THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH vs. ANIL KUMAR @ BADKA

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 29-08-2018

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Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1094  OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No.5528 of 2015) State of Uttar Pradesh             Appellant(s) VERSUS Anil Kumar @ Badka & Ors. Respondent(s)                   J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is filed by the State of U.P. against the final judgment and order dated 02.09.2014 passed by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   in Government   Appeal   No.3317   of   2014   whereby   the Signature Not Verified Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   dismissed   the Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2018.08.29 13:38:38 IST Reason: 1 application filed by the appellant herein seeking leave to   file   appeal   under   Section   378(3)  of   the   Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)   and affirmed the judgment dated 31.05.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.3, Kannauj acquitting the accused­respondents in S.T. No.204 of 2012.  3) Keeping in view the short point involved in the appeal, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail except   few   to   appreciate   the   grievance   of   the appellant. 4) The   respondents   (accused)   were   prosecuted and tried for commission of   offences punishable under   Sections   363,   366,   376   and   120­B   of   the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)  pursuant to lodging of FIR No. 139/2012 in Police Station   Gursahay Ganj, sub­District Sadar, District Kannauj in Sessions Trial Case No. 204 of 2012 in the Court of the Additional District Judge, 2 Court   No.3,   Kannauj.   The   prosecution   adduced evidence in support of their case. 5) By judgment dated 31.05.2014, the Additional Sessions   Judge   on   appreciating   the   evidence adduced   by   the   prosecution   acquitted   the respondents   (accused)   of   the   charge   of   offences punishable  under Sections   363, 366, 376,  120­B IPC. 6) The   State   of   U.P.,   felt   aggrieved   by   the respondents' acquittal, filed an application for leave to appeal before the High Court under Section 378 (3) of the Code. 7) By impugned order, the High Court declined to grant leave and accordingly rejected the application made by the State. It is against this order, the State has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition in this Court. 8) Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3 9) Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant­State   has made only  one submission.  According to him, the High   Court   while   dismissing   the   application   for leave to appeal did not assign any reason and hence the impugned order is rendered bad in law. It was his   submission   that   there   were   several discrepancies   and   errors   in   the   judgment   of   the Sessions Judge against which the leave to appeal was sought and, therefore, this was a fit case where the High Court should have granted leave to appeal for further probing into the case by the Appellate Court.   In   support   of   his   submission,   he   placed reliance on the decision of this Court in   State of Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar, (2008) 9 SCC 475.   10) We   are   inclined   to   agree   in   part   with   the submission  urged  by  the  learned  counsel for  the appellant. 4 11) The   question   as   to   how   the   application   for grant of leave to appeal made under Section 378 (3) of the Code should be decided by the High Court and what are the parameters which the High Court should keep in mind remains no more   res integra . This issue was examined by this Court in  State of Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar (supra).   Justice   C.K.   Thakker   speaking   for   the Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 as under:  “19.  Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in case of acquittal.   Sub­section   (3)   declares   that   no appeal “shall be entertained except with the leave   of   the   High   Court”.   It   is,   therefore, necessary for the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for leave to appeal   as   required   by   sub­section   (3)   of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an   appeal   can   be   registered   and   heard   on merits by the High Court only after the High Court   grants   leave   by   allowing   the application   filed   under   sub­section   (3)   of Section 378 of the Code. 20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question   whether   requisite   leave   should   or should not be granted, the High Court must apply   its   mind,   consider   whether   a   prima 5 facie   case   has   been   made   out   or   arguable points have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside. 21.  It   cannot   be   laid   down   as   an   abstract proposition   of   law   of   universal   application that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of the   prosecution   evidence   and   refuse   leave observing   that   the   judgment   of   acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted. 24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against an order of acquittal recorded   by   the   trial   court.   We   only   state that in such cases, the appellate court must consider   the   relevant   material,   sworn testimonies   of   prosecution   witnesses   and record reasons why leave sought by the State should   not   be   granted   and   the   order   of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed. Where there is application of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order of the court may not be said   to   be   illegal   or   objectionable.   At   the same time, however, if arguable points have been   raised,   if   the   material   on   record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review   or   reconsideration   of   evidence,   the appellate court must grant  leave  as sought and decide the appeal on merits. In the case 6 on hand, the High Court, with respect, did neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.” 12) Coming   now   to   the   facts   of   this   case,   it   is apposite   to   reproduce   the   impugned   order   in verbatim infra: “On   a  careful  perusal   of   the   judgment  and record, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial judge is perverse or unreasonable. Simply   because   another   view   might   have been   taken   of   the   evidence   provides   no ground   for   interfering   with   the   order   of acquittal unless the view taken by the trial judge is not a possible view.  On the evidence available on record, it cannot be said that the view   taken   by   the   trial   judge   was   not   a reasonably possible view.   In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the application for leave to appeal which   is   rejected   and   consequently,   the Government Appeal is also dismissed.” 13) We are constrained to observe that the High Court grossly erred in passing the impugned order without assigning any reason.   In our considered opinion, it was a clear case of total non­application of mind to the case by the learned Judges because 7 the order impugned neither sets out the facts nor the submissions of the parties nor the findings and nor the reasons as to why the leave to file appeal is declined to the appellant. We, therefore, disapprove the casual approach of the High Court in deciding the application which, in our view, is against the law laid down by this Court in the case of  State of Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar (supra). 14) In   the   light   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the application made by the appellant for grant of leave to appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   State   of Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar (supra). 8 15) It is made clear that we have not applied our mind to the merits of the case and remanded the case to the High Court having noticed that it was an unreasoned order.  The High Court will accordingly decide   the   application   on  merits  uninfluenced   by any of our observations made in this order.                                      .……...................................J.                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                       ………..................................J.                      [UDAY UMESH LALIT] New Delhi, August 29, 2018. 9