Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
DABUR (DR. S. K. BURMAN) PRIVATE LTD. DEOGHAR, BIHAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE WORKMEN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/07/1967
BENCH:
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
BENCH:
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
SHELAT, J.M.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
CITATION:
1968 AIR 17 1968 SCR (1) 61
ACT:
Industrial Dispute--Order of Reference--Clerical error, if
can be corrected.
HEADNOTE:
The Government referred an industrial dispute to Labour
Court, Patna, and subsequently issued an order by way of
corrigendum substituting "Ranchi" for "Patna". In
proceedings before the Labour Court, Ranchi, objection was
raised that once having made the reference to the Labour
Court, Patna, the Government was not competent to cancel or
withdraw that reference, so the Labour Court, Ranchi had no
jurisdiction. The Labour Court, Ranchi rejected the
objection. The High Court also rejected this Contention. In
appeal to this Court:
HELD: The alteration in the order of reference was a mere
correction of a clerical error. because, by mistake, Patna
had been mentioned in place of Ranchi in the first
notification and the second notification merely corrected
that mistake. Such a clerical error can always be corrected
and such a correction does not amount either to the
withdrawal of the reference from, or cancellation of the re-
ference to the Labour Court, Patna. [63F-H]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2568 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
March 23, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial
Case No. 118 of 1963.
H. R. Gokhale and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.
M. K. Ramamurthi, Shymala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for the
respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J.-The
Government of Bihar, by an Order dated 14th June, 1961,
referred an industrial dispute under section 10(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) to the Labour
Court, Patna, wherein the following two issues were
referred:-
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"(1) Whether the discharge of the following
forty workmen was proper? If not, whether
they are entitled to reinstatement and/or any
other relief?
(2) Whether the above-mentioned workmen are
entitled to be made permanent?"
Subsequently, the Government issued an Order by way of
corrigendum on the 19th July, 1961, substituting "Ranchi"
for "Patna"
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in the original order of reference dated 14th June, 1961.
The effect of this corrigendum was that the reference of the
dispute, instead of being made to the Labour Court, Patna,
came before the Labour Court, Ranchi. In the proceedings
before that Court, the principal objections that was raised
was that the Government, having once made a reference to the
Labour Court, Patna, was not competent to cancel or withdraw
that reference and could not make a competent reference of
the same industrial dispute to the Labour Court, Ranchi, so
that the latter Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the
reference. The case before the Labour Court was also
contested on various other grounds, but we need only mention
those grounds which have been urged before us in this
appeal. While the Labour Court was dealing with the
reference, adjournments were sought on behalf of the
appellant, M/s. Dabur (Dr. S. K. Burman) Private Ltd.
After decision of some preliminary points by the order dated
18th August, 1962, the case was fixed for hearing on 19th
November, 1962. On that date, the management again prayed
for an adjournment on the ground that their local Manager,
Sri Basant Jha, had been lying ill for some time past and it
was not possible for the management to prosecute their case
with diligence. The Labour Court rejected this application
and, thereupon, proceeded to hear the reference ex parte.
The Labour Court held that the reference to it was competent
and it had jurisdiction to deal with it, even though, by the
original order of reference, the Government had purported to
refer the dispute to the Labour Court, Patna. On the first
issue referred, the Court recorded the finding that the 40
workmen, who had been discharged, were not casual workers
and that their discharge by the employers on the basis that
they were casual workers was not proper. It was further
held that the discharge was mala fide inasmuch as the
purpose of the discharge was to avoid the liability of
treating these workmen as permanent employees by preventing
them from completing 240 days of work in a year. There was
the further finding that the workmen were all discharged
from service as they had demanded increase in rates of wages
and had also claimed that Sundays should be made paid
holidays. Against this award, the appellant filed a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High
Court of Patna requesting that Court to quash the award.
That Court upheld the award and dismissed the writ petition.
Consequently, the appellant has come up to this Court by
special leave against that judgment of the High Court.
Mr. Gokhale, appearing on behalf of the appellant, emphati-
cally urged that both the Labour Court, Ranchi as well as
the Patna High Court were wrong in holding that,the
reference to the Labour Court, Ranchi, was competent even
after the reference,
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had originally been made to the Labour Court, Patna. He
relied on the principle laid down by this Court that once
the Government has made a reference to a particular Labour
Court, it is that Labour Court which becomes seized of that
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industrial dispute and, thereafter, the Government has no
jurisdiction either to withdraw that reference or cancel it.
In this case, however, as is
clear from the judgment of the High Court, the question
that arose was entirely different. The High Court has
clearly held that this was not a case where the Government
either withdrew or cancelled the reference to the Labour
Court, Patna. The High Court has held that, from the facts
stated by the appellant in the writ petition filed in that
Court, it appeared that the alteration in the order of
reference was a mere correction of a clerical error.
because, by mistake, Patna had been mentioned in place of
Ranchi in the first notification. The second notification
merely corrected that mistake. Mr. Gokhale wanted us to
hold that the High Court was wrong in its view that the
Government had merely made’ correction of a clerical error
and that we should accept the submission on behalf of the
appellant that, in fact, the
State Government bad first intentionally referred the
dispute to the Labour Court, Patna, and issued the
corrigendum only when the Government decided that the
reference should go to the Labour Court, Ranchi and not
Labour Court, Patna, because Labour Court, Patna bad no
jurisdiction to entertain the reference. We are unable to
accept this submission made on behalf of the
appellant. The High Court drew in inference from the
facts stated in the writ petition filed by the appellant
itself that this was a case of mere correction of a clerical
error. This finding recorded by the High Court on the basis
of the facts given in the writ petition is not now open to
challenge in this special appeal, particularly because even
a copy of that writ petition has not been
made a part of the paper-book before us. We cannot see
how any objection can be taken to the competence of the
State Government to make a correction of a mere clerical
error. The finding that it was a clerical error means that
the Government in fact intended to make the reference to the
Labour Court, Ranchi; but while actually scribing the order
of reference, a mistake was committed by the writer of
putting down Patna instead of Ranchi.
Such a clerical error can always be corrected and such
a correction does not amount either to the withdrawal of the
reference from. or cancellation of the reference to. the
Labour Court, Patna. The High Court was. therefore. right
in rejecting this contention on behalf of the appellant.
On merits, Mr. Gokhale wanted to urge only two points
before us. ’One was that the Labour Court committed a
manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record in
holding that the workmen concerned were not casual workers.
The judgment of the High Court, however, shows that before
that Court
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it was nowhere urged or argued that any such error of law
apparent on the face of the record had been committed by the
Labour Court. What was urged before the High Court was
that, even on the ex parte evidence on record, the Labour
Court ought to have held that the workmen were mere casual
labourers. The High Court was right in holding that this
point urged on behalf of the appellant essentially raised a
question of fact only and that Court, in its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, could not interfere
on such a question of fact. Since no submission was made
before the High Court that the finding of the Labour Court
that the workmen are not casual labourers suffers from any
manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record,
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the appellant is not entitled to raise this point in this
special appeal before us. On the finding actually recorded
by the Labour Court and upheld by the High Court, the order
of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of these workmen
is fully justified, so that the order made by the Labour
Court, insofar as it is against the interests of the
appellant, is correct and must be upheld. In view of this
position, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether
the Labour Court was or was not right in recording the
finding as to mala fides.
The only other point urged was that the Labour Court should
not have proceeded ex parte when material was placed before
that Court on behalf of the appellant to show that its local
Manager, Sri Basant Jha, was in fact lying ill. The
question whether an adjournment should or should not have
been granted on this ground was in the discretion of the
Labour Court. Even the order by which the Labour Court
rejected that application for adjournment is not before us
and, consequently, it cannot be held that the Labour Court
committed any such error in rejecting the application for
adjournment and proceeding ex parte as would justify
interference by this Court.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Y.P. Appeal
dismissed.
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