GURUVIAH vs. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 20-08-2019

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL   NO(s).1208 OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.1658 of 2019)
GURUVIAH
VERSUS
THE STATE REPRESENTED BY
THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
WITH   CRIMINAL APPEAL   NO(s).1209 OF 2019 (arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.3985 of 2019)
VELUSAMY
VERSUS
THE STATE REPRESENTED BY
THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE
JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The appellants, who are village assistants, challenge their conviction under Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter called as “the Act”) with fine Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MANISH SETHI Date: 2019.08.20 17:03:25 IST Reason: and a default stipulation, sentencing them to one year of rigorous imprisonment.  The appellants have been acquitted of the charge 1 under Section 7 of the Act and Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.     The   village   administrative   officer,   accused   no.1,   was convicted under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2) and 12 of the Act. He has since been deceased during the pendency of his separate appeal.  2. The appellants were village assistants in the office of the village administrative officer, arrayed as accused 2 and 3.   On 17.12.2003,   P.W.   2   lodged   a   written   complaint   before   the Additional   Superintendent   of   Police   (Vigilance   and   Anti­ Corruption) that the village administrative officer had demanded a sum of Rs.600/­ for signing the necessary papers to facilitate transfer of electric connection in the name of the complainant. The illegal gratification is stated to have been handed over to one of the appellants on the instruction of the village administrative officer, and who after counting it handed it over to the other appellant.   They   were   apprehended   by   the   trap   officials immediately thereafter and the money recovered.  2 3. Learned senior counsel Shri S. Nagamuthu, appearing for the appellants, submitted that according to P.W.2 the demand had been exclusively made by the village administrative officer alone.   The   latter   alone   was   competent   to   sign   the   necessary papers   to   facilitate   transfer   of   the   electric   connection.   The appellants were menial assistants in his office.   There was no occasion for them to demand any illegal gratification as they were incompetent to grant any favour to P.W.2. The appellants had never made any demand for illegal gratification from P.W.2.  They had only received the money from P.W.2 on the instructions of the village administrative officer in the bonafide belief that it was payment   towards   demand   of   arrears   of   land   tax,   for   which a receipt had already been issued earlier without actual payment. In the absence of any proof for demand and acceptance by the appellants,   they   cannot   be   convicted   on   assumptions   and presumptions.  There is no proof of any conspiracy. Mere recovery from   the   appellants   was   not   sufficient   for   conviction.     It   is unlikely that a demand of Rs.600/­ would be made to facilitate a subsidy of Rs.625/­. Reliance in support of the submissions was placed on   , 1996 (11) Virendranath vs. State of Maharashtra SCC 688.   3 4. Shri   M.   Yogesh   Kannan,   learned   counsel   for   the   State, submitted that evidently the appellants were in league with the village administrative officer.  Mere absence of direct evidence for demand and acceptance or conspiracy was irrelevant in view of the circumstantial evidence available and which unhesitatingly points   towards   the   appellants   as   being   part   of   design   for obtaining   illegal   gratification.     The   demand   undoubtedly   was made by the village administrative officer alone. The money was handed over to accused no.2 on his instructions. After counting the amount, accused no.2 handed over the money to appellant no.3 who put it in his shirt pocket. The application form was then filled up by accused no.3 after which the village administrative officer signed and put seal. The transfer of electric connection would have facilitated P.W.2 to obtain a subsidy of Rs.625/­ every six months.   The defence of the appellants that the money was received bonafide in the belief that it was towards arrears of land tax for   Fasli   years 1412 and 1413 is falsified by the fact that taxation for the years in question had already been cancelled by the State  Government.  Relying  upon   T.  Shankar Prasad vs. 4 ,   (2004)   3   SCC   753,   it   was   submitted   that   the State   of   A.P. conviction   and   sentence   of   the   appellants   calls   for   no interference. 5. We   have   considered   the   submissions   and   perused   the materials   on   record.     P.W.2   was   desirous   for   transfer   of   the electric connection on the land in question in his own name to facilitate   a   subsidy   of   Rs.625/­   every   six   months.   The   village administrative   officer   was   required   to   sign   the   necessary documents for the purpose. P.W.2 lodged a written complaint on 17.12.2003   against   the   village   administrative   officer   alone   for having demanded a sum of Rs.600/­ as illegal gratification for the purpose.     P.W.2   lodged   a   written   report   regarding   the   same. Necessary   mazhar   was   prepared.     The   appellants   were   village assistants in the office of the village administrative officer. The village administrative officer came to the office along with accused no.3 while accused no.2 waited at the office for both of them.  The money was handed over to accused no.2 on the instructions of the village administrative officer.  The significance of accused no.2 counting the money before handing it over to accused no.3 who 5 put it in his shirt pocket, lay in the confirmation that the amount was   in   consonance   with   the   demand,   of   which   naturally   the appellants were therefore aware of. It was only after the money as demanded   was   paid   that   accused   no.3   filled   up   the   form   for transfer   of   the   electric   connection   in   the   name   of   P.W.2   and placed it before the village administrative officer who then signed and   put   his   seal   on   the   same.     At   this   moment,   they   were apprehended.  The money was handed over to the trap officials by the village administrative officer after taking it back from accused no.3. Their hands were dipped in the sodium carbonate solution, including the shirt of the third accused, leading to change of colour of the solution confirming that they were the same notes which were given to P.W.2 by the trap officials.  6. P.W.1 proved the sanction for the prosecution. The mere absence of any specific statement by P.W.2 and the trap witness P.W.4   of   any   demand   and   acceptance   by   the   appellants, attributing the same only to the village administrative officer can be of no avail to the appellants.  P.W.10, Inspector Crime Branch proved the trap proceedings and recovery.   The defence of the 6 appellants that they had received the money in the bonafide belief that it was towards arrears of land tax is belied by the fact that land tax for the period in question had already been cancelled by the State Government.  The taking of a false defence is a further aggravating   circumstance   against   the   appellants.     The   second contention that it is improbable that a demand of Rs.600/­ would have been made for a subsidy benefit of Rs.625/­ only, ignores the fact that it entitled P.W.2 for a subsidy of Rs.625/­ every six months.  Evidently the appellants were in league with the village administrative officer.   7. The contention that there was no demand or acceptance by the   appellants   or   that   it   was   in   a   bonafide   belief   merits   no consideration. The prosecution was therefore able to establish a prima facie   case against the appellants. Section 20 of the Act provides   that   if   an   accused   public   servant   has   accepted   or obtained for himself or for any other person any undue advantage from   any   person,   there   shall   be   a   presumption   unless   the contrary   is   proved   that   he   accepted   or   obtained   that   undue advantage as a motive of reward for performance of a public duty 7 improperly or dishonestly either by himself or by another public servant.   The acquittal of the appellants under Section 7 of the Act,   in   our   opinion   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   is inconsequential   and   cannot   negate   the   presumption   drawn against   them.   The   fact   that   P.W.2   in   his   chief   may   not  have named accused no.2 is considered inconsequential. 8. In     (supra),   the   venue   for   payment   of   the Virendranath illegal gratification was at a restaurant. The illegal gratification on directions of the prime accused was handed over to the owner of the restaurant.   The acquittal of the restaurant owner by this Court was based on an entirely different reason which has no application   to   the   facts   of   the   present   case.     We   consider   it appropriate to set out the same below: “5.  Insofar   as   A­2   is   concerned,   we   find considerable merit in the contention raised on his behalf that he could have received the money innocently from the complainant at the asking of A­1, without realising that it was bribe money. The argument prevails because the prosecution has nowhere led any other evidence of conduct or consistency of a behaviour from which it could be spelt out that A­2 was a habitual go­between in facilitating acceptance of bribe by A­1. This single   instance   which   has   been   brought   forth does not reveal of any regularity of conduct of 8 this nature. There thus exists an area of doubt, the benefit of which shall go to A­2. Accordingly, the appeal of A­2 is allowed and he is acquitted of the charges.” 9. In  T. Shankar Prasad  (supra), the prime accused directed the money to be handed over to the co­accused when both of them were caught on the spot and the money recovered from the co­accused.  The co­accused took the plea that there was no proof of demand and acceptance against him.   A similar defence was taken   that   he   had   accepted   the   same   in   the   bonafide   belief towards advance tax.  Referring to Section 20 of the Act, noticing that there was no material towards any advance tax liability, it was observed: “24.   ….An   overall   consideration   of   the   materials sufficiently substantiates, in the case on hand, the prevalence of a system and methodology cleverly adopted by the accused that the demand will be specified when both the accused were present and thereafter as and when A­1 puts his signature the party has to meet A­2 at his seat for fixing the seal and   making   entry   in   the   register   to   make   the process complete only after collecting the amount already   specified   by   A­1   in   A­2’s   presence.   The involvement of both of them in a well­planned and cleverly   managed   device   to   systematically   collect money   stood   sufficiently   established   on   the evidence let in by the prosecution. Further, A­2 did 9 not   offer   his   explanation   immediately   after   the recovery   of   money.   A   similar   plea   of   receiving money as advance tax was rejected and affirmed by this Court in  A. Abdul Kaffar  v.  State of Kerala . It was noted that such a stand was not taken at the first­available opportunity and the defence was not genuine. In   State of U.P.   v.   Dr G.K. Ghosh   it was observed that in case of an offence of demanding and accepting illegal gratification, depending on the circumstances of the case, the court may feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis of the   oral   evidence   of   the   complainant   and   the official witnesses even if the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. When besides   such   evidence,   there   is   circumstantial evidence which is consistent with the guilt of the accused   and   not   consistent   with   his   innocence, there   should   be   no   difficulty   in   upholding   the conviction.” 10. We find no merit in the appeals, which are dismissed.  The appellants   are   directed   to   surrender   forthwith   for   serving   out their remaining sentence. …………...................J. [ASHOK BHUSHAN] …………...................J. [NAVIN SINHA] NEW DELHI AUGUST 20, 2019. 10