Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PARSHOTTAMDAS RAMDAS PATEL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1987
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 220 1988 SCR (1) 997
1988 SCC (1) 132 JT 1987 (4) 323
1987 SCALE (2)1141
CITATOR INFO :
F 1989 SC1796 (5,12)
ACT:
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 Section
2(q)(i)-’Vacant land’-What is-Applicability of Act to ’land’
which is subject matter of land Acquisition proceedings.
HEADNOTE:
%
The State Government of Gujarat-Appellant, issued a
Notification dated March 31,1976 published in the Government
Gazette dated April 8, 1976 under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the Lands of the
respondents were likely to be needed for the public purpose
of providing housing accommodation for the employees of the
Municipal Corporation, and that after making an enquiry
under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the
State Government had issued a declaration under section 6 of
the said Act declaring that the aforesaid lands along with
other lands were needed for the said public purpose.
In the meanwhile the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation
Act, 1976 came into force with effect from 17.2.1976.
The respondents filed statements before the Competent
Authority under section 6 of the 1976 Act including the
lands to be acquired which were in excess of the ceiling
limit which each of the respondents could retain after the
coming into force of the 1976 Act.
Thereafter, the respondents filed writ petitions
contending that the acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 should be proceeded with and the
acquisition proceedings to the extent it related to the
surplus land under the ceiling law should be dropped. The
applicability of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 insofar as they were applicable
within the limits of the Municipal Corporation were
questioned contending that: (i) the Act was beyond the
legislative competence of Parliament insofar as the State
Government of Gujarat was concerned; (ii) that the lands in
question were not ’vacant lands’ as defined in the Act and,
therefore the proceedings instituted in respect of them
under the Act were liable to be quashed, and (iii) that the
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land acquisition proceedings under the Land
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Acquisition Act 1894 which were initiated should be
completed, and the Land Acquisition Officer should be
directed to pass awards in favour of the respondents. These
writ petitions were contested by the appellants-State.
The High Court though negativing the contentions of the
respondents regarding the legislative competence of
Parliament to pass the Urban Land Act, quashed the
proceedings instituted under the Act. It, however, declined
to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Land
Acquisition Officer before whom the proceedings were
commenced under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as he was not
made a party to the writ proceedings, but made a declaration
that the land acquisition proceedings did not suffer from
any infirmity.
The State Government aggrieved by the judgment of the
High Court filed Special Leave Petitions to this Court.
On the question whether; the lands of the respondents
are lands to which the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 would apply.
Allowing the Appeals,
^
HELD: 1. The finding of the High Court that by virtue
of section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954
the lands fell outside the definition of ’vacant land’ in
the Urban Land Act, 1976 is unsustainable. The High Court
omitted to notice that the owners were entitled to construct
buildings on the lands after the permission was accorded by
the local authority. [1005C]
2. The object of the Urban Land Act, 1976 is to provide
for the imposition of a ceiling on ’vacant land’ in urban
agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of
the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of
buildings on such land and to bring about an equitable
distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the
common good. [1000G]
3. The question whether a piece of land is a ’vacant
land’ or not does not depend upon the fact whether a prudent
man would put up a building on that land or not after the
issue of a notification under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor a land will cease to be a ’vacant
land’ merely because the permission of certain authorities
is to be taken to put up a building thereon. [1006G-H]
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4. The proceedings under the land Acquisition Act, 1894
cannot have any bearing on the question whether the lands in
question are ’vacant lands’ or not for the purposes of the
ceiling law contained in the Urban Land Act, 1976. When the
lands in question or bulk of them are likely to be acquired
under the ceiling law by paying a compensation as provided
therein, it would not be proper to compel the Government to
acquire them under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. [1007D]
5. Sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the
Urban Land Act 1976 does not provide that a land on which
the owner cannot construct a building will cease to be
’vacant land’ for the purposes of the Act. [1007F]
6. As long as construction of a building can be done on
a land by some person or authority, the land does not get
excluded from the definition of the expression ’vacant land’
under the Act. The lands in the instant case, therefore, are
’vacant lands.’ [1007G]
Smt. Shanti Devi v. The Competent Authority under U.L.
(C.R.) Act, 1976 Delhi and others, AIR 1980 Delhi 106,
overruled.
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Prabhakar Narhar Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and
Another, AIR 1984 Bombay 122 and The State of U.P. and
another v. Radha Raman Agarwal and another, AIR 1987
Allahabad 272, approved.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 635-642
of 1981.
From the Judgment and order dated 19/22.9.1980 of the
Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 3295, 3480, 3481, 3648, of
1979, 668, 669,889and 1205 of1980.
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, G.A. Shah,
Hameed Qureshi and M.N. Shroff for the Appellants.
B.K. Mehta, M.N. Goswami, P.V. Nanavathy and H.S.
Parihar, for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J. These appeals by special leave are
filed against the common judgment in eight writ petitions on
the file of the High Court of Gujarat. The respondents in
these appeals i.e. the
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petitioners in the said writ petitions questioned the
applicability of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act 33 of 1976) (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’) to several pieces of land
belonging to them situated within the limits of the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. They raised three
contentions before the High Court-(i) that the Act was
beyond the legislative competence of Parliament insofar as
the State of Gujarat was concerned; (ii) that the lands in
question were not vacant lands as defined in the Act and,
therefore, the proceedings instituted in respect of them
under the Act were liable to be quashed; and (iii) that the
land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 which had been initiated in respect of the lands in
question should be completed and the Land Acquisition
Officer should be directed to pass awards in favour of the
respondents. The writ petitions were resisted by the State
of Gujarat and despite such opposition the High Court
allowed the writ petitions. The High Court negatived the
contention of the respondents regarding the legislative
competence of Parliament to pass the Act in view of the
decision in Union of India etc. v. Valluri Basavaiah
Chaudhary etc etc. [1979] 3 S.C.R. 802. The High Court,
however, quashed the proceedings instituted under the Act in
respect of the aforesaid lands which were pending before the
Additional Collector and the Competent Authority, Ahmedabad.
While the High Court declined to issue a writ in the nature
of mandamus directing the Land Acquisition Officer, before
whom the proceedings commenced under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 were pending as he had not been made a party to
the writ petitions, it, however, made a declaration that the
land acquisition proceedings did not suffer from any
infirmity. Indirectly the High Court indicated that the land
acquisition proceedings should be proceeded with. Aggrieved
by the judgment of the High Court the appellants have filed
these appeals by special leave.
The principal question which arises for consideration
in this case is whether the lands in question are the lands
to which the Act would apply. The Act came into force with
effect from 17.2.1976. The object of the Act, as can be seen
from its preamble, is to provide for the imposition of a
ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the
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acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to
regulate the constructions of buildings on such land and for
matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the
concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons
and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to
bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban
agglomerations to subserve the common good. Section 3 of the
Act, which may be considered to be the key section of the
Act, pro-
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vides that except as otherwise provided in the Act, on and
from the commencement of the Act, no person shall be
entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling
limit in the territories to which the Act applies under sub-
section (2) of section 1. The State of Gujarat is one of the
States to which the Act has been made applicable by virtue
of the provisions in sub-section (2) of section 1 of the
Act. The ceiling limit is prescribed by section 4 of the
Act. The expression ’vacant land’ is defined in section 2(q)
of the Act thus:
"2(q) ‘Vacant land’ means land, not being land
mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an
urban agglomeration, but does not include-
(i) land on which construction of a building
is not permissible under the building regulations
in force in the area in which such land is
situated;
(ii) in an area where there are building
regulations, the land occupied by any building
which has been constructed before, or is being
constructed on, the appointed day with the
approval of the appropriate authority and the land
appurtenant to such building; and
(iii) in an area where there are no building
regulations, the land occupied by any building
which has been constructed before, or is being
constructed on, the appointed day and the land
appurtenant to such building:
Provided that where any person ordinarily
keeps his cattle, other than for the purpose of
dairy farming or for the purpose of breeding of
live-stock, on any land situated in a village
within an urban agglomeration (described as a
village in the revenue records), then, so much
extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for
the keeping of such cattle immediately before the
appointed day shall not be deemed to be vacant
land for the purposes of this clause."
Section 6 of the Act requires every person holding
vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the
commencement of the Act to file a statement before the
competent authority having jurisdiction on the area in which
the land is situated. Section 7 of the Act is ancillary to
section 6 of the Act. Section 8 of the Act provides for the
preparation of the draft statement as regards the vacant
land held by any person in
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excess of the ceiling limit and for calling for objections
from the owner to the said statement. It also empowers the
competent authority to consider the objections raised by the
owner of the land and to pass such order as it deems fit.
After the disposal of the objections the competent authority
is required by section 9 of the Act to make the necessary
alterations in the draft statement in accordance with the
orders passed on the objections aforesaid and to determine
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the vacant land held by the person concerned in excess of
the ceiling limit. A copy of the draft statement as so
altered as the final statement under section 9 of the Act.
After the service of the final statement prepared under
section 9 of the Act on the person concerned the competent
authority is required to acquire the land held by the person
concerned in excess of the ceiling limit in accordance with
the procedure prescribed therein. Section 11 of the Act
provides for payment of compensation in accordance with the
principles contained therein. The Act contains provisions
regarding the constitution of the Urban Land Tribunal and
makes provisions for appeal to the Urban Land Tribunal and
also a second appeal to the High Court. Section 19 of the
Act provides that subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) thereof nothing in Chapter III of the Act would apply to
vacant lands held by the Central Government or any State
Government or any local authority or corporation or other
institution specified therein. Section 15 of the Act imposes
ceiling limit on future acquisition of vacant lands also. It
is not necessary to refer to the several other provisions in
the Act except section 42 thereof. Section 42 of the Act
provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other
law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or
agreement or decree or order of a court, tribunal or other
authority. Thus the Act is given an overriding effect.
We have already given the definition of the expression
‘vacant land’ found in section 2(q) of the Act. ‘Vacant
land’ means any land which is not being used mainly for the
purpose of agriculture. But it does not include (i) land on
which construction of a building is not permissible under
the building regulations in force in the area in which such
land is situated; (ii) in an area where there are building
regulations, the land occupied by any building which has
been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the
appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority
and the land appurtenant to such building; and (iii) in an
area where there are no building regulations the land
occupied by any building which has been constructed before,
or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the land
appurtenant to such building. The proviso to the definition
in section 2(q) of the Act
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provides that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle,
other than for the purpose of dairy farming or for the
purpose of breeding of live-stock, on any land situated in a
village within an urban agglomeration (described as a
village in the revenue records), then, so much extent of the
land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such
cattle immediately before the appointed day shall not be
deemed to be vacant land for the purposes of this clause.
The expression ‘appointed day’ is defined in section 2(a) of
the Act. Under that clause ‘appointed day’ means in relation
to any State to which the Act applied in the first instance,
the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament, and in relation to any
State which adopts the act under clause (1) of Article 252
of the Constitution, the date of such adoption. So far as
the State of Gujarat is concerned, the appointed date is the
date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament since the Act became
applicable to the State of Gujarat at the first instance by
virtue of section 1(2) of the Act.
The first contention raised by the respondents, namely,
that the lands in question were agricultural lands under the
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Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and, therefore, they were
not vacant lands under the Act was rejected by the High
Court itself and we need not dwell on it in these appeals
since the said contention has not been raised before us.
The second contention raised by the respondents who
were petitioners before the High Court was that the lands in
question were lands on which the construction of buildings
was not permissible under the building regulations in force
in the area in which the lands were situated and, therefore,
they were outside the scope of the expression ‘vacant land’.
In other words the contention was that as the lands in
question were lands which came within the scope of sub-
clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act, they could
not be treated as vacant lands. Three grounds were urged in
support of the above contention and they were based on the
existence of a town planning scheme, namely, the Town
Planning Scheme No. 29 framed by the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 which
was in force at the relevant time. The first ground urged in
this behalf by the respondents before the High Court was
that permission to build on the lands in question could not
be granted by the authorities concerned as they had been
included within the ‘green belt’ around the city of
Ahmedabad under the Town Planning Scheme and hence they were
not vacant lands. This plea was not accepted by the
1004
High Court because the proposal to retain the ‘green belt’
had been abolished in the year 1975 and the restrictions on
building, if any, on those lands on that account were no
longer in existence. The second ground urged before the High
Court was that on the coming into force of the Town Planning
Scheme No. 29 framed under the Bombay Town Planning Act,
1954 no building activity was permissible on the aforesaid
lands because the said lands had been reserved for a public
purpose, namely, construction of Government staff quarters.
In support of this submission reliance was placed on section
29 of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The relevant part
of section 29 of the Bombay Town Planning Act,-1954 reads as
follows:
"Restriction after declaration for town
planning scheme.
29(1). On or after the date on which the
local authority’s declaration of intention to make
a scheme under section 22 or the notification
issued by the State Government under section 24 is
published in the Official Gazette,-
(a) no person shall within the area included
in the scheme erect or proceed with any building
or work or remove, pull down, alter, make
additions to or make any substantial repair to any
building, part of a building, a compound wall or
any drainage work or remove any earth, stone or
material, or sub-divide any land, or change the
user of any land or building unless such person
has applied for and obtained the necessary
permission which shall be contained in a
commencement certificate granted by the local
authority in the form prescribed
................."
The High Court treating section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay
Town Planning Act, 1954 as a building regulation within the
meaning of that expression used in sub-clause (i) of clause
(q) of section 2 of the Act was of the view that the ban
contained in clause (a) of section 29(1) of the Bombay Town
Planning Act, 1954 brought the lands in question within sub-
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clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act. Assuming
for purposes of argument that section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay
Town Planning Act, 1954 amounted to a building regulation it
cannot be said that the construction of buildings on the
land in question was not permissible at all. Section
29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 only required
a person who owned a piece of land situated within an
1005
area included in the scheme to obtain the permission from
the local authority before erecting or constructing any
building or pulling down or altering any building as
provided therein. Merely because section 29(1)(a) of the
Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 requires a person owning the
land to which a scheme applied to obtain permission of the
local authority to construct a building on it, it cannot be
said that the land was one on which construction of building
was not permissible. The embargo in question was not total.
It was only where the ban was complete it could be said that
no construction was permissible on the land. The High Court
omitted to notice that the owners were entitled to construct
buildings on the lands after the permission was accorded by
the local authority. The finding of the High Court that by
virtue of section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act,
1954 the lands fell outside the definition of ‘vacant land’
in the Act is, therefore, unsustainable.
It was no doubt true that the State Government had
issued a notification dated March 31, 1976 published in the
Gujarat Government Gazette dated April 8, 1976 under section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the
lands in question were likely to be needed for a public
purpose, namely, for providing housing accommodation for the
employees of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and that
after making an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 the State Government had issued
declaration under section 6 of that Act declaring that the
aforesaid lands along with other lands were needed for the
public purpose referred to above. In the meanwhile the Act
came into force with effect from 17.2.1976. The respondents
filed statements before the competent authority under
section 6 of the Act including the lands in question which
were in excess of the ceiling limit which each of them could
retain after the coming into force of the Act. Thereafter
they filed the above writ petitions out of which these
appeals arise contending that the acquisition proceedings
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be proceeded
with and the acquisition of proceedings of the surplus land
under the ceiling law should be dropped. In this connection
the respondents relied upon the provisions contained in
section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which clause
‘seventhly’ stated that any outlay or improvements on, or
disposal of the land acquired, commenced, made or effected
without the sanction of the Collector after the date of
publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section
(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should not be taken
into consideration by the Court at the time of determining
compensation payable under the said Act. The argument of the
respondents was that
1006
clause ‘seventhly’ in section 24 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 again amounted to an embargo on construction of
buildings on the lands which attracted sub-clause (i) of
clause (q) of section 2 of the Act and, therefore, the lands
were not vacant lands. Reliance was placed by the
respondents on the decision of the High Court of Delhi in
Smt. Shanti Devi v. The Competent Authority under U.L. (C. &
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R.) Act, 1976, Delhi and others, AIR 1980 Delhi 106 in which
the High Court of Delhi had taken the view that a land in
respect of which a notification under section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been issued was a land on
which construction of buildings was not permissible and was
thus outside the definition of the expression ‘vacant land’
in section 2(q) of the Act. The reason given by the Delhi
High Court for reaching the above conclusion is set out in
para 12 of the said decision. It reads thus:-
"12. It is pertinent to note that the land in
Sant Nagar is under threat of acquisition by issue
of S. 4 notification of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. This is not denied by the respondents. In
this view of the matter also building activity
would not be permissible as no prudent person
would construct on land already notified under S.
4 of the said Act because he will get no
compensation for it unless the construction is
made with the permission of the Land Acquisition
Collector. For all intents and purposes the effect
of S. 4 notification, therefore, is that building
activity is not permissible in Sant Nagar. This
would also result in excluding the Sant Nagar
plots from the total holding of the petitioner for
the purposes of computing vacant land under the
Act."
With great respect to the High Court of Delhi it has to
be stated that the view taken by it is wholly incorrect. The
High Court of Delhi omitted to notice that in order to
exclude a land from the definition of ‘vacant land’ it
should be shown that it was a land on which construction of
a building was not permissible under the building
regulations in force in the area in which such land was
situated. The question whether a piece of land is a vacant
land or not does not depend upon the fact whether a prudent
man would put up a building on that land or not after the
issue of a notification under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor a land will cease to be a vacant
land merely because the permission of certain authority is
to be taken to put up a building thereon. It may be further
seen that what clause ‘seventhly’ in section 24 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 provides is that any
1007
outlay or improvements on, or disposal of the land acquired,
commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the
Collector after the date of the publication of the
notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
shall not be taken into consideration while awarding
compensation. It does not ban the construction of any
building on the land which is so notified. The High Court of
Gujarat against whose judgment these appeals have been filed
also committed an error in accepting a similar contention
which was urged before them. The declaration made by the
High Court in these cases that the land acquisition
proceedings did not suffer from an infirmity which
indirectly suggests that the proceedings should go on is
again erroneous. It is open to the State Government to drop
the land acquisition proceedings and to withdraw the lands
from acquisition under section 48 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. We are informed that the State Government has in
fact subsequently withdrawn these lands from acquisition.
The proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot
therefore have any bearing on the question whether the lands
in question are vacant lands or not for purposes of the
ceiling law contained in the Act. When the lands in question
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or bulk of them are likely to be acquired under the ceiling
law by paying compensation as provided therein, it would not
be proper to compel the Government to acquire them under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. As already
stated the Act has the overriding effect on all other laws.
It was, however, urged before this Court by the learned
counsel for the appellants that because the lands in
question have been reserved under the Town Planning Scheme
for purposes of building staff quarters the lands could not
be treated as vacant lands. We do not find any substance in
this submission because the construction of buildings on the
lands in question is permissible though not by the owners of
land. Sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act
does not provide that a land on which the owner cannot
construct a building will cease to be vacant land for
purposes of the Act. As long as construction of building can
be done on a land by some person or authority, the land does
not get excluded from the definition of the expression
‘vacant land’ under the Act. The lands in question,
therefore, are vacant lands.
Before concluding our judgment we wish to refer to the
decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in
Prabhakar Narhar Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another,
AIR 1984 Bombay 122 in which the following passage appears
at page 130:
1008
"Reliance was placed on the decision of the
Delhi High Court in Shanti Devi v. Competent
Authority, (AIR 1930 Delhi 106). In that decision,
the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court took
the view that S. 2(q) of the Act contemplated that
the activity of building is not permissible on the
date when the land is sought to be dealt with and
not at any future time and the possibility that
such activity could come to be permitted in future
or that there are buildings constructed in the
area or that there is no prohibition to construct
in an unapproved colony or that there is no
permanent prohibition to construct would not be
sufficient to treat the land as ‘vacant land’
within the meaning of the provision. So far as the
decision holds that the relevant date for
determination for the purpose of S. 2(q)(i) of the
Act is the date on which the land is sought to be
dealt with, that is, the commencement date
referred to in S. 3 there can be no dispute. In a
part of the decision, the Division Bench seems to
have taken the view that land notified for
acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act must be
held to be one on which construction of buildings
was not permitted. We are really not concerned
with that view, so far as the present petitions
are concerned, but it is sufficient to point out
that the correctness of that view has not been
accepted by this Court in Dattatraya v. State of
Maharashtra, [1981] Mah LJ 764; (AIR 1981 Bom 326)
and in an unreported decision of this Court in
D.P. Dani v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition
No. 1650 of 1979 decided on 31st January, 1983).
In Dattatraya’s case the contention was that
certain plots of land which were reserved for
various public activities, such as buildings of
primary school, high school, civil hospital, bus
terminus etc. under the Town Planning Scheme
should be excluded for the purpose of computation
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of vacant land, because, according to the
petitioners, in that case no building activity was
permitted on those lands so far as the petitioners
were concerned. The Division Bench after referring
to the primary object of the Act as set out in the
case of Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah
Choudhary, (AIR 1979 SC 1415) rejected the
contention that merely because the petitioners are
prohibited from constructing any building under
the building regulations contained in the Town
Planning Scheme the land should not be treated as
vacant land. The Division Bench found that if the
regulations allowed the
1009
building activity not to a person who holds that
land but by public bodies or the State Government
then certainly construction of building is
permitted either by an individual or even by
public authority and cannot be taken out of the
definition."
We agree with the observations made in the above case.
A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has in The State of
U.P. and another v. Radha Raman Agarwal and another, AIR
1987 Allahabad 272 also taken the view that a land will
cease to be a ‘vacant land’ for purposes of the Act only
where the construction of a building on it is wholly
impermissible. We agree with the views expressed by the High
Courts of Bombay and Allahabad.
In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the
judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions
filed in the High Court. There will, however, be no order as
to costs.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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