Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5128 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 39105 of 2012)
S.P. Malhotra …Appellant
Versus
Punjab National Bank & Ors. …Respondents
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment
and order dated 25.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in L.P.A.No. 2028 of 2011, by way of which it
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has reversed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated
20.5.2011 passed in Writ Petition No. 1201 of 1988, by which and
whereunder the learned Single Judge had awarded the relief to the
appellant herein on the ground that in case the Disciplinary Authority
does not agree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in
disciplinary proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority must record
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reasons for disagreement and communicate the same to the delinquent
and seek his response and only after considering the same, he could
pass the order of punishment.
| mstances g | iving rise |
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A. The appellant was appointed as Clerk/Cashier in the respondent
Bank in the year 1969 and was promoted as Accountant in the year
1977, and further promoted as Assistant Manager in the year 1981.
The Disciplinary Authority put him under suspension in November,
1982 for certain delinquencies and in respect of the same, a
chargesheet dated 7.2.1983 was served upon him containing four
charges namely:
(i) Tampering with official record to the detriment of the Bank’s
interest;
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(ii) Indulging in un-authorized business against the interest of the
Bank;
(iii) Mis-utilising official position to benefit relatives and friends
against the interest of the Bank; and
(iv) Concealment of facts from the authorities.
B. The appellant submitted his reply to the said charges in July,
1983 denying all the allegations and further submitting that it was the
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Branch Manager who had sanctioned all the loans and advances and
all the entries had been made at his behest. As the Disciplinary
Authority was not satisfied with the reply submitted by the appellant,
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C. After conducting and concluding the enquiry, the Enquiry
Officer submitted report dated 27.2.1985 exonerating the appellant on
all the charges and in support of the findings sufficient reasons had
been given on each charge.
D. The Disciplinary Authority partly agreed with the findings on
charge Nos. (ii) and (iii), but disagreed with the findings qua charge
Nos. (i) and (iv), and vide order dated 27.4.1985 imposed the
punishment of dismissal from service.
E. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred the appeal against the said
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order under Regulation 17 of the Punjab National Bank
Officers/Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation 1977
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Regulations), and the appeal was
dismissed vide order dated 14.8.1985 by the Appellate Authority. The
Appellate Authority also concurred with the findings on two charges
recorded by the Enquiry Officer.
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F. Being aggrieved of the order of the Appellate Authority, the
appellant filed review petition under Regulation 18 of the Regulations
and the said review petition was also dismissed vide order dated
19.8.1987.
G. The appellant challenged the said orders of punishment by
filing a Writ Petition No. 1201 of 1988 before the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The said writ petition was
contested by the respondent Bank. The learned Single Judge allowed
the said writ petition vide judgment and order dated 20.5.2011,
holding that in case the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the
findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, he must record reasons for
the dis-agreement and communicate the same to the delinquent
seeking his explanation and after considering the same, the
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punishment could be passed. In the instant case, as such a course had
not been resorted to, the punishment order stood vitiated.
H. Aggrieved, the respondent Bank preferred LPA before the
Division Bench which has been allowed taking a view that as the
punishment had been imposed prior to the date of judgment in
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc.etc. v. B. Karunakar
etc.etc. , AIR 1994 SC 1074, i.e. 20.11.1990, and as there was no
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requirement of issuing a second show cause notice before the
punishment was imposed, the question of serving the copy of the
reasons recorded for dis-agreement to the delinquent would not arise.
Hence, this appeal.
4. Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant has submitted that the Division Bench has not examined the
case in correct perspective and failed to appreciate that the judgment
in ECIL (supra) had no application in the instant case. The matter was
squarely covered by the judgment of this court in Punjab National
Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Misra , AIR 1998 SC 2713, and the
ratio thereof had correctly been applied by the learned Single Judge.
Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
5. Per contra, Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for
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the respondent Bank has defended the judgment of the Division Bench
contending that there was no requirement of serving the recorded
reasons for dis-agreement by the Disciplinary Authority to the
delinquent if such a decision was taken prior to the date of decision of
ECIL (supra) i.e. 20.11.1990, and therefore, no interference is
required in the appeal.
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6. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
| separate is | sues are in |
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namely, (a) requirement of issuing a second show cause notice by the
Disciplinary Authority to the delinquent before imposing the
punishment; and (b) serving the copy of the reasons recorded by the
Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer.
In the case of ECIL (supra), only the first issue was involved
and in the facts of this case, only second issue was involved. The
second issue was examined and decided by a three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Kunj Behari Misra (supra), wherein the judgment of
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ECIL (supra) has not only been referred to, but extensively quoted,
and it has clearly been stipulated that wherein the second issue is
involved, the order of punishment would stand vitiated in case the
reasons so recorded by the Disciplinary Authority for dis-agreement
with the Enquiry Officer had not been supplied to the delinquent and
his explanation had not been sought. While deciding the said case, the
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court relied upon the earlier judgment of this court in Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna , AIR 1987 SC 71.
| ty disagree | d with th |
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Enquiry Officer on 12.12.1983 and passed the order on 15.12.1983
imposing the punishment, and immediately thereafter, the delinquent
officers therein stood superannuated on 31.12.1983. In Kunj Behari
Misra (supra), this court held as under:
“19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that
the principles of natural justice have to be read into
Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the
disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry
authority on any article of charge, then before it records
its own findings on such charge, it must record its
tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the
delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it
records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer
containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the
delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade
the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable
conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of
natural justice, as we have already observed, require the
authority which has to take a final decision and can
impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer
charged of misconduct to file a representation before the
disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges
framed against the officer.” (Emphasis added)
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The Court further held as under:
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| anded to th<br>r innings.” | e disciplin |
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9. The view taken by this Court in the aforesaid case has
consistently been approved and followed as is evident from the
judgments in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. ,
AIR 1999 SC 3734; State Bank of India & Ors. v. K.P. Narayanan
Kutty , AIR 2003 SC 1100; J.A. Naiksatam v. Prothonotary and
Senior Master, High Court of Bombay & Ors. , AIR 2005 SC 1218;
P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India & Ors. , AIR 2006 SC 2064;
and Ranjit Singh v. Union of India & Ors. , AIR 2006 SC 3685.
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10. In Canara Bank & Ors. v. Shri Debasis Das & Ors. , AIR
2003 SC 2041, this Court explained the ratio of the judgment in Kunj
Behari Misra (supra), observing that it was a case where the
disciplinary authority differed from the view of the Inquiry Officer.
“In that context, it was held that denial of opportunity of hearing was
per se violative of the principles of natural justice.”
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11. In fact, not furnishing the copy of the recorded reasons for
disagreement from the enquiry report itself causes the prejudice to the
delinquent and therefore, it has to be understood in an entirely
| n that of | the issue |
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12. The learned Single Judge has concluded the case observing as
under:
“The whole process that resulted in dismissal of the
petitioner is flawed from his inception and the order of
dismissal cannot be sustained. I am examining this case
after nearly 23 years after its institution and the petitioner
has also attained the age of superannuation. The issue of
reinstatement or giving him the benefit of his wages for
during the time when he did not serve will not be
appropriate. The impugned orders of dismissal are set
aside and the petitioner shall be taken to have retired on
the date when he would have superannuated and all the
terminal benefits shall be worked out and paid to him in
12 weeks on such basis. There shall be, however, no
direction for payment of any salary for the period when
he did not work.”
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13. As the case is squarely covered by the judgment of this court in
Kunj Behari Misra (supra), we do not see any reason to approve the
impugned judgment rendered by the Division Bench.
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Thus, in view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment
and order of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned
Single Judge is restored. No costs.
…….………………….…J.
(Dr. B.S. Chauhan)
………………………….J.
(S.A. Bobde)
New Delhi,
July 4, 2013
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