Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 148
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) DIARY NO. 54941/2025
STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. …PETITIONERS
VERSUS
MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA
GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL …RESPONDENT
O R D E R
1
1. Respondent-Managing Committee of Namatara Girls’ High School had
2
approached the State Education Tribunal , Bhubaneswar, Odisha with an
3
application under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 for
release of grant-in-aid.
th
2. By an order dated 30 December, 2013, the Tribunal allowed the
application by directing the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary
Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and
non-teaching staff of the school in the manner as directed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.02.12
17:32:57 IST
Reason:
1
school
2
Tribunal
3
G.I.A. Case No.623 of 2011
th 4
3. The order dated 30 December, 2013 was carried in appeal by the State
5 th
of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack on 16 October,
2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the appeal was not
accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order. Since
presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to be precise, the State
of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of the impugned order. By an
th
order dated 26 April, 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal citing
failure to file the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order as the reason.
4. Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber. It
th
obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order dated 30 December,
th
2013 on 13 February, 2024. A week later, the State of Odisha filed an
6 th
application seeking recall of the order dated 26 April, 2023. Together
7
with such application was filed an application for condonation of delay
seeking condonation of 291 days’ delay.
5. The application for condonation of delay was taken up for consideration
st
by the High Court on 21 February, 2025. Having noted that the certified
th
copy of the impugned order was filed only on 13 February, 2024, the
th
High Court correctly observed that the appeal filed on 16 October, 2015
was inherently defective and the delay in presenting the appeal is in
excess of 11 years. Considering the aforesaid position, the application for
4
FAO No. 582 of 2015
5
High Court
6
I.A. No.165 of 2024
7
I.A. No.126 of 2025
2
condonation of delay was rejected resulting in the application for recall
being dismissed as time-barred.
st
6. The order of the High Court dated 21 February, 2025 is challenged by
the State of Odisha in this special leave petition.
7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in filing the special leave
petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same after curing
8
defects. In the application for condonation of delay , the State of Odisha
seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows:
“3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on receipt of order of the
Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A. No. 126 of 2025
in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the petitioner considered the matter and
sent it to the law department opined that it is a fit case for filing
the present SLP against the impugned judgements dated
26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025.
4. That the delay in filing the appeal was on account of procedural
delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority. The delay
caused is not deliberate and intentional.”
8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Odisha,
submits that the delay in presenting the special leave petition is not
deliberate and having regard to the long line of decisions of this Court
advocating a liberal approach when an authority under Article 12 of the
Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation of delay, she urges that
the delay be condoned and this Court may direct the High Court to
th
examine the challenge to the order dated 30 December, 2013 of the
Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the appeal.
8
IA No.34867 of 2026
3
9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started dictating an order of
dismissal of the special leave petition. It was then that she prayed for
withdrawal of the special leave petition. We had so recorded. However,
when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana prayed for recall of
the order of dismissal of the special leave petition as withdrawn; she also
submitted, on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a
detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the special leave
petition.
10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as withdrawn
and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred considering paragraphs
3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above, with
the observation that reasons would follow.
11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of
discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in
the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the
proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court propounding
the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have
considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
4
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
9
v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal
approach which this Court has been adopting in matters instituted before
it is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated
that a justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks
condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah
speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land
10
Acquisition Officer had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and
quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen
as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But
a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to
have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
9
(1987) 2 SCC 107
10
(1988) 2 SCC 142
5
officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-
purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into
the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental
decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible.
It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government
must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to
put government and private parties on the same footing in all
respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making
process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law
officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament
and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers
should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its
law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by
this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach
while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in
11
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited , where a delay
of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned.
12
University of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned.
While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal
under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
11
(2012) 3 SCC 563
12
(2020) 13 SCC 745
6
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v.
13
Collector(LA) very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an
end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case
cannot be considered at the stage of considering the application for
condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
14
India authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of
condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was
observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’
and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this
Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in
presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a
discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation
of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be
the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has
to be examined.
13
(2024) 12 SCC 336
14
(2023) 10 SCC 531
7
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post
Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is
the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon’ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club,
15
Bombay and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for
the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed
by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost
on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over
a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out
in petitioner’s own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
( h ) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record
on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved
by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this
file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable
ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters
might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help
a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of
limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other
private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to
15
1994 Supp (2) SCC 603
8
present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional
decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But
there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the
attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common
interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem
to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it
affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed.
The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by
time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after
the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this
Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that
matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible
support for such optimism and the Court’s patience having been tested
to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and
indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High
Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four
months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely
the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all
the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that
9
the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has
been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave
petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand
rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed
as time-barred.
………..……………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….……..…………………………J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 09, 2026.
10
2026 INSC 148
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) DIARY NO. 54941/2025
STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. …PETITIONERS
VERSUS
MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA
GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL …RESPONDENT
O R D E R
1
1. Respondent-Managing Committee of Namatara Girls’ High School had
2
approached the State Education Tribunal , Bhubaneswar, Odisha with an
3
application under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 for
release of grant-in-aid.
th
2. By an order dated 30 December, 2013, the Tribunal allowed the
application by directing the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary
Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and
non-teaching staff of the school in the manner as directed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.02.12
17:32:57 IST
Reason:
1
school
2
Tribunal
3
G.I.A. Case No.623 of 2011
th 4
3. The order dated 30 December, 2013 was carried in appeal by the State
5 th
of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack on 16 October,
2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the appeal was not
accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order. Since
presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to be precise, the State
of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of the impugned order. By an
th
order dated 26 April, 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal citing
failure to file the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order as the reason.
4. Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber. It
th
obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order dated 30 December,
th
2013 on 13 February, 2024. A week later, the State of Odisha filed an
6 th
application seeking recall of the order dated 26 April, 2023. Together
7
with such application was filed an application for condonation of delay
seeking condonation of 291 days’ delay.
5. The application for condonation of delay was taken up for consideration
st
by the High Court on 21 February, 2025. Having noted that the certified
th
copy of the impugned order was filed only on 13 February, 2024, the
th
High Court correctly observed that the appeal filed on 16 October, 2015
was inherently defective and the delay in presenting the appeal is in
excess of 11 years. Considering the aforesaid position, the application for
4
FAO No. 582 of 2015
5
High Court
6
I.A. No.165 of 2024
7
I.A. No.126 of 2025
2
condonation of delay was rejected resulting in the application for recall
being dismissed as time-barred.
st
6. The order of the High Court dated 21 February, 2025 is challenged by
the State of Odisha in this special leave petition.
7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in filing the special leave
petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same after curing
8
defects. In the application for condonation of delay , the State of Odisha
seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows:
“3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on receipt of order of the
Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A. No. 126 of 2025
in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the petitioner considered the matter and
sent it to the law department opined that it is a fit case for filing
the present SLP against the impugned judgements dated
26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025.
4. That the delay in filing the appeal was on account of procedural
delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority. The delay
caused is not deliberate and intentional.”
8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Odisha,
submits that the delay in presenting the special leave petition is not
deliberate and having regard to the long line of decisions of this Court
advocating a liberal approach when an authority under Article 12 of the
Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation of delay, she urges that
the delay be condoned and this Court may direct the High Court to
th
examine the challenge to the order dated 30 December, 2013 of the
Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the appeal.
8
IA No.34867 of 2026
3
9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started dictating an order of
dismissal of the special leave petition. It was then that she prayed for
withdrawal of the special leave petition. We had so recorded. However,
when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana prayed for recall of
the order of dismissal of the special leave petition as withdrawn; she also
submitted, on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a
detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the special leave
petition.
10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as withdrawn
and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred considering paragraphs
3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above, with
the observation that reasons would follow.
11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of
discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in
the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the
proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court propounding
the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have
considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
4
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
9
v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal
approach which this Court has been adopting in matters instituted before
it is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated
that a justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks
condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah
speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land
10
Acquisition Officer had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and
quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen
as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But
a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to
have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
9
(1987) 2 SCC 107
10
(1988) 2 SCC 142
5
officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-
purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into
the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental
decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible.
It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government
must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to
put government and private parties on the same footing in all
respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making
process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law
officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament
and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers
should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its
law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by
this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach
while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in
11
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited , where a delay
of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned.
12
University of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned.
While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal
under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
11
(2012) 3 SCC 563
12
(2020) 13 SCC 745
6
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v.
13
Collector(LA) very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an
end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case
cannot be considered at the stage of considering the application for
condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
14
India authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of
condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was
observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’
and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this
Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in
presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a
discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation
of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be
the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has
to be examined.
13
(2024) 12 SCC 336
14
(2023) 10 SCC 531
7
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post
Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is
the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon’ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club,
15
Bombay and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for
the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed
by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost
on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over
a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out
in petitioner’s own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
( h ) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record
on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved
by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this
file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable
ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters
might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help
a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of
limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other
private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to
15
1994 Supp (2) SCC 603
8
present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional
decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But
there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the
attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common
interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem
to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it
affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed.
The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by
time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after
the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this
Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that
matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible
support for such optimism and the Court’s patience having been tested
to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and
indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High
Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four
months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely
the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all
the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that
9
the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has
been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave
petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand
rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed
as time-barred.
………..……………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…….……..…………………………J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 09, 2026.
10