Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.3040430442/2017
Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. …Petitioners
and others etc. etc.
versus
State of U.P. and others …Respondents
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.3045530460/2017
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.2352223530/2018
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the
special leave petitions is condoned.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2019.08.08
17:05:20 IST
Reason:
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common
impugned judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 passed by the
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High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal No.
919/1993 and other allied first appeals, the respective original
claimants – land owners have preferred the present special leave
petitions.
3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that there is an
inordinate delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days respectively
(approximately 21 years) in preferring the special leave petitions
before this Court challenging the impugned common judgment
and order passed by the High Court. There is a further delay of
193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the special leave
petitions.
3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/are
vehemently opposed by the respondents herein. Therefore, this
Court is first required to consider and decide the
application/applications submitted by the petitioners/applicants
praying to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days
respectively in preferring the special leave petitions.
4. Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf
of the respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the
lands of the respective petitioners have been compulsorily
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acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and
therefore, they are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands
acquired. It is submitted that the dispute is with respect to the
lands acquired of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta which are only 4
kms. away from village Kasna. It is submitted that the location
wise the lands of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta were better located
and were abutting the national highway, i.e, Noida – Dadri Road.
It is submitted that village Kasna is 4 kms. behind village
Gulsitapur. It is submitted that for the lands acquired of village
Kasna, Section 4 notification was issued on 1.3.1989 and the
compensation was awarded @ Rs.65/ per square yard, which
has been confirmed by this Court vide order dated 05.12.2016. It
is submitted that therefore the respective petitioners are entitled
to the fair compensation for the lands acquired of village
Gulsitapur and Tilpta at par with the land owners of village
Kasna, i.e., at Rs.65/ per square yard. It is submitted that
therefore the agriculturists/farmers are entitled to the fair
compensation for the lands acquired. It is submitted that for the
lands compulsorily acquired, the delay should not defeat the
valuable rights of the petitioners to get fair compensation. It is
submitted that the petitioners may not be awarded the interest
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and other statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act for
the period of delay.
4.1 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
decisions of this Court in the cases of
Market Committee, Hodal v.
Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311; Dhiraj Singh v. State
of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127; and K. Subbarayudu
v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12
SCC 840 , it is prayed to condone the delay and consider the
special leave petitions on merits.
5. All these applications are vehemently opposed by the
learned Advocates appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 – Uttar
Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) and
on behalf of respondent no.4 – Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority. Counter affidavits are filed on behalf of
respondent nos. 3 and 4 opposing the present applications for
condonation of delay.
5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents that there is an inordinate delay of
approximately 21 years in preferring the special leave petitions.
It is submitted that at no point of time earlier the respective
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petitioners made any grievance with respect to inadequacy of the
compensation as awarded by the High Court.
5.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that as such no sufficient cause has
been shown explaining the huge delay of approximately 21 years.
It is submitted that merely because in view of the subsequent
decision in the case of lands acquired of another village, relying
upon which the petitioners have preferred the present petitions,
huge delay of approximately 21 years may not be condoned.
5.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for
the respondents that even otherwise the reliance placed upon the
decisions of the High Court and this Court is with respect to
entirely different village, i.e., village Kasna and that too in respect
of the land which was acquired after about four years of
acquisition of the petitioners’ land. It is submitted that therefore
the lands acquired of village Kasna are not comparable at all with
respect to the lands acquired of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta.
5.4 It is further submitted that so far as the impugned common
judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 is concerned, as such, the
same has attained finality. It is submitted that not only the
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petitioners accepted the compensation but after the said
judgment was delivered by the High Court no special leave
petition has been filed by the present petitioners all these years.
It is submitted that therefore they have acquiesced with the
impugned common judgment and order of the High Court.
5.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that any attempt by the present
petitioners to reopen the judgment shall lead to a cascading effect
where every one whose land has been acquired by the said
notification with respect to the land acquired at village
Gulsitapur and Tilpta would start demanding enhanced
compensation @ Rs.65/ per square yard. It is submitted that
similarly the other land owners whose land has been acquired
though at different villages between the years 19851989, too
start demanding the same rate of compensation.
5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that after the acquisition, the land is
developed, infrastructure and amenities are laid. They are
maintained. The developed land has been allotted decades ago. It
is submitted that the rate of allotment is based on the cost of
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acquisition and the amounts spent on development, laying out
the infrastructure. It is submitted that if the cost of acquisition
is increased, then how this cost would now be recovered from the
allottees after decades of allotment. It is submitted therefore that
to entertain the present petitions now after a period of
approximately 21 years and to increase the amount of
compensation would have a cascading effect.
5.7 It is further submitted that it is disputed and denied that
the land in village Gulsitapur is superior to the land in village
Kasna. It is submitted that the correct fact is that village Kasna is
located on the main road, which connects Greater Noida to
Sikanderabad, District Bulandshar, unlike the land of village
Gulsitapur which is in the interiors.
5.8 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this
Court by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioners, referred to hereinabove, is concerned, it is
vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents that none of the aforesaid decisions of
this Court shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It
is submitted that in the present case there is an inordinate delay
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of approximately 21 years. It is submitted that in the present
case the petitioners have failed to make out a sufficient cause to
condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years in preferring
the special leave petitions. It is submitted that in the relied upon
cases this Court was satisfied on the sufficient cause for delay. It
is submitted that in the relied upon cases the parity was claimed
with respect to the land acquired under the very notification and
it was pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty
some of the land owners whose land was acquired under the
same notification could not prefer the appeals earlier and they
preferred the appeals subsequently and claimed parity of
compensation at par with the lands acquired under the very
notification. It is submitted that in the present case the
petitioners are claiming the parity in compensation with respect
to the land acquired of another village and that too the land in
the said village was acquired after a period of four years and
location wise etc. the lands are different. It is submitted that
therefore on facts the same shall not be applicable to the facts of
the case on hand.
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5.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present applications for condonation of delay and consequently
dismiss the special leave petitions as barred by limitation.
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties at length.
6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there is
an inordinate delay of approximately 21 years in preferring the
special leave petitions before this Court challenging the
impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court
which has been passed in the year 1996. It is required to be
noted that the notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act with respect to the land situated in village
Gulsitapur and Tilpta was issued in the year 1985; possession
was taken over in the month of January, 1987; the Land
Acquisition Officer declared the award in the year 1988 awarding
compensation at the rate of Rs.810 per square yard. At the
instance of the petitioners herein the original land owners,
reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was made
to the reference Court. By judgment and award dated 22.3.1993,
the reference Court enhanced the compensation to Rs.30/ per
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square yard. However, on appeals and considering the material
on record, by the impugned common judgment and order, the
High Court reduced the amount of compensation to Rs. 2220
per square yard. That thereafter, after a period of approximately
21 years, now the petitioners have preferred the present petitions
claiming compensation at par with the compensation awarded for
the land owners of another village Kasna. It is required to be
noted that so far as the land acquisition of village Kasna is
concerned, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act was issued in the year 1989, i.e., after a gap of four years and
it appears that in between certain developments have also taken
place.
7. Having considered the averments made in the
application/applications for condonation of delay, we are of the
opinion that as such the petitioners have miserably failed to
make out a case to condone the huge delay of approximately 21
years. No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the huge
delay of approximately 21 years. It is required to be noted that
as such in the application itself it is submitted by the petitioners
that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court. The
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only explanation in approaching this Court after about 21 years
is given in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:
“That the primary reason in not approaching this Hon’ble
Court in time was the fact that it was only in December,
2016, the claimants pertaining to village Kasana got the
enhanced compensation from this Hon’ble Court to the
tune of Rs.65/ per sq. yard. The petitioners herein came
to know about the said fact in the month of January,
2017 causing not only lots of heartburn but spelling
miseries over them. It took not only lots of courage in
mustering support from number of affected families but
also it took time for the petitioners to collectively file the
instant special leave petition claiming not only the
enhanced compensation but also parity with regard to
the compensation awarded to their covillagers at village
Kasana.”
7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there
is a reasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the
enhanced compensation to the tune of Rs.65/ per square yard,
but fairly enough in order to balance the equity, this Court may
not grant interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court
i.e., 2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before this
Court. Except the explanation in paragraph 3, reproduced
hereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explaining
the huge delay of approximately 21 years. Neither any poverty is
pleaded nor any financial difficulty is pleaded. Nothing is on
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record that after the impugned common judgment and order is
passed by the High Court, the petitioners made any
grievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of the
compensation determined by the High Court. On the contrary, all
the petitioners have accepted the compensation as per the
judgment and award passed by the reference Court determining
the compensation at the rate of Rs.30/ per square yard. It
appears that with respect to some of the land owners even the
execution petitions are pending with respect to recovery of the
differential amount of compensation, determined by the reference
Court and the High Court as by the impugned common judgment
and order the High Court has reduced the compensation from
Rs.30/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/ per sq. yard. Be that as it may,
the fact remains that after the impugned common judgment and
order is passed by the High Court, no grievance at all is made by
the petitioners with respect to inadequacy of the compensation
determined by the High Court. Thus, it can be said that for a
period of approximately 21 years no grievance was made by the
petitioners. Therefore, considering the terms of doctrine of
acquiescence, the petitioners lose their right to complain. This
principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that
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in such a case the party who did not make any objection
acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and
therefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.
8. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz.,
laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of
jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non
existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by
any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts
have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of
acquiescence and nonsuited the litigants who approached the
court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing
the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the
period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be
brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that
prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot
enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over,
however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if
there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the
prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is
shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case
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where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not
brought within the period of limitation and subsequently
proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with
the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant
has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay
with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case
despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not
properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make
out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make
out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating
the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will
be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not
initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without
any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of
unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such
person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These
principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public
policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time
then such right is nonexistent.
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9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal (supra); Dhiraj
Singh (supra); and K. Subbarayudu (supra) , relied upon by the
learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is
concerned, having gone through the said decisions, we are of the
opinion that none of the said decisions shall be applicable to the
facts of the case on hand and/or the said decisions shall be of
any assistance to the petitioners. First of all, in the relied upon
cases, there was no such inordinate delay of approximately 21
years. In the relied upon cases, this Court was satisfied on the
sufficient cause for delay. In the relied upon cases, parity was
claimed with respect to the land acquired under the very
notification and it was pointed out that due to poverty and
financial difficulty some of the land owners whose land was
acquired under the same notification could not prefer the appeals
earlier and thereafter they preferred the appeals subsequently
and claimed parity of compensation at par with the land acquired
under the same notification. It is also required to be noted that
as such in none of the aforesaid decisions, this Court had dealt
with and/or considered the adverse impact/effect on the
State/acquiring body if after inordinate delay/laches the
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State/acquiring body is directed to pay the enhanced amount of
compensation. In the present case, lands were acquired as far
back as in the year 1985 and the award by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988. The reference
Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/ per
square yard, which came to be reduced by the High Court by the
impugned common judgment and order in the year 1996. It is
required to be noted that the lands were acquired for Industrial
development purposes. That after the acquisition, the land has
been developed, infrastructure and amenities are laid and the
developed land has been allotted approximately before 30 years.
It is the specific case on behalf of the respondents that the rate of
allotment was based on the cost of acquisition and the amount
spent on development, laying out the infrastructure. Therefore, if
the cost of acquisition is increased now and the State/acquiring
body is directed to pay enhanced compensation, in that case, it
would be very difficult to recover the difference of amount of
compensation from the allottees after decades of allotment. The
acquiring body will have to make additional budgetary provision
and as observed hereinabove it would be very difficult for the
acquiring body to recover the difference of compensation from the
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allottees after so many years. All these aspects and the cascading
effect on the State/acquiring body if they are directed to pay the
additional compensation after number of years, have not been
considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by
the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Even if the petitioners
are denied the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the
delayed period as requested by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, in that case also, to direct the State/acquiring body to
pay the enhanced amount of compensation after number of years
(21 years) would be unreasonable and would have a financial
burden upon them and as observed hereinabove it would be very
difficult for the State/acquiring body to recover the same from the
allottees. Under the circumstances, none of the aforesaid
decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand
and/or the same shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.
10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we
refuse to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days
respectively in filing the special leave petitions. Accordingly, the
applications for condonation of delay stand dismissed.
Consequently, all these special leave petitions are dismissed on
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the ground of limitation. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………..J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
……………………………………J.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J.
AUGUST 08, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
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