Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1945 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur & Ors
RESPONDENT:
M/s Rajesh Construction Co
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/04/2007
BENCH:
TARUN CHATTERJEE & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
[ Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.19332-33 of 2005 ]
TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.
Delay Condoned.
Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgments and final
orders dated 29th July 2004 and 8th April, 2005 passed by a
learned Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur
in M.C.C. No. 3295 of 2003 and M.C.C. No. 1579 of 2004. By
the order dated 29th July 2004, learned Judge of the High Court
appointed Mr. Justice B.C. Verma, a retired Chief Justice of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, as sole arbitrator to
adjudicate upon disputes between the appellants and the
respondent herein. The order dated 8th April, 2005 passed in
MCC No. 1579 of 2004 is under challenge as the application for
review and/or recall of the order dated 29th July 2004 at the
instance of the appellants was also rejected.
Notice was issued on the application for condonation of
delay and also on the special leave petitions by this court on
12th September 2005. After exchange of affidavits an order was
passed by this court on 5th January 2007 in which one of us
was a party. The said order of this court may be relevant for our
decision which is as follows:-
"Having regard to the facts of the case, we
suggested to the parties that the Municipal
Corporation may be directed by this Court to
constitute a Board of Arbitrators under Clause 29 of
the Agreement without any preconditions. Such an
appointment should be made within three weeks
from this Court’s order and the Board of Arbitrators
will take up the matter from the stage at which it has
reached before the Arbitrator appointed by the High
court. The Board of Arbitrators shall thereafter
conclude the proceedings within six months."
However, this suggestion of this court made on
5th January 2007 was not accepted by the respondent and for
that reason, we heard the appeal on merits.
The appellants floated a notice inviting tender for
construction of a road. Finally, half of the job was awarded to
the respondent by entering into a contract on the same terms
and conditions as contained in the tender. The tender contained
various clauses; one amongst the same being Clause 29 which
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8
pertained to arbitration in case any dispute arose between the
parties and reads thus:-
"Except as otherwise provided in this contract all
questions and disputes relating to the meaning of
the specifications, drawing and instructions
herein before mentioned and as to thing
whatsoever, in any way arising out or relating to
the contract, designs, drawings, specifications,
estimates concerning the works or the execution
or failure to execute the same, whether arising
during the progress of the work or after the
completion or abandonment there of shall be
referred to the City Engineer in writing for his
decision, within a period of 30 days of such
occurrence. Thereupon the City Engineer shall
give his written instructions and/or decisions
within a period of 60 days of such request. This
period can be extended by mutual consent of the
parties.
Upon receipt of written instructions of decisions,
the parties shall promptly proceed without delay
to comply such instructions or decisions. If the
City Engineer fails to give his instructions or
decisions in writing within a period of 60 days or
mutually agreed time after being requested if the
parties are aggrieved against the decision o f the
C. E., the parties may within 30 days prefer an
appeal of the M.P.L., Com. who shall afford an
opportunity to the parties of being heard and to
offer evidence in support of his appeal. The M.P.L.
Com will, give his decision within 90 days. If any
party is not satisfied with the decision of the
M.P.L. Com, he can refer such disputes for
arbitration by an Arbitration Board to be
constituted by the Corporation which, shall
consist of three members of whom one shall be
chosen from among the officers belonging to be
Urban Administration and Development
Department not below the rank of B.E. one
Retired Chief Engineer of any Technical
Department and City Engineer Nagar Nigam
Jabalpur,
The following are also the terms of this contract, namely, :
a) No person other than the aforesaid Arbitration Board
constituted by the Corporation (to handle cases of all
Technical Departments) shall act as Arbitrator and it for
any reason that is not possible the matter shall not be
referred to Arbitration at all.
b) The Corporation may at any time effect any change
in the personnel of the Board and the new members or
members appointed to the Arbitration Board shall be
entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage it
was left by his or their predecessors.
c) The party invoking arbitration shall specify the
dispute or disputes to be referred to arbitration under
this clause together with the amount or amounts
claimed in respect of each such dispute(s).
d) Where the party invoking arbitration is the contractor
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8
no reference for arbitration shall be maintainable,
unless the contractor furnishes a security deposit of a
sum determined according to the table given below, and
the sum so deposited shall on the determination of
arbitration proceeding, be adjusted against the cost, if
any awarded by the Board against the party and the
balance remaining after such adjustment or in the
absence of the such cost being awarded the whole of
the sum shall be refunded to him within one month
from the date of the award.
Amount of Claim
Rate of Security Deposits
For claim below
Rs.10000/-.
5% of amount claimed
For claim of Rs.10000/-
and above but below
Rs.1 ,00 ,000/-
3% of amount claimed
subject to minimum of
Rs. 500/-
For claims of
Rs.1,00,000/- and above
2% o f the amount
claimed subject to a
minimum o f Rs. 3000/
e) \005 \005
f) \005
g)\005
h)\005 \005"
(Underlining is ours)
Reference to sub-clauses (e) to (h) of the Arbitration
Clause 29 would not be necessary in view of the fact that the
said sub-clauses are not required to be considered for decision
and accordingly are omitted.
In 2002, the respondent filed an application under
Section 11(6)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996
(hereinafter called the "Act") in the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur seeking appointment of an arbitrator to
adjudicate upon disputes between it and the appellants, which
came to be registered as M.C.C No. 285/2002. By an order
dated 7th May 2003, a learned Judge of the High Court allowed
the application directing the appellant, Municipal Corporation,
to invoke the arbitration clause and appoint an arbitrator in
compliance with Clause 29 of the contract at the earliest to
resolve the disputes between the parties. The learned Judge
directed:
"In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the
application filed by the applicants under Section
11(6)(c) of the Act is hereby allowed. The
respondents are directed to invoke the arbitration
clause 29 and it is directed that as early as possible
the arbitrator be appointed to resolve the dispute
between the applicant and the respondent nos. 1
and 2."
(Underlining is ours)
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8
A bare perusal of this direction made by the High Court,
while allowing the application under Section 11(6)(c) of the Act,
would clearly indicate that the Corporation was directed to
invoke the arbitration clause and appoint an Arbitration Board
in compliance with Clause 29 of the contract. In that view of the
matter, we examined Clause 29 of the contract and its sub
clauses in detail from which the followings emerge:
[I] No reference for arbitration shall be maintainable
unless the contractor furnishes the security deposit of a
sum determined as per the table given in sub-clause (d) of
the contract by the Corporation.
[II] Obligation of the Corporation would arise to
constitute an Arbitration Board only after the security
deposit is determined by the Corporation and deposited
by the contractor.
[III] The Corporation shall constitute a Board called
’Arbitration Board’ for arbitration which shall consist of
three members of whom one shall be chosen from among
the officers belonging to the Urban Administration and
Development Department not below the rank of B.E., one
Retired Chief Engineer of any Technical Department and
City Engineer, Nagar Nigam, Jabalpur; subject to
compliance of (I) and (II) as noted herein above.
At the risk of repetition, we may reiterate that the High
Court while allowing the application under Section 11(6)(c) of
the Act directed appointment of the Arbitrator in terms of
Clause 29 of the contract, which contained the aforesaid
provisions.
It may be kept on record that, on instruction, Mr. Ranjan
Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the Corporation, submitted
that the Corporation was ready and willing to constitute an
Arbitration Board in compliance with Clause 29 of the contract
without any reference being made to the Chief Engineer, or in
case of failure of the Chief Engineer to take decision or give
instruction in writing to file an appeal before MPL Com and that
the Arbitration Board shall proceed from the stage at which the
learned Arbitrator, appointed by the High Court, had already
reached.
Keeping in mind the aforesaid stand taken by the
Corporation, we shall now consider whether the High Court was
justified in appointing a retired Chief Justice of a High Court as
the sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes raised by the parties.
Seeking enforcement of the order of the High Court dated
7th May 2003, invoking Clause 29 for appointment of an
arbitrator, the respondent filed another application being
M.C.C.No. 3295/2003. By the impugned order, as noted herein
earlier, Mr. B.C Verma, retired Chief Justice of Punjab and
Haryana High Court was appointed by a learned Judge to act as
an arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the
parties.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Judge of
the High Court, the appellants filed a review application before
the High Court, which by the subsequent order dated 8th April,
2005 passed in M.C.C. No. 1579 of 2004, which is impugned in
Special Leave Petition No.19333 of 2005, was rejected. Feeling
aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, this appeal has been filed by
the appellants.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the material put on record in detail. At the outset,
it is necessary for us to examine Section 11(6)(c) of the Act,
which reads as under:
"11. Appointment of arbitrators. \026
(1)\005.
(6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed
upon by the parties, -
(a) A party fails to act as required under that
procedure; or
(b) The parties, or the two appointed
arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement
expected of them under that procedure; or
( c) A person, including an institution, fails to
perform any function entrusted to him or
it under that procedure.
A party may request the Chief Justice or any
person or institution designated by him to take the
necessary measure, unless the agreement on the
appointment procedure provides other means for
securing the appointment." [Underlining is ours)
Section 11(6)(c) says that in case one of the parties to the
arbitration agreement fails to perform any function entrusted to
it, the other party shall have the right to approach the
appropriate forum to take necessary measure in that regard.
However, this provision also says that in a situation where the
arbitration agreement provides for other measures for securing
the appointment of an arbitrator, the same shall be followed.
It was contended by Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, learned
counsel appearing for the appellants, that it was not open to the
High Court to appoint an arbitrator without complying with
Clause 29 of the contract. According to him, as noted herein
earlier, the High Court by its own order dated 7th May 2003
directed appointment of an arbitrator in compliance with Clause
29 of the contract which clearly provides a procedure for
appointment of an arbitrator and also indicates who shall be
appointed arbitrator and how he shall be appointed.
Mr. Mukherjee had brought to our notice that Clause 29 of the
contract clearly stipulated that no person other than the
Arbitration Board constituted by the Corporation would act as
arbitrator provided that the party invoking arbitration clause
furnishes a security deposit of a sum determined according to
the table given in the contract itself. After such determination
and on deposit of the said sum by the party invoking arbitration
clause, it would become the duty and obligation of the
Corporation to constitute an Arbitration Board as provided in
Clause 29 of the contract. Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee
contended that since the High Court by its earlier order dated
7th of May, 2003, having directed the parties to invoke
arbitration clause in compliance with Clause 29 of the contract,
it was not open to the High Court to appoint a retired Chief
Justice of a High Court as an Arbitrator before the respondent
had furnished security and before determination of the amount
of security by the Corporation, as provided in Clause 29 (d) of
the contract, which clearly says, as noted herein earlier, that no
reference for arbitration shall be maintainable unless the
contractor furnishes the security deposit of a sum determined
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8
by the Corporation. Mr. Mukherjee, therefore, contended that
the High Court was not justified in appointing a retired Chief
Justice of a High Court to act as an Arbitrator over looking
Clause 29(d) of the contract and also without considering the
fact that obligation of the Corporation to appoint an arbitrator
to resolve a dispute between the parties would only arise when
the contractor had furnished security which was to be
determined by the Corporation.
This submission of Mr. Mukherjee was seriously
contested by Mr. Amit Sharma, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent. According to him, no interference can be made
with the impugned order since the High Court was fully justified
in appointing an arbitrator in the manner it had done. In this
connection reliance was placed on the case of Datar
Switchgears Ltd. v. Tata Finance Ltd [2000(8) SCC 151].
Reliance was also placed by Mr. Sharma on the case of Punj
Llyods Ltd v. Petronet MHB Ltd. [2006(2) SCC 638]. Relying
on the aforesaid two decisions, Mr. Sharma invited us to re-
consider the submission of Mr. Mukherjee and to dismiss the
present appeal.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after
considering the rival submissions made on their behalf and
examining Clause 29 of the contract in detail, we are of the view
that the High Court was not justified in appointing a retired
Chief Justice of a High Court to act as sole arbitrator as the
same is contrary to Clause 29 of the contract. As noted earlier,
the High Court, by its earlier order dated 7th May 2003 directed
the parties to invoke the arbitration clause and to appoint an
arbitrator in compliance with Clause 29 of the contract entered
into between the parties.
Clause 29 specifically stipulates, as indicated herein
earlier, that if any dispute arises between the parties, the party
seeking invocation of the arbitration clause, shall first approach
the Chief Engineer and on his failure to arbitrate the dispute,
the party aggrieved may file an appeal to MPL Com, failing
which, the Corporation shall constitute an Arbitration Board to
resolve the disputes in the manner indicated in Clause 29.
However, before doing so, the party invoking arbitration clause
is required to furnish security of a sum to be determined by the
Corporation.
In this case, admittedly, the security has not been
furnished by the respondent to the Corporation. We, in fact,
asked Mr. Sharma, appearing on behalf of the respondent to
ascertain on the date of the hearing of the appeal, whether the
security deposit was made or not. On instruction, Mr. Sharma
informed us that such security has not yet been deposited.
Such being the position even today, we hold that the obligation
of the Corporation to constitute an Arbitration Board to resolve
disputes between the parties could not arise because of failure
of the respondent to furnish security as envisaged in Clause
29(d) of the contract. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that on
account of non-furnishing of security by the respondent, the
question of constituting an Arbitration Board by the
Corporation could not arise at all. Accordingly, we hold that the
High Court was not justified in appointing a retired Chief
Justice of a High Court as Arbitrator by the impugned order.
It is not disputed before us that the learned Arbitrator
appointed by the High Court has already commenced the
arbitration proceeding. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of
the Corporation, on instruction, had submitted before us that
they shall constitute an Arbitration Board as soon as the
respondent furnishes security in terms of Clause 29(d) of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8
contract and if any direction is given to the Arbitration Board to
proceed from the stage the learned Arbitrator had already
reached, that would not be objected to. That is to say, Mr.
Mukherjee contended that the Arbitration Board may be
directed to take over the arbitration proceedings from the stage
the learned Arbitrator had already reached.
Such being the stand taken by the Corporation, we direct
the respondent to furnish the security of a sum to be
determined by the Corporation within six weeks from this date
and in the event security determined by the Corporation is
furnished within the time mentioned herein earlier, the
Corporation shall constitute an Arbitration Board in compliance
with Clause 29 of the contract. It is directed that the Arbitration
Board shall proceed from the stage the learned Arbitrator
appointed by the High Court had already reached.
That apart, it has to be kept in mind that it is always the
duty of the court to construe the arbitration agreement in a
manner so as to uphold the same. Therefore we must hold that
the High Court ought not to have appointed an arbitrator in a
manner, which was inconsistent with the arbitration agreement.
Before parting with this judgment, we will be failing in
our duty if we do not consider and deal with the decisions cited
by Mr. Sharma appearing on behalf of the respondent. First
decision relied on by him was Datar Switchgears Ltd. case
(supra). It is difficult to understand how the said decision
would be of assistance to Mr. Sharma. In this decision, this
Court was dealing with a case falling under Section 11(6) of the
Act where no time limit is prescribed, whereas time limit of 30
days is prescribed under Section 11(4) and (5) of the Act. In that
context, it was held by this court that if one party makes a
demand for appointment of an arbitrator to the opposite party
and the latter does not make an appointment within 30 days of
demand, the right of appointment of arbitrator does not get
automatically forfeited after expiry of 30 days. This Court held
that under Section 11(6), if the opposite party has not made an
appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make
appointment is not forfeited but still continues. However, the
right of the opposite party ceases when an application under
Section 11 seeking appointment of an arbitrator is filed. This is
not the factual situation in the present case, nor are we
concerned with this aspect in the present case.
So far as the case of Punj Llyods Ltd (supra) is
concerned, it is true that this decision of this Court was
rendered by a bench of three Judges which affirmed the
decision in the case of Datar Switchgears Ltd. (supra). Since
we are not concerned in the facts and circumstances of the
present case with the question decided by this Court in the
aforesaid two decisions, we are unable to rely on those
decisions.
For the reasons aforesaid, the order dated 29th July 2004
which has given rise to Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave
Petition No.19332 of 2005 is set aside and we direct the
Corporation to constitute an Arbitration Board in terms of
Clause 29 within a period of three months from this date,
provided the respondent furnishes security in terms of the table
provided in Clause 29(d) of the contract, as determined by the
Corporation within a period of six weeks from this date. We,
however, make it clear that in view of the stand taken by the
Corporation, as noted herein earlier, the Arbitration Board shall
commence their proceedings from the stage the arbitrator
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8
appointed by the High Court had already reached.
Since we have set aside the order dated 29th July 2004,
Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave petition No. 19333 of
2005 filed against the order dated 8th April, 2005 has become
infructuous.
The Appeal is disposed of in the manner indicated above.
There will be no order as to costs.