Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
UNION OF INDIA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
H. C. GOEL
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/08/1963
BENCH:
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
BENCH:
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SUBBARAO, K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION:
1964 AIR 364 1964 SCR (4) 718
CITATOR INFO :
R 1965 SC1103 (9)
D 1967 SC1445 (10)
R 1969 SC 966 (5)
R 1969 SC1294 (5)
F 1969 SC1302 (8)
R 1970 SC1095 (6)
R 1974 SC1589 (22)
R 1978 SC1277 (18)
RF 1981 SC 858 (6)
F 1983 SC 454 (10)
D 1984 SC 273 (44)
RF 1988 SC1000 (4)
RF 1991 SC 471 (6,7)
RF 1992 SC2219 (138)
ACT:
Civil Service-Disciplinary proceedings-Enquiry--proposal by
enquiry officer, if binding on the Government-Order of
dismissal based on no evidence--Government acting bona fide-
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere-Constitution of
India, Arts. 226 and 311(1) & (2)-Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. r. 55.
HEADNOTE:
On a complaint the appellant decided to hold a departmental
enquiry against the respondent, suspended him and served a
notice calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken on the following charges; (i)
Meeting the Deputy Director, Administration, C.P.W.D., at
his residence without neccssary permission, (ii) Voluntarily
expressing regret at his not having brought sweets from
Calcutta for the Deputy Director’s Children, (iii) Offering
a currency note which from size and colour appeared to be a
hundred rupee note as bribe with the intention of presuading
Deputy Director, Shri Rajagopalan to support his
representation regarding his seniority to the U.P.S.C., (iv)
violation of Rule 3 of the C. C. B. (Conduct Rules). The
respondent tendered his explanation and on enquiry, the
charges were not found proved. The appellant considered the
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enquiry report and provisionally came to the conclusion that
the respondent should be dismissed and accordingly issued a
second notice against him. The respondent submitted his
explanation to this notice. At that stage, his case was
referred to the Union Public Service Commission. The
Commission advised the appellant that none of the penalties
could be inflicted on the respondent. The appellant
considered the matter afresh and remitted it back to the
commission to reconsider it again. The Commission, on re-
examining the matter adhered to its earlier views
719
and conveyed them to the appellant. The appellant
considered the whole case again and dismissed the respondent
from service. The respondent then moved a writ petition in
the High Court under Arts. 226 and 311 for quashing the said
order of dismissal. The petition was dismissed by the
learned single Judge. The respondent then preferred Letters
Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.
The appeal was allowed and his dismissal was set aside. In
this Court two questions of law arose for consideration,
namely (1) whether Government is competent to differ from
the findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer who has
been entrusted with the work of holding a departmental en-
quiry against a delinquent Government servant under r. 55 of
the Civil Services Rules and (2) whether the High Court in
dealing with a writ petition filed by a Government Officer
who has been dismissed from service is entitled to hold that
the conclusion reached by the Government in regard to his
misconduct is not supported by any evidence at all. The
appellant mainly contended that if it acted bona fide, the
High Court would not be justified in interfering with its
conclusions though the High Court may feel that the said
conclusions are based on no evidence.
Held, that on principle, neither findings recorded by the
enquiry officer, nor hisrecommendations are binding on the
Government and therefore,the constitutional safeguard
afforded by Art. 311(2) cannotbe said to have been
contravened by the appellant.
The Secretary ofState for India v. 1. M. La, [1945]
F.C.R. 103, High Commissioner for India and High
Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal, 75 I.A. 225, Khem
Chand v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1080, State of Assam
v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, [1964] 2. S.C.R. I and A. N. D’Silva
v. Union of India, [19621 Supp. I S.C.R. 968, referred to.
In dealing with writ petition filed by public servants who
have been dismissed or otherwise dealt with so as to attract
Art. 311(2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction
to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which
the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by
any evidence at all.
It cannot be held, that if mala fides are not alleged and
bona fides are assumed in favour of the appellant, its
conclusion on a question of fact cannot be successfully
challenged even if it is manifest that there is no evidence
to support it.
In the present case, there is no evidence on the record to
sustain the finding of the appellant that charge no. 3 has
been proved against the respondent.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 645 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 2, 1960, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at
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Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. 27-D of 1959.
720
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General for India and R. H.
Dhebar, for the appellant.
N.C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and K. K. Sinha, for the
respondent.
August 30, 1963. The judgment of the court was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-Two short questions of law arise for our
decision in the present appeal. The first question is
whether Government is competent to differ from the findings
of fact recorded by the enquiry officer who has been
entrusted with the work of holding a departmental enquiry
against a delinquent government servant under Rule 55 of the
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules ;
and the other question is whether the High Court in dealing
with a writ petition field by a Government Officer who has
been dismissed from Government service is entitled to hold
that the conclusion reached by the Government in regard to
his misconduct is not supported by any evidence at all. As
our ]judgment will show, we are inclined to answer both the
questions in the affirmative. Thus, the appellant, the
Union of Union of India. succeeds on the first point, but
fails on the second. At the hearing of this appeal, the
learned Attorney-General told us that the appellant was
fighting this appeal as a test case not so much to sustain
the order of dismissal passed against the respondent is to
obtain a decision from this Court on the two points of law
raised by it in the present appeal.
The above two points arise in this way. The respondent, H.
C. Goel, joined the Central Public Works Department on the
26th November, 1941, and in due course, he was selected for
appointment in Class I post in or about 1945-46. In
January, 1956, he was posted as Surveyor of Works at
Calcutta. It appears that he felt that his seniority had
not been properly fixed and so, he had made a representation
in that behalf to the Union Public Service Commission. He
happened to go to Delhi about the middle of January, 1956.
Then, he called on Mr. R. Rajagopalan, who was the Deputy
Director of Administration, at his residence on the 19th
January, 1956. His idea in seeing Mr. RajaGopalan was to
acquaint him with the merits of his case.
721
In the course of his conversation with Mr. Rajagopalan it is
alleged that be apologised for not having brought
‘rasagullas’ for the children of Mr. Rajagopalan. There-
upon, Mr. Rajagopalan frowned and expressed his displeasure
at the implied suggestion. A little later, during the
course of the interview, it is alleged that the respondent
took out from his pocket a wallet and from it produced what
appeared to Mr. Rajagopalan to be a folded hundred rupee
note. Mr. Rajagopalan showed his stern disapproval of this
conduct, whereupon the respondent said ’No’ and put the
wallet with the note in his -pocket. After a few minutes
the interview ended and the respondent left Mr.
Rajagopalan’s -place.
Soon thereafter Mr. Rajagopalan reported the incident to Mr.
Ananthakrishnan, Director of Administration, C.P. W.D., and
at his suggestion be submitted a complaint in writing. In
this complaint. Mr. Rajagopalan narrated the incidents as
they had occurred and added that at the end of the
interview, the respondent asked him whether he could meet
Mr. Rajagopalan again the next day to know about the result
of his representation, and Mr. Rajagopalan told him that he
might make the enquiry when he happened to visit Delhi next.
On receiving this complaint from Mr. Rajagopalan, the
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appellant decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the
respondent, suspended him and served a notice on him on the
9th February, 1956, setting forth the charges against him
and calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him. This notice contained four
charges which read thus:-
(i) Meeting the Deputy Director,
Administration, C.P.W.D., at his residence
without necessary permission.
(ii)Voluntarily expressing regret at his not
having brought sweets from Calcutta for the
Deputy Director’s children.
(iii) Offering a currency note which from size
and colour appeared to be a hundred rupee note
as bribe with the intention of persuading
Deputy Director, Sri Rajagopalan to support
his representation regarding his seniority to
the U.P.S.C.
(iv) Violation of Rule 3 of the C.C. S.
(Conduct Rules).
722
The respondent tendered his explanation and the matter was
enquired into under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules by
Mr. Kapoor. The Enquiry Officer examined Mr. Rajagopalan
and the respondent, considered the evidence produced before
him, and came to the conclusion that the charges framed
against the respondent had not been satisfactorily proved.
This report was made by the enquiry officer on the 10th
April, 1956.
The appellant considered the report submitted to it by Mr.
Kapoor and provisionally came to the conclusion that the
respondent should be dismissed from service, and accordingly
issued a second notice against the respondent on the 14th
June, 1956. The respondent submitted his explanation in
response to this notice.
At that stage, the respondent’s case was referred to the
Union Public Service Commission. By its report made on the
30th October, 1956, the Commission took the view that the
first charge should be dropped; the second charge was hardly
a matter justifying framing of a charge against the officer;
the third charge had not been proved on the basis of the
available evidence; and in view of the said conclusion, the
Commission thought that the fourth charge failed
automatically. The Commission accordingly advised the
appellant that none of the penalties provided for in Rule 49
of the Civil Rules need be inflicted on the respondent.
The appellant considered the matter afresh in the light of
the report received from the U.P.S.C., but since it adhered
to the conclusion which it had provisionally reached before
issuing the second notice against the respondent, it
requested the Commission to reconsider the matter and re-
mitted the said matter to it on the 8th December, 1956. The
Commission, on re-examining the matter, adhered to its
earlier views and conveyed the same to the appellant on the
15th January, 1957. The appellant considered the whole case
again and came to the conclusion that a case had been
established against the respondent for his dismissal, and
so, by its order passed on the 13th March, 1957, dismissed
him from service.
The respondent then moved the Punjab High Court by his writ
petition No. 201-D of 1957 for quashing the said order of
dismissal, under Articles 226 and 311 of the
723
Constitution. A learned Single Judge of the said High Court
heard the matter and came to the conclusion that the
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respondent had not made out a case for quashing the order of
dismissal passed against him. The respondent then preferred
an appeal under the Letters Patent and a Division Bench of
the said High Court which heard the Letters Patent Appeal
has allowed the respondent’s appeal. It has held that in
view of the fact that the Enquiry Officer had made a report
in favour of the respondent, it was not open to the
appellant to differ from his findings and inasmuch as the
impugned order of dismissal was passed by the appellant as a
result of its conclusion that the findings of the enquiry
officer were erroneous, the said order contravened the
provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. That is how the
writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed and his
dismissal set aside The appellant then applied for a
certificate to the High Court but the said application was
rejected. The appellant then moved this Court for special
leave and it is with the special leave granted by this Court
that it has brought the present appeal before us.
The first question which calls for our decision is whether
it was competent to the appellant to take a different view
on the evidence adduced against the respondent and proceed
on the basis that the conclusions of fact recorded by the
enquiry officer were unsound and erroneous. If it is held
that the appellant was precluded from differing from the
conclusions of the enquiry officer, then, of course, the
subsequent steps taken by the appellant would be in-
consistant with Art. 311 of the Constitution. On the other
hand, if the competence of the appellant to differ from the
conclusions of the enquiry officer cannot be seriously ques-
tioned, then the argument that the appellant contravened
Art. 311 when it issued the second notice against the res-
pondent cannot succeed.
Article 311 consists of two sub-articles and their effect is
no longer in doubt. The question about the safeguards
provided to the public servants in the matter of their dis-
missal, removal or reduction in rank by the Constitutional
provision contained in Art. 311, has been examined by this
court on several occasions. It is now well-settled-that a
public servant who is entitled to the protection of Art. 311
724
must get two opportunities to defend himself. He must have
a clear notice of the charge which he is called upon to meet
before the departmental enquiry commences, and after he gets
such notice and is given the opportunity to offer his
explanation, the enquiry must be conducted according to the
rules and consistently with the requirements of natural
justice. At the end of the enquiry, the enquiry officer
appreciates the evidence, records his conclusions and
submits his report to the Government concerned. That is the
first stage of the enquiry, and this stage can validly begin
only after charge has been served on the delinquent public
servant.
After the report is received by the Government, the
Government is entitled to consider the report and the evi-
dence led against the delinquent public servant. The Gov-
ernment may agree with the report or may differ, either
wholly or partially, from the conclusions recorded in the
report. If the report makes findings in favour of the
public servant, and the Government agrees with the said
findings, nothing more remains to be done, and the public
servant who may have been suspended is entitled to
reinstatement and consequential reliefs. If the report
makes findings in favour of the public servant and the
Government disagree with the said findings and holds that
the charges framed against the public servant are prima
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facie proved, the Government should decide provisionally
what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and
proceed to issue a second notice against him in that behalf.
If the enquiry officer makes findings, some of which are in
favour of the public servant and some against him, the
Government is entitled to consider the whole matter and if
it holds that some or all the charges framed against the
public servant are, in its opinion, prima facie established
against him, then also the Government has to decide
provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the
public servant and give him notice accordingly. It would
thus be seen that the object of the second notice is to
enable the public servant to satisfy the Government on both
the counts, one that he is innocent of the charges framed
against him and the other that even if the charges are held
proved against him, the punishment proposed to be inflicted
upon him is unduly severe. This position under Art. 311 of
the Con-
725
stitution is substantially similar to the position which
governed the public servants under s. 240 of the Government
of India Act, 1935. The scope and effect of the provisions
of s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as well as
the scope and effect of Art. 311 of the Constitution have
been considered by judicial decisions on several occasions
and it is unnecessary to deal with this point in detail,
vide The Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lal(1), High
Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v.
I. M. Lal(2) ; and Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors. (3).
These reported decisions would show, that it has never been
suggested that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer
conclude the matter and that the Government which appoints
the enquiry officers and directs the enquiry is bound by the
said findings and must act on the basis that the said
findings are final and cannot- be reopened. The High Court
has, however, held that there are certain observations made
by the Federal Court in the case of I. M. Lal(1), and by
this Court in the case of Khem Chand(3) which support the
respondent’s contention that the appellant was bound by the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer in his favour in
the present enquiry proceedings Before referring to these
observations, it is relevant to examine this contention on
principle. It is obvious that the enquiry officer holds the
enquiry against the respondent as a delegate of the
appellant. That indeed is the character which the enquiry
officer inevitably occupies when he holds a departmental
enquiry at the instance of the Government. The object of
the enquiry is plain. It is to enable the Government to
hold an investigation into the charges framed against a
delinquent public servant, so that the Government can, in
due course, consider the evidence adduced and decide whether
the said charges are proved or not. The interposition of
the enquiry which is held by a duly appointed enquiry
officer does not alter the true legal position that the
charges are framed by the Government and it is the
Government which is empowered to impose punishment on the
delinquent public servant. Therefore, on principle, it is
diffi-
(1)[1945] F.C.R. 1-03. (2) 75, I.A. 225.
(2)[1958] S.C.R. 1080.
726
cult to see how the respondent is justified in contending
that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer bind the
appellant in the present case.
If the contention raised by the respondent were to be
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upheld, it would lead to illogical and almost fantastic
results. If the enquiry officer makes findings against the
public servant, on the respondent’s contention the Govern-
ment can never re-examine the matter, so that even if the
Government were satisfied that the findings against the
public servant were erroneous, it must proceed on the basis
that the public servant is guilty and impose some punishment
on him. It is obvious that this proposition is entirely
inconsistant with the Constitutional rights of the appellant
which is the appointing authority and which has the power to
impose the punishment on the respondent.
Similarly, if the enquiry officer makes findings in favour
of the public servant, on the respondent’s case that is
final and however illogical, erroneous or unsound the said
findings may be, the appellant is powerless and must act on
the basis that the public servant is innocent. That again
is a very anomalous position and it ignores the true Con-
stitutional rights of the appellant and the character of the
enquiry officer and the scope of his enquiry.
Sometimes, several charges are framed and findings are
recorded by the enquiry officer in respect of them. In such
cases, Government may accept some findings and may reject
others, and it has naturally to proceed to take the next
step in the light of its own conclusions. Such a case arose
before this Court in The State of Assam and Anr. v. Bimal
Kumar Pandit(1). Dealing with the requirements which the
second notice must satisfy in such a case, this Court has
held that the said notice must indicate to the public
servant clearly the grounds on which the Government
provisionally intends to act in imposing the proposed
punishment specified in the notice.
Besides, it would be apparent that if the respondent’s
argument is valid, then the second notice would serve very
little purpose. If, at that stage, the Government is bound
to accept the findings of the enquiry officer, the
opportunity whichis intended to be given to the public
servant to show causenot only against the proposed
punishment but also (1)[1964] 2 S.C.R. 1.
727
against the findings recorded against him, would be defeat-
ed, because on the respondent’s case Government cannot alter
the said findings. In our opinion, the contention raised by
the respondent is patently unsound and must be rejected.
In this connection, we may add that unless the statutory
rule or the specific order under which an officer is
appointed to hold an enquiry so requires, the enquiry offi-
cer need not make any recommendations as to the punishment
which may be imposed on the delinquent officer in case the
charges framed against him are held proved at the enquiry;
if, however, the enquiry officer makes any recommendations,
the said recommendations like his findings on the merits are
intended merely to supply appropriate material for the
consideration of the Government. Neither the findings, nor
the recommendations are binding on the Government, vide A.
N. D’Silva v. Union of India(1).
Let us now briefly consider whether the observations on
which the respondent rests Ms case justify his contention.
In The Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lal(2) Spens
C.J. examined the provisions of s. 240(3) of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and observed that the said sub-section
involves in all cases "where there is an enquiry and as a
result thereof some authority definitely proposes dismissal,
or reduction in rank, that the person concerned shall be
told in full, or adequately summarised form, the results of
that enquiry and the findings of the enquiring officer and
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be given an opportunity of showing cause with that
information why he should not suffer the proposed dismissal
or reduction." Mr. Chatterjee suggests that these
observations indicate that it is only on the basis of the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer that the second
notice can be issued. In our opinion, this argument is
completely misconceived. ID the case of 1. M. Lal, the
findings were against him and it is by reference to the said
findings that the observations made by Spens C. J. must be
considered. If the findings are against the public servant,
and the Government on considering the evidence, accepts the
said findings provisionally, it would be right to say that
on the said findings the second notice is served on the
public servant, and so,
((I) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968,
(2) [1945] F.C.R. 103.
728
he should be given a clear idea as to the nature of the said
findings. That, of course, does not mean that the findings
of the enquiry officer arc binding and virtually conclude
the matter.
The same comment has to be made about the observations made
by S. R. Das C.J. in the case of Khem Chand(1). Summarising
his conclusions, the learned Chief justice observed, inter
alia, that the second opportunity to which a public servant
is entitled can be effective only if "the competent
authority after the enquiry is over and after applying its
mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved
against the Government servant, tentatively proposes to
inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the
same to the Government servant." It is obvious that when the
learned Chief justice refers to the charges proved against
the Government servant, it is not intended to be suggested
that the findings made by the enquiry officer in that behalf
arc final. The enquiry report along with the evidence
recorded constitute the material on which the Government has
ultimately to act. That is the only purpose of the enquiry
held by competent officer and the report which he makes as a
result of the said enquiry. Therefore, we have no
hesitation in holding that the High Court was in error in
coming to the conclusion that the appellant was not
justified in differing from the findings recorded by the
enquiry officer. As we have just indicated, if it is held
that the report of the enquiry officer is not binding on the
Government, then the Constitutional safeguard afforded by
Art. 311(1) & (2) cannot be said to have been contravened by
the appellant and the grievance made by the respondent in
that behalf must fail.
This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. It
still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not
right when he contends that in the circumstances of this
case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no
evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse
and-, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent
error on the face of the record that the High Court would be
justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions
filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or other-
(1)[1958] S.C.R. 1080.
729
wise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311 (2), the High
Court under Art. 226 has Jurisdiction to enquire whether the
conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of
dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It
is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed
against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can
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be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the
proceedings held against such a public servant under the
statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the
charge framed against him are in the nature of quasijudicial
proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of
certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant
if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate
conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings which
is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence. In
fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we ought
to add that he did not seriously dispute this, position in
law.
He, however, attempted to argue that if the appellant acted
bona fide, then the High Court would not be justified in
interfering with its conclusion though the High, Court may
feel that the said conclusion is based on no evidence. His
contention was that cases where conclusions. are reached by
the Government without any evidence, could Dot, in law, be
distinguished from cases of mala fides; and so he suggested
that perverse conclusions of fact may be and can be attacked
only on the ground that, they are mala fides, and since mala
fides were not alleged in the present case, it was not open
to the respondent to contend that the view taken by the
appellant can be corrected in writ proceedings.
We are not prepared to accept this contention. Malafide
exercise of power can be attacked independently on the
ground that it is mala fide. Such an exercise of power is
always liable to be quashed on the main ground that it is
not a bona fide exercise of power. But we are not prepared
to hold that if mala fides are not alleged and bona fides
are assumed in favour of the appellant, its conclusion on a
question of fact cannot be successfully challenged even if
it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it. The
two infirmities are separate and distinct though, con-
ceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There may 47-
2 S. C. India/64
730
be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting
bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the
Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the
conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence
may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that
if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the
conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorary will not
issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we
are not prepared to accept the learned AttorneyGeneral’s
argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the
appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari’ can be
issued in favour of the respondent.
That takes us to the merits of the respondent’s contention
that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge
framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on
no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed
before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to
bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the
determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown
that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible
view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision
and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the
same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely
sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in
dealing with this part of the respondent’s case is, is there
any evidence on which a finding can be made against the
respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him? In
exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea,
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the High Court cannot consider the question about the
sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a
particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the
competence of the authority which dealt with the question;
but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any
evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In
other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry
is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the
charge in question is proved against the respondent? This
approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the
evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that
evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.
Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the
respondent’s
731
grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the find-
ing which is implicit in the appellant’s order dismissing
the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is
based on no evidence.
The facts relating to this narrow point are very few. The
respondent expressed his regret to Mr. Rajagopalan that he
had not brought rasagullas for his children. There is some
controversy as to whether this statement was made by the
respondent at the beginning of his interview with Mr.
Rajagopalan or at its end. The complaint made by Mr.
Rajagopalan shows that the interview began with the
respondent’s expression of regret that he had not brought
sweets for Mr. Rajagopalan’s,children. Mr. Rajagopalan in
his evidence stated that this statement was made by the
respondent at the close of the interview. One fact is clear
that the respondent did express regret that he had not taken
sweets to Mr. Rajagopalan’s place. If the respondent’s
version that he said so at the beginning of the interview is
believed, particularly when it is supported by the complaint
made by Mr. Rajagopalan, it may show that the stern
disapproval expressed by Mr. Rajagopalan on hearing the said
remark from the respondent must have acted as a warning to
him. That, however is another Matter.
Then, as to the hundred rupee note which according to Mr.
Rajagopalan, was taken out by the respondent from his
wallet, Mr. Rajagopalan has admitted that the said note was
folded double. He says, that be noticed that its colour was
blue and that its size was bigger than the usual ten rupee
or five rupee note. Mr. Rajagopalan who appears to be a
straightforward officer gave his evidence in a very honest
way. He frankly told the enquiry officer that it could not
be said that the hundred rupee note which he thought the
respondent took out from his wallet had been offered to him
by the respondent, but he thought that the whole thing had
to be viewed in the context of the matter. He also admitted
that his eye-sight was not perfect.
The respondent, on the other hand, suggested that in reply
tothe questions which Mr. Rajagopalan put to him he tookout
some papers from his pocket to find out the letter ofhis
appointment, and as soon as Mr. Rajagopalan
732
appeared to discourage him, he put the said paper in his
pocket.
Now, in this state of the evidence, how can it be said that
respondent even attempted to offer a bribe to Mr. Raja-
gopalan. Mr. Rajagopalan makes a definite statement that
respondent did not offer him a bribe. He merely refers to
the fact that respondent took out a paper from his wallet
and the said paper appeared to him like a hundred rupee note
duble folded. Undoubtedly, Mr. Rajagopalan suspected the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11
respondent’s conduct, and so, made a report immediately.
But the suspicion entertained by Mr. Rajagopalan cannot, in
law, be treated as evidence against the respondent even
though there is no doubt that Mr. Rajagopalan is a
straightforward and an honest officer. Though we fully
appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out
corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the fact
that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should
not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic
enquiries. It may be that the technical rules which govern
criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to
disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle
that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken
to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much
to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held
under the statutory rules. We have very carefully
considered the evidence led in the present enquiry and borne
in mind the plea made by the learned AttorneyGeneral, but we
are unable to hold that on the record, there is any evidence
which can sustain the finding of the appellant that charge
No. 3 has been proved against the respondent. It is in this
connection and only incidentally that it may be relevant to
add that the U.P.S.C. considered the matter twice and came
to the firm decision that the main charge against the
respondent had not been established.
The result is, though the appellant succeeds on the
principle point of law raised in the appeal, the appeal
fails, because, on the merits, we hold that no case had been
made out for punishing the respondent.
The appellant to pay the costs of respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
733