Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 648 OF 2002
Ramesh Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J
1. Grievance in the writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short ‘the Constitution’) is that
there should be parity in the matter of service benefits so far
as the army personnel and officers working in the General
Reserve Engineering Force (in short ‘GREF’). Stand of the
petitioner that he and other employees are serving in the
Border Road Organisation and the Government of India is
bound to treat equally with the members of the Armed Force
and there should not be any distinction pertaining to
extending the facilities and benefits in the service including
allowance pay etc. Reference is made to a decision of this
Court in R. Viswan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1983
(3) SCC 401) to contend that this Court had, in fact, directed
such a course to be adopted. It is pointed out under a
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misconception the 4 and the 5 Central Pay Commissions
have not considered the connected issue in the proper
perspective.
2. Mr. B. Dutta, learned Additional Solicitor General, on the
contrary submitted that in R. Viswan’s case (supra) there was
no direction to give parity as is being contended by the
petitioner. On the contrary in Sukhdev Singh Gill v. State of
Punjab and Ors. (2000 (8) SCC 492), this Court had, inter alia,
held that such a course is not permissible.
3. In R. Viswan’s (supra) it was, inter-alia, observed as
follows:
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“11. Before we part with this point, we may
point out that an anguished complaint was
made before us on behalf of the petitioners
that there is considerable disparity between
the Army personnel posted in GREF units and
the other officers and men of GREF insofar as
the terms and conditions of service, such as,
salary, allowances and rations are concerned.
It is not necessary for us to consider whether
this complaint is justified; it is possible that it
may not be wholly unjustified but we may
point out that in any event it has no real
bearing at all on the question whether the
members of GREF can be said to be members
of Armed Forces. Since the members of GREF
are drawn from two different sources, it is
possible that the terms and conditions of
service of the personnel coming from the two
sources may be different. The Army personnel
posted in GREF units naturally carry their
own terms and conditions of service while the
other officers and men in GREF are governed
by their own distinctive terms and conditions.
It is difficult to appreciate how differences in
terms and conditions of service between GREF
personnel coming from two different streams
can possibly have any impact on the character
of GREF as a force integral to the Armed
Forces. It is immaterial for the purpose of
determining whether the members of GREF
are members of the Armed Forces as to what
are the terms and conditions of service of the
members of GREF and whether they are
identical with those of Armed personnel
appointed on the same or equivalent posts in
GREF units. But, we may observe that in case
it is found that the terms and conditions of
service of officers and men in GREF directly
recruited or taken on deputation are in any
way less favourable than those of Army
personnel appointed to the same or equivalent
posts in GREF, the Central Government might
well consider the advisability of taking steps
for ensuring that the disparity, if any, between
the terms and conditions of service, such as,
salary, allowances, rations etc. of Army
personnel posted in GREF units and other
officers and men in GREF is removed.”
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4. Subsequently, in Union of India v. Dineshan K.K. (2008
(1) SCC 586) at para 10 it was observed as under:
“10. Mr. B. Dutta, learned Additional Solicitor
General, appearing for the Union of India
contended that the direction given by the High
Court is manifestly contrary to the settled legal
position, enunciated by this Court in several
decisions that pay fixation is essentially an
executive function, ordinarily undertaken by
an expert body like the Pay Commission,
whose recommendations are entitled to a great
weight through not binding on the
Government. It was argued that the
recommendations of an expert body are not
justiciable since the Court is not equipped to
take upon itself the task of job evaluation,
which is a complex exercise. In support of the
proposition, reliance is placed on two
decisions of this Court in S.C. Chandra v.
State of Jharkhand (2007 (8) SCC 279) and
Union of India v. Hiranmoy Sen (2008 (1) SCC
630).”
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5. We find from the extract of the 4 Central Pay
Commission’s Report in para 10.472 the Commission had
with reference to this Court’s judgment in R. Viswan’s case
(supra) held that there was no scope for any parity as
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contended. Similar is the position in the 5th Central Pay
Commission report.
6. In view of what has been stated in Sukhdev Singh Gill’s
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case (supra) and the fact that the 4 and 5th Central Pay
Commissions considered the relevant aspects, we are of the
view that the prayers as made cannot be accepted; more
particularly, when there is no challenge to the
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recommendations of the 4 and 5 Central Pay Commissions.
It needs no emphasis that even if such a challenge is made,
the scope for interference is extremely limited because the
Court does not normally substitute its views for those of
expert bodies like Pay Commission unless some glaring
infirmities are established.
7. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.
.........................................J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
…......................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
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………….............................J.
(AFTAB ALAM)
New Delhi,
March 11, 2008
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