Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5062 of 1997
PETITIONER:
SRI SWAMI KRISHNANAND GOVINDANAND
RESPONDENT:
M.D. OSWAL HOSIERY (REGD.)
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/02/2002
BENCH:
SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI & DORAISWAMY RAJU
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2002 (2) SCR 1
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi
allowing the respondent’s Second Appeal Order No. 275 of 1980 on December
2, 1981.
The appellant-landlord of the suit premises is a registered society under
the Societies Registration Act. It filed application against the
respondent-tenant for his eviction from the suit premises under Clause (d)
of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short "the Act") on
the ground that the premises are required bonafide for furtherance of its
activities. The respondent filed written statement denying both that the
appellant is an institution within the meaning of that provision and that
it required the premises bonafide for furtherance of its activities. It
appears that when the case was posted for trial, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent conceded the facts disputed by the respondent
in his written statement before the Court. That statement of the advocate
was recorded by the Addl. Rent Controller thus : "The respondent’s learned
counsel has admitted the ground of eviction and also the fact that
appellant is a public charitable institution and for that purpose it
required the premises". On that basis the eviction application filed by the
appellant was allowed on 24th March, 1973. Within a week thereafter the
respondent filed a review petition which was dismissed. He then filed a
writ petition challenging the validity of the said order of eviction but
that was dismissed as withdrawn on July 22, 1974. Thereafter, the
respondent filed an appeal against the said order of eviction before the
Rent Control Tribunal but it was also dismissed on September 5, 1977. Be
that as it may, when the appellant filed a petition for execution of order
of eviction, the respondent raised objections both under Section 40 of the
Act as well as under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By separate
orders both the objection petitions were dismissed on April 5, 1980. That
order was challenged by the respondent unsuccessfully before the Rent
Control Tribunal. Dis-satisfied with order of the Tribunal dated May 16,
1980, dismissing the appeal, the respondent filed the aforementioned second
appeal which was allowed on December 2, 1981. It is against that order of
the High Court that the present appeal is filed by special leave.
Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant, has
vehemently contended that statement made by the learned counsel of the
respondent across the Bar is indeed an admission of the party and,
therefore, the Addl. Rent Controller recorded his satisfaction on the basis
of the admission; the order of the Addl. Rent Controller cannot there by be
treated as being without jurisdiction. We are afraid we cannot accede to
the contention of the learned counsel. Whether the appellant is an
institution within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it
required bonafide the premises for furtherance of its activities, are
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questions touching the jurisdiction of the Addl. Rent Controller. He can
record his satisfaction only when he holds on these questions in favour of
the appellant. For so holding there must be material on record to support
his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction not . based on any material or
based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated and any order passed on
such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction. There can be no doubt
that admission of a party is a relevant material. But can the statement
made by the learned counsel of a party across the Bar be treated as
admission of the party ? Having regard to the requirements of Section 18 of
the Evidence Act, on the facts of this case, in our view, the
aforementioned statement of the counsel of the respondent can not be
accepted as an admission so as to bind the respondent. Excluding that
statement from consideration there was thus no material before the Addl.
Rent Controller to record his satisfaction within the meaning of Clause (d)
of Section 22 of the Act. It follows that the order of eviction was without
jurisdiction.
The learned counsel next contended that the statement of the learned
counsel for the respondent should be treated as a compromise as the Court
granted five years’ time to the respondent for vacating the suit premises.
In our view, this contention has to be rejected. The compromise like a
contract postulates consensus between two parties. A statement of a counsel
conceding the grounds of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent
to vacate the premises, can not be termed a compromise.
In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere
with the order under challenge. The appeal is dismissed with costs.