are   required   to   be   compensated   by   the   award   of   public   law damages in light of the principles laid down by this Court in 21 Nilabati Behera .   In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the families of each of the deceased should be paid by the State an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/­ (Rupees Twenty Five Lacs Only) each and the injured witnesses, if still surviving, otherwise their   families   are   required   to   be   paid   an   amount   of Rs.10,00,000/­ (Rupees Ten Lacs Only) each. The said amount shall be deposited within a period of eight weeks from today in the Trial Court, and on such deposit the said amounts shall be distributed   by   the   Sessions   Judge,   after   an   enquiry   and satisfying himself regarding the genuineness of the entitlement of the claimants.    45. This case, in our opinion, is a classic illustration of how the State   failed   in   its   primary   constitutional   responsibility   of maintaining   law   and   order   by   its   ineffectiveness   in   the enforcement of criminal law.  In our opinion, the reasons for such failure are many. Some of them are ­ (i) inefficiency arising out of either incompetence or lack of proper training in the system of 21 Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (Through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) v. State of Orissa & Others , (1993) 2 SCC 746. 31 criminal investigation; (ii) corruption or political interference with the investigation of crime; (iii) less than the desirable levels of efficiency of the public prosecutors to correctly advise and guide the investigating agencies contributing to the failure of the proper enforcement of criminal law; and (iv) inadequate efficiency levels of the bar and the members of the Judiciary (an offshoot of the bar) which contributed to the overall decline in the efficiency in the dispensation of criminal justice system.   Over   a   period   of   time   lot   of   irrelevant   and   unwarranted considerations   have   crept   into   the   selection   and   appointment process of Public Prosecutors all over the country.   If in a case like the one on hand where three people were killed and more than   five   people   were   injured,   if   charges   are   not   framed   in accordance with the mandate of law, the blame must be squarely taken by both the bar and the bench. Another distressing feature of the record in this case is the humungous cross examination of the witnesses by the defense which mostly is uncalled for. 32 46. In view of the above, the appeals stand disposed of. …..................................... J .                                             (J. CHELAMESWAR) …..................................... J .                      (SANJAY KISHAN KAUL) New Delhi May 16, 2018. 33 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1525 OF 2009 VINUBHAI RANCHHODBHAI PATEL APPELLANT(S) VERSUS RAJIVBHAI DUDABHAI PATEL & ORS. RESPONDENT(S) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1526-1527 OF 2009 O R D E R In view of the situation obtaining on the record, we thought it fit to call for the assistance of Mr.S.Nagumuthu and Ms.Tarannum Cheema, learned counsel to assist this Court. We place on record the invaluable assistance rendered by them as amicus curiae. We also deem it appropriate to place on record the appreciation for the effort put in by Mr.A.Selvin Raja, learned counsel, a young member of the Bar, appearing for the appellant. ........................J. [J.CHELAMESWAR] ........................J. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL] NEW DELHI MAY 16, 2018