Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAM PRASAD
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
04/12/1967
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
SIKRI, S.M.
HEGDE, K.S.
CITATION:
1968 AIR 881 1968 SCR (2) 522
ACT:
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), s. 300 (Fourthly)-Scope of.
Practice-Acquittal by High Court of accused of major offence
and conviction for lesser offence-Appeal against acquittal
to Supreme Court-Right of accused to prove that he was not
guilty of any offence.
HEADNOTE:
The accused poured kerosene upon his mistress and set her
clothes on: fire. There were extensive burns and she died
as a result thereof. On the question as do the nature of
the offence.
HELD : The accused must have known that he was committing an
act so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability
cause death or such injury as was likely to cause death. As
he had no excuse for incurring that risk the offence falls
under s. 300 (fourthly) of the Indian Penal Code, that is
culpable homicide amounting to murder, even if the accused
did not intend to cause her death. [527 D-E]
Although the clause is usually invoked in those cases where
there is no intention to cause the death of any particular
person, it may, on its terms, be used in those cases where
there is such callousness towards the result and the risk
taken is such that it may be stated that the person knew
that the act was likely to cause death or such bodily injury
as was likely to cause death. [527 C]
Even though there is no provision to that effect in the
Rules of the Supreme Court, in the case of an appeal by the
State against acquittal for the major offence, it is safer,
fair and just to the accused to give him a chance to prove
that he was not guilty even of the lesser offence on the
analogy of s. 439(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [524 F]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
92 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated’
October 20, 1964 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1964.
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I.N. Shroff and M. N. Shroff, for the appellant.
O.P. Rana, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, J. The respondent Ramprasad against whom the
State of Madhya Pradesh has filed this appeal by special
leave was tried in the Court of Session under s. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code. He was convicted by the Sessions Judge
under s. 324 of the Code and sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for six months. The State Government there
filed an appeal against his acquittal under s. 302, Indian
Penal Code and also ’an application for
523
revision for the enhancement of the sentence passed on him.
The High Court convicted him under s. 304 Part II and
sentenced him to 4 years’ rigorous imprisonment;
concurrently the application for revision was dismissed as
infructuous. The State Government has now filed this appeal
and contends that the conviction of the respondent should
have been under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and that
there has been failure of justice in the case requiring
interference from this Court.
The facts of the case are as follows : Ram Prasad was living
with his mistress Mst. Rajji at Mannaur in District Panna.
Evidence shows that they were having quarrels for some time
previous to the incident which took place on May 24, 1963.
On that date, Ram Prasad intended leaving Mannaur for a
place called Harsa, because his cattle used to be stolen at
Mannaur. Mst. Rajji was unwilling to go with him unless he
first reported the matter to the police station house before
taking her to Harsa; alternatively, she wanted that he
should leave her at Mannaur and give her some cattle for her
maintenance. To either course Ram Prasad was unwilling.
Matters came to a head on the night of. the 24th when Rain
Prasad ordered a van in which he began putting his luggage
with a view to leaving for Harsa. Mst. Rajji then went to
some of the village panchas and brought them over for
intercession. It is these panchas who have now appeared as
witnesses to the incident that took place immediately
afterwards. To all the panchas Mst. Rajji again narrated
the story of her grievance and Ram Prasad insisted on taking
her away. As Rain Prasad would not give in, nor would
Rajji, the panchas could do nothing further and some of them
went away to their lodging which were close to the residence
of Ram Prasad. Evidence then shows that Ram Prasad
approached Mannulal (P.W.4) with a lantern in one hand and
an aluminium bowl in the other. He asked for some kerosene
oil, because oil in his lamp had run down, but Mannulal did
not give any as he had none to spare. Immediately
thereafter Ram Prasad went back to his room and a cry was
heard from Mst. Rajji that Ram Prasad had put kerosene oil
on her and set her alight. Mannulal, Holke and others
immediately arrived on the scene and put out the fire, but
before that happened, Mst. Rajii was extensively burnt.
She kept on, accusing Ram Prasad with the deed, but Ram
Prasad, according to the witnesses, did not say anything in
protest. On the other hand, when he was questioned by the
panchas as to why he had done so, he retorted that Mst.
Rajji was his wife and what had they to do with the matter
and added that they might even get him hanged. Mst. Rajji
was -then taken on cycle to the police station house
although the hospital was on the way. Evidence shows that
Mst. Rajji insisted on being taken to the police station
house first. There she made the statement which is Ex. P-
7, in, which she charged Ram Prasad with her condition and
stated also,,
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524
that he had put kerosene oil on her and set her clothes on
fire. Later she was removed to the hospital where
separately to two doctors in attendance (Dr. Mrs. Ghosh and
Dr. M. L. Gupta) she again stated that she was burnt by her
husband who had put kerosene oil on her. Dr. Ghosh noted on
the bed head ticket "homicidal burn by husband’. The next
day, Mst. Rajji died Prosecution produced the panchas as
witnesses to the earlier transaction in which Mst. Rajji
and Ram Prasad had disagreed over going to Harsa and also in
proof of the statement of Mst. Rajji that Ram Prasad had
put kerosene oil on her and set her clothes alight. They
have also through the same witnesses proved the conduct of-
Ram Prasad when Mst. Rajji accused him of having committed
the outrage. The prosecution has further relied upon the
statements made by Mst. Rajji in Ex. P-7 and to the two
doctors who have deposed in the court.
The High Court and the court below have agreed in holding
Ram Prasad responsible for the outrage. They have accepted
the three dying declarations as well as the evidence of the
eye witnesses in support of the prosecution case. ’They
have only ,differed as to the offence disclosed by this
evidence.
We issued notice to the respondent to show cause against the
appeal of the State Government. Although he received the
notice, he did not make any arrangement for his own
representation in this Court. We accordingly invited Mr. O.
P. Rana to appear as amicus curiae on behalf of the
respondent at State expense. We allowed Mr. Rana to argue
not only about the nature of the offence but also on merits
with a view to point out to us any circumstance proving that
the conviction itself was wrong. Although there is no
provision to this effect in the rules of this Court, we
thought it safer to follow the procedure laid down for the
High Court in the Code of Criminal Procedure when it hears
’a matter after notice of enhancement of sentence. It
seemed to us to be both fair and just to give the accused a
chance to prove to the satisfaction of this Court that the
offence itself had not ’been brought home to him.
In so far as the quarrel between Ram Prasad and Mst.Rajji is
concerned,there is nothing which can be said against it.In
fact the record bristles with evidence on this point. All
theevidence which has been brought to show that Ram Prasad
was intending to leave for Harsa and Mst. Rajji was
resisting him could not be false, because the panchas were
called and they attempted to intervene. The real dispute is
as to whether it was Ram Prasad who poured kerosene oil on
Mst. Rajji and set her alight or whether, as suggested by
Ram Prasad and pleaded by Mr. Rana, it was Mst. Rajji who
herself put her own clothes on fire and committed suicide at
the same time falsely charging Ram Prasad with the outrage.
In this connection, prosecution produc-
525
ed four witnesses. The first is Mannulal who was present at
the. calling of the panchayat by Mst. Rajji. In fact it
was Mst. Rajji herself who went to summon him to the house
of Ram Prasad and it was from him that Ram Prasad asked for
some kerosene off. The fact that kerosene oil was asked for
is admitted by Ram Prasad himself and the question arises
why was it necessary for Ram Prasad to have asked for
kerosene oil at that moment and why immediately afterwards
Mst. Rajji was found with her clothes burning. No doubt,
Mannulal did not give any kerosene oil but it seems to us
that the lantern which Ram Prasad carried in his own hand
had some kerosene oil in it. It was possible for him to
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have extracted some oil from the lantern. We do not put too
much emphasis upon this aspect of the case, because there is
no direct evidence. But on the side of the prosecution and
the defence, there is agreement that kerosene oil was in
fact put upon the clothes before they were set on fire. In
fact the burnt clothes even in the court emitted still a
smell of kerosene oil and the aluminium bowl also smelt of
kerosene. This was noted by the Sessions Judge who tried
the case.
It, therefore, stands to reason that kerosene oil was in
fact employed before the clothes were set on. fire and the
short question. in this case is whether it was Ram Prasad
who set fire to the clothes or it was Mst. Rajji who put
kerosene oil on herself and set herself alight. On this
part of the case, there is the evidence of Mannulal to which
we have already referred. A similar statement was made by
Holke (P.W. 3) and Soni (P.W. 6). They consistently spoke
of Ram Prasad having asked Mannulal for kerosene oil and
that immediately afterwards Mst. Rajji was found with her
clothes burning and accusing Ram Prasad of the outrage upon
her. There is one witness, however, who did not entirely
support this story and that is Jhallu (P.W. 4). His version
was that Mst. Rajji stated to Ram Prasad that their quarrel
had been, settled, implying thereby that she had set herself
on fire and thus terminated the quarrel. This statement was
made by the accused in his examination under S. 342 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and support is therefore sought
to the contrary story from the evidence of Jhallu. Jhallu
was declared hostile and was crossexamined with reference to
his previous statement before the police. We find that in
his statement to the police he did not mention the fact to
which he deposed in the Court of Session and it makes us
doubtful whether what he stated in the Court of Session was
true. In fact there is nothing brought out in his deposi-
tion beyond this remark by Mst. Rajji that the quarrel
between the bania and herself has been settled. Mst. Rajji
in addition to making the accusation might have stated that
their quarrel had got settled. It is possible this retort
might well have been uttered: with the accusation. But it
is curious that when Mst. Rajji roundly accused Ram Prasad
with having set fire to her clothes, Ram
526
Prasad did not say anything in defence which one would
expect a reasonable man to do. He should have protested
then and there. He had no reason to state to the panchas
that Mst. Rajji was his wife and the panchas had nothing to
do with the matter .and that they could get him hanged. His
attitude later in not ,,going to the police station house
and to the hospital speaks against him. There are also the
three statements by Rajji to say nothing of her shouts
accusing her husband which were part of the res gestae. On
the whole, therefore, we are satisfied that the conclusion
of the High Court and the Sessions Judge that it was Ram
Prasad who had put kerosene oil upon Mst. Rajji and set her
clothes on fire was correct in the circumstances of this
case.
The question then arises, what was the offence which Ram
Prasad can be said to have committed ? The offence of
causing injury by burning is a broad spectrum which runs
from s. 324 causing- simple injury by burning through s.
326, namely, causing grievous injury by burning to the two
major offences, namely, culpable homicide not amounting to
murder and even murder itself. The Sessions Judge chose the
lowest end of the spectrum which is surprising enough,
because the burns were so extensive that they were certainly
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grievous by all account. The High Court placed the offence
a little higher, namely, culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. We think that the matter goes a little further than
-this. As death has been caused the question has to be
considered in the light of homicide to determine whether the
action of Ram Prasad Calls within culpable homicide not
amounting to murder or the higher offence of murder itself.
Here we see that death has actually been caused by the
criminal act; in other words, there has been homicide and
since it is not accidental or suicidal death, responsibility
for the homicide, in the absence of any exceptions ;or
extenuating circumstances, must be borne by the person who
,caused it. The High Court has apparently stopped short by
holding that this was a case of culpable homicide not
amounting -to murder. The question is whether the offence
falls in any of the clauses of s. 300 Indian Penal Code. In
this connection it is difficult to say that Ram Prasad
intended causing the death of Mst. Rajji although it might
well be the truth. That he set fire to her clothes after
pouring kerosene oil is a patent fact and therefore the
matter has to be viewed not only with regard to the firstly
of s. 300, but all the other clauses also. We do not -wish
to consider the second and the third clauses, because the
question then would arise what was the extent of the injury
which Ram Prasad intended to cause or knew would be caused
to Mst. Rajji. That would be a matter of speculation. In
our opinion, this matter can ’be disposed of with reference
to clause fourthly ,of s. 300. That clause reads as follows
:-
....... culpable homicide is murder..... if
the person committing the act knows that it is
so imminently
527
dangerous that it must in all probability,
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death, and commits’such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk or causing
death or such injury as aforesaid."
It is obvious that there was no excuse for Ram Prasad to
have taken the risk of causing the death or such bodily
injury as was likely to cause death. The question therefore
arises whether Ram Prasad knew that his act was so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause
death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, so
as to bring the matter within the clause. Although clause
fourthly is usually invoked in those cases where there is no
intention to cause the death of any particular person (as
the illustration shows) the clause may on its terms be used
in those cases where there is such callousness towards the
result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that
the person knows that the act is likely to cause death or
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In the
present case, Ram Prasad poured kerosene upon the clothes of
Mst. Rajji and set fire to those clothes. It is obvious
that such fire spreads rapidly and burns extensively. No
special knowledge is needed to know that one may cause death
by burning if he sets fire to the clothes of a person.
Therefore, it is obvious that Ram Prasad must have known
that he was running the risk of causing the death of Rajji
or such bodily injury as was likely to cause her death. As
he had no excuse for incurring that risk, the offence must
be taken to fall within 4thly of S. 300, Indian Penal Code.
In other words, his offence was culpable homicide amounting
to murder even if he did not intend causing the death of
Mst. Rajji. He committed an act so imminently dangerous
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that it was in all probability likely to cause death or to
result in an injury that was likely to cause death. We are
accordingly of the opinion that the High Court and the
Sessions Judge were both wrong in holding that the offence
did not fall within murder.
Mr. Rana contended that there was no proof from the medical
reports that kerosene oil was employed because the wounds
did not smell of kerosene. Apart from the fact that both
the courts have held that kerosene was so employed, the
evidence is quite satisfactory that kerosene was in fact
poured upon the victim before the clothes were set on fire.
The omission of this fact in the medical reports is not of
consequence.
We accordingly allow this appeal, substitute the conviction
under s. 302 of the Indian Penal-Code in place of the
conviction under s. 304 Part II and sentence Ram Prasad to
imprisonment for life.
V.P.S. Appeal allowed.
528