Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE BALLARPUR COLLIERIES CO.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE INDUSTRIAL COURT, NAGPUR AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
15/11/1965
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
RAMASWAMI, V.
SATYANARAYANARAJU, P.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 925 1966 SCR (2) 589
ACT:
Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement
Act. No. 23 of 1947, s. 1(3), Notification under-Certain
industries exempted from operation of provisions of the Act-
Head Office of mining company whether exempted.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was a mining company with its head office at
Nagpur. The business of the head office was to look after
the sale of coal extracted from the collieries. An employee
of the company working in the head office made applications
under s. 16 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, to the Assistant Commissioner
of Labour, Nagpur. The company objected that by virtue of
the notification under s. 1(3) of the Act the mining
industry had been exempted from the operation of the Act
including s. 16 and therefore the Assistant Labour
Commissioner had no jurisdiction. The authorities under the
Act as well as the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227, re-
jected the company’s contention. The High Court took the
view that what was exempted by the third item in the
notification was not the head office of a mine but the mine
itself and consequently the employees of the head office
were governed by the Act. The company appealed to the
Supreme Court by special leave.
HELD : The notification in question said that the Act would
come into force on 21st November, 1947 "in all the
industries except the following" and then went on to name
four industries the third one being ’Mines’. After the word
’following’ the, word industries must be read and thus read
the notification in effect said the Act would come into
effect on the given date in all industries except the
industries mentioned. Therefore it was not only mines but
the mining industry itself that was exempted from the
operation of the Act. [593 A-B, D E]
If the notification exempted the industry of mines or the
mining industry it could not be said that it merely exempted
that part of the said industry of mines or mining industry
which consisted of raising coat at the colliery and did not
include the head office thereof. As the High Court said,
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the head office was part of the integrated activity of the
company. Therefore when the mining industry was exempted
from the operation of the Act the exemption applied not only
to that part of the industry which consisted of raising coal
at the colliery but also to that part of it which consisted
in the sale of coal and its supply to the customers and
would thus include the head office also. [593 E-G]
M/s. Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. D. K. Worlikar, A.I.R.
1960 S.C. 842 and M/s. Serajuddin and Co. v. Their Workmen,
[1962] 3. Supp. S.C.R. 934, distinguished.
On the above view the Assistant Labour Commissioner had no
jurisdiction under the Act to deal with the matter in
question. [595 E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1965.
5 9 0
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
September 8, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil
Application No. 364 of 1961.
C. B. Agarwala, 0. P. Malhotra, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
G. L. Sangli and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, J. The only question raised in this appeal by
special. leave is whether the Central Provinces and Berar
Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, No. XXIII of 1947,
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) is applicable to the
head office of the appellant which is known as the Ballarpur
Collieries Company. The head office is situate in Nagpur
and has a staff of about 35 employees. The business of the
head office is to look after the sale of coal extracted from
the collieries.
The question arises in this way. Bapat respondent was a
stenographer working in the head office at Nagpur. He was
dismissed from service on July 31, 1959. It is not
necessary for present purposes to go into the facts and
circumstances leading to this dismissal. Suffice it to
mention that an enquiry was said to have been held before
the dismissal order was passed. While this enquiry was
pending Bapat made an application under S. 16 of the Act
before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur, on July
21, 1959. In this application Bapat prayed that the
employer should be ordered to pay him wages from the date of
dismissal, discharge or removal to the date of the order
under s. 16 in addition to a sum not exceeding Rs. 2,500 by
way of compensation. It was also prayed that the
employer should be ordered to pay retrenchment compensation
under Chap. V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. 14 of
1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act No. 14).
Though this application was headed as application for
reinstatement and compensation etc., there was no prayer for
reinstatement and Bapat was only content to ask for a sum of
Rs. 2,500 by way of compensation. While this application
was pending, Bapat was, as already indicated, dismissed on
July 31, 1959. Thereupon he filed another application under
S. 16 of the Act on August 19, 1959. In this application he
prayed for reinstatement or in the alternative for full com-
pensation amounting to Rs. 2,500 and such other relief as he
might be entitled to.
The main contention of the appellant before the Assistant
Commissioner of Labour was that the Act did not apply to it
and
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591
therefore the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to
proceed in the matter. The Assistant Commissioner held that
the Act applied and he had jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. He therefore gave relief by setting aside the order
of dismissal and directing that the employer should pay Rs.
2,000 as compensation and wages from the date of dismissal
to the date of his order.
This order was taken in revision by the appellant to the
State Industrial Court at Nagpur, and the main contention
again urged there was that the Act did not apply to the
appellant and the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction
to deal with the matter. This contention did not find
favour with the State Industrial Court with the result that
the revision was dismissed.
The appellant then filed a petition under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution in the High Court, and the same
contention was raised that the Act did not apply and the
Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the matter.
The High Court held on a construction of the relevant
provisions of the Act and the notification issued thereunder
that the Act was applicable and in consequence the writ
petition was dismissed. The High Court having refused to
give leave to appeal to this Court, the appellant obtained
special leave from this Court; and that is how the matter
has come before us.
Section 1 of the Act came into force on June 2, 1947, andas
provided by S. 1(3) thereof, the rest of the Act came into
force on November 21, 1947, on a notification being issued
by the State Government in that behalf. Section 1(3) lays
down that "the State Government may by notification bring
the remaining sections or any of them into force in such
area or industry and on such date as may be specified in the
notification." By virtue of the power conferred on the State
Government by S. 1(3) the following notification was issued
on November 2,
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-
section (3)of section 1, of the Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes
Settlement Act, 1947, the Provincial
Government are pleased to direct that sections
2 to 61 of the said Act shall come into force
on the 21st November 1947, in all the
industries except the following namely :-
(i) Textile industry.
(ii) Employment in any industry carried on by
or under the authority of the Central
Government
592
by an Indian State Railway or by a Railway
Company operating an Indian State Railway.
(iii) Mines.
(iv) Saw Mills."
It is the interpretation of this notification which calls
for consideration in the present appeal. The appellant’s
contention is that by this notification, the Act was applied
as from November 21, 1947, to all industries except four
specified therein; and of these, the third was mines. It is
urged on behalf of the appellant that when the notification
provided for the application of the Act to .all industries
except four which were excepted it was exempting the mining
industry by the third item of exemption. The nlining
industry according to the appellant will include the head
office, for as the High Court says, "it is not disputed that
the Head Office is a part of integrated activity of the
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petitioner-company which carries on the business of
producing coal and its sale and supply to its various
customers." The argument is that the head office at Nagpur
being a part of integrated activity of carrying on the
mining industry by the appellant, the head office was
equally exempt from the application of the Act by the
notification in question. If that is so, no application
under S. 16 of the Act could be made by Bapat to the
Assistant Commissioner of Labour. It is also pointed out on
behalf of the appellant that Bapat would have a remedy under
the Central Act No. 14 of 1947 which came into force earlier
than the Act from April 1, 1947, though the procedure for
obtaining relief under that Act would be different namely,
through- a reference by the appropriate Government under s.
10 of the Central Act No. 14 of 1947.
The High Court however held that what was exempted by the
third item in the notification was not the head office of a
mine but the mine itself and no more.. Consequently the
employees at the head office of the appellant were governed
by the Act. This view of the High Court is being supported
by the respondents before us, and it is urged that the
notification uses the word " mines" and not the words
"mining industry" in the exemption part and therefore what
was exempted from the Act were merely -the coal mines where
mining operations were carried on and not the mining
industry, which may include the head office also.
We are of the opinion that the contention raised on behalf
of the appellant is correct, and what the notification
exempted was the mining industry from the operation of the
Act. In this %connection we may refer to the following
words in the notification
5 93
namely, "the said Act shall come into force on the 21st
November, 1947 in a11 the industries except the following".
Grammatically the word "industries" must be understood as
following the word"following" appearing in the above
sentence. Thus what the notification in effect said was
that the said Act shall come into force on 21st November
1947 in all the industries except the following, industries.
It has however, been urged that if that was so, it was not
necessary, for example, in the first item of examption to
use the words "textile industry", and it would have been
sufficient to use the word "textile". All that we need say
is that the notification is not a work of art and has to be
read in its tenor without trying to find out why the word
"industry" was used in the first item and why the same was
not used in the third and fourth items, which deal with
"Mines" and "Saw Mills" respectively. Grammatically,
however, this part of the notification clearly says that the
Act would apply to all industries except the four industries
specified therein for the purpose of exemption. These four
exemptions include the industry of mines. We see no
difference between the words "mining industry" and "industry
of mines", for they mean the same thing, namely, the
industry which is concerned with mines. If therefore the
notification exempted the industry of mines or the mining
industry it cannot be said that it merely exempted that part
of the said industry of mines or mining industry which
consisted of raising coal at the colliery and did not
include the head office thereof. As we have already
indicated, the High Court has said that "it is not disputed
that the head office is a part of integrated activity of the
petitioner company which carries on the business of
producing coal and its sale and supply to its various
customers". Therefore, when the industry of mines or the
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mining industry was exempted from the operation of the Act,
the exemption applied not only to that part of the industry
which consisted of raising coal at the colliery but also to
that part of it which consisted in the sale of coal and its
supply to customers and would thus include the head office
also. As we read the notification we see no escape from the
conclusion that what was exempted from the application of
the Act was the industry of mines or the mining industry and
that would include not only the colliery where the coal was
raised but also the head office from where the coal was sold
’and distributed to the customers.
It now remains to refer to two cases on which reliance was
placed by the High Court. The first is Messrs. Godavari
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. D. K. Worlikar(1). In that case this
Court held
(1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 305.
5 9 4
that the notification under challenge there did not apply to
the head office of the Sugar Mills. That decision turned on
the actual words of the notification and is of no assistance
to the respondents. It was pointed out in that case that if
the notification had merely used the words "sugar industry"
it would have been possible to construe that expression in a
broader sense having regard to the wide definition of the
word "industry"; but the notification had deliberately
adopted a different phraseology and had brought within its
purview not the sugar industry as such but the manufacture
of sugar and its by-products. The words of the notification
in that case were "the said Act shall apply to the following
industry, namely, the manufacture of sugar and its by-
products". Therefore on the words of the notification in
that case, the wide implication which might have arisen if
the notification had merely stated that the Act applied to
the sugar industry was cut down by the specific words in the
notification, namely, manufacture of sugar and its by-
products, which would clearly apply only to a part of sugar
industry which dealt with the manufacture of sugar and the
by-products and would not apply to the head office which did
not deal with the actual manufacture but dealt with the
consequent steps following on the manufacture viz., sale and
distribution to customers. In the present case the
notification clearly applied to the industry of mines which
in our opinion is nothing different from mining industry and
must therefore take in the entire industry including the
raising of coal from the colliery as .well as its
distribution, sale and supply to the customers. That case
therefore is of no help to the respondents.
The next case to which reference is made is Messrs.
Serajuddin and Company v. Their workmen(1). In that case a
dispute relating to the head office of a mining company was
referred by the Government of West Bengal to the industrial
tribunal and a question arose whether the Government of West
Bengal was the appropriate government within the meaning of
S. 2 (a) (i) of the Central Act No. 14 of 1947. It was held
that the West Bengal Government was the appropriate
government and the decision turned on the interpretation of
S. 2 (a) (i) of the said Act which defined "appropriate
government". The words which came in for interpretation
were "in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a
banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oil-field, or a
major port". It was held that the word "mine" as used in s.
2 (a) (i) of the Central Act No. 14 of 1947 referred to a
mine as defined in the Mines Act and that a dispute with
reference to the head office of a mine was not a dispute
concerning the mine which
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(1) [1962] 3 Supp. S.C.R. 934.
5 9 5
must mean a mine as defined in the Mines Act. That case
also is of no help to the respondents for here we are not
concerned with the word "mine’; what we are concerned with
is whether the exemption clause in the notification which
exempts the industry of mines or the mining industry will
take in the head office. The words therefore in the present
notification are different and the decision in that case is
of no help. We have no doubt that when the notification
exempts the industry of mines or the mining industry which
in our opinion mean the same thing, the exemption includes
the he-ad office also which must be treated as an integral
part of the mining industry, for it deals with the subse-
quent steps taken to dispose of, in this case, the coal
raised from the colliery.
Learned counsel for the appellant wished to argue that the
head office carried on other activities besides the activity
of selling coal raised from the colliery. We have not
allowed him to raise this point for this was not raised in
the High Court. We have already referred to the observation
of the High Court that it was not disputed that the head
office was a part of integrated activity of the appellant-
company which carried on the business of producing coal and
its sale and supply to its various customers. It was not
even the case of the respondents in reply in the High Court
that the head office carried on other activities besides the
sale and distribution of the coal produced in the colliery.
In the view we have taken of the notification and its
interpretation we are of opinion that the Assistant
Commissioner of Labour had no jurisdiction under the Act to
deal with the application of Bapat. In this view of the
matter the appeal must be allowed and the orders of the High
Court, the State Industrial Court and the Assistant
Commissioner of Labour are set aside. We therefore direct
the dismissal of the application under S. 16 of the Act. In
the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
596